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ABSTRACT 
 
The UK speculative housebuilding industry has grown and prospered primarily through the 
conversion of greenfield land into mass, standardised housing estates.  As such, the UK 
Government’s  commitment  to  restricting  the  development  of  housing  primarily  to 
brownfield  sites  presents  a  significant  challenge  to  the  current  skills  base  of  many 
speculative housebuilders.  Whilst the housebuilding industry has demonstrated in recent 
years a commitment to brownfield development through the steady increase in the numbers 
of dwellings built on previously developed land, concerns exists over whether the industry 
has  developed  the  requisite  core  competencies  necessary  to  secure  a  long-term 
commitment  to  brownfield  development.    In  response  to  such  concerns,  this  research 
assesses the attitudes, behaviours and corporate strategies of a select number of speculative 
housebuilders  towards  brownfield  development  in  the  English  and  Scottish  contexts.  
Through  this,  the  research  presents  a  timely  and  important  evaluation  of  the  strategic 
decision making of UK speculative housebuilders and explores the concept of institutional 
capacity through an investigation into the private sectors response to public policy change.   
   iii
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Speculative housebuilding in the UK is an inherently risky and innately volatile process 
that is directly linked to the performance not only of land and housing markets, but also to 
the  wider  performance  of  the  economy  and  finance  markets.    And,  like  many  other 
manufacturing processes in the UK, speculative housebuilding is based on an enterprise of 
conjecture – that is, an assumption of the risk of loss in return for the uncertain possibility 
of reward.  For speculative housebuilders specifically, their reward i.e. development profit, 
is  achieved  “…by  a  judicious  purchase  of  land  and  conceiving  of  the  appropriate 
residential scheme for the site” (Ball 1983:50) where “…land is purchased and much, or 
all, of the building work is done before there is a contract with the purchaser” (Wellings 
2006:9).  Furthermore, residential development under the speculative model means that the 
turnover time of capital is much longer because it has to be invested in land years in 
advance of building (Ball 1983).  In addition, at the commencement of building on site, 
speculative housebuilding requires more capital to be ‘sunk into the ground’ by way of 
infrastructure and ground preparation tasks, following which the houses are then built.  No 
revenue is forthcoming for these up front costs until the houses are sold, which can be 
anytime from an ‘off plan’ stage prior to construction, through to the post construction 
stage of development (ibid).       
 
Nonetheless, whilst speculative housebuilding is an inherently risky business, speculative 
housebuilders have emerged over the past 35 years to become the leading providers of new 
homes in the UK.  Since 1974, speculative housebuilders have been responsible for the 
majority of new homes in the UK and currently, they deliver approximately 90% of all new 
homes  annually  (DCLG  2008).    Together  with  this  increasing  role  in  new  housing 
provision  is  the  sustained  concentration  of  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry, 
through persistent merger and acquisition activity and organic growth.  And, alongside the 
growth  of  volume  and  more  recently  super  builders,  is  the  emergence  of  regeneration 
specialists, who seek to capture the urban redevelopment market in light of increased levels 
of residential activity on previously used land in urban locales.         
 
Historically, the conventional business strategies of UK speculative housebuilders have 
reflected  the  use  of  greenfield  land  for  the  majority  of  new  housebuilding;  and 
housebuilders currently demonstrate a reliance on the tried and tested methods and the 
management of risk and uncertainty associated with greenfield development (Adams and   xix
Watkins 2002).  Over the years, the dominant use of greenfield land by speculative 
housebuilders in delivering the majority of new homes in the UK has shaped the way they 
operate  and  compete,  through  instilling  greenfield  land  acquisition  and  construction 
efficiency as a means of competitive differentiation and profit maximisation in speculative 
housebuilding over time (Adams 2004).  This greenfield-based business acumen has also 
placed innovative capacity in UK speculative housebuilding as a widely explored research 
issue (Ball 1999).  Indeed, debate over the quality of housing design currently pervades 
both academic literature and public policy.     
 
With this in mind, recent changes in the direction of public policy favouring brownfield 
development are likely to significantly affect the capacity of speculative housebuilders to 
continue delivering the majority of new homes in the UK.  Over the past 10 years, as the 
policy context within which UK speculative housebuilders operate has changed markedly, 
the discourse of brownfield development has become ubiquitous in both the urban policy 
and  urban  regeneration  agendas  in  the  UK.    Consequently,  the  redevelopment  of 
brownfield  sites  is  increasingly  seen  as  an  important  solution  to  the  growing  list  of 
contemporary urban problems (Raco and Henderson 2006).  And, resultantly, brownfield 
development has emerged in the UK Government’s policy agenda as the foundation for 
property-led urban regeneration (Dixon 2006) where the redirection of new housebuilding 
towards primarily brownfield sites is now a fundamental aspect of public policy.          
 
Against the historical backdrop of greenfield dominance and reliance in UK speculative 
housebuilding, the Government’s decision to switch the balance of residential development 
primarily to brownfield sites represents a significant challenge to the prevalent skills and 
strategies of much of the UK speculative housebuilding industry (Adams 2004).  This is 
evident  in  four  critical  aspects  of  private  housebuilding:  land  acquisition,  planning 
permission, marketing strategies and product design.     
 
Brownfield land acquisition presents the housebuilding industry with new challenges to its 
tried and tested methods of acquisition for four main reasons.  First, the very nature of 
brownfield  sites  with  their  history  of  previous  uses  often  results  in  abnormal  site 
preparation costs, making development appraisal even more uncertain than usual (Adams 
and Watkins 2002).  Secondly, brownfield landowners are unlikely to grant lengthy options 
or conditional contracts, allowing housebuilders time to bargain with planning authorities 
(Bramely et al 1995).  Thirdly, if brownfield sites need to be pieced together from parcels   xx
in different ownerships, acquisition can be very protracted (Adams and Watkins 2002).  
Finally, for many housebuilders, brownfield land markets remain a relatively unknown 
arena in which contacts, networks and practices need to be built up before large-scale entry 
(Adams 2004). 
 
Although  Government  policy  favours  brownfield  housing  development,  planning 
permission is not necessarily easier to obtain on brownfield sites than on greenfield ones 
(Adams and Watkins 2002).  Very real concern exists in urban communities that increased 
urban housing development reflects a policy of ‘town cramming’ rather than town planning 
(Williams 1999).  Since the task of fitting new developments into existing urban areas is 
more challenging than building on greenfield land, housebuilders may need to develop 
fresh skills and approaches to convince planning authorities and local communities that 
their  proposed  brownfield  developments,  even  if  welcome  in  principle,  represent  a 
worthwhile contribution to the quality of urban life, rather than a mere translation of the 
greenfield development model to a brownfield location (Adams 2004). 
 
Housebuilders have become highly skilled in the marketing images they portray for their 
greenfield development sites, which often centre on the ‘mythical golden family’ located 
on the estate fit for the ‘fantasy of traditional living’ (Glancey 1997).  Quite different 
approaches and quite different images will be needed for brownfield locations set in the 
midst of urban complexity (Adams and Watkins 2002).   
 
Brownfield product design presents a severe test to those housebuilders who have relied on 
their  conventional  strategies  of  product  standardisation  over  time.    Whilst  the  use  of 
standard  unit  types  has  conventionally  facilitated  speculative  housebuilders  under  the 
greenfield mode of production, through the benefits of construction efficiency and cost 
minimisation (Gibb 1999, Nicol and Hooper 1999), standardised product ranges will not 
suffice on brownfield land for two key reasons.  First, brownfield sites will require careful 
individual design accounting for previous use and often-existing structures.  Second, the 
milieu of potential urban purchasers, with their social and economic diversity, are unlikely 
to be satisfied with a narrow and inflexible product range (Adams and Watkins 2002).  
 
This  brief  review  of  some  of  the  challenges  facing  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding 
industry in respect of the policy switch favouring brownfield development raises three 
important research questions:   xxi
 
1.  How far does the UK speculative housebuilding industry have the ‘institutional 
capacity’ to replace its traditional emphasis on greenfield land dealings, planning 
battles,  marketing  strategies  and  product  design  with  novel  approaches  better 
placed for successful brownfield development? 
 
2.  To what extent will the leading established housebuilders be able to survive and 
adapt to the new policy agenda, or will they, with some notable exceptions, fall 
victim  to  takeover  by  an  emerging  generation  of  more  innovative  companies 
capable of doing so? 
 
3.  To what extent will brownfield development emerge as a new form of strategic 
competitive advantage amongst currently dominant housebuilders? 
 
The extent to which the policy switch favouring brownfield development will challenge the 
current  structure  and  organisation  of  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry  is 
unknown, but it is possible that those housebuilders who are more adept in delivering 
brownfield sites for housing may well challenge the currently dominant producers.  In this 
context, the main aim of the research will be: 
 
‘To determine whether and how far the long-term success of the present policy emphasis 
on brownfield development will require the emergence of a new structure of provision 
(Ball  1999)  in  speculative  housebuilding  rather  than  a  reliance  merely  on  stimulating 
innovation among currently-dominant producers’. 
 
In order to fulfil this aim, three objectives frame the research: 
 
1.  Outline the current structure and organisation of UK speculative housebuilding and 
consider the extent to which the policy switch favouring brownfield development 
will challenge the currently dominant producers. 
 
2.  Outline the conventional business strategies of UK speculative housebuilders and 
critically  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield 
development will require the development of new core competencies.  
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3.  Outline  the  external  institutional  and  internal  firm  barriers  to  successful 
brownfield development and consider the extent to which these can be overcome 
under the current structure of provision of UK speculative housebuilding.     
 
In respect of the aim and objectives, the conceptual approach to this research seeks to 
explore two key aspects of UK speculative housebuilding: 
 
1.  The role of internal firm competencies of UK speculative housebuilders in their 
response to external policy change. 
 
2.  The role of the external institutional environment of UK speculative housebuilding 
in facilitating or constraining housebuilders’ response to external policy change.   
 
As such, this research draws upon two key areas of social science theory: the theory of 
strategic  management  in  particular  the  core  competence  approach;  and,  the  theory  of 
institutionalism  in  particular  the  role  of  the  public  sector  in  shaping  private  sector 
behaviour through institutional capacity building.  Below, these conceptual approaches are 
briefly outlined in the context of the research.     
 
Theories  of  strategic  management  have  evolved  and  the  paradigmatic  shift  from  a 
previously  structuralist  focus  on  firm  strategic  analysis  toward  a  more  behaviourist 
understanding of organisational learning represents a broader change in the understanding 
of  firm  behaviour  and  signals  the  development  of  a  resource-based  view  of  the  firm 
(Dobson et al 2004).  The importance of internal firm competencies in driving change 
represents the evolution of strategy as a concept.  Because the residential development 
process  is  distinctly  different  at  brownfield  locations  compared  with  that  at  greenfield 
locations,  housebuilders  will  be  required  to  develop  new  business  strategies  and 
specifically to invest in the new core competencies required to exploit emerging market 
opportunities (Adams 2004).  As such, UK speculative housebuilders are currently faced 
with  the  challenge  of  refocusing  or  rebuilding  their  core  competencies  in  establishing 
development feasibility if they are to compete successfully in the emerging opportunity 
arena of brownfield development (Adams 2004).   
    
The functional transformation of the traditional industrial structure of urban areas towards 
a service orientation has meant a radical change in urban policy making (Nijkamp et al   xxiii
2002).    The  transformation  of  cities  and  their  governance  structures  has  generated 
“…not merely new relations of economic life and social activity to be accommodated in 
cities…(but has) also changed expectations of the roles and relationships of governance 
and the modes of governance.  It has changed how the formal organisation and procedures 
of  the  public  sector  interact  with  the  wider  society”  (Cars  et  al  2002:xi).    Guy  and 
Henneberry (2000) argue that these changing contexts of development decision-making 
exemplify the complex interrelationships of the social and the economic and provide a 
basis for justifying the development and use of an institutional understanding of urban 
development processes (p.2400).   
 
From this perspective, institutional capacity is defined as capacity that ‘…is embedded in 
the dynamics of the wider social context within which action focused at the local level 
takes place’ (Cars et al 2002:4).  Institutional capacity therefore refers to ‘…particular 
forms of richness that enables individuals and groups to mobilise resources and perform 
meaningful  action’  (ibid.).    As  such,  institutional  capacity  is  best  understood  as  ‘…a 
complex, fluid and evolving infrastructure acting at several levels – from the visible level 
of organisations and institutional power structures to the deeper levels of ideas, discourses 
and identities.  Accumulated experience and history certainly count, but their effects are 
filtered by a continuous, open and multi-level interaction between established practices and 
understandings and emerging ones, with uncertain outcomes’ (Cars et al 2002:62).               
 
Much of the existing research on institutional capacity in urban development and British 
property research has focused primarily on the operations of, and interactions between, the 
wide  variety  of  public-sector  and  semi  public-sector  agencies  that  now  comprise  the 
institutional  landscape  of  economic  development  and  urban  regeneration  (Amin  1999; 
Macleod  1997;  Raco  1997;  Amin  1995).    This  research  will  explore  the  concept  of 
institutional capacity as a central element of governance but will approach its applicability 
from an investigation into the adaptive capacity of the private sector to respond to public 
policy change.  Using the policy switch favouring brownfield development, this research 
presents a case study in changing relations between the state and the market.  It considers 
the role of the wider institutional landscape as crucial in facilitating the capacity of the 
speculative housebuilding industry in responding to regulatory change, whilst at the same 
time, highlights the institutional and structural constraints of the housebuilding process that 
may impede this response.   
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Before proceeding there are two important points that need to be raised in order to 
fully contextualise this research.    
 
First, it is important to acknowledge the distinction between the level of analysis of the 
contextual material in this thesis and that of the empirical research undertaken.  The first 
half of the thesis discusses and contextualises speculative housebuilding at the UK level, as 
it is at this level from which both the academic literature and previous research makes 
reference to
1.  Then, in line with the conceptual approach to this research and in respect of 
resource, time and financial constraints and the need to tie down any specific external 
influences on speculative housebuilder response to brownfield policy
2, the empirical stage 
of this research presents both broad results from a survey of UK housebuilders and detailed 
results from its focus on two distinct regions within the UK – Manchester, England and 
Glasgow, Scotland.  The results of this empirical research are findings that are relevant 
across the UK.     
 
Second, this empirical research was conducted between February 2006 and July 2007.  The 
recent  impacts  of  the  ‘credit  crunch’  and  the  succeeding  recession  on  both  the  UK 
speculative  housebuilding  industry  and  UK  housebuilding  starts  and  completions  have 
therefore not been noted.  But, the potential of the ‘credit crunch’ and the recession to 
effect significant implications on the delivery of new homes primarily on brownfield land 
and  further,  the  long-term  achievement  of  the  Government’s  brownfield  development 
agenda, is undoubtedly present.      
    
                                                       
 
1 Whilst some may contend that previous research is not representative of all 4 countries of the UK, it is not 
the role of this thesis to determine or uncover this.  As such, assumptions will be made that the previous 
research and literature is representative of UK speculative housebuilding.      
2 Please find a more detailed explanation in Chapter 6.    
 
 
 
1
CHAPTER 1 
 
THE  STRUCTURE  AND  ORGANISATION  OF  THE  UK  SPECULATIVE 
HOUSEBUILDING INDUSTRY 
 
1.1  Introduction 
This chapter emphasises the dominance of speculative housebuilders in the provision of 
new homes in the UK, who are currently responsible for approximately 90% of all new 
homes  delivered  annually  (DCLG  2008).    Together  with  this  increasing  role  in  new 
housing  provision  is  the  sustained  concentration  of  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding 
industry,  one  better  characterised  by  “…oligopoly  rather  than  competition”  (Gibb 
1999:44).  The logic behind this sustained concentration is examined and the importance of 
the ‘regionalisation’ of business activities in UK speculative housebuilding is emphasised.  
Through a discussion on the growth of volume and super builders and the emergence of 
regeneration specialists, who seek to capture the urban redevelopment market in light of 
increased  levels  of  residential  activity  on  previously  used  land  in  urban  locales,  the 
changing  nature  of  the  structure  and  organisation  of  UK  speculative  housebuilding  is 
emphasised.    The  chapter  concludes  by  considering  the  impact  of  the  policy  switch 
favouring brownfield development on the current structure and organisation of the UK 
speculative housebuilding industry and emphasises that those housebuilders who are more 
adept in delivering brownfield sites for housing may well challenge the currently dominant 
producers. 
 
1.2  What is Speculative Housebuilding? 
The most recognised players in the UK speculative
3 housebuilding industry are, of course, 
some the biggest builders around.  Ask anyone to name a housebuilder and the likely 
response would probably consist of Barratt, Bellway, Wimpey or Persimmon.  And they 
would be right.  However, out of those most commonly known UK housebuilders, only 
Wimpey  was  operating  in  the  1930’s,  and  even  they  have  now  merged  with  Taylor 
Woodrow (in 2007) to form the UK’s currently largest builder, Taylor Wimpey.  This first 
                                                       
 
3 The term speculative in this context refers to activity by housebuilders based on an assumption of the risk of 
loss, in return for the uncertain possibility of a reward i.e. profit and saleability of product.    
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glimpse  at  UK  speculative  housebuilding  highlights  one  of  its  most  innate  features  - 
volatility - that is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.   
          
Ball  (1983)  identifies  speculative  housebuilders  as  firms  whose  development  profit  is 
achieved “…by a judicious purchase of land and conceiving of the appropriate residential 
scheme for the site” (pp.50-51).  Ball makes clear that whilst housebuilders are productive 
enterprises because of their building activities, they are merchants as well, buying and 
selling in a variety of markets where they try to get the most profitable terms.  This is 
clearest  with  the  selling  of  the  completed  product  “…where  each  firm  has  specific 
marketing strategies.  But land purchase and the hiring of building workers are also key 
market  exchanges  for  a  housebuilder”  (Ball  1983:21).    For  housebuilders  then,  the 
predominant risks to assess in the speculative development of land for housing are: 
 
•  The marketability of houses built on site 
•  The price paid for the land 
•  The timing of development 
•  And, the overall scale of housebuilding appropriate for the firms resources in the 
context of the current state of the market    
(Ball 1983 pp.50-51)    
 
Wellings  (2006)  suggests  that  the  term  ‘speculative’  that  often  accompanies  private 
housebuilding was first used to describe housebuilders in simply ‘economic process’ terms, 
but has since been used more pejoratively than that.  Wellings (2006) reminds us that a 
speculative housebuilder is a developer rather than a builder, as “…the land is purchased 
and much, or all, of the building work is done before there is a contract with the purchaser” 
(p.9).   Wellings argues that this is of little difference to high street retailers, who produce 
goods for sale before purchasers are identified.     
 
Ball (1983) explores the process and management of speculative housebuilding in more 
detail by comparing their tasks to contractors and jobbing builders
4.  He makes clear that a 
                                                       
 
4 Ball (1983) defines contractors as those builders who simply build to contract.  Usually there is a main 
contractor who appoints subcontractors to undertake all or part of the actual building work (p.50).  Jobbing 
builders are the classic small-time builders akin to the centuries old master craftsmen.  Only a few workers  
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distinctive  management  task  exists  for  the  speculative  housebuilder  because  of  the 
differences in investment.  In speculative housebuilding, the turnover time of capital is 
much longer because it has to be invested in land years in advance of building, whereas 
after 6 months, most contracting projects are self-financing as the client makes monthly 
progress payments (Ball 1983).  Furthermore, at the commencement of building on site, 
speculative housebuilding requires more capital to be ‘sunk into the ground’ by way of 
infrastructure and ground preparation tasks, following which the houses are then built.  No 
revenue is forthcoming for these up front costs until the houses are sold, which can be 
anytime from an ‘off plan’ stage prior to construction, through to the post construction 
stage of development.   
 
Competition between firms is also different for speculative housebuilders than contractors 
or jobbing builders.  In speculative housebuilding, competition takes place at the time of 
land purchase and house sale rather than just prior to the start of building as in contracting 
(Ball 1983).  Wellings (2006) however criticises the loose use of the term ‘speculative’ in 
this instance as “…a pejorative description, implying that land is acquired solely because it 
is expected to appreciate in value.  That is not to dismiss the fact that some land may be 
bought  to  be  held  for  appreciation,  but  wholesaling  and  land  improvement  remain  an 
integral and necessary part of the development process” (pp.10-11).   
    
1.3  The Importance of Speculative Housebuilding in the Provision of New 
Homes in the UK 
The dominance of speculative housebuilding in the provision of new homes in the UK has 
emerged as a resolute trend over the past 35 years.  Since 1974, speculative housebuilders 
have  been  responsible  for  the  majority  of  new  homes  in  the  UK  and  currently,  they 
produce approximately 90% of all new homes annually (DCLG 2008)
5.  Concurrent with 
this trend is the declining role of local authorities (LAs) as providers of new housing, 
whose contributions have reduced from their peak of 75% in 1953 to a mere 0.1% in 2007 
(DCLG 2008).  Registered social landlords (RSLs) have largely replaced the role of LAs in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
are directly employed, others being hired on a casual basis, and some tasks are also subcontracted out to 
specialists (p.49).     
5 Whilst there is a presumption of sustained dominance, it is not to suggest that this power and monopoly is 
irreversible.    
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providing social rented housing, and in 2007 they provided 10.4% of all new homes, up 
from 9% in 2005 (DCLG 2008).  However, it is important to recognise that RSLs have not 
replaced the quantity of new homes that LAs had previously achieved and as such, the 
dominance of speculative housebuilders remains.          
 
Whilst speculative housebuilders have dominated the provision of new housing in the UK 
since 1974, Figure 1.1 also shows the concurrent decline of overall housebuilding rates 
over the past 35 years.  Appendix 1 provides housebuilding completions by tenure between 
1947 and 2007.  Together with Figure 1.1, these data demonstrate the significance of the 
speculative housebuilding industry to housing provision in the UK.            
 
Figure 1.1: Permanent Dwellings completed by tenure, United Kingdom 
 
Source: Housing Statistics 2006 (DCLG 2007) 
 
However, whilst it is evident that there have been declining rates of new housebuilding in 
the UK since the 1960s, the emergence of flatted development has provided a relative rise 
in new housing output by the private sector since 2002
6.  Figure 1.2 shows the gradual 
decline since 1996/7 of the proportion of houses to flats being built in the UK each year.  
The most recent figures indicate that 45% of new homes built in the UK in 2006/07 were 
flats and 55% were houses (DCLG 2008).    
                                                       
 
6 Whilst only 152,098 new homes by the private sector were built in 2001, 181,169 were built in 2004, an 
increase of nearly 30,000 over 3 years.  Flatted development contributed largely to this increase, from 15% of 
new homes in 1999/00 to 45% in 2005/06 (DCLG 2006).  
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This means that whilst speculative housebuilders have been building relatively more new 
homes  in  the  UK  since  the  late  90s,  a  significant  proportion  of  those  dwellings  were 
delivered in high-density flatted developments, predominantly on brownfield sites
7.  This 
raises important issues concerning the differential profitability of different product mixes 
and  land  intensity  in  UK  speculative  housebuilding  and  the  impact  of  a  potential 
dependence on flatted development in the delivery of new homes on brownfield sites.  As 
such, these will be important features of analysis in this research.     
 
Figure 1.2: Proportions of Houses and Flats in the UK, 1996-2007  
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Source: DCLG (2008:13) 
 
Having outlined the importance of speculative housebuilders to new housing provision in 
the UK, the chapter now turns to a discussion on the changing nature of the UK speculative 
housebuilding industry, with reference to its sustained concentration and the emergence of 
super builders and regeneration specialists.          
 
                                                       
 
7 The use of flats on brownfield sites will be discussed in more detail at a later stage in the thesis.    
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1.4  The  Sustained  Concentration  of  the  UK  Speculative  Housebuilding 
Industry 
It is notable that whilst new housebuilding numbers have declined over the past 35 years, 
the housebuilders delivering the majority of those new homes have become substantially 
bigger.  Any analysis of the structure and organisation of the UK speculative housebuilding 
industry  will  reveal  one  of  its  most  enduring  features:  the  sustained  concentration  of 
production through merger, acquisition and organic growth.   
 
Wellings  (2004)  argues  that,  unlike  most  other  industrial  organisation  processes,  the 
justification for housebuilders to grow to a point where they produce more than 500 units a 
year does not lie in ‘economies of scale’.  However, UK speculative housebuilders have 
continued to merge, acquire their competitors and those less productive than themselves, 
and grow their businesses organically into huge companies that require separate divisions 
and  separate  organisational  structures  at  both  the  regional  level  and  the  national  level 
(Gibb  1999,  Adams  and  Watkins  2002).    Appendix  2  demonstrates  this  regional 
organisation in the Gladedale Group, a top ten housebuilder, and shows how Gladedale is 
divided into 3 distinct regions, each of which has a divisional head office.     
 
There are a number of key studies that reveal the emergence of concentration in the UK 
speculative housebuilding industry over the past 30 years and explain the proliferation of 
mergers and acquisitions, resulting in the emergence of Britain’s volume builders (see Ball 
1983,  Lambert  1990,  Nicol  and  Hooper  1999,  Wellings  2006,  Ball  2006).    Volume 
builders
8 have dominated the UK speculative housebuilding industry for a number of years 
now.  This is typified in their market share, unit output and merger activity.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
 
8 The characterisation of ‘large’ and ‘volume’ housebuilding companies in terms of dwelling completions is 
variable in the literature and classifications range from between 100-500 units for ‘large’ builders, to between 
2000-5000 for ‘volume’ builders (Nicol and Hooper 1999:60).  However, it is now commonly agreed in the 
literature that volume housebuilders are “…companies completing an average of 2000 or more dwellings 
each year” (Adams and Watkins 2002:122).        
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Table 1.1: The Biggest UK housebuilders, unit completions, 2001-2007  
Housebuilder  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Taylor Wimpey  Did not 
exist 
Did not 
exist 
Did not 
exist 
Did not 
exist 
Did not 
exist 
22,000  20,645 
Barratt 
 
11,310  12,250  13,304  14,021  14,351  19,808  17,168 
Persimmon  12,051  12,352  12,163  12,360  12,636  16,701  15,905 
Wimpey  11,537  13,480  12,909  12,232  12,100  Merged w/ 
Taylor 
Woodrow to 
form Taylor 
Wimpey 
Merged w/ 
Taylor 
Woodrow to 
form Taylor 
Wimpey 
 
Bryant  5,226  6,238  7,690  9,053  8,178  Merged w/ 
Wimpey to 
form Taylor 
Wimpey 
Merged w/ 
Wimpey to 
form Taylor 
Wimpey 
 
Bellway  5,725  6,044  6,278  6,610  7,001  7,117  7,638 
David Wilson  3,908  4,164  5,037  5,588  5,207  5,486  Merged w/ 
Barratt 
Berkeley  2,892  3,955  4,181  4,839  4,379  3,817  3,293 
Redrow  3,463  3,908  4,031  4,284  4,372  4,735  4,823 
Westbury 
 
4,008  3,812  4,538  4,400  4,361  Taken over by 
Persimmon 
Taken over by 
Persimmon 
Miller 
 
2,030  2,298  2,871  2,505  2,801  3,960  3,578 
Bovis 
 
Figure 
not 
available 
Figure 
not 
available 
Figure 
not 
available 
 
Figure 
not 
available 
2,702  3,123  2,930 
Gladedale  Did not 
exist 
Did not 
exist 
Did not 
exist 
Did not 
exist 
2,801  3,854  3,500 
Source: Wellings (2006:12) 
 
Table 1.1 provides the unit completions of the UK’s largest housebuilders between 2001 
and 2007, whilst Table 1.2 shows the mergers and acquisitions that have taken place in the 
housebuilding industry since January 2002.   
  
 
 
 
8
Table 1.2:  Merger & Acquisitions in UK Speculative Housebuilding 
                 2002 – 2007 
Date  Housebuilder  Units  Value £m  Buyer 
Jan 02 
Jan 02 
Feb 02 
Jun 02 
July 02 
July 02 
Nov 02 
April 03 
May 03 
June 03 
June 03 
Sept 03 
Oct 03 
Nov 03 
Dec 03 
Jan 04 
Feb 04 
Feb 04 
May 04 
Nov 04 
Dec 04 
Dec 04 
Feb 05 
Apr 05 
Apr 05 
May 05 
June 05 
July 05 
July 05 
Sept 05 
Dec 05 
Jan 06 
Jan 06 
Jan 06 
Feb 06 
Apr 06 
June 06 
Feb 07 
July 07 
July 07 
Tay Homes 
Charlton Group 
McAlpine Cumbria 
Prowting 
Banner 
North Country Homes 
Laing Homes 
Henry Boot Homes 
Bett Group 
Honeygrove 
Merewood Group 
John Laing Partnership 
Wilson Connolly 
Ward 
Swan Hill 
Rialto 
Tudor Homes 
Sharman Group 
Alexander Developments 
Manor Kingdom 
Honey Grove 
Raven Group 
Countryside Properties 
Country & Metropolitan 
Linden North-west 
Jennings Homes 
Ashwood Homes 
Fairbriar 
Crosby Homes 
Fairclough Homes 
Senator Homes 
Rydon Group 
Westbury 
Figuredale 
Yuill Homes 
Roland Bardsley 
Squire Bridge 
Wilson Bowden 
Ben Bailey 
Taylor Woodrow 
931 
240 
 
1307 
119 
630 
1232 
694 
916 
 
281 
 
c500 
4002 
423 
193 
887 
 
 
82 
c80 
41 
 
1911 
759 
 
230 
 
 
1162 
1563 
211 
328 
4361 
160 
305 
104 
 
 
30 
8 
16 
141 
28 
14 
297 
48 
94 
 
23 
16 
499 
74 
48 
60 
15 
10 
6 
 
9 
15 
222 
72 
5 
15 
23 
19 
236 
264 
25 
c.100 
643 
67 
60 
25 
4 
£2.2bn 
83.7 
£5bn 
Redrow 
McInerney 
Centuar Homes (MBO) 
Westbury 
75% to Prowting Trust 
Country & Metropolitan 
Wimpey 
Wilson Bowden 
Gladedale 
Propan (Honeygrove) 
Persimmon 
MBO 
Taylor Woodrow 
Wilson Bowden 
Raven Mount 
Fairview 
Kier Residential 
David McLean 
McInerney 
Remo Dipre & David Gaffney 
Oakdene Homes 
Raven Mount 
MBO 
Gladedale 
Arley Homes 
David McLean 
Kier Residential 
MBO 
Lend Lease 
Miller Group 
Persimmon 
MBO 
Persimmon 
Galliford Try 
Taggart Holdings 
Wilson Bowden 
Barratt 
Barratt 
Gladedale 
George Wimpey 
Source: Wellings 2004, Wellings 2005, Wellings 2006 
 
Table 1.1 demonstrates how the UK speculative housebuilding industry is currently led by 
three  ‘super  builders’,  whose  annual  unit  completions  dominate  the  industry’s  output: 
Taylor Wimpey, Barratt, and Persimmon.  The remaining builders have anywhere between 
50% and 75% fewer unit completions per annum.  In June 2007, the biggest ever merger  
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was recorded between two top ten housebuilders at the time, George Wimpey and Taylor 
Woodrow, at a value of £5bn.  
 
This trend towards greater concentration in UK speculative housebuilding has sustained 
over the 8 years since the issue was last reviewed in detail in the academic literature by 
Nicol  and  Hooper  (1999).    Indeed,  both  the  structure  of  the  industry  and  the  size  of 
housebuilders have changed markedly since then.  It is this continuing concentration that 
will be the feature of the following section. 
 
1.5  Why Concentrate? 
According to Ball (2006), it has long been recognised that large-scale housebuilders might 
arise in specific contexts.  He highlights that although large firms grew rapidly in the 1920s 
and 1930s housebuilding boom in the UK (see Ball 1983 and Wellings 2006 for more 
detail), few of these firms have actually managed to have a sustained life span.  Rather 
“…they  tended  to  disappear  and  shrink  significantly  in  size  when  their  respective 
housebuilding  markets  entered  periods  of  turbulence  and  supply-side  decline”  (Ball 
2006:173).    Indeed,  previous  explanations  for  the  concentration  of  production  in  UK 
speculative housebuilding have emphasised the major restructuring of the industry during 
the 1970s following the 1972/73 boom and slump in the housing market.  Bramley et al 
(1995) suggest that during this time period, there was a significant decline in the number of 
small and medium size firms and a marked increase in the market share of firms producing 
500+ units per annum.  Nicol and Hooper (1999) suggest that the most striking feature of 
housing  production  at  this  time  was  the  increase  in  the  share  of  firms  producing  250 
dwellings or more per annum.  The author’s highlight while in 1969 such firms had only 
25% of market share, by 1979 their share had risen to over 50%, doubling in 10 years.   
 
Ball (1983) originally observed that this increase in market share by firms producing 250+ 
dwellings per annum was cyclical, increasing in booms and decreasing in slumps “…but 
having a ratchet effect with each cycle, raising the long-term market share of the larger 
firms” (Nicol and Hooper 1999:60).  Ball (1983) suggested that the larger firms were most 
able to alter their output depending upon the relative profitability of housebuilding and 
during the 1970s, the restructuring of the largest producers reinforced the concentration of 
speculative housebuilding into larger units.  Of course, this concentration also increased  
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the centralisation of ownership of capital in the industry via firm take over (Nicol and 
Hooper 1999).       
 
Ball  (2006)  further  considers  whether  such  increasing  concentration  is  predominately 
cyclical in character, as in earlier periods, or is highlighting more fundamental shifts in 
industrial structure.  The fundamental changes that can arise are broadly separated by Ball 
(2006) into the following: 
 
•  Benefits of larger firm size in a free market context.  These might arise “…from the 
growth of scale and scope economies, which could occur in production, finance, the 
procurement  of  inputs,  in  marketing  and  sales,  or  in  the  benefits  of  strategic 
behaviour in relation to other competitors” (p.173).   
•  The influences of regulation on firm structure i.e. changes in the regulatory land-
use planning environment.   
 
Through  investigating  the  benefits  of  greater  firm  size  by  undertaking  a  comparative 
investigation of firm size hierarchies in the UK and USA, Ball (2006) identifies some 
important conclusions.  He suggests first that scale economies in production, procurement, 
marketing  and  finance  seem  to  be  important  at  smaller  firm  sizes  but  appear  to  be 
exhausted  at  output  levels  well  below  those  of  the  largest  firms.    This  supports  what 
Wellings (2004) suggested previously.  Secondly, Ball (2006) identifies that diversification 
size  benefits  were  identified  in  terms  of  permitting  a  wider  spatial  spread  of  housing 
markets in which firms are active when demand fluctuations between those markets are 
imperfectly correlated.  He importantly identifies the planning system as distinguishing the 
UK situation from the USA.  He states that in the UK, long-term restrictions on residential 
land supply exist in areas of high housing demand and as the planning process is complex 
and contains significant discretion, “…these characteristics of the land market probably 
explain much of the high level of concentration” in the UK
9 (p.193).          
 
                                                       
 
9 Ball (2006) makes clear that there is no evidence of widespread monopoly abuse of the market, although the 
recent OFT inquiry into the housebuilding industry might make Ball rethink his statement.  Nonetheless, he 
continues to suggest however that such high degrees of concentration and the way in which the planning 
system  regulates  the  land  market  “…with  no  concern  for  the  competitive  implications  of  its  actions  do 
suggest that competition might be blunted” (pg.193).   
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Wellings (2006) rejects the argument that the economies of scale and scope necessitated 
the creation first of the regional and then of the national builder.  He suggests that whilst 
businesses experience diseconomies of scale as they grow, for the housebuilding industry, 
these issues extend beyond “…the increased costs of supervision and communication as 
perhaps even more important the increase in firm size may dilute the entrepreneurial flair 
that was responsible for creating the earlier growth” (p.159).  Wellings (2006) makes clear 
that the diseconomies of scale arise not from larger firm size but “…from the need to 
introduce new operating units as the housebuilder expands geographically” (p.163). He 
suggests that although there are recognisable competitive advantages that accrue to a larger 
firm, “…any economies of scale that do exist in the speculative housebuilding industry are 
apt to be exaggerated, not of sufficient amount to necessitate the creation of larger firms” 
(p.173).   
 
Wellings (2006) draws on his doctoral work to suggest that the economies of speculative 
housebuilding do not require even larger units and therefore, the explanation for sustained 
growth and concentration must lie elsewhere.  He argues that the driving force behind 
growth and towards consolidation is a complex interaction between financial incentives, 
stock market pressures, personal motivation and the judgemental qualities of entrepreneurs 
at  critical  points  in  the  housing  cycle.    Wellings  (2006)  emphasises  the  “…prosaic 
explanations of money and ambition, and the simplistic concept of not making mistakes” 
(p.265) as an alternative explanation for the growth of UK speculative housebuilders.    
 
The  reasons  behind  the  sustained  growth  and  concentration  of  the  UK  speculative 
housebuilding industry have shown to be varied.  The above discussion serves to highlight 
the emerging importance of a small number of very large housebuilders in the delivery of 
new homes in the UK and demonstrates the intense competition within the UK speculative 
housebuilding  industry  in  terms  of  growth,  expansion  and  the  omnipresent  threat  of 
takeover or merger.     
 
1.6  Regionalisation in UK Speculative Housebuilding 
However, paradoxically, as much competition takes place within housebuilders as between 
them.  The above section has shown that, for housebuilders, economies of scale do not 
provide  an  adequate  explanation  for  their  growth  (Wellings  2006:146).    The  largest  
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housebuilders  have  adapted  their  corporate  structures  to  minimise  the  organisational 
diseconomies of housebuilding through ‘regionalisation’.     
 
Indeed,  the  majority  of  nationally  operating  housebuilders  function  as  a  collection  of 
regional  divisions  rather  than  as  a  single  unified  business.    As  such,  housebuilding 
companies are often referred to as ‘Groups’ and a board of directors ultimately governs the 
Group.  Each Group is typically comprised of a number of distinct operating divisions, 
which  are  geographically  dispersed  and  comprised  of  a  number  of  regional  operating 
businesses
10.    The  Persimmon  Group,  for  example,  operates  from  three  geographic 
divisions, North, Central and South, and a divisional board, headed by a division chief 
executive,  controls  each  division.    Each  division  has  a  number  of  regional  operating 
businesses, which are headed by a managing director and a management team “…with 
local knowledge and experience” (www.persimmonhomes.co.uk). 
  
Wellings (2006) suggests that the consensus is that the ideal size for one operating unit is 
400-500 houses a year in a localised area.  This is because increased corporate size requires 
“…not the doubling of the operating unit, but its replication and ultimately the introduction 
of additional layers of management.  Given the limitations on the number of executives 
that might report directly to a group managing director, further increases in size require yet 
another intermediate layer of supervision.  Not only does that incur a monetary cost, but it 
also imposes a motivational barrier” (p.160).            
 
Adams and Watkins (2002) suggest that this regional organisation of operation has the 
distinct advantage of enabling national management separately to identify the financial 
performance
11  of  each  region  and  to  encourage  a  strong  sense  of  internal  regional 
competition within the company.  Thus “...not only does underperformance by any one 
region  in  comparison  with  the  corporate  average  become  easier  to  identify,  if  that 
underperformance persists, the separate organisational structure at regional level allows 
national management to close down that particular regional office or merge it with another 
one, in a reasonably painless manner” (Adams and Watkins 2002:127).  This corporate 
regionalisation therefore: 
                                                       
 
10 Refer to Appendix 2 for the organisational structure of the Gladedale Group.   
11 “Units sales, turnover, margin, return on capital etc” (Adams and Watkins 2002:127).  
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•  Provides housebuilders with the ‘institutional flexibility’ to respond to the varying 
pace of change in housing and employment markets at the regional level. 
•  Enables companies to connect with greater effectiveness to the devolved political 
decision-making process that increasingly determines the release of housing land at 
the regional and local level. 
•  Means that successful housebuilders are likely to grow ever more sophisticated in 
the way they create and deploy regionalisation as an explicit corporate strategy. 
(Adams and Watkins 2002:127).   
 
The above discussion has shown that the structure of the UK speculative housebuilding 
industry has changed markedly over the past two decades.  As Wellings (2006) highlights 
“corporate change has been extensive and leadership has often proved transient” (p.108).  
However, as suggested earlier, whilst industry concentration has continued, the types of 
housebuilders within the industry have also changed.  Since early 2000, the emergence of 
super  builders  has  dominated  the  structure  and  organisation  of  the  UK  speculative 
housebuilding industry.        
 
1.7  The Rise of the Super Builder 
Whilst the housebuilding literature has previously focused on the emergence of ‘volume’ 
housebuilders over the past two decades (see Adams and Watkins 2002, Nicol and Hooper 
1999, Bramley et al 1995, Ball 1983) it is clear that a new breed of housebuilder has 
emerged.  This is shown in the most recent merger and acquisition activity between the 
UK’s top ten biggest housebuilders (by unit completions) over the past three years (see 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2).   
 
There is no clear explanation for the emergence of super builders in the literature as it is 
not documented and has only focused on the emergence of national and volume builders 
to-date.  However, Wellings (2004) does suggest that for the currently dominant builders 
“…it would become progressively harder for the top ten to keep increasing their market 
share – there are no companies outside the top ten that, if acquired, would be large enough 
to make a significant difference.  If two of the top ten were to merge now, it would be a 
land deal and there would be some drop in the combined volume, but a new number ten  
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would be added” (p.25).  And, in revisiting this issue and discussing the latest round of 
merger  and  acquisition  activity  a  year  later,  Wellings  (2005)  confirmed  that  “…these 
acquisitions are a substitute for land deals
12 but it does highlight the volume housebuilders’ 
need for acquisitions to feed their land requirement” (p.27).        
 
For a broad indication of this underlying trend, Wellings (2006) makes comment on the 
market share of the top ten housebuilders by unit completions in 2005 (refer to Table 1.1).  
He suggests that their market share actually peaked in 2002, at 47%, and after a further fall 
in  2005,  had  fallen  to  around  44%,  back  to  the  level  of  2000
13.    Taking  the  top  ten 
housebuilders as a group, their total completions in 2005 fell by almost 500, compared 
with 2004.  Whilst Wellings (2006) does not give an explanation of this fall in market 
share of the top ten housebuilders, his comments raise some interesting questions for the 
structure of the industry, amidst external policy change, which will be considered in the 
second part of this thesis.          
 
Reasons behind the emergence of ‘super builders’ may also lie in the stock market as a 
driver of growth.  Ball (1983) suggests that “…large firms are very different from their 
smaller competitors in this industry both in terms of their ownership and the way they 
operate as productive capital…(where) public quotation is usually essential” (p.57).  This 
is because even the smallest producers will require an effective land supply, of anywhere 
between 3-5 years, together with a strategic land bank upwards of 10-15 years.  In order to 
make such purchases, firms will require capital and “…borrowing such capital on a fixed 
interest basis leaves a firm highly vulnerable to failure” (Ball 1983:57).  As profit steadily 
has to be made to meet the interest payments on such capital borrowings, equity capital 
overcomes this ‘gearing problem’ as dividends can be varied during the course of the profit 
cycle (ibid).  Public quotation enables share issues to be used as a means of raising capital; 
therefore, a larger housebuilder with more share issues available provides a better means of 
raising capital to spend on its essential raw material, land. 
 
                                                       
 
12 This emphasis on the importance of land will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.   
13 Wellings (2006) makes clear that the crude market share is measured by adding the total completions 
disclosed by the individual firms for their financial years, divided by completions on a calendar basis (p.14).  
Wellings (2006) wishes to make clear that these percentages overstate the true market share and should be 
taken as no more that a broad indication of the underlying trends (p.15).   
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However, it is important to highlight that the growth of housebuilders into super builders 
may erode the level of personal control held by the owners, in turn diluting the level of 
entrepreneurial flair in the company (Wellings 2006).  If super builders are being created 
through the merger of top ten housebuilders on land grounds and for  public quotation 
benefits, then the extent to which this will continue under a brownfield policy climate is an 
interesting issue for further consideration. 
 
Whilst this chapter has so far focused on the rise of national, volume and super builders, 
the emergence of ‘regeneration specialists’ provides an example of an emerging business 
strategy in UK housebuilding hoping to capture the urban redevelopment market.   
 
1.8  The Emergence of Brownfield ‘Regeneration Specialists’               
Whilst niche and specialist housebuilders have always been a part of the UK speculative 
housebuilding  makeup
14,  the  recent  emergence  of  regeneration  specialists  hoping  to 
capture  the  urban  redevelopment  market,  reveals  a  new  specialism  in  UK  speculative 
housebuilding. 
 
Take Urban Splash as an example.  Set up in 1993, the company was among the first in 
Britain to see that the many under-used urban historic buildings and brownfield sites could 
be transformed into new mixed-use spaces whilst at the same time, stimulating the broader 
regeneration  of  urban  communities  (www.urbansplash.co.uk).    Urban  Splash’s 
commitment to brownfield regeneration and its creative adaptation and re-use of buildings 
stems not only from the desire to capitalise on the urban regeneration market but also from 
more intangible and prosaic reasons related to desires of its founder, Tom Bloxham.  In 
2005, Urban Splash was the 86
th biggest UK housebuilder, completing 101 units.  So much 
is  the  success  of  Urban Splash’s  story  in  the  urban  regeneration  market, it led  Mallet 
(2004), writing in Property Week, to suggest: “Where will money be made in the next few 
years? Well one thing that Urban Splash has done so much better than anyone else in the 
regeneration  game  is  to  demonstrate  that  regeneration  is  highly  profitable  in  the  most 
                                                       
 
14 McCarthy and Stone built its first sheltered housing for sale in 1976 whilst Rendell completed a pioneering 
scheme for low cost housing for sale to council nominees in Swindon in 1978 (Wellings 2006).   
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unlikely places, and that in property, just as in any other business, it can be style and 
imagination that drive wealth creation.” (http://www.urbansplash.co.uk/us.php).   
 
It  is  important  not  to  associate  ‘regeneration  specialists’  only  with  smaller companies.  
Indeed,  Berkeley  Homes  -  a  company  considered  to  be  the  pioneer  of  urban 
redevelopment
15 - provides an important contrast to Urban Splash and acknowledges that it 
is not just smaller companies who are adept at using brownfield development as a core 
business strategy.  Berkeley Homes produced 3817 new homes in 2006, with 95% of those 
on  brownfield  sites,  making  it  the  UK’s  7
th  largest  builder  (Wellings  2006:12).  
Karadimitriou (2005), in his study of Berkeley Homes, discusses this success and considers 
them  one  of  the  more  specialised  brownfield  regeneration  housebuilders  in  the  UK.  
Ironically, the company was founded in 1976 as a niche builder of luxury suburban homes.  
Karadimitriou (2005) makes clear that the top management of the group realised “…that 
something was changing in government policy in the early 1990s and consciously began to 
shift its activity to urban brownfield sites” (p.280).  Karadimitriou (2005) puts Berkeley’s 
success  down  to  the  mechanisms  in  place  that  facilitate  knowledge  transfer within  the 
group.  Since the early 1990s, the group has “…had the chance to develop the set of skills 
and practices that allow it to take advantage of bigger opportunities, bigger sites, and more 
complicated projects” (p.283).         
 
It  is  worthy  to  note  that  the  volume  builders,  not  wanting  to  miss  the  brownfield 
bandwagon,  are  also  advertising  themselves  as  regeneration  specialists.    Barratt,  for 
example, consider themselves the “industry leaders in brownfield development”
16 whilst 
Redrow  Homes  suggest  that  their  mixed-use  regeneration  expertise  enables  them  to 
“provide  individual  and  creative  solutions  to  deliver  sustainable  new  communities”
17.  
However,  the  extent  to  which  these  volume  builders  can  be  considered  regeneration 
specialists  is  limited,  as  their  brownfield  development  rates  do  not  marry  up  with  the 
images put forward in the advertisements and marketing literature.  Indeed, some of the 
volume builders have specialist subsidiaries to deal with the brownfield regeneration side 
of their business.      
                                                       
 
15  Indeed,  on  their  website,  The  Berkeley  Group  Holdings  plc  consider  themselves  “a  leader  in  urban 
regeneration” who produce 95% of all new homes on brownfield sites (www.berkleyhomes.co.uk).    
16 http://www.barratt-investor-relations.co.uk.   
17 http://www.redrow.co.uk/pages/company/about_redrow.     
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1.9  Chapter Conclusions 
The chapter has emphasised that the UK speculative housebuilding industry now plays a 
crucial role in the delivery of new homes in the UK.  Whilst this responsibility for new 
home  provision  has  increased  markedly  since  the  early  1960s,  the  number  of  new 
dwellings that the industry is delivering annually has gradually declined.  The recent uplift 
in new housing completions has been the result of a marked increase in the proportions of 
flatted development in new housing delivery.   
 
In addition to the changes in its output, the UK speculative housebuilding industry has also 
faced structural adjustments of late, with the recent spate of merger activity between top 
ten  housebuilders  resulting  in  the  emergence  of  ‘super  builders’.    The  sustained 
concentration  in  UK  speculative  housebuilding  places  a  small  number  of  very  large 
housebuilders  at  the  forefront  of  new  home  delivery  in  the  UK.    More  so,  the  policy 
encouragement of urban regeneration has seen the emergence of regeneration specialists 
hoping  to  capture  the  urban  redevelopment  market  away  from  the  currently  dominant 
producers.   
 
As such, the extent to which these regeneration specialists will challenge the dominance of 
the super and volume builders will be of interest to the remainder of this research.  Indeed, 
in light of the policy switch favouring brownfield development, the role of regeneration 
specialists will arguably become more important.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE  CONVENTIONAL  BUSINESS  STRATEGIES  OF  UK  SPECULATIVE 
HOUSEBUILDERS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The conventional business strategies of the UK speculative housebuilding industry reflect 
both a reliance on the tried and tested methods associated with greenfield development and 
the risks and uncertainties involved in the speculative development of land for housing.  
This chapter explores how these factors have shaped the way housebuilders operate and 
compete,  through  instilling  greenfield  land  acquisition  and  construction efficiency as a 
means of competitive differentiation and profit maximisation in speculative housebuilding 
over time.  The skills and strategies adopted by speculative housebuilders therefore reflect 
the greenfield mode of production.  As such, the inherent risks associated with speculative 
residential development have therefore been managed and averted under the greenfield 
experience.  This chapter therefore provides a suitable benchmark for assessing the impact 
of  the  policy  preference  for  brownfield  development  on  the  conventional  business 
strategies of UK speculative housebuilders.   
 
2.2  Establishing  Development  Feasibility  in  Speculative  Residential 
Development  
It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a detailed discussion of the competing 
models of the development process, a subject covered extensively elsewhere (Gore and 
Nicholson  1991,  1992;  Healey  1991,  1992;  Hooper  1992;  Adams  and  Watkins  2002; 
Ratcliffe et al 2004).  But, a discussion of the basic skills required to establish development 
feasibility in speculative housebuilding is essential for two reasons: first, to highlight the 
conventional business strategies of UK speculative housebuilders; and second, to provide a 
useful  benchmark  for  assessing  the  impact  of  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield 
development  on  the  way  in  which  housebuilders  currently  establish  development 
feasibility.        
  
 
 
 
19
In the UK, speculative housebuilders generally control all of the development functions 
involved in the land conversion process.   Bramley et  al (1995) suggest the process of 
establishing development feasibility entails “…land acquisition and assembly, obtaining 
planning permission, and marketing the final product” (p.87).  Adams and Watkins (2002) 
make  clear  that  apart  from  those  locations  or  times  of  poor  housing  demand,  “…the 
viability  of  speculative  residential  development  and  indeed  profitability  of  UK 
housebuilding as a whole has depended on finding land at the right price, gaining planning 
permission and marketing the completed product” (p.129).  
 
Ball  (1983)  suggests  that  the  speculative  residential  development  process  involves  a 
number  of  interrelated  but  temporarily  separate  activities:    “…the  initial  purchase  and 
assembly of land sites, the conception of housing schemes, the determination of the time of 
building and finally, the selling of completed houses” (p.126).  An immediate concern of 
housebuilders therefore “…is to generate at least a minimum positive level of cash flow, 
because development and production times are long and the market for their products is 
variable”  (p.126).    As  such,  in  reaching  their  financial  objectives,  speculative 
housebuilders  “…face  conflicting  pressures  over  land  acquisition,  sales  revenue  and 
production costs.  The outcome is an overriding concern with land banking and sales rates 
per  sites,  combined  with  an  attempt  to  have  a  diversified  market  presence  and  low 
production rates of fairly standardised house types on individual sites” (p.126).            
 
Adams  and  Watkins  (2002)  emphasise  that  the  traditional  models  of  the  residential 
development process are constructed around the conversion of greenfield land into new 
housing  estates.    The  authors  make  clear  these  basic  skills  required  to  establish 
development feasibility have been honed and sharpened primarily through the conversion 
of greenfield land into standardised estates.  The three skills of establishing development 
feasibility – land acquisition, gaining planning permission and marketing the completed 
product – will now be discussed in more detail, where the dominance of greenfield based 
business strategies will be emphasised.  Following this, the conventional ways in which 
speculative housebuilders approach design in speculative residential development will be 
discussed.        
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2.3  The Conventional Business Strategies of UK Speculative Housebuilders 
The conventional business strategies of UK speculative housebuilders reflect the strong 
sense of corporate competition that exists within the industry and therefore, also reveals the 
intense pressures within the industry to maintain profitability by cost minimisation (Ball 
1983, Adams and Watkins 2002).  As will be highlighted in the following discussion, the 
route towards maximum profitability and cost minimisation has been polished primarily 
through the greenfield experience.  This section therefore sets the scene for assessing the 
impact  of  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield  development  on  the  conventional 
business strategies of UK speculative housebuilders.               
 
2.3.1  Seeking out and acquiring land    
Land acquisition is a pivotal activity of speculative housebuilders (Leishman et al 2000), as 
the demand for land for residential development is a demand for the factor of production 
(Oxley, 2004).  As the housebuilding industry in the UK derives much of its profit from 
land  (Barker,  2004)  it  therefore  allocates  much  of  its  resources  to  searching  out  and 
acquiring suitable land for residential development (Adams and Watkins 2002).       
 
Whilst land is the UK speculative housebuilding industry’s principal resource, access to it 
is controlled by the planning system and currently, supply is judged to be limited (Barker 
2004).  Therefore, the control that the public sector has over the allocation of land for 
housing and the amount of land that can be developed for housing, results in an uncertain 
residential development process for speculative housebuilders (Barker 2003, 2004).  This 
has resultantly contributed to the conventional behaviours of housebuilders towards land 
acquisition. 
 
In  response  to  such  uncertainty  and  in  order  to  ensure  that  they  have  ready  access to 
development land to secure their business operations, housebuilders have sought to control 
land by strategically building up a ‘land bank portfolio’ (Ball 1983).   Ball (1983) suggests 
the  most  useful  way  of  conceptualising  the  nature  of  a  housebuilders  land  bank  is  to 
“…treat it as a portfolio of land just as a commercial bank or other financial institution has 
a portfolio of assets.  In both cases, the portfolios consist of a spread of high-yielding but 
potentially risky assets and safer but less profitable assets that can ensure a steady cash 
flow and corporate stability.  Portfolios have a temporal profile consisting of assets with  
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different dates of maturity and profit realisation” (p.148).  A land bank portfolio therefore 
“…spreads risk and takes the pain out of speculation” (ibid.).  
 
Land banks also help to increase development profit by keeping down housebuilders’ land 
costs relative to house prices, particularly in a rising housing market (Ball 1983).  Ball 
(1983) makes clear that the obvious way to keep land costs down in an inflationary period 
is to hold onto land for several years after purchase before developing it.  Therefore, land 
banks serve to create more certainty for housebuilders and are strategically necessary to 
cope with the uncertain flow of suitable sites, which is determined by the actions of the 
local planning authority (Bramley et al 1995).  The land bank portfolio therefore fulfils two 
vital roles: it acts as a  strategic response to uncertainty and it provides an operational 
function through the sustained and continued flow of suitable development sites.    
 
In speculative housebuilding, it is common practice for housebuilders to ‘control’ land in 
anticipation of its future purchase, through the use of option agreements and conditional 
contracts.    Option  agreements  are  used  by  speculative  housebuilders  to  ‘control’  land 
where the sale price of the land and the commitment to purchase is only finalised once 
planning consent has been obtained.  Option agreements “…usually involve a small down 
payment, typically 10 % of the current market value, in exchange for the right to purchase 
for development with a modest discount when planning permission is granted” (Bramley et 
al 1995:74).  Bramley et al (1995) note that options are a relatively low risk and low cost 
way for speculative housebuilders to augment their land banks, as they allow flexibility 
and continuity.  More specifically, options are important as, if the land in the land bank has 
Table 2.1:  The Conventional Approach to Land Supply by UK Speculative           
                  Housebuilders  
Conventional 
Competence  
Conventional Skills 
 
 
Sourcing land, 
controlling, 
ownership and 
land acquisition  
 
•  Exploiting low land value through the use of lengthy options to capture 
inflationary land values. 
•  Reliable site preparation costs allow certainty in development appraisal. 
•  Larger sites allow ease in assembling large land parcels. 
•  Existing knowledge of the market and its contacts provides low risk and 
more certainty. 
•  Maintaining a suitable flow of both short term and long term land. 
 
Source:  Adapted from Adams (2004) and Own Analysis  
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been bought at full development value or ‘substantial hope value’, then the working capital 
that those housebuilders have tied up can be considerable and “…depending on interest 
rates,  unattractive”  (Bramley  et  al  1995:74).    In  addition,  as  the  value  of  land  to 
housebuilders  will  depend  on  the  revenue  expected  from  house  sales  and  the  cost  of 
development on the site (Oxley 2004), it makes land purchase prior to any knowledge of 
development  potentially  an  extremely  risky  business.    As  a  result,  taking  out  option 
agreements is one way in which speculative housebuilders may reduce this risk.   
   
Rather  than  owning  the  land  outright,  the  use  of  option  agreements  and  conditional 
contracts by housebuilders in the speculative acquisition of land therefore:  
 
•  Act to minimise the amount of capital tied up  in land upfront before full-scale 
acquisition takes place.   
•  Reduce the risk in purchasing land without knowledge of the ultimate sale price of 
the house or the ultimate occupiers of the property (Barker 2003).   
 
This  conventional  approach  to  land  acquisition  by  speculative  housebuilders  allows 
continuity  of  development  together  with  the  flexibility  of  response  and  cushioning  for 
delays  on  specific  sites  (Bramley  et  al  1995),  and  means  that  builders  have  an  active 
development  pipeline  and  a  continuous  profit  stream.    Similarly,  housebuilders  might 
withhold land from development “…if there is an expectation that house prices, and hence 
the returns from development, will continue to rise in real terms” (Bramley et al 1995:72).  
Housebuilders have learned that land is a valuable source of inflationary gain, and “…the 
profit  margin  on  each  house  may  be  substantially  enhanced  because  land  with  a  low 
historic value is being used to build houses priced at current market values” (Bramley et al 
1995:93), so during periods of high house price inflation, profit margins may increase 
substantially.   
 
Barlow  and  King  (1992)  emphasise  that  land  banking  in  speculative  housebuilding 
“remains  crucial  for  maintaining  output  and  maximising  development  gains”  (p.391).  
Consequently,  worries  over  good  design  and  enhancing  the  quality  of  the  local 
environment  are  all  but  removed  from  the  profit  equation  of  much  of  the  speculative 
housebuilding industry.  As a result of this ‘land focused’ ethos, builders have concentrated 
their competitive behaviour and strategies generally on “land acquisition and marketing  
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skills as the key to success, rather than an ability to innovate technically or in terms of 
design” (Barlow and Bhatti 1997:36).  This will be an interesting premise upon which to 
assess the capacity of speculative housebuilders under a predominantly brownfield modus 
operandi.        
 
2.3.2  Planning permission and marketing strategies in speculative residential 
development 
Once  a  suitable  site  for  development  has  been  identified,  housebuilders  have  to  form 
expectations  about  the  outcome  of  planning  applications  (Bramley  et  al  2005:73).  
However,  as  the  literature  suggests,  housebuilders  are  not  simply passive recipients of 
these planning policies, but rather seek to influence policy formation and conduct pre-
application discussions to test the acceptability of their planning proposals (Bramley et al 
1995, Adams and Watkins 2002).  Bramley et al (1995:75) make clear that some studies 
have  shown  housebuilders  “…engage  in  sophisticated  lobbying  activities  that  seek  to 
influence policy in general terms and to have their sites included in development plans” 
(see Farthing 1993, Adams and May 1990 and Short et al 1986).      
 
Both Adams and Watkins (2002) and Bramley et al (1995) make clear that housebuilders, 
especially  those  larger  housebuilders  with  the  financial  muscle,  will  seek  out  the  best 
possible professional representation and specialist expertise to maximise their chances and 
improve the prediction of success in planning applications, negotiations and appeals.     
 
 
Table 2.2: The Conventional Approach to Gaining Planning Permission by  
                 UK Speculative Housebuilders  
Conventional 
Competence  
Conventional Skills 
 
 
Securing 
planning 
permission 
and other 
consents 
 
•  Utilising standardised layouts and products to provide blanket building 
regulations. 
•  Having familiarity of the planning requirements of conventional 
developments. 
•  Utilising tried and tested methods in promoting land through the planning 
system.  
•  Utilising sophisticated lobbying techniques to argue for planning consent. 
Source:  Adapted from Adams and Watkins (2002) and Own Analysis  
 
 
 
24
In respect of marketing, Adams and Watkins (2002) argue that, traditionally, because of 
the speculative nature of residential development in the UK, housebuilders do not normally 
rely upon any level of pre-sales before commencing construction, unlike other commercial 
and industrial developers.  Rather, at the outset of development, housebuilders rely on an 
on-site sales and marketing suite in combination with a show home or flat and extensive 
advertising and promotion in order to “…lure potential customers” (Adams and Watkins 
2002:137).  
 
Marketing therefore plays a pivotal role in capturing the target market and achieving the 
sales necessary to maintain a steady cash flow; as Leishman et al (2000) emphasise, the 
failure of housebuilders to achieve the required rates of sales can lead to a significant 
erosion of profit.  In order for housebuilders to ensure their required rate of sales, their 
marketing strategies have traditionally focused largely on offering not just a home, but 
“…a whole new lifestyle that implies upward mobility in both family prospects and social 
interaction” (Adams and Watkins 2002:137).  This lifestyle has been primarily suburban in 
its  nature  and  part  of  an  extensive  and  established  demand,  reflective  of  urban 
decentralisation trends in the late 80s and early 90s.  As such, the marketing strategies have 
connected powerfully with the British psyche (Adams and Watkins 2002).      
 
2.3.3  Standard products for standard locations  
One of the most conspicuous features of speculative housebuilding that explains the way in 
which  housebuilders  approach  the  speculative  residential  development  process  is  the 
standardisation of production.  This involves the use of standardised building materials and 
tried and tested construction methods to generate a number of standard house types that 
Table 2.3: The Conventional Approach to Marketing by UK Speculative                        
                  Housebuilders  
Conventional 
Competence  
Conventional Skills 
 
Creating 
Attractive 
Marketing 
Images  
 
•  Marketing images and lifestyles used.  
•  Images readily connect to the suburban family oriented lifestyles. 
•  Typical family purchasers. 
 
Source:  Adapted from Adams and Watkins (2002)  
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can be readily reproduced at varying locations in an efficient and flexible manner.  This 
tactic  has  shaped  the  way  housebuilders  operate  and  deliver  profit  as  it  has  instilled 
construction efficiency as a means of competitive differentiation and profit maximisation 
in  speculative  housebuilding  over  time.    This  business  acumen  has  also  contributed 
significantly to policy and other public sector pressure for innovation and better design in 
the delivery of new homes by the private sector.  As such, innovative capacity will be an 
important aspect to this research.  First, the section will explore the conventional strategy 
of the standardisation of production.                  
 
Nicol and Hooper (1999) define a standard house type as being comprised of two key 
elements: its footprint and its façade.  In effect, this allows “…different facades to be 
bolted on to a standard structural design” (p.66) and houses can be ‘dressed’ according to 
the  requirements  of  the  locality.    Gibb  (1999)  makes  clear  that  standardisation  is 
compelling  to  housebuilders  as  the  design  costs  are  greatly  reduced,  supplies  can  be 
purchased at bulk rates, the logistics of moving labour and materials is simplified and 
contractors also benefit from the economics standardisation brings.  Adams and Watkins 
(2002)  further  suggest  that  standardised  house  types  allow  blanket  building  control 
approval  to  be  achieved,  which  further  limits  design  costs,  enables  accurate  cost 
forecasting when housebuilders bid for land, and allows a reliance on designs known to 
have sold well in the past.     
 
Nicol and Hooper (1999) argue that the extensive use of standard house types restricts 
consumer flexibility to the internal non-structural features of the house  rather than the 
external  aspects  of  the  dwelling.    Further,  Barlow  and  King  (1992)  suggest  that 
housebuilders remain resolutely antagonistic to greater customer input in design because 
Table 2.4: The Conventional Approach to Product Design by UK Speculative                        
                  Housebuilders  
Conventional 
Competence  
Conventional Skills 
 
Standardisation 
of  
Production 
•  Standard products for standard locations, achieving blanket building 
regulations.  
•  Standard layouts and construction methods. 
•  Certainty in build cost. 
•  Reliance on designs known to have sold well in the past. 
 
Source:  Adapted from Adams and Watkins (2002)  
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their competitive strategies focus on the acquisition of land.  In their study of builders in 
Sweden, Barlow and King (1992) found that housebuilders have paid more attention to 
product and process innovations than their British counterparts because there has been less 
scope for developers to make purely inflationary profits from land as “…the system of 
subsidised loans and public land ownership largely preclude land banking as a strategy” 
(Barlow  and  King  1992:391).    Thus,  as  housebuilders  in  Sweden  are  prevented  from 
making money through strategic land acquisition, they are forced to focus an adding value 
directly from their product and thus require greater customer input in order to ensure that 
designs will sell well.     
 
2.3.4  Customer focus in UK speculative housebuilding 
The reliance on standard house types, as discussed above, has undoubtedly encouraged the 
lack of direct customer impact in the design process of speculative housebuilding.  Indeed, 
the Barker Review (2004) makes clear how housebuilders do not have to deliver a good 
product  or  high  levels  of  customer  service  to  win  market  share  (p.111).    The  Barker 
Review  draws  on  the  national  consumer  satisfaction  survey  to  conclude  that  although 
customers are mostly satisfied that new houses represent good value for money overall, 
“…a substantial proportion of customers express concerns about the quality of service and 
with the standard of construction and finishing.  Satisfaction with the service provided by 
housebuilders  tends  to  decline  over  successive  stages  of  the  purchased  process,  with 
dissatisfaction levels particularly high with after-sales” (p.112).   
 
In UK speculative housebuilding, the link between innovation and customer focus is a 
tangible  one,  because  the  design  of  new  homes  directly  affects  the  customisation  of 
products and services.  In UK speculative housebuilding, there are two aspects to customer 
focus: first, the quality of customer service and, secondly the customisation of products 
and  services  (Barlow  and  Ozaki  2003:97).    Barlow  and  Ozaki  (2003)  suggest  that 
introducing greater product customisation in the new homes market poses “…significant 
challenges for housebuilders (which) relate to the difficulty in capturing user requirements, 
the acceptability of customisation under the current regulatory and funding framework, and 
the  need  for  robust  supply  chains  that  can  cope  with  the  flexibility  inherent  in  mass 
customised  approaches”  (p.91).    The  authors  highlight  a  number  of  other  institutional 
barriers to greater customer input, which are briefly summarised in Table 2.5.        
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Craig and Roy (2004) make clear that “…brand loyalty in housing is restricted by the fixed 
location of the product and price variation by locality” (p.74).  Ozaki (2003) concurs and 
suggests “…the fact that location is the most important factor in new housing purchasing in 
the UK may restrict a person from buying a house from the same housebuilder” (p.558).  
This  important  feature  of  speculative  housebuilding,  coupled  with  the  nature  of 
competitive strategies focusing on land acquisition and house price inflation (Barlow 1993) 
combine to make the speculative housebuilding industry in the UK inherently lacking in 
customer focus in relation to design.  
 
Whilst both the industry specific and institutional reluctance to greater customer input into 
designs  and  greater  customer  satisfaction  with  their  product  have  been  noted, 
“…housebuilders are, of course, no different from other firms in their perception that there 
is a need to achieve high levels of customer service” (Barlow and Ozaki 2003:93).  The 
literature surrounding housebuilders’ attempts to integrate customer input into design and 
Table 2.5: Institutional Barriers to Greater Customer Input in UK Speculative  
                 Housebuilding 
 
•  Housing is a multi-purpose, complex product in which there is an infinite possible range of 
variations in size and shape, space and layout, amenities and finish – identifying user 
requirements and adding value to increase satisfaction pre-supposes that people know what 
they want and that their needs can be captured and translated into realisable products.  
•  The immediate customer is not always an individual purchaser: under a buy to let scenario, 
landlords may have different priorities than the user (tenant) of the dwelling.   
•  Local authority planning and design guidelines are widely seen within the industry as the 
fundamental barrier to greater diversity in housing types. 
•  Mortgage lenders are generally highly conservative with regard to innovative designs that they 
believe may not appeal in the future, to the detriment of marketability. 
•  The typical customer supply chain - used to dealing with standardised pre-assembled 
components which can be configured in many different ways to offer wider choices in final 
products - is simply not robust enough to cope with variability in customer demands (Naim 
and Barlow 2003). 
•  Those wishing to buy a new home face a persistent undersupply and a long term sellers market 
– dissatisfied customers cannot switch to another provider because of a lack of alternatives.   
 
Source: Barlow and Ozaki (2003)  
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indeed into competitive strategies is, however, few and far between.  However, Barlow and 
Ozaki (2003) in their study of how housebuilders are adopting customer focus found that 
housebuilders are improving their customer focus by: 
 
•  Introducing more off-site prefabrication such as timber frame. 
•  Managing their supply chains more effectively. 
•  Improving techniques for monitoring and responding to complaints. 
•  Turning attention to customer service both before and after sale. 
 
However,  Barlow  and  Ozaki  (2003)  also  suggest  that  any  initiatives  by  speculative 
housebuilders to integrate customer input into their designs “are unlikely to realise their 
full  potential  without  a  radically  new  relationship  between  housebuilders  and  their 
customers” (p.98).  The authors further suggest “…it will be necessary for the industry to 
adopt  a  broader  view  of  customer  focus,  which  integrates  customers  into  the  product 
supply chain more closely” (ibid.).  More specifically, the authors make clear that “…re-
orienting the housebuilding industry’s competitive strategies will require its members to 
resolve tensions between their traditional focus on driving down construction costs and 
emphasising the value of their product to customers (ibid.).     
 
The section has demonstrated that high levels of customer satisfaction are not inherent in 
UK speculative housebuilding, because of their core strategies of standardisation.  
 
2.3.5  Design and innovative capacity 
It is well documented in the literature that the UK speculative housebuilding industry is not 
renowned  for  its  innovative  capacity  both  in  the  development  of  its  products  and  the 
processes it uses (Barlow and Ozaki 2000, Ball 1999, Barlow 1999, Barlow and Ball 1999, 
Barlow  and  Bhatti  1997,  Barlow  and  King  1992).    This  lack  in  product  and  process 
innovations has caused numerous obstacles to speculative housebuilders in responding to 
an  array  of  demographic,  cultural,  regulatory  and  environmental  requests  and  policy 
initiatives.    For  example,  Barlow  and  Ozaki  (2000),  Barlow  and  Ozaki  (2003),  Ozaki 
(2003)  and  Naim  and  Barlow  (2003)  discuss  the  obstacles  that  the  lack  of  innovative  
 
 
 
29
capacity  places  on  increased  levels  of  customer  input  and  customer  satisfaction  in 
speculative housebuilding
18.    
 
According  to  Ball  (1999),  the  ability  of  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry  to 
increase the innovative capacity
19 of its product is influenced by a number of external and 
internal  constraints.    The  internal  constraints  reflect  the  skills  and  competencies  of 
housebuilders and their individual firm strategies, whilst the external constraints relate to 
“market contexts within which firms operate” (Ball 1999:10).  Ball (1999) suggests that 
these existing market contexts “…severely constrain what housebuilders can do in terms of 
design, quality, cost and innovation” (p.10).  He suggests that the specific characteristics of 
these  external  market  contexts,  when  taken  together,  limit  the  possibilities  for 
housebuilding innovation.  This is explained in Table 2.6. 
 
Barlow (1999) argues that speculative housebuilders should engage in a ‘radical’ approach 
to product and process innovation to facilitate their response to their changing business 
environment, which he considers as:  
 
•  The need for more new homes and increasing household numbers. 
•  Broad attitudinal shifts in the way the home is used – improving the quality and 
functionality of the home. 
•  Tighter regulatory controls over environmental standards and the location of new 
homes to urban brownfield sites. 
•  Rising construction costs and labour shortages.  
Source: Barlow (1999:27-29) 
 
                                                       
 
18 In addition, Barlow and Bhatti (1997) discuss the obstacles that the lack of innovation causes in using 
environmental performance as a competitive strategy, whilst Barlow and Ball (1999) examine the role of 
innovative capacity in speculative housebuilding as a means of improving British housing supply.  Hertin et 
al (2003), in their study into the impacts of climate change on the perceptions, impacts and adaptive capacity 
of the housebuilding industry, suggest that technological adaptations through innovation could “in principle, 
prevent or mitigate almost any impact of climate change on buildings and the construction process – with the 
exception of major extreme events” (p.258), but as of yet are not common practice.           
19 ‘Innovative capacity’ is loosely defined as the ability to develop new  ways of responding to existing 
demands or develop new skills in response to emerging demands, such as policy change or demographic 
change (Ball 1999).    
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Table 2.6:  The Constraining Force of External Market Contexts to the  
                  Innovative Capacity of UK Speculative Housebuilders 
Market Context  Constraint 
 
 
 
 
Housing Market 
 
The conservatism of consumers and the lack of bespoke custom-built 
properties in the UK mean that change in standard house types only 
occurs through “…a piecemeal improvement of building elements 
rather than through radical transformation” (p.13).  Mortgage lenders 
are also cautious about stylistic innovation and would rather follow 
customer preference, whilst the volatile housing market induces 
uncertainty and a reliance on response through well-known 
construction techniques. 
 
 
Labour Market 
Where sub-contracting is standard practice, limited skills are 
available and bad practice pervades, making innovative techniques 
expensive and risky.  
 
 
Materials Market 
Builders may refuse to adopt new ways or raise the price of an 
innovative material or alter its specifications at a considerable cost 
once the housebuilder is locked into the deal to use it. 
 
 
 
Land and Planning 
Market 
The coercive force of competition in the land market – housebuilders 
raw material –and the importance of land for housebuilders 
profitability mean that housebuilders are not pushed to “…the current 
leading edge of productive efficiency and innovation (p.19). With 
regard to planning, it has specific goals and its remit does not stretch 
to innovation within housing production.  “…Planners’ attitudes to 
housebuilding innovation have evolved incrementally and without 
concern for best practice” (p.20).         
   
Source:  Ball (1999) 
 
Barlow (1999) provides an audit of innovation trends and explains three key approaches to 
innovation in UK speculative housebuilding:  
 
•  Building process innovations.  
•  Housing product innovations. 
•  Internal flexibility to innovation.   
 
Building process innovations refer to new technologies that replace traditional brick and 
block approaches to housebuilding and include steel framing, timber framing, new mortars 
and thinner, lighter bricks.  However, Barlow (1999) suggests that a series of structural and 
cultural barriers to the adoption of many new process innovations remain, suggesting that 
the benefits of new approaches for cost reduction are ambiguous and are initially more  
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expensive, and that purchaser resistance and previous negative experiences undermine any 
cost advantages.   
 
With regard to housing product innovations, Barlow (1999) indicates that by increasing the 
value-added to customers, housebuilders can potentially raise the attractiveness of new 
housing relative to the existing stock through greater customer choice, more flexible and 
adaptable  house  types  and  more  energy  efficient  functional  homes.    However,  Barlow 
suggests that there has  been relatively little progress: lead in times constrain customer 
input and doubts about the cost unpredictability and consumer commitment to the dwelling 
exist.  In respect of internal flexibility, Barlow states that whilst housebuilders were trying 
to reduce the number of internal walls to maximise flexibility, customers were preoccupied 
with the number of bedrooms rather than the absolute amount of space (p.35).   
 
Ultimately, Barlow (1999) suggests that housebuilders need to improve their control of the 
supply  chain  and  integrate  their  design,  product  development  and  market  intelligence 
functions more effectively.  These will “…involve the introduction of new organisational 
structures  and  skills”  (p.35).    He  suggests  that  the  above  examples  of  innovation  in 
housebuilding products and processes have been “…mostly at the level of discussion rather 
than  implementation”  (p.35)  and  have  been  hindered  by  concern  over  costs.    Most 
explicitly, Barlow (1999) makes clear that “in the absence of any coherent vision, they 
cannot  be  said  to  represent  a  move  towards  product  and  process  based  competitive 
strategies, away from housebuilders traditional land orientated strategies” (p.37).                             
 
Through his work, Barlow (1999) emphasises the perceived balance between the risks and 
potential  rewards  as  a  major  parameter  influencing  the  rate  at  which  new  process 
innovations are adopted, because “…this will in turn reflect their cost relative to more 
traditional building methods and prevailing market conditions” (p. 33). Importantly, he 
adds  “…the  newer  approaches  may  percolate  through  the  industry  more  widely  in  the 
event of tighter energy efficiency regulations, an increase in the proportion of brownfield 
land developed, or a more buoyant market for new housing” (p.33), reminding us of the 
importance  of  policy  and  external  demands  in  shaping  housebuilders’  approaches  to 
innovation.   
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Indeed, Barlow and Ball (1999) suggest that while the successful root through external 
barriers depends on how proficient the industry is in overturning its legacy of actual and 
perceived constraints, ultimately, industrial self-transformation has not been successful to-
date.    Importantly,  the  authors  argue  that  government  and  other  housing  related 
organisations should reassess and strengthen their approaches to housing supply and the 
housebuilding industry.  As such, Asibobng and Barlow (1997) argue that, in comparison 
to technology-led or market-led innovation, policy-led innovation is likely to become more 
prevalent in speculative housebuilding (cited in Gibb 1999:45).  The authors make clear 
that the state’s role in  encouraging more innovative forms of development is likely to 
increase.  This is important to note and will be returned to in the latter part of the thesis.     
 
2.4  The Role of Risk and Uncertainty in UK Speculative Housebuilding 
Risk  significantly  influences  the  nature  of  speculative  residential  development and  has 
fundamentally  shaped  both  the  speculative  housing  development  process  and  the 
speculative  product.    Indeed,  “risk  is  the  very  business  of  property  development,  and 
uncertainty  the  prevailing  climate  within  which  development  takes  place”  (Ratcliffe 
2004:335).  Speculative housebuilders have conventionally sought to manage risk within a 
primarily greenfield mode of production, using greenfield based strategies such as land 
banking, standard house types and the lack of customer input into housing design.            
 
The Barker Review (Barker 2003, 2004) judged risk as a key influence on the behaviour of 
the speculative housebuilding industry.  The review made clear that any understanding of 
the  housebuilding  industry  “…requires  an  understanding  of  how  (the)  industry  is 
particularly influenced by risk” (Barker 2003:64).  The Review identified two types of risk 
of particular significance in speculative housebuilding: market risk and site-specific risk.   
 
Market risk is associated with the volatility of house prices; speculative housebuilders’ 
profits are largely dependent on future house price movements.  The impact of this risk on 
housebuilders is evidenced by the sensitivity of their stock prices to expectations about 
interest rates changes - a major driver of house prices through their impact on consumer 
demand  and  the  cost  of  mortgage  finance.    Barker  (2003)  suggests  that  the impact of 
market  risk  can  explain  a  number  of  features  of  the  speculative  housebuilding  sector.  
Indeed, “…housebuilders tend to structure their business activities in order to minimise  
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fixed commitments, as these create the risk of greatly reduced profits or bankruptcy in the 
event of a market downturn” (p.65).  Specifically, market risk: 
 
•  Can  reduce  housebuilders’  willingness  to  undertake  significant  brownfield 
developments, particularly at high densities, given the length of time that capital 
may be tied up.   
•  Encourages  the  use  of  sub-contracting,  which  may  have  implications  for 
operational efficiency and the availability of skills.  
•  May  lead  to  a  reluctance  among  some  housebuilders  to  undertake  significant 
investment in plant and alternative construction techniques. 
•  May  explain  in  part  housebuilders’  choice  of  financing  through  retained  profit 
rather than debt of equity. 
•  Helps explain housebuilders’ use of options in land acquisition. 
 
Second, site-specific risk is concerned with the establishment of development feasibility, 
specifically  land  acquisition,  gaining  planning  permission  and  construction.  
Housebuilders’ behaviour is shaped by specific risks in relation to the regions in which 
they operate and the sites upon which they are building.  More over, “…the lead times 
undertaking housing development are relatively long and can be uncertain, increasing the 
cost of development”  and exacerbating market  risks (p.66).  Site-specific risks include 
archaeological finds, the discovery of unexpected contamination on brownfield sites and 
problems  of  site  assembly;  delays  in  obtaining  planning  permission;  and,  external 
infrastructural delays.  Barker (2003) suggests that these site-specific risks also explain a 
number of features of speculative housebuilding and may reinforce behaviours associated 
with market risk.  In particular, site-specific risk: 
 
•  Encourages the use of sub-contracting. 
•  Reduces housebuilders’ willingness to undertake brownfield development. 
•  Helps explain housebuilders’ use of options in land acquisition.   
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Table 2.7: Housebuilders’ Response to Market and Site-Specific Risk 
Subcontracting   Where delays occur which prevent the developer getting on site, the 
use of sub-contractors means that the developer has fewer direct 
employees standing around idle, until subcontracting workers are 
required.  Site-specific risks can contribute to the advantages of 
subcontracting.  
 
Brownfield 
Development 
Brownfield development is exacerbated by risk.  The positive 
externalities of brownfield development (regeneration, reduced 
greenfield land and environmental impacts) are not signalled to 
housebuilders or landowners, as their profits from brownfield 
development will not reflect them.  This suggests that there is 
possible market failure in the provision of brownfield development – 
low value of brownfield land and the high costs of developing it, 
coupled with high existing use values, which militate against 
redevelopment. 
 
Financing 
Housebuilding  
 
 
The ability and willingness of housebuilders to tap the capital 
markets has been limited because: 
•  The shares of major housebuilders are poorly rated. 
•  Housebuilders have shown an unwillingness and or inability 
to take on significant fixed rate debt to finance their 
activities. 
•  Most of the major housebuilders capital requirements in 
recent times have been met through retained profit. 
 
Institutional Investment  Absence of direct involvement of financial institutions in the 
residential property sector.  Involvement could support more 
responsive UK housing output through less risk-averse capital 
allocation. 
 
Options  The level of risk derives from the fact that, at the stage the land is 
acquired, neither the ultimate occupiers of the property, nor the sale 
price, have been identified. The greater the site risk and therefore the 
delay between land purchase and the development being completed, 
the greater the housebuilders’ exposure to market risk.  Option 
contracts, under which the sale price of the land is only agreed 
between landowner and developer once planning consent has been 
obtained, may reduce this risk.  Options allow developers to mitigate 
against site-specific risks by allowing costs to be passed on to land 
owners by adjustments to the agreed sale price of the land.    
 
Controlling Output  An additional way to avoid market and site specific risks is to split 
large sites with competitors, which allows for diversification and 
reduces their exposure to a single development.  Alternatively, firms 
take a cautious wait-and-see approach when developing large sites, 
so that output is trickled onto the market over extended time periods.    
  
Source:  Barker (2003, pp.66-68) 
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The extent to which housebuilders are willing to trade off one type of risk for another is 
unknown, as is whether builders expect a greater reward in profit terms if risk is of a 
greater extent (this would usually be the case if the principles of development appraisal are 
correct).  This is because the opinion as to which form of risk has the most negative of 
effects is arguably down to the ethos of the housebuilding company and the nature of the 
site.  However, Ratcliffe et al (2004) note that typically, high-risk projects would require 
higher profit levels.        
 
Table 2.7 demonstrates the impact that risk has on the housebuilding industry’s behaviour, 
as identified by Barker (2003).  It explains the way in which the industry has sought to 
manage both market and site-specific risk through the production process. 
 
In addition to the market and site-specific risks identified by Barker (2003, 2004), risk also 
affects the design process and helps explain the reliance by UK speculative housebuilders 
on  the  standardisation  of  product  and  process  in  the  delivery  of  new  homes.    The 
traditional approach to development design taken by the private sector involves seeking 
investment opportunities that have a high probability of financial success, “…which can be 
better  guaranteed  be  reducing  financial  exposure,  and  therefore  risk,  and  increasing 
certainty”  (Carmona  et  al  2003:39).    As  a  result,  “…anything  that  increases  cost  and 
therefore risk is generally opposed by developers, for example, delay in granting planning 
permissions, contributions to infrastructure or bespoke design solutions” (ibid.).   
 
Carmona  et  al  (2003)  suggest  that  for  housebuilders,  standardisation  of  product 
“…represents a rational response to the risk and uncertainty they constantly face from a 
range of sources” (p.47): 
 
•  Volatility in the market and land costs (in the pattern of demand and confidence of 
potential purchasers). 
•  Risks of delay between the decision to build and completion. 
•  Changes in the availability of financing for both builder and purchaser. 
•  Changes in the availability and cost of materials and labour. 
 
The  authors  suggest  that  these  uncertainties  are  increased  “…because  of  the  long  and 
irreversible nature of the production processes (by comparison with other commodities)  
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and because of the difficulties in accommodating substantial changes during the production 
process” (p.47).   
 
This section has shown how UK speculative housebuilders’ experience of risk has been 
significantly  influenced  by  greenfield  development.    Therefore,  the  ways  in  which 
housebuilders manage and negate risk has also been shaped largely by their greenfield 
experiences.      
 
2.5  Chapter Conclusions  
This  chapter  has  demonstrated  that  the  conventional  business  strategies  of  the  UK 
speculative housebuilding industry reflect the reliance on tried and tested methods that are 
associated  with  the  greenfield  mode  of  production.    It  has  also  emphasised  how  the 
traditional  models  of  the  residential  development  process  are  constructed  around  the 
conversion of greenfield land.  The core skills of establishing development feasibility - 
land acquisition, gaining planning permission and marketing the final product - in addition 
to the other corporate strategy of the standardisation of production, have been developed 
under a greenfield mode of operation.  Consequently, the risks and uncertainties involved 
in the speculative development of land for housing are also specifically relevant to the 
primary development of greenfield land.   
 
The  chapter  has  shown  how  these  conventional  business  strategies  have  undoubtedly 
shaped the way housebuilders operate and compete, because they have instilled greenfield 
land acquisition and construction efficiency as a means of competitive differentiation and 
profit maximisation in speculative housebuilding over time.  The inherent risks associated 
with speculative residential development have therefore been managed and negated under 
the  greenfield  experience.    This  has  meant  UK  speculative  housebuilders  have  made 
limited attempts to integrate innovation into product design and as such, a lack of customer 
focus remains a significant issue for the industry.     
 
The chapter provides a suitable benchmark for assessing the impact of the policy switch 
favouring brownfield development on both the conventional business strategies of the UK 
speculative housebuilding industry and their traditional risk aversion tactics.        
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE POLICY CONTEXT OF BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter explores the contribution of brownfield development to the UK Government’s 
urban policy agenda and emphasises housing-led urban regeneration as an increasingly 
significant appendage to achieving the wider goals of sustainability.    The relationship 
between sustainability and brownfield development is discussed first, where the rationale 
for the Government’s ‘brownfield first’ agenda is examined.  The chapter then critically 
assesses  this  agenda,  acknowledging  the  impact  that  spatial  variation  can  have  on  the 
efficacy of brownfield development and emphasising the dangers of reifying brownfield 
development as a “win-win-win policy agenda” (Raco & Henderson 2006:500).  Thus, the 
assumption  that  brownfield  development  is  ipso  facto  sustainable  is  confronted.  
Throughout  the  chapter,  the  competing  uses  of  brownfield  land  and  the  need  for  a 
convergence  of  economic,  environmental  and  social  goals  in  brownfield  development 
outcomes  is  emphasised.    The  chapter  draws  to  a  close  with  a  discussion  on  the 
increasingly important role of the private sector, in particular speculative housebuilders, in 
delivering  the  Government’s  brownfield  policy  agenda  and  will  consider  whether  the 
organisational  processes  and  cultures  of  speculative  housebuilders  match  the  nature  of 
brownfield development being promoted. 
 
3.2  Defining Brownfield Land  
There are many terms often associated with ‘brownfield’ land, some of which include: 
vacant,  derelict,  contaminated,  previously  developed,  partially  occupied,  and  land  not 
currently in use (Alker et al 2000).  Although generally understood in the literature as land 
that  is  ‘previously-developed’  (see  Oxley  2004,  Cullingworth  and  Nadin  2003,  Rydin 
2003), the exact definition of brownfield land has been the subject of much confusion in 
the past and many competing definitions of brownfield land exist.  Some authors do not 
even offer a definition in their discussion of brownfield land (Evans et al 2005, Cars et al 
2002, Vigar et al 2000).                    
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The UK Government currently define brownfield land as: “formally previously developed 
land that is unused or may be available for development.  It includes both vacant and 
derelict land and land currently in use with known potential for redevelopment.  It excludes 
land that was previously developed where the remains have blended into the landscape 
over time” (ODPM 2005a:77).    
 
Alker et al (2000) have developed an alternative definition of brownfield, suggesting a 
brownfield site “…is any land or premises which has been previously used or developed 
and is not currently fully in use, although it may be partially occupied or utilised.  It may 
also be vacant, derelict or contaminated.  Therefore a brownfield site is not available for 
immediate use without intervention” (p.64).   
 
Both Alker et al (2000) and the UK Government’s definitions of brownfield land include 
the  same  fundamental  principles  of  what  brownfield  land  is.    However,  where  the 
Government ensures that brownfield land must have development potential, Alker et al 
(2000) make clear that their definition does not indicate this availability for redevelopment.  
The authors note that brownfield land exists in the greenbelt, for example in former MOD 
sites or NHS hospital sites, and suggest that although such land is designated as brownfield 
in the nature and state of the site, it would not be available for redevelopment under the 
current greenbelt principles.             
 
Adams  and  Watkins  (2002)  suggest  that  although  all  other  land  not  falling  into  the 
definition  of  brownfield  land  should  be  considered  as  greenfield,  such  a  dichotomous 
distinction between the characteristics of greenfield and brownfield must not prevent land 
from being considered, in some cases “…somewhere between the common perception of 
the two” (p.18).  The authors emphasise that some greenfield sites may have characteristics 
that make them complex to develop whilst some brownfield sites may be straightforward 
by  comparison.  Importantly,  Adams  and  Watkins  (2002)  make  clear  that  with  the 
dichotomous distinction between greenfield and brownfield, there is a tendency to over 
simplify the issues and to adopt the view that brownfield land by definition is the most 
sustainable  option  of  land  development.    Indeed,  cases  may  exist  where  greenfield 
development offers a more sustainable option (ibid).     
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For the purpose of this research, the UK Governments’ definition will be used, as it is 
likely to be the most prevailing one used in the public and private sectors.   
 
3.3  The Role of Brownfield Land and UK Sustainable Development Policy 
Over the past 10 years, the discourse of brownfield development has become ubiquitous in 
both the urban policy and urban regeneration agendas in the UK, and the development of 
brownfield  sites  is  increasingly  seen  as  an  important  solution  to  the  growing  list  of 
contemporary urban problems (Raco and Henderson 2006).  Whilst some would argue that 
brownfield  development  is  “the  darling  of  environmental  and  community  development 
circles” (DePass 2006:605), others would suggest that perhaps too much is expected of 
brownfield projects and that the often narrow economic focus of brownfield development 
prevents  the  convergence  of  the  environmental,  economic  and  social  goals  of  urban 
regeneration (Raco and Henderson 2006).  There is of course the argument that increased 
urban compaction through the intensive use of brownfield sites for housing is the most 
sustainable  form  of  urban  development.    However,  as  this  chapter  will  make  clear, 
brownfield development is often elided with sustainability and inclusivity “…in ways that 
imply that almost any type of development will yield a public good” (Raco and Henderson 
2006:508).    Whilst  brownfield  development  remains  a  crucial  part  of  both  the  UK 
Government’s sustainable development and urban regeneration agendas and allows for the 
potential reconnection, in policy terms, of the urban and the environmental (While et al 
2004), it is imperative to avoid reifying brownfield development as an all encompassing ad 
infinitum sustainable solution to the growing need for more new homes in the UK.        
 
Over the past 10 years, brownfield development has emerged in the UK Government’s 
urban policy agenda as a solution to the enduring urban decline that typified UK cities in 
the  1970s  and  1980s,  the  result  of  industrial  decline  and  economic  restructuring.  
Brownfield reuse has emerged as the foundation for urban regeneration (Dixon 2006) and 
in the UK’s core cities, the most notable recent reuse of brownfield land has been for 
housing, with owner-occupiers and buy-to-let investors the main clientele.  Indeed, the 
growth  of  city  centre  living  “…is  the  most  visible  symbol  of  this  urban  renaissance” 
(Nathan and Unwin 2005:1): for example, in the late 80s, Manchester had a city centre 
population  of  less  than  1000,  but  by  1991,  this  had  risen  to  3,500  and  by  2005,  the 
population had reached 15,000 (ibid.).              
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The use of brownfield land for housing has also emerged as an integral part of the UK 
Government’s  approach  to  delivering  sustainability.    The  inclusion  of  ‘sustainable 
communities’  as  one  of  the  four  key  priority  areas  for  immediate  action  in  the  UK 
Government’s ‘Strategy for Sustainable Development’
20 provides a notable commitment to 
the use of previously developed land as a facilitator for more sustainable ways of living 
(HM Government 2005:17).  The corresponding application of the HM Government’s core 
principles of sustainable communities in the devolved administrations of the UK differs.  
Below is a discussion on the application of these principles in England, which provides a 
good discussion in light of the Barker Review (2004) and the subsequent wave of policy 
discussions on brownfield land, housing supply and land supply that has been a feature of 
English urban policy since the beginnings of the brownfield policy agenda in early 2000. 
 
3.3.1  Sustainable  development  policy  and  the  role  of  brownfield  land  in 
England  
In England, the Government’s commitment to achieving sustainability through the urban 
form  was  first  fully  articulated  in  2003,  with  the  publication  of  the  Sustainable 
Communities Plan (ODPM 2003).  Marked as a step change in the approach to urban 
development, the Sustainable Communities Plan (SCP) sets out the policies, resources, 
partnerships  and  programmes  that  are  requisite  to  achieving  the  desired  “thriving  and 
inclusive communities” (ODPM 2003:3).  Unfortunately however, just what comprises a 
‘sustainable community’ has not been as fully articulated as the policies intended to deliver 
them.  In response to criticism
21 over its failure to initially provide a suitable definition of 
‘sustainable  communities’,  the  Government  now  defines  sustainable  communities  as 
“places where people want to live and work, now and in the future.  They meet the diverse 
                                                       
 
20 “Sustainable Communities” sits within four main shared priority areas for immediate UK action, the other 
three being “sustainable consumption and production”, “climate change and energy” and “natural resource 
protection and environmental enhancement” (HM Government 2005:17).           
21 Allmendinger and Tiesdell (2004) suggest that the Government’s initial notion of sustainable communities 
was unclear, fuzzy, lacking in conceptual clarity and consistency surrounding its use, and provided little 
indication  of  how  planners  and  others  should  use  the  concept  in  everyday  practice.    The  authors  were 
cautious about  using the  term communities  “…because  it is people – not planners, designers,  nor other 
professionals – that create communities.  Equally, people often have an intuitive understanding of what they 
mean by community” (p.313).  The authors suggest that the notion of what is ‘sustainable’ and what is a 
‘community’ is open to interpretation and assert that regeneration and planning should be about creating 
“sustainable  places”,  which  they  suggest  would  reflect  the  main  features  of  both  place  making  and 
sustainability.  See also Egan (2004:18-21) for another critique.    
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needs of existing and future residents, are sensitive to their environment, and contribute to 
a high quality of life. They are safe and inclusive, well planned, built and run, and offer 
equality of opportunity and good services for all” (ODPM 2005a).   
  
The  Government’s  commitment  to  the  delivery  of  sustainable  urban  development  was 
further reinforced with the publication of its next phase of the SCP, which involves two 
five-year sister plans.  The first, Sustainable Communities: Homes for All (ODPM 2005b) 
focuses  on  housing,  whilst  the  second,  Sustainable  Communities:  People  Places  and 
Prosperity (ODPM 2005c) focuses on the need to give communities more power and say in 
the decisions that affect them. 
 
Whilst the Government’s commitment to sustainability through the urban form has been a 
relatively recent affair in England, the use of brownfield land for housing as an urban 
policy  goal actually stretches back to previous Government administrations.  From the 
1990s,  residential  development  became  an  important  part  of  urban  and  regeneration 
policies
22, where housing was incorporated into city centre regeneration initiatives partly in 
response to rising housing needs projections for single person households (Bromley et al 
2005;  DETR  2000).    It  was  the  housing  white  paper  (DOE  1996)  under  the  Major 
Administration that set the original target for brownfield land use for housing, stating that 
at  least  50%  of  the  required  new  housing  should  be  on  urban  land.    This  original 
brownfield  target  was  subsequently  increased  by  the  Blair  Administration  to  60%  in 
England (DETR 2000a) and has since been retained by the Brown Administration.   
 
Concurrently, new housing has also emerged as the key driver for urban regeneration in 
England.    The  Urban  Task  Force  (1999)  and  the  Urban  White  Paper  (DETR  2000a) 
essentially “…synthesised many of these ideas into a vision of urban renaissance which 
aspires to make our towns and cities places where people want to live and work” (Bromley 
et al 2005:2408).  Indeed, the Urban Task Force (UTF) established a vision for cities, 
“…founded on the principles of design excellence, social well-being and environmental 
responsibility within appropriate delivery, fiscal and legal frameworks” (Urban Task Force 
Update Report 2005:2).  In total, 105 recommendations were made in the original report, 
                                                       
 
22 See DoE (1995a, 1995b, 1997), DETR (1998, 2000a, 200b).     
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which  together  set  out  a  vision,  “…of  well  designed,  compact  and  connected  cities 
supporting a diverse range of uses – where people live, work and enjoy leisure time at 
close quarters – in a sustainable urban environment well integrated with public transport 
and adaptable to change” (ibid.).  The role of brownfield land for new housing is integral to 
this vision.     
 
This  brownfield  policy  agenda  in  England  has  seemingly  been  a  success,  in  terms  of 
housing provision primarily on brownfield land (see Chapter 3, p.45).  And, the recent 
Urban  Task  Force  Update  Report  (Urban  Task  Force  2005)  makes  no  qualms  about 
advertising this.  Indeed, the report highlights that the re-use of brownfield land has been 
encouraged,  people  have  started  moving  back  into  the  cities,  residential densities have 
increased, and there has been a “measurable change of culture” in cities (ibid).  However, 
as  has  already  been  highlighted  in  Chapter  1,  housebuilding  rates  are  relatively  low 
compared  with  the  historical  completions  data  (see  Appendix  1).    Because  the  60% 
brownfield target is a relative target, it does not take account of levels of housebuilding 
activity and simply reports of the proportion of new homes built each year on brownfield 
land.  Thus, if the recent use of brownfield land is primarily for flatted development at high 
densities  (as  was  suggested  in  Chapter  1),  then  the  overall  proportion  of  new  housing 
development on brownfield land will obviously increase, such is the inherent problem with 
targets as a measure of achievement.      
  
Issues concerning the need to increase the amount of new homes in England were raised in 
the Barker Review (2004), the Callcutt Review of Housebuilding Delivery (Callcutt 2007) 
and the Housing Green Paper (DCLG 2008).  The Barker Review highlighted that over the 
last 10 to 15 years, housing supply has become almost totally unresponsive, so as house 
prices have risen, the supply of houses has not increased at all.  The reasons for this were 
largely because constraints on land supply prevent the market functioning ‘normally’.  The 
review suggested that higher and more responsive levels of housebuilding, leading to a 
lower trend in real house prices, would be beneficial.  The recommendations were to build 
between  70,000  and  120,000  more  new  homes  each  year  to  offset  problems  of 
affordability, the result of a long-term upward trend in real house prices.  Importantly, the 
Barker Review emphasised that land supply is the key constraint to increasing housing 
supply, due to a number of factors, which are identified in Table 3.1.   
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The Callcutt Review (Callcutt 2007) and the Housing Green Paper (DCLG 2008) further 
emphasise the need for more new homes to be built.  The housing targets suggested by 
Barker (2004) have since been increased and currently, the Housing Green Paper provides 
two new targets: 
 
•  2 million new homes by 2016. 
•  3 million new homes by 2020.  
DCLG (2008:10) 
 
This is to be achieved by a gradual increase in the amount of new homes built to 240,000 
per annum (DCLG 2008).       
 
 
Of crucial importance to this research is the issue of brownfield land identified in Barker’s 
analysis of the factors affecting land supply (see Table 3.1).  She states that the difficulties 
associated  with  the  use  of  brownfield  land  for  housing  can  act  to  prevent  those  sites 
coming forward for development.  This issue has significant implications for the delivery 
of new homes, based on the Government’s policy drive for brownfield development.  If the 
Government’s brownfield policy has over-constrained housing supply in the past, then it 
Table 3.1: Factors Affecting Land Supply, Barker Review (2004) 
 
 
•  In some areas, not enough land is allocated for development and/or the rate of land release is 
not responsive to market conditions and rising house prices.  Housebuilding is often 
politically contentious and assessing both the costs and benefits of development is difficult, 
as the incentives facing decision makers do not reflect those costs and benefits. 
 
•  Local costs of development can be high and those already housed have a much stronger 
voice than those in need of housing. Many of the Review’s recommendations aim to 
improve the framework within which development decisions are taken in this regard. 
 
•  There are also a number of barriers to the development of allocated land. For example, the 
availability of infrastructure, the costs and complexities sometimes associated with 
developing previously used (brownfield) land, weak incentives to bring land forward for 
development and the difficulties of site assembly where land ownership is fragmented. 
 
•  The housebuilding industry faces a range of significant market and planning risks.  This 
results in an industry that is reluctant to invest for the long term, to employ direct labour, 
and at times may hold back production rates. 
 
Source:  Barker (2004:15)  
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remains a crucial policy and research issue and will be returned to in the final Chapter of 
this thesis. 
 
The  UK  Government  is  clearly  committed  to  delivering  sustainable  development
23 
solutions through the regeneration of cites and the reuse of urban brownfield sites as the 
preferred location for new housing development.  The policy contribution that new housing 
looks  set  to  make  towards  achieving  the  goals  of  sustainable  development  places  the 
speculative housebuilding industry as one of the main partners in the delivery of the UK 
Government’s sustainability agenda.  Whether the organisational processes and cultures of 
UK speculative housebuilders match the nature of brownfield development remains to be 
seen, and will be the subject of the remainder of this thesis.  Indeed, the implications of a 
lack of capacity by UK housebuilders to deliver the Government’s sustainability agenda 
and brownfield agenda in particular, will be testing.  The discussion now moves on to 
explaining the brownfield development targets in England and Scotland.   
                   
3.4  Brownfield Development Targets in England and Scotland  
The role that brownfield development plays in the delivery of new homes in the devolved 
administrations of the UK differs
24.  Whilst England has a national brownfield target for 
annual new housebuilding completions, Scotland and Wales take a more relaxed approach 
and  both  seek  to  promote  the  reuse  of  brownfield  land  for  housing  in  preference  to 
                                                       
 
23 Although there is much debate in the literature over the contested and fuzzy nature of the concept of 
sustainable development, there is a general agreement that sustainable development should be understood as 
a  holistic  and  multidimensional  concept  (Hall  and  Pfeiffer  2000),  where  “…economic  prosperity,  social 
inclusion and environmental protection are seen as equally important” (Adams and Watkins 2002:59).   
24 The United Kingdom - a constitutional monarchy and unitary state - consists of four countries: England, 
Northern  Ireland,  Scotland  and  Wales.    Following  referendums  in  Scotland  and  Wales  in  1997,  and  in 
Northern  Ireland  in  1998,  the  UK  Parliament  transferred  a  range  of  powers  to  national  parliaments  or 
assemblies.  The Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly 
were established, and took control in 1999. The arrangements are different in the devolved administrations, 
‘…reflecting their history and administrative structures’ (http://www.direct.gov.uk).  The UK Government 
remains responsible for national policy on all matters that have not been devolved, including foreign affairs, 
defence, social security,  macro-economic  management and trade.  It is also responsible for Government 
policy in England on all the matters that have been devolved to Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland.  The 
UK Parliament is still able to pass legislation for any part of the UK, though in practice it only deals with 
devolved matters with the agreement of the devolved governments (http://www.direct.gov.uk).  For example, 
the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales can both pass legislation on the devolved 
subjects of housing and planning (http://www.scotland.gov.uk, http://www.direct.gov.uk).     
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greenfield sites (Scottish Executive 2003, National Assembly for Wales 2006)
25.   The 
effects of this different policy direction on the use of brownfield development for new 
housebuilding  will  be  interesting  to  note,  and  will  be  a  feature  of  this  research;  a 
comparative analysis of housebuilders operating in Scotland and England is the subject of 
the second half of the thesis
26.  As such, the remainder of this Chapter will focus on the 
brownfield policy approaches taken by England and Scotland.                
 
3.4.1  Brownfield development in England 
The Blair Administration introduced an English brownfield target with the publication of 
the Urban White Paper: Our Towns and Cities: the future – delivering an urban renaissance 
(DETR 2000a), which was enforced through the issuance of PPG3: Planning for Housing 
(DETR 2000b).  The brownfield target states “by 2008, 60% of new housing should be 
built on brownfield land or be provided by the conversion of existing buildings” (DETR 
2000b).  This was then replaced with the issuance of PPS3: Housing (DCLG 2006), and 
the original 60% target has since been adopted as a national annual target.  PPS3 states 
“The national annual target is that at least 60 per cent of new housing should be provided 
on previously developed land” (DCLG 2006:15).      
 
 
Since the inception of urban and planning policy favouring brownfield development, there 
has been a major shift in the delivery of new housing to brownfield sites in England.  In the 
                                                       
 
25  Whilst  this  research  acknowledges  that  devolution  has  led  to  slightly  (but  not  significantly)  different 
approaches  to  brownfield  policy,  further  divergence  of  the  devolved  administrations’  approaches  to 
brownfield  policy  may  present  implications  for  any  future  assessment  of  the  speculative  housebuilding 
industry’s capacity for brownfield development at the UK level.  This may require separate research to be 
conducted at the devolved administrative level. 
26 The justification behind this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
Table 3.2:  Proportion of new dwellings on previously-developed land (PDL)  
                  Including conversions, England 1996 – 2007 
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Source:  DCLG (2008:1)  
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11 years from 1996-2007, the proportion of new dwellings built on brownfield land has 
increased from 57% to 75%, with a peak output of brownfield land in 2006 at 76% of all 
new  dwellings.    Figure  3.1  shows  that  the  Government’s  60%  brownfield  target  was 
exceeded  in  2000,  and  has  since  continued  to  rise.    In  addition  to  the  increase  in  the 
proportion of dwellings built on brownfield land over the past 10 years, there has been a 
sharp  increase  in  the  density  of  those  dwellings.    Both  Figure  3.2  and  Table  3.3 
demonstrate this.    
 
Figure 3.1:  New Dwellings and Conversions on Previously Developed Land,  
England 1989-2007 
 
    Source: DCLG (2008:2) 
 
The development of previously used land for housing at higher densities has been both 
market-led and policy led (Adams and Watkins 2002).  Indeed, from a market perspective, 
the increasing rates of brownfield development must reflect both a certain level of financial 
preference for developers and a certain level of demand from consumers and investors.   
 
However, this Chapter has shown that brownfield development has also been policy-led.  
Figure  3.1  shows  how  brownfield  output  is  largely  congruent  with  the  Government’s 
policy  in  promoting  it.    Prior  to  the  original  60%  target  (DETR  2000a),  brownfield 
completions stayed below 60% and since 2000, they have continued to rise.  The interface 
between  policy-led  and  market-led  brownfield  development  will  be  returned  to  in  the  
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second part of the thesis, where the implications for the longevity of the ‘brownfield first 
agenda’ are discussed. 
 
Table 3.3: Density of New Dwellings, England 1995 – 2007 
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Figure 3.2:  Density  of  new  dwellings  built  on  PDL,  non-PDL  and  all  land, 
England 1989-2007 
 
Source: DCLG (2008:4) 
 
3.4.2. The stock and flow of brownfield land in England 
With regard to the stock and flow of brownfield sites in England, Table 3.4 presents data 
from the National Land Use Database and shows the total amount of previously developed  
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land in England has been decreasing since 2002, from 66,110ha to 63,490ha in 2005.  This 
reflects the upward trend of the flow of brownfield usage for housing since 1997.  Table 
3.4 also shows previously developed vacant land and derelict land and buildings make up a 
large proportion of the brownfield sites in England, whilst vacant buildings comprise a 
smaller proportion.         
 
In terms of the longevity of the role of brownfield development in the provision of new 
homes, the issue remains as to whether the stock and flow of brownfield land can be kept 
in balance, particularly in respect of the increasing need for more new homes in England 
(DCLG 2008).  Whether the planning system can produce an adequate flow of brownfield 
land in order to maintain, if not exceed, the 60% target remains a critical question.  The 
ability of the public sector to identify a continuous stock of brownfield land in order to 
maintain a steady flow of brownfield sites for development is crucial in the successful 
delivery of new homes.  Indeed, as the Barker Review (2004) highlighted, and as is shown 
in Table 3.1, constraints on land supply exist for brownfield land and the crucial policy 
challenge will be to remove these constraints as more brownfield land is taken up for 
development, in order to maintain a balanced flow of brownfield land.  The responsibility 
of housebuilders in identifying brownfield opportunities will also be of interest.            
 
This policy challenge is reflected in the current usage of brownfield land that has been 
identified by the Government.  Of the 27,600ha of brownfield land in England that was 
deemed by local planning authorities to be suitable for housing in 2005, 52% is currently in 
use (DCLG 2006:30).  Taking the remainder of that total, 48% (13,000ha), and multiplying 
it by the required density of new housing as shown in PPS3 (DGLG 2006), this equates to 
a total of 520,000 new homes that can be built on vacant and derelict land and buildings in 
England  considered  suitable  for  development.    This  then  means  that  120,000  of  those 
homes need to be built on brownfield sites, giving us roughly 4.3 years worth of land 
supply
27.  4.3 years worth of land would be viewed generally as a short to medium-term 
land supply by the speculative housebuilding industry (Ball 2006).  Thus, the current stock 
of  brownfield  land  could  be  considered  inadequate  for  the  long-term  brownfield 
                                                       
 
27 60% of 200,000 = 120,000 / 520,000 = 4.3 years.    
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development prospects of the private sector
28.  The public sector thus has the ability both to 
facilitate and constrain the delivery of housing on brownfield sites and this is of particular 
interest in this research.  As such, this issue will be returned to in the second part of the 
thesis.      
 
Table 3.4: Trends in previously developed land by land type, (hectares):  
                 England, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 
   
1998 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
Vacant and Derelict Land and  
Buildings (hectares) 
 
Previously developed vacant land 
14,860  14,730  15,680  14,610  14,100  13,920 
 
Derelict land and buildings 
19,340  21,140  19,960  20,550  19,870  18,720 
 
Vacant buildings 
 
4,310  4,990  5,070  4,550  4,200  3,920 
All Vacant and Derelict Land and 
Buildings 
 
38,510 
 
41,130 
 
40,710 
 
39,710 
 
38,170 
 
36,560 
 
Currently in Use 
(hectares) 
 
Allocated in a local plan or with 
planning permission for any use 
 
10,960 
 
14,030 
 
16,570 
 
17,580 
 
18,120 
 
18,920 
 
Known redevelopment potential but 
no planning allocation or 
permission 
 
 
8,240 
 
10,350 
 
8,830 
 
8,470 
 
7,840 
 
8,010 
All Currently in Use  19,200  24,380  25,400  26,050  25,960  26,930 
             
All Land Types  57,710  65,500  66,110  65,760  64,130  63,490 
Source: DCLG (2006b:24) 
 
Indeed, if only 13,000ha out of a total of 63,790ha of brownfield land is available for 
immediate use for housing, providing 4.3 years worth of supply, then this leaves 50,790ha 
of brownfield land that requires some level of public or private sector action to convert the 
development potential into an opportunity.  Public sector assistance is therefore likely to 
become more important in the future of brownfield land availability, particularly if the 
                                                       
 
28 Whilst this 4.3 years supply may not be financially viable for development by the private sector, the 
calculations given provide a useful indication of the stock and flow of brownfield development in the context 
of England’s policy promoting its use.    
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required rates of housing output identified in the housing green paper are to be achieved 
and more importantly maintained.     
 
Figure 3.3: Previously developed land suitable for housing by land type 2005:  
       27,600ha (44% of total PDL in England)  
 
 
Source: DCLG (2006b:7) 
 
Whilst the 60% brownfield development target has seemingly been achieved in England 
both within the originally proposed time limit of 2008 and the yearly target thereafter, it is 
now  important,  in  both  policy  and  academic  terms,  to  look  ahead  and  consider  the 
requirements for brownfield land in the provision of new housing in the next 10 to 15 
years.  The above discussion has shown that a policy challenge remains in maintaining an 
adequate  flow  of  brownfield  sites  for  housing  through  both  the  removal  of barriers to 
development  in  the  existing  stock  of  brownfield  land  and  the  identification  of  new 
brownfield  stock.  The  question  over  how  best  the  flow  of  brownfield  sites  can  be 
controlled in a manner that allows an adequate number of developable sites through the 
planning system therefore remains an important policy issue and one for future research.        
 
Whilst the growing demand for brownfield sites for housing is largely policy driven, it is 
clear that both builder and market demand are keeping some level of pace with this policy 
change.    Total  housing  completions  however  remain  low  compared  to  historical  rates 
though and this remains a significant policy issue at the time of writing.        
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3.4.3  Brownfield development in Scotland 
The  role  that  brownfield  land  plays  in  Scotland’s  housing  development  aspirations  is 
somewhat inconspicuous in comparison to England’s brownfield target.  SPP3: Planning 
for  Housing  states  that  “Planning  authorities  should  promote  the  re-use  of  previously 
developed land in preference to greenfield land, provided that a satisfactory residential 
environment  can  be  created”  (Scottish  Executive  2003:13).    This  position  is  further 
reinforced  in  the  Regeneration  Statement  (Scottish  Executive  2006),  where  Scotland’s 
approach  to  new  housing  development  is  also  brownfield  focused.    The  Statement’s 
emphasis  is  to  “promote  the  reuse  of  vacant  and  derelict  and  brownfield  land  for 
development, in preference to greenfield land” (Scottish Executive 2006:39).     
 
The reasons for the lack of a national brownfield target in Scotland are made clear in SPP3: 
Planning for Housing, which states, “the availability of previously developed sites varies 
across  the  country,  so  a  national  target  for  brownfield  residential  development  is  not 
appropriate.  However, targets may have practical value at the development plan level. 
Where  planning  authorities  set  targets  for  housing  on  brownfield  land,  they should be 
realistic and should normally be supported by the findings of a survey such as an urban 
capacity study” (Scottish Executive 2003:14).  
 
Figure 3.4 demonstrates this variance in the availability of vacant and  derelict land in 
Scotland.  It shows that North Lanarkshire and Glasgow City have the most urban vacant 
land  in  Scotland,  whilst  North  Lanarkshire,  Highland  and  Renfrewshire  have the most 
derelict land.  Midlothian, West Lothian and East Ayrshire have limited vacant urban land.  
The local authority with the highest amount of recorded derelict and urban vacant land is 
North Lanarkshire, which contains 1,399 hectares (14% of Scotland’s total). Glasgow City 
has the second highest amount with 1,268 hectares (12% of Scotland’s total) and Highland 
is third, with 1,044 hectares (10% of Scotland’s total) (SVDLS 2008:1).          
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Figure  3.4:  Derelict  and  Urban  Vacant  Land  by  Local  Authority,  Scotland, 
2007 
 
Source: SVDLS (2008:1) 
 
In Scotland, brownfield land is categorised into two main types: derelict and vacant land.  
Derelict land (and buildings) is that “which has been so damaged by development or use 
that it is incapable of being developed for beneficial use without rehabilitation, and which 
is not being used for either the purpose for which it is held, or for a use acceptable in a 
local plan. The main exceptions are operational sites where rehabilitation would not be 
possible or appropriate within five years, and land which is derelict through natural causes 
(for example, neglected woodland or farmland) and which appears to have blended into the 
landscape.  All sites where contamination is known or suspected are classed as derelict” 
(SVDLS 2008:4).  Vacant land “is located in urban settlements and is considered to display 
the characteristics of urban vacant land; that is, land which is unused or unsightly, or which 
would benefit from development or improvement.  The main exceptions are for land held 
for operational needs, agricultural land, urban fringe land and open space within the built 
up area, even where these offer the prospects of future development” (ibid).      
 
3.4.4  The stock and flow of brownfield land in Scotland  
With regard to the flow of brownfield sites in Scotland, in 2007 there were 10,240 hectares 
of derelict and urban vacant land, of which 74 % was classified as derelict (7,580 hectares).  
Overall, the total amount of urban vacant and derelict land in Scotland has shown a net 
decrease of 4 % since 2002, from 10,687 hectares in 2002 to 10,240 hectares in 2007 
(SVDLS 2008).         
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Table  3.6  shows  the  development  potential  of  this  derelict  and  urban  vacant  land  in 
Scotland;  it  shows  that  28%  of  all  derelict  land  with  known  development  potential  is 
developable in the short term, compared to 47% of  all urban vacant land with known 
development  potential.    The  SVDLS  (2008)  suggests  that  the  amount  of  short-term 
developable urban vacant land is higher than short-term developable derelict land because 
“…derelict  land  by  definition  requires  some  form  of  rehabilitation  before  new 
development  can  commence”  (p.23).    The  SVDLS  (2008)  considers  that  land  is 
developable in the short term “…if there is an expectation of development within 5 years” 
(p.29).  Overall, 33% of all derelict and urban vacant land within Scotland (with known 
development potential) is developable in the short term.    
 
Table 3.5: Derelict and Urban Vacant Land (UVL) (hectares), Scotland  
                1996-2007 
   
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
Derelict 
  
 
7,858 
 
7,787 
 
7,237 
 
7,148 
 
6,825 
 
7,767 
 
7,741 
 
7,638 
 
7,597 
 
7,480 
 
7,580 
 
Urban 
Vacant 
  
 
4,438 
 
4,250 
 
4,195 
 
3,897 
 
3,586 
 
3,155 
 
2,977 
 
2,891 
 
2,973 
 
2,905 
 
2,660 
 
Total  
 
12,296 
 
12,037 
 
11,432 
 
11,044 
 
10,411 
 
10,922 
 
10,717 
 
10,529 
 
10,570 
 
10,386 
 
10,240 
Source: SVDLS (2008:8-10) 
 
At the other end of the scale, 15 % of derelict land across Scotland was viewed as being 
uneconomic to develop
29, whilst 6% of urban vacant land is considered undevelopable.  
The ‘unknown’ values in Table 3.6 are accounted for “…due to a small number of local 
authorities being unable to provide development potential information for the majority (if 
not all) of their sites” (ibid.).        
 
 
                                                       
 
29 The SVDLS does not provide a definition for ‘uneconomic to develop’ but does suggest that the category 
is comprised of land that is seen by local authorities as being uneconomic to develop and (or) is viewed as 
suitable to reclaim for a 'soft' end use (i.e. non-built use) (SVDLS 2008).        
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Table 3.6: Development Potential of Derelict and Urban Vacant Land (UVL),                 
                  Scotland, 2007 
  Derelict 
Land 
 
% 
Urban  
Vacant 
Land 
 
% 
Total  
Derelict  
and UVL 
 
% 
 
Development Potential 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developable - Short Term 
 
1,720  28  1,154  47  2,875  33 
Developable - Medium Term 
 
2,497  40  694  28  3,191  37 
Developable – Undetermined 
 
1,051  17  473  19  1,525  18 
Uneconomic to develop 
 
930  15  147  6  1,077  12 
Unknown 
 
1,378  -  191  -  1,572  - 
Total 
 
7,480  100  2,905  100  10,386  100 
Source: SVDLS (2006:22)  
 
In terms of brownfield and greenfield completions in Scotland, the data is less readily 
available  than  in  England,  perhaps  due  to  the  lack  of  a  self  imposed  target  and  the 
corresponding lack of need to publicise the data in order to demonstrate politically positive 
policy results. Table 3.7 shows the number of dwellings completed on brownfield and 
greenfield sites in Scotland by the private sector from 2002-2005
30.  
 
Table 3.7: Number of Dwellings Completed on Brownfield/Greenfield (bf/gf)                              
                 Sites (private sector): Scotland 2002-2005  
   
Completed 
(all) 
 
Number 
with bf/gf 
info 
 
% with 
info 
 
Completed  
bf 
 
% bf 
 
Completed 
gf 
 
% gf 
2002  18,829  10,479  56  5,497  52  4,982  48 
2003  19,750  15,309  78  7,278  48  8,031  52 
2004  21,079  17,990  85  9,833  55  8,157  45 
2005  19,332  17,393  90  8,503  49  8,890  51 
Source:  Scottish Executive Development Department Analytical Services Division, 
 by email 
 
                                                       
 
30 More up-to-date figures have been difficult to access.    
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As Table 3.7 shows, not all dwelling completions have information pertaining to their 
greenfield  or  brownfield  status  (due  to  Local  Authorities  not  submitting  the  data).  
However, this has risen from 56% in 2002 to 90% in 2005, perhaps signifying the policy 
importance of the greenfield/brownfield development proportions.  The percentage of new 
dwellings developed on brownfield sites in Scotland appears to have teetered around the 
50% mark since 2002.  This represents a lower achievement in brownfield development 
rates for Scotland compared to England, and is likely due to the availability and location of 
previously developed land (refer to Figure 3.4) and the lack of target based policy.   
 
This section has shown that the development of brownfield land in England and Scotland 
has become increasingly prevalent.  It has also shown the increasingly significant role of 
brownfield  development  in  delivering  the  UK  Government’s  sustainable  development 
agenda.    Indeed,  the  promotion  of  urban  intensification  policies  centered  on  attracting 
people back into the cities through ‘residentialisation’ (Bromley et al 2005) is the hallmark 
of the UK’s urban regeneration agenda.  However, the predominant use of brownfield land 
for the delivery of new homes has been subject to critical assessment in both the public and 
private areas and the academic literature.  As such, the following section will critically 
consider the predominant use of brownfield land for the delivery of new homes in the UK.   
 
3.5  A  Critical  Assessment  of  the  UK  Government’s  ‘Brownfield  First’ 
Agenda in New Housing Provision 
Although the Government’s mission to create sustainable communities, with brownfield 
development as a key driver, has garnered support from many of the stakeholders involved 
in the speculative residential development process, there have been some challenges to this 
policy approach.  Whilst some have suggested that the 60% brownfield target should be 
increased to as much as 80%
31, others have called for an increase in the use of greenfield 
sites to help alleviate the problems of affordability and the unresponsiveness of supply to 
demand in the housing market.  This section therefore critically assesses the ‘brownfield 
first’ approach taken by the UK Government and is arranged by a number of key points 
that emerge from a review of the relevant literature and other publications.     
                                                       
 
31 CPRE (www.cpre.org).  
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3.5.1  Brownfield sites have diverse and often unique problems 
The previous use of a brownfield site and its subsequent previously developed features are 
often specific to the area in which it is located.  Indeed, the differing historical uses of land 
present  varying  and  often  unique  challenges.    For  example,  the  north  of  England  is 
characterised by a former manufacturing industry based on cotton and other mill functions, 
whereas the west of Scotland is characterised by ship building and its related industries.  
As such, brownfield sites in these two areas will have a diverse array of site-related issues 
and will in some cases be unique to the site or the site’s immediate locale.  In a review of 
both the academic literature and the policy discussions on the use of brownfield land for 
housing development, there appears to be an evident lack of a spatial element attached to 
the nature of brownfield land.         
  
In response to the spatial variation that brownfield development constraints can present, 
policy  solutions  for  the  use  of  brownfield  land  for  new  housing  are  not  sufficiently 
disaggregated  in  regional  or  local  levels  to  account  for  this  spatial  variation.  Further, 
sufficient  disaggregation  is  not  evident  on  a  site-by-site  basis  either.    More  workable 
solutions  may  be  available  if  brownfield  land  was  sufficiently  disaggregated.    Recent 
developments in local brownfield policy in England as a result of English Partnership’s 
National Brownfield Strategy, are encouraging and do demonstrate some level of bottom-
up policy formation.  Pilot brownfield land action plans and local brownfield strategies 
have recently been undertaken by a number of local authorities in England and seek to 
deliver  ‘economic  and  housing  strategies’  (www.englishpartnerships.co.uk).    However, 
these  are  only  in  the  embryonic  stages  and  still  require  significant  policy  lead  and 
encouragement.       
 
Aside from the diverse problems that characterise brownfield sites, diverse opportunities 
and social significance are also features of brownfield sites that should help determine 
what type of redevelopment on brownfield sites is suitable.  As such, one could consider 
England’s brownfield target to be a priori inflexible with respect to local and regional 
variations in the character of brownfield sites.     
  
 
 
 
57
3.5.2  Brownfield development is not synonymous with better design 
Tiesdell and Adams (2004) suggest that the development of greenfield and brownfield sites 
displays significant contrasts, and as a consequence, “…successful brownfield developers 
yield  opportunity  space  in  their  business  strategies  to  designers”  (p.23).    The  authors 
suggest that on brownfield sites, investment in better design is “a development necessity 
rather than a development choice” (p.25).  Tiesdell and Adams (2004) make clear that if 
viewing design as a means of overcoming obstacles and achieving a saleable product on a 
brownfield  site,  brownfield  developers  are  again  compelled  both  to  employ  skilled 
designers  and  to  yield  opportunity  space  to  them  (p.41).    The  assumptions  made  by 
Tiesdell and Adams (2004) that brownfield developments are likely to be better designed is 
an interesting one, but it is important to make clear that brownfield development should 
not always be considered synonymous with better design.       
 
3.5.3  Does market choice match the policies for urban living? 
The distorting effect of the UK Government’s promotion of policies for urban living on 
market choice is a very real issue and one that will become crucial to the success not only 
of  the  UK  Government’s  brownfield  policy  agenda  but  of  housebuilding  delivery  in 
general.  The extent to which the public policies promoting urban living and directing new 
housing development into the urban core are congruent with market choice is an interesting 
issue that perhaps demands further academic and policy work.  Indeed, the extent to which 
the planning system has distorted the market by ‘forcing’ builders to build on brownfield 
land at generally higher densities emphasises the argument over whether urban policies are 
economically or politically driven.         
 
The issues surrounding whether market choice matches the policies for urban living should 
become clearer over the coming years, when an increased proportion of new homes are 
delivered  on  previously  developed  land  within  urban  areas.    If  any  level  of  market 
saturation arises in urban areas and the level of unsold stock rises due to slow sales or lack 
of investor demand, then a mismatch between urban policy and the market will become 
clearer.  Some would argue that this is already the case in the Northern cities of Leeds and 
Manchester.  Adams and Watkins (2002) emphasise that the use of brownfield land for the 
majority of new homes in the UK is policy driven rather than market driven.  If the market  
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to any extent rejects the types of houses (and communities) built on previously used land, 
then a significant policy challenge will emerge.        
 
3.5.4  Alternative uses for brownfield land 
In England, the Brownfield Guide produced by English Partnerships makes clear that not 
all brownfield land is suitable for redevelopment (English Partnerships 2006).  Indeed, in 
some  instances  the  combined  economic  and  environmental  costs  of  redevelopment  are 
such that they outweigh the associated regeneration benefits. Brownfield land can also 
present a number of alternative functions; it can contain important habitats and may be able 
to make immense contributions to biodiversity for example, rather than being redeveloped 
for residential or commercial use; it can contain important historical buildings, providing 
heritage and cultural uses; also, a high percentage of brownfield sites are in the flood plain 
and  are  therefore  not  conducive  to  residential  or  commercial  redevelopment  (English 
Partnerships 2006:24).      
 
The  UK  Government’s  focus  on  the  property-led  regeneration  of  urban  areas  and  on 
delivering new homes primarily on brownfield sites could be argued to have promoted a 
narrow economic focus on the use of brownfield land.  If this is the case, then this focus 
could act as a barrier to the convergence of the economic, environmental and social goals 
of land reuse and sustainability.   
 
3.5.5  Brownfield development is not always sustainable 
Whilst brownfield development for housing is promoted by the UK Government as the 
most  sustainable  way  to  deliver  the  majority  of  new  homes  in  the  UK,  the  academic 
literature suggests that in some cases, this approach is not in fact sustainable.  Raco (2006) 
for  example,  suggests  that  the  label  brownfield  is  often  elided  with  sustainability  and 
inclusivity in ways that imply that almost any type of development will yield a public good 
(Raco  2006:508).    From  another  perspective,  Dixon  (2006)  suggests  that  the  UK 
speculative housebuilding industry has been slow in mainstreaming sustainability into their 
housebuilding activities and is merely paying lip service to the fundamentals of sustainable 
residential development.  The author concludes to say that a challenge remains to the UK 
speculative  housebuilding  industry  of  integrating  sustainability  into  brownfield 
development.      
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Pediatiti  et  al  (2005)  in  their  research  on  monitoring  the  sustainability  of  brownfield 
redevelopment projects, acknowledge that brownfield redevelopment is often considered to 
be de facto sustainable and presented as a headline sustainability indicator (see DETR 
1999).  However, the authors assert that many examples exist where the redevelopment of 
brownfield  sites  has  not  been  sustainable,  because  they  have  failed  to  assess  the 
environmental, social, economic and physical impacts holistically, as well as consider the 
long term impacts of such brownfield redevelopment projects in general (see also Little 
2005).    As  a  result,  the  authors  argue  that  there  is  a  significant  need  to  monitor  the 
sustainability of brownfield redevelopment projects by a participatory approach “…that 
allows the development of context-specific indicators in a holistic manner” (p.181).      
 
3.5.6  Is greenfield land sacrosanct?  
The  greenbelt  marked  its  50
th  anniversary  on  August  3
rd  2005  and  it  is  clear  that  the 
dynamic of cities have changed since the boundaries of the greenbelt were drawn up over 
50  years  ago.    Whilst  there  are  obvious  benefits  to  be  gained  from  building  at  high 
densities and on previously used land, Hall (2006) reminds us that greenfield sites are not a 
priori  sacrosanct,  but  rather,  provide  us  with  one  valuable  solution  to  remedying  the 
problems of the under supply of housing in the UK.  Hall (2006) suggests that not only is 
building primarily on brownfield sites inflexible in growth areas, he also suggests that 
present polices are already inhibiting housing completions.  He makes clear that there are 
too many flats being built on urban brownfield sites with no justification.  Hall (2006) 
concludes by suggesting that Government instead should be aiming for static or slowly 
rising trends in greenfield development plus a sharp increase in brownfield development.  
 
Allied to this argument is the need for increasing levels of affordability in the UK housing 
market.  Monk et al (2005) suggest that ‘…the overall supply of land for housing through 
the planning system severely constrains the total amount of affordable housing that can be 
secured’ (p.196).  As such, affordable housing units represent around just 10% of all new 
homes delivered in the UK per annum, which Monk et al (2005) indicate is far below the 
numbers required.  As affordable housing ‘…inherently requires some form of subsidy’ 
(Monk et al 2005:186), the use of greenfield release  as a mechanism for the planning 
system to increase not just housing numbers in general (see Hall 2006) but the delivery of  
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more  affordable  units  also,  seems  a  logical  premise.    Indeed,  as  Monk  et  al  (2005) 
estimate,  circa  15,000  new  affordable  homes  are  secured  by  the  planning system each 
year
32, then the potential for this to be increased through a mechanism of greenfield release 
is inviting, in theory at least.                   
 
Fyson  (2004)  suggests  that  the  restriction  on  greenfield  land  use  for  residential 
development has forced housebuilding too far away from major centres of employment and 
services, resulting in wasteful long distance travel.   Indeed, there is the argument that 
derelict or less scenically attractive greenbelt land could be used for housing development 
or commercial use and such removal from the greenbelt could be done without affecting 
the  integrity  of  the  greenbelt.    Without  such  flexibility,  Gill  (2004)  emphasises  that 
increasing  the  greenbelt  designation  runs  the  risk  of  pushing  development  beyond  it, 
increasing commuting distances to towns and cities and the need to provide transport links 
through an area that policy tries to protect in the first place.  A flexible application of the 
greenbelt policy would allow the use of neglected parts of the greenbelt for development, 
such as land that could be used for a sustainable purpose.   
 
However, a counter argument can be deduced: will a potential elasticity in the greenbelt 
remove the incentive for developers to concentrate on brownfield sites?  Further, will there 
be  a  gradual  undermining  of  the  greenbelt  principle  per  se,  as  certain  areas  may  be 
considered suitable for release and not others?  These issues will be considered in the final 
chapter of this thesis.     
 
3.5.7  Is urban intensification the most sustainable option? 
One of the key drivers of the sustainable communities plan is to create high-density mixed-
use  developments,  preferably  in  existing  urban  areas,  through  the  efficient  re-use  of 
previously developed land.  Brownfield development for housing therefore reflects a policy 
of urban compaction and containment.  However, to some, building communities at a high 
density provides no viable means of sustainable living.   
 
                                                       
 
32 Monk et al (2005) emphasise that whilst the validity of these figures are questionable, affordable units do 
represent 10% of new homes per annum in the UK.    
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Defined as “a relatively high density, mixed use city, based on an efficient public transport 
system and dimensions that encourage walking and cycling” (Newman and Kenworthy 
1996), the compact city is argued to be socially sustainable, as local facilities and services 
can be offered and maintained due to high population densities; in addition, accessibility to 
goods and services is more equitably distributed.  Increasing density also offers vitality and 
vibrancy,  and  promotes  opportunities  for  cultural  activities  and  social  interaction.  
Considering economic opportunities, the compact city offers concentration, the ability to 
rejuvenate and maintain local economies, with services and infrastructure being provided 
more efficiently (Williams 1999).  More so, the compact city is thought to offer many 
benefits  in  terms  of  environmental  sustainability;  by  building  on  brownfield  sites,  the 
countryside is protected through relieving the pressures of developing on rural lands.    
 
Similarly,  urban  intensification  offers  opportunities  for  emission  efficient  modes  of 
transport  such  as  cycling,  walking  and  public  transport,  leading  to  an  overall  reduced 
dependence on the car (Newman and Kenworthy 2000).  Bannister (1997) suggests that 
cities need to attract people back to them as they must form the basis for sustainable living 
because of the proximity  of facilities, the range of opportunities available, and for the 
possibility of short journeys by public transport, walking and cycling.    
 
However, not all advocate such urban intensification as the road to a sustainable urban 
form.    In  her  research,  Reza-Masnavi  (2000)  found  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  the 
compact city eliminates the necessity for using the car, since it is that form of transport 
used most frequently for going to work and for bulky shopping.  The author also found that 
there was no evidence to suggest that compact areas were necessarily associated with an 
increased  use  of  public  transport.    Jenks  (2000)  suggests,  as  there  are  a  variety  of 
components of intensification policies, “different aims mean that deriving conclusions is 
difficult; some aspects of intensification in some places have contributed to sustainability, 
whilst others clearly have not” (p.12).        
 
The route to the most sustainable urban form may not be solely one of compactness, but 
rather, a exercise in drawing on some of the positive aspects of urban intensification and 
considering  these  within  alternative  urban  forms,  such  as  dispersed  or  edge  cities  for 
example (Pressman and Minnery 1992).  Williams (2000) suggests that, although some 
aspects of intensification may represent a more sustainable use of land, the importance of  
 
 
 
62
defining  the  type  of  intensification  acceptable  to  local  residents  and  users  of  a  given 
locality is the key to determining whether the effect of intensification was seen as positive.  
Similarly, urban sustainability is not just dependent on focused ‘compact city’ planning 
policy  and  urban  form  alone;  huge  shifts  in  behaviour  and  attitudes  are  also  required 
(Simmonds  and  Coombe  2000),  as  well  as  the  consideration  of  aspects  such as social 
equity and desirability (Burton 2000).     
 
It is notable that urban intensification does offer some positive aspects when considering 
the  sustainability  of  the  urban  form,  but  these  need  to  be  considered  against  location 
specific and behavioural aspects of both the area and populations concerned if they are 
going to be successful.  Jenks et al (1996) suggest the search for the ultimate sustainable 
form now needs to be reoriented to the search for a number of sustainable urban forms, 
which  respond  to  a  variety  of  existing  settlement  patterns  and  contexts.    This  places 
emphasis on solutions appropriate for different scales and locations of development and 
acknowledges path dependency as an issue.  Indeed, as the authors suggest, if urban form 
has any role to play in the sustainable future, then it has to be not only theoretically valid, 
but achievable in real terms.   
 
Marvin and Guy (2000) suggest that such a multiplicity of pathways should stimulate a 
shift from a singular model outlook to one that considers multiple models of what the 
sustainable city might become.  Additionally, Jenks (2000) suggests that pathways aren’t 
ideal types but rather are contested in particular local contexts, as competing social actors 
‘grapple’ with the concept of sustainable development.   
 
The  above  section  has  shown  how  there  are  a  number  of  important  challenges  to  the 
fundamental  premise  of  the  UK  Government’s  brownfield  first  agenda  and  the  above 
critical analysis serves well to draw attention to the complexity of the issues concerning 
brownfield  development  in  principle  and  specifically,  the  delivery  of  new  homes  on 
brownfield land, through building at higher densities and in mainly urban areas.       
 
3.6  Chapter Conclusions  
The  Government  makes  clear  that  creating  sustainable  communities  everywhere  is  a 
challenging  task:  “It  requires  us  to  integrate  the  delivery  of  social,  economic  and  
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environmental goals, to take a co-ordinated approach to delivering public services that 
work for everyone, including the most disadvantaged, and to think strategically for the 
long-term” (HM Government 2005:119).  And, the above critical analysis serves well to 
draw attention to the complexity of the issues concerned with building at higher densities 
and in mainly urban areas.  Whilst there has been much grumbling from the housebuilding 
industry  over  the  forceful  nature  of  urban  policy  since  the  inception  of  the  Labour 
Government  and the resulting tightening of the  regulatory  environment  (Adams 2004), 
there have also been challenges to the concept of the compact city.  Building at higher 
densities and mainly in urban areas, whilst ticking all the boxes of what it means to be 
sustainable, can yield an array of unwelcome and undesirable offspring.   
 
It  is  clear  that  brownfield  development  needs  to  be  set  within  wider  development 
objectives and policy agendas if it is to deliver extensive urban regeneration.  Indeed, the 
urban and the environmental are being reconnected in various ways, “…with potentially 
far-reaching implications for our understanding of the dynamics of urban politics whether 
oriented to growth or distribution” (Raco 2006:553).  Ultimately, brownfield development 
has to be refocused “…to create more socially and environmentally beneficial outcomes” 
(Raco  2006:508)  and  provides  a  rare  opportunity  for  environmental  and  community 
development  goals  to  converge  (Depass  2006).    And,  any  sustainable  housing  system 
“…must  incorporate  social,  economic  and  environmental  sustainability  in  a  mutually 
reinforcing  way”  (Brown  and  Bhatti  2003:510).    The  continued  commitment  by 
Government to brownfield development, the principles of the greenbelt and the increase in 
the density of new dwellings, coupled with the requirements for higher quality design and 
sustainable construction, will significantly control the location, quantity and quality of all 
new housebuilding and alter the overall direction of housing development in the UK.  The 
impacts of this on the success of the UK Government’s brownfield development agenda 
will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.      
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE  CHALLENGE  OF  BROWNFIELD  DEVELOPMENT  TO  THE  UK  SPECULATIVE 
HOUSEBUILDING INDUSTRY 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The development of brownfield sites is intended to produce an array of economic, social 
and  environmental  benefits  in  line  with  the  principles  of  sustainable  development.  
However, previously developed land exhibits hazards, usually the result of human activity, 
which are not normally encountered on greenfield sites (Leech and Goodger 1991:21).  As 
a result, returning brownfield land back to beneficial use can be complicated by an array of 
ground  related  and  institutional  issues,  which  can  be  viewed  as  either  constraints  or 
opportunities  depending  on  the  perception  of  risk  tolerability  by  UK  speculative 
housebuilders.    As  such,  this  Chapter  identifies  and  explores  the  most  prevalent  risks 
associated with the speculative use of previously developed ‘brownfield’ land for housing 
and presents a new categorisation of brownfield risks.  The Chapter then discusses the role 
of perception in risk tolerability and considers how brownfield risks can be viewed as both 
constraints  and  opportunities  by  housebuilders.    Finally,  the  discussion  considers  the 
impact  of  these  risks  on  the  conventional  business  strategies  of  UK  speculative 
housebuilders.  Before this, the initial focus of the Chapter outlines the importance of 
acknowledging the differing spatial configuration of brownfield land in the UK.                     
 
4.2  The Differing Spatial Configuration of Brownfield Land in the UK 
Prior to any discussion on the speculative redevelopment of brownfield land for housing, it 
is important to recognise the differing spatial configuration of brownfield land in the UK 
and to acknowledge that most brownfield sites possess their own unique amalgamation of 
opportunities  and  constraints.    Figure  4.1  demonstrates  the  spatial  configuration  of 
brownfield land in England and shows the amount of previously developed land by type by 
region (for a Scottish comparison, refer back to Chapter 3).  It indicates that the North 
West of England holds not only the most previously developed land, but also the greatest 
proportion of vacant and derelict land and buildings in England.  In comparison, the South  
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East  of  England  has  the  greatest  proportion  of  brownfield  land  currently  in  use  with 
planning permission or allocation for redevelopment, whereas the East of England has the 
largest  amount  of  brownfield  land  currently  in  use  with  known  potential  for 
redevelopment.     
 
Figure 4.1: Amounts by region by type of previously developed land, England 
2006 
 
Source:  Land Use Change Statistics, 2006 (DCLG 2007:10)  
 
This differing spatial configuration of brownfield land in the UK represents a challenge to 
both  policy  makers  and  housebuilders.    It  indicates  that  success  in  the  speculative 
redevelopment of brownfield sites for housing requires specifically tailored approaches by 
both  housebuilders  and  policy  makers,  to  account  for  the  unique  array  of  market, 
regulatory  and  physical  risks  that  exist  as  well  as  the  local  and  regional contexts that 
influence the nature of these.  It is therefore important not to reify brownfield land in its 
spatial  configuration  nor  in  terms  of  risks,  constraints  and  opportunities.   Rather,  it is 
imperative to provide the opportunity for national, regional and local policy makers to 
develop strategies for enabling the reuse of previously developed land for housing, which 
are tailored to regional and/or local policy needs.  This issue is returned to in the second 
part of the thesis.          
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Table 4.1:  Redeveloped Brownfield Sites and their Previous Uses  
Previous/Historical Use  Contaminants  Proposed Use of Site 
 
 
Brickworks, shallow mine 
workings, road haulage, 
made ground. 
 
Heavy metals
33, hydrocarbons.  
 
Development of 3 & 4bedroom detached 
houses. 
 
Cotton mill, bleach works, 
oil seals manufacture. 
 
Heavy metals, hydrocarbons. 
 
Private housing for rent.     
 
Dye works, chemical works, 
railway, cattle pens, coal 
merchants, electric light 
bulb manufacture, oil depot, 
scrap year. 
 
Heavy metals, hydrocarbons, 
methane, mineral oil and soil 
contamination.  
 
Housing with private gardens, managed 
housing, non-residential development and 
leisure open space. 
 
Iron works, lime kiln dock, 
timber yard, gas works. 
 
 
Heavy metals, sulphates, 
ammoniac nitrogen. 
 
Luxury apartments plus commercial use. 
 
Landfill site. 
 
 
Methane and heavy metals. 
 
Housing Association, rented and for sale, 
children’s home. 
 
Petrol filling station and 
motor vehicle workshop. 
 
 
Hydrocarbons, heavy metals. 
 
Detached executive homes. 
 
Rail yard forming part of 
town gas works. 
 
 
Gas works wastes related to 
coke and coal handling.  
 
Housing Association rented and private 
sale, apartments and houses. 
 
Road Haulage. 
 
 
Arsenic and gas works waste, 
including tarry ash with 
occasional spent oxide 
fragments, petroleum 
hydrocarbon, zinc, cyanide 
and sulphate.   
 
 
Private for sale and elderly persons 
bungalows. 
 
Ship building works. 
 
 
Heavy metals. 
 
Housing association rented and shared 
ownership, private housing for sale plus 
commercial use and open space.  
 
Timber mill. 
 
Heavy metals, polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbons, 
sulphates.   
 
Housing association, shared ownership. 
 Source:  Adapted from Syms and Knight (2000) 
 
                                                       
 
33 The most common heavy metals found in Syms and Knight (2000) research included: arsenic, copper, lead, 
nickel, zinc, chromium, cadmium, and mercury.  
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Table 4.1, adapted from Syms and Knight (2000), provides a useful illustration of the 
differing nature of brownfield sites and shows a wide range of previous and historical uses, 
the main contaminants associated with these previous uses and the proposed use of the site 
once remediation was undertaken.   
 
4.3  Principal Risks in the Speculative Development of Brownfield Land for 
Housing 
Whilst  the  previous  section  has  show  there  to  be  a  differing  spatial  configuration  of 
brownfield land across the UK, in addition to a range of risks associated with this type of 
development, it is undoubtedly useful to categorise these risks.  In addition to providing a 
useful synopsis of the main risks in the speculative development of brownfield land for 
housing, a category of risks will also facilitate the evaluation of the impact of brownfield 
development on the conventional business strategies of UK speculative housebuilders in 
the second part of this thesis.     
 
The term ‘risk’ is defined in a variety of different ways depending on the discipline.  From 
a property investment perspective, Hargitay and Shi-Ming Yu (1993) simply define risk as 
‘…the extent to which the actual outcome of an action or decision may diverge from the 
expected outcome.  An action or decision is described as risk-fee when its consequences 
are known with certainty’ (p.35).  In reference to UK speculative housebuilding, Bramley 
et al (1995) define risk in economic terms, in respect of the cycle of demand for property 
and the large amount of capital housebuilders have to invest in land and development prior 
to production.  The authors suggest ‘…together, with the volatility of the market, this 
makes the industry exceptionally risky’ (p.88).  From a strategic management perspective, 
Johnson et al (2005) suggest risk ‘…concerns the probability  and consequences of the 
failure of strategy.  This risk can be particularly high for organisations with major long-
term programmes of innovation or where high levels of uncertainty exist about key issues 
in the environment’ (p.369).   
 
Both  Bramely  et  al’s  (1995)  and  Johnson  et  al’s  (2005)  definitions  of  risk  suitably 
encapsulate the inherent risks in UK speculative housebuilding of market uncertainty and 
the lack of innovation in product and process (see Chapter 2).  As such, this places UK 
speculative housebuilding as an inherently risky and volatile industry.               
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The  literature  provides  a  number  of  differing  categorisations  of  risk  in  respect  of  the 
redevelopment of brownfield land for housing.  The terminology used in the literature also 
varies, and most commonly includes ‘risk’, ‘barrier’, ‘hazard’ and ‘constraint’.   It is clear 
from  a  review  of  the  literature  that  ‘risk’  has  emerged  to  become  synonymous  with 
‘barrier’ or ‘constraint’ in the brownfield development literature, which may have caused a 
negative stigma to issues surrounding brownfield redevelopment in general.  Whilst the 
nature of speculative housebuilding is inherently risky in itself, a review of the literature 
demonstrates that risk is firmly in the spotlight of brownfield redevelopment.  As a result, 
the term ‘risk’ will be used in place of ‘barrier’ or ‘constraint’, for the following three 
reasons: 
 
•  To account for the negative perception of brownfield as a barrier or constraint.  
•  To remove the innate negative stigma of brownfield development that has emerged 
in discussions of speculative brownfield development. 
•  To allow ‘risk’ to be viewed as a constraint or an opportunity, depending on the 
perception of risk tolerability.   
 
This research therefore contributes in moving the brownfield development debate away 
from the negative stigma that the terms ‘constraint’, ‘hazard’, and ‘barrier’ impose.  This is 
undoubtedly  important  in  altering  the  perception  of  risk  tolerability  of  speculative 
housebuilders and other users of brownfield land, such as potential institutional investors.  
The  discussion  will  now  turn  to  the  varying  and  competing  categorisations  of  risk  in 
preparation for establishing a new categorisation of brownfield risks.     
 
The hazards of a derelict site “…impose constraints on the freedom of action, not only on 
the contractor in site operations but also, more fundamentally, on the choice of a suitable 
development  sites  as  well  as  on  the  statutory  authority  in  giving  planning  consent.  
Protection of the environment may dictate what form of reclamation is permissible and the 
means of disposal of dangerous material.  Safety of the works and future occupants may 
require a measure of over design, while the protection of site workers will demand time-
consuming and costly safety procedures” (Leech and Goodger 1991:23).  Therefore, the 
suitability of a site for a particular form of development will depend on the presence, or 
otherwise, of hazards that are likely to affect the end use created by development.  There  
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may be a great number of hazards on a given site, but relatively few are likely to affect a 
particular end use, and not all of these will be of sufficient intensity to pose a threat (Leech 
and Goodger 1991).    
 
Charles et al (2002)
34 discuss the main ground-related risks that are commonly associated 
with previously used land that can affect its development for housing.  The authors classify 
the main ground related hazards encountered on brownfield sites as ground movement, 
vulnerability of construction materials to aggressive ground conditions, gas migration and 
subterranean fires.  They also highlight concern over the potential migration of liquid or 
gaseous  contamination  from  a  site.    Leech  and  Goodger  (1991)  suggest  that  whilst 
contamination  is  usually  shallow  and  the  ground  is  often  well  compacted,  deep  and 
massive foundations, buried tanks, and services often remain as obstacles to development.  
In addition, some contaminants may react dangerously when disturbed or upon change in 
the water table.   
 
Donovan et al (2005) categorise barriers to sustainable urban regeneration as ‘perceptual’, 
‘institutional’  and  ‘economic’,  which  the  authors  suggest  seems  to  fit  the  range  of 
challenges to sustainability identified by urban development practitioners in their research.  
The authors suggest that economic imperatives exacerbate the institutional and perceptual 
barriers  to  sustainability  “…as  actors  fall  back  into  established  ways  of  working  and 
designing rather than trying to engage with the plethora of possibilities that sustainable 
development offers” (pp.21-22).  This work demonstrates the often inter linked and inter 
dependent  nature  of  the  risks  in  brownfield  development  and  urban  regeneration.  
Therefore, it is important to make clear that risks should not themselves be isolated in their 
potential impact or effect.     
 
With  specific  regard  to  the  speculative  redevelopment  of  brownfield  land for housing, 
Adams  and  Watkins  (2002)  categorise  brownfield  development  ‘constraints’  into  three 
types: planning, physical and ownership
35.  The authors also discuss the nature of demand 
                                                       
 
34 The authors are employees of the Building Research Establishment (BRE), the National Housebuilding 
Council (NHBC) and the Construction Research Communications (CRC).   
35 Adams’ earlier work (see Adams et al 1988) also considers price constraints in addition to ownership, 
planning  and  physical  constraints.    Price  constraints  were  suggested  to  be  largely  related  to  vendors’ 
expectations of site values being considerably higher than that which any developer is prepared to pay. This  
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for brownfield land and consider how ‘user’, ‘developer’ and ‘investor’ demand can be 
constraining but can also be stimulated by the appropriate institutional measure (p.235).  
Adams and Watkins (2002) therefore consider ‘developer’, ‘user’ and ‘investor’ attitudes 
and behaviours as a constraining force on the development of brownfield land.  Table 4.2 
summarises the main planning, physical and ownership constraints identified by Adams 
and Watkins (2002).  
 
In research commissioned by RICS in 1999 into the barriers to residential development, 
McGarty et al (1999) found that the most important risks identified by housebuilders were 
the nature and extent of contamination.  Other significant issues were found to be planning 
approval  (due  to  the  length  and  inflexibility  of  the  process),  the  time  involved  in  the 
brownfield development process, lack of funding opportunities, the negative perception of 
land and property after remediation, and market demand.  Whilst their research does not 
offer a precise categorisation of the risks, it does identify similar issues to those raised by 
Adams and Watkins (2002).   
 
From  an  American  comparative  view,  Ellerbush  (2006)  identifies  a  number  of 
predominantly  institutional  and  financial  barriers  to  brownfield  redevelopment
36.    He 
suggests that liabilities associated with former industrial properties are foremost among the 
principal barriers to redevelopment, where “…local governments have faced potential risk-
based decisions of choosing to either forgo tax income or condemning property only to 
face  federal  of  state  driven  cleanups  that  cost  many  times  the  value  of  the  property” 
(p.564).  And, along the same lines, the author also notes that developers and investors 
may view the risk of future liability as too great to get involved in the redevelopment of 
brownfield land.       
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
constraint has since been incorporated into the understanding of ownership constraint as outlined in Adams et 
al (2001:460).     
36 See DeSousa (2006) and DePass (2006) for a good overview of the brownfield redevelopment process 
from an American context, including federal policy and the role of the US Environmental Protection Agency 
and Superfund.    
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  Table 4.2: Physical, Planning and Ownership Constraints in Brownfield  
                  Development for Housing by UK Speculative Housebuilders  
 
Planning 
•  No automatic presumption in favour of developing suitable brownfield sites. 
•  Unrealistic protection of potential housing sites for future employment use. 
•  Outdated development plans, particularly in urban areas. 
•  Inappropriate planning gain requirements. 
•  Local resident opposition to development that can exceed that on greenfield sites. 
•  Delay and inconsistency in planning appeal decisions. 
•  Potential local opposition and NIMBYISM. 
•  Lack of congruence between development briefs and planning permission requirements. 
 
Physical    
•  Substantial underground obstructions such as old foundations or machinery bases and 
redundant services. 
•  Threat of contamination and the associative perceived financial and/or legal risk in dealing 
with it. 
•  Lack of an effective institutional framework for remediation activities in which all parties 
can have confidence. 
•  New development must be carefully woven into the existing urban fabric.  
•  Vehicular access may be hard to provide unless adjoining land can be purchased. 
•  Site size. 
•  Nature of soil and top soil. 
•  Topography. 
•  Relief.  
•  Prospective site attractiveness. 
 
Ownership  
•  Difficulty of site assembly due to unknown or unclear ownership. 
•  Ownership rights may be divided: the power of freehold owners to sell development land 
with immediate vacant possession may be restricted by lesser rights in the same land. 
•  Ownership assembly may be required for development. 
•  Owners may be willing to sell but not on terms acceptable to potential purchasers. 
•  Reluctance of owners to sell sites (expectation of higher gains in the future). 
•  Disjointed land ownerships and multiplicity of tenure rights act as a serious deterrent  (Adair 
et al 1998 quoted in Adams and Watkins 2002:230). 
 
Source: Adapted from Adams and Watkins (2002:226-231) 
 
Ellerbush (2006) suggests other barriers to the redevelopment of brownfield land
37.  These 
include: 
                                                       
 
37  McCarthy  (2002)  also  provides  a  useful  overview  of  these  similarly  identified  barriers  to  private 
brownfield development from an American perspective.  The author suggests that liability for contamination, 
uncertain  cleanup  standards,  availability  of  funding  for  redevelopment  and  complicated  regulatory 
arrangements all act as barriers to successful private brownfield redevelopment (see pp.289-292).    
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•  Chain  of  title  liability  uncertainty –  prospective  property  owners  could  be  held 
responsible for contamination they did not produce. 
•  Lender uncertainty – lenders could be held responsible through their association 
with property owners who become legally responsible. 
•  Clean up costs and cost uncertainty – long transaction and negotiation processes 
and lack of clear cleanup end points. 
•  The lack of predictable outcomes and therefore greater uncertainty.  
•  The lack of familiarity with manoeuvring through the complexity of community 
projects.   
 
Syms  (Syms  1997,  Syms  1999,  Syms  2001,  Syms  and  Knight  2000)  has  identified  a 
number  of  key  risks  in  using  brownfield  land  for  housing  and  generally  recognises 
physical, economic, regulatory and social factors in the redevelopment of brownfield land 
for housing.  However, Syms (2001) mentions a few more general issues associated with 
brownfield redevelopment, which are worthy to note and include: 
 
•  Environmental  concerns:  groundwater  reformation,  groundwater  quality,  soil 
quality, air quality, prevalence of contaminative land uses in the vicinity.   
•  Community matters: the location of the site within the settlement, the supply of and 
demand for development land, the image and homogeneity of the settlement, the 
municipal structure, and time constraints. 
•  Transport  issues:  the  proximity  of  disposal  and  supply  systems,  connections  to 
local  road  networks,  connections  to  motorway  network  and  public  transport 
services.  
•  Managing  the  supply  of  development  land:  many  different  factors  affect  these, 
including supply and demand, and availability.   
•  Valuing brownfield land: problems with land that falls outside the legal definition 
of contaminated land but nevertheless contains contaminative substances.      
 
Syms (1999) provides a detailed overview of the main factors affecting the speculative 
development of brownfield land for housing, from the point of view of a cross section of 
development  process  professionals  including  surveyors,  residential  and  commercial  
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developers, town planners, lawyers, engineers, architects and other professions
38.  This is 
shown  in  Figures  4.2  and  4.3  as  the  most  important  and  least  important  respectively.  
Figure 4.2 shows that site-specific contamination including the migration, soil quality, and 
health risks associated with that contamination are the most important factors affecting the 
redevelopment of brownfield land.   
 
Figure  4.2:  Most  important  brownfield  factors:  percentage  of  respondents 
considering factor very important or important  
 
Source:  Syms (1999:496) 
 
Figure  4.3  shows  that  the  least  important  factors  in  affecting  the  redevelopment  of 
brownfield  land  are  political  composition  of  the  local  authority,  fuel  consumption  in 
remediation  treatment  process,  and  the  environmental  risk  of  transporting development 
waste.    These  issues  are  largely  institutional  factors  affecting  the  development  of 
brownfield land for housing.   
 
                                                       
 
38 In this research Syms (1999) makes clear that the poor response rate  from developers  meant that an 
intended comparison between developers was abandoned due to lack of statistical robustness.  Thus, the 
sample did not facilitate inter-group comparisons.    
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Figure 4.3: Least important brownfield factors: percentage of respondents 
considering factor very important or important 
 
Source: Syms (1999:497) 
 
Shephard and Dixon (2004) highlight the potential impact of the EU Landfill Directive on 
the take up of contaminated sites in the UK, suggesting that it increases risk.  This is 
because since 16
 July 2004, the Directive banned the co-disposal of hazardous and non-
hazardous  waste  resulting  in  a  radically  reduced  number  of  sites  permitted  to  accept 
hazardous waste.  Shephard and Dixon (2004) also found that post-remediation stigma 
amongst purchasers, valuers and lenders was considered to be a significant issue by both 
housebuilders and commercial property developers.  This has negative spin-offs in terms of 
the risk attached to marketing and successfully selling homes built on brownfield sites, 
contaminated ones in particular.   
 
4.4  Developing a Renewed Classification of Brownfield Risks 
Having identified the principal risks involved in the development of brownfield land for 
housing as documented in the existing literature, this section amalgamates these risk to 
present a new classification system, which best reflects the aim and objectives of the thesis.   
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Table 4.3:  The Main Risks of Developing Brownfield Land for Housing by UK   
                  Speculative Housebuilders 
Perceptual Risks 
•  Post-remediation stigma of land and property after remediation by purchasers, valuers and lenders, 
including view from adjoining sites. 
•  Negative perceptions by potential purchasers affecting marketing and sales of units, including human 
health risks, attractiveness and image of the site and other social issues. 
•  Political composition of local authority. 
•  Prospective and/or perceived site attractiveness prior to acquisition and development.   
•  Socio-cultural issues regarding perception of previously used land. 
•  Incomplete or lack of knowledge of definitions and information regarding contamination of sites 
within decision making organisations and wider population. 
•  Gap between knowledge and action. 
•  Housebuilders perceptions of their skills capacity and suitability to deal with brownfield sites.      
 
Physical Risks 
•  Migration of contaminants. 
•  Nature and quality of the soil and top soil. 
•  Air quality. 
•  Environmental risk of transporting waste. 
•  Substantial underground obstructions, including old foundations, piles and redundant services. 
•  Threat of further contamination and financial and/or legal risk in dealing with it. 
•  Existing urban fabric. 
•  Vehicular access (ransom strips). 
•  Size of the site. 
•  Topography of the site and its associative limitations. 
•  Difficulty in identifying site ownership and potential for ransom strips. 
 
Institutional Risks  
Land 
•  Disjointed land ownership and multiplicity of tenurial rights and associative site assembly problems. 
•  Reluctance of owners to sell land in general and on terms acceptable by purchasers. 
•  Lack of effective institutional framework for remediation activities in which all parties have 
confidence. 
•  Planning. 
•  No automatic presumption in favour of developing suitable brownfield sites. 
•  Unrealistic protection of potential housing sites for future employment use. 
•  Lower certainty associated with brownfield sites in terms of delivery times and cost requirements.   
•  Outdated development plans, particularly in urban areas. 
•  Inappropriate planning gain requirements. 
•  Local resident opposition to development that can exceed that on greenfield sites. 
•  Delay and inconsistency in planning appeal decisions. 
•  Potential local opposition and ‘nimbyism’. 
•  Lack of congruence between development briefs and planning permission requirements. 
Other 
•  Lack of joined up support, integration of objectives and activities between and within institutions. 
•  Lack of institutional funding for the redevelopment of severely contaminated sites. 
•  Lack of insurance availability for severely contaminated sites. 
•  Delays associated with utilities providers. 
 
       Source: Own Analysis 
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This classification system is then used in assessing the potential effects of the brownfield 
development  policy  agenda  on  the  conventional  business  strategies  of  UK  speculative 
housebuilders.       
 
Table 4.3 identifies the categorisation of risks and provides a useful synopsis of the risks 
associated with brownfield development based on a review of the literature.  Perceptual 
risks relate to risks that are less tangible but which remain significant in their effect.  These 
risks are largely based on speculative housebuilders’ perceptions and they demonstrate that 
the  gap  in  knowledge  and  reality  can  serve  to  negatively  influence  the  success  of 
brownfield development for housing.  Physical risks account for the ground related issues 
pertaining  to  the  speculative  redevelopment  of  previously  used  land  for  housing.  
Institutional risks incorporate those risks that relate to the external environment in which 
speculative housebuilders operate, such as the land market and planning contexts.  
 
It is important to make clear that not all risks are relevant to all brownfield sites and some 
risks  are  site-specific  (Barker  2003).    As  such,  Table  4.4  presents  the  principal  risks 
identified  in  Table  4.3  and  categorises  them  into  site  specific  and  generic  risks.    The 
categorisation  of  brownfield  risks  based  on  their  site-specific  nature  facilitates  the 
formulation of responses to these risks, whether they are policy responses, institutional 
responses or housebuilder responses.   
 
Table  4.4  shows  that  perceptual  risks  tend  to  be  both  site-specific  and  generic.    For 
example, local residents’ negative perceptions tend to be a site-specific risk, whilst more 
general socio-cultural risks concerning the contaminative issues facing  brownfield land 
reuse generally affect all brownfield sites.  It is, of course, possible for generic perceptions 
to shape local acceptability of the risks associated with using brownfield land for housing 
as well as site-specific risks.  Physical risks tend largely to be site-specific in nature.  There 
are a few generic risks associated with the physical risks of brownfield sites and those that 
do  exist  relate  largely  to  general  ownership  constraints.    Institutional  risks  are  largely 
generic in nature and may therefore require institutional assistance to negate their effects.  
Any  site-specific  institutional  risks  that  exist  may  require  a  mixture  of  public  sector 
intervention and the development of core competencies by housebuilders to mitigate or 
alleviate them. 
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Table 4.4:  Site Specific and Generic Risks in Speculative Residential  
                 Brownfield Development 
Site Specific Risks 
 
Generic Risks 
Perceptual Risks 
•  Post-remediation stigma of land and property by 
purchasers, valuers and lenders, including view from 
adjoining sites. 
•  Negative perceptions by potential purchasers affecting 
marketing and sales, including human health risks, 
attractiveness and image of the site.  
•  Political composition of local authority. 
•  Prospective and/or perceived site attractiveness prior 
to acquisition and succeeding commencement of 
development.  
 
Perceptual Risks 
•  Socio-cultural issues regarding perception of previously used 
land. 
•  Incomplete or lack of knowledge of definitions and information 
regarding contamination of sites within decision making 
organisations and wider population. 
•  Gap between knowledge and action. 
 
 
 
 
Physical Risks 
•  Migration of contaminants. 
•  Nature and quality of the soil and top soil. 
•  Air quality. 
•  Environmental risk of transporting waste. 
•  Substantial underground obstructions, including old 
foundations, piles, machinery bases and redundant 
services. 
•  Threat of further contamination and financial and/or 
legal risk in dealing with it. 
•  Existing urban fabric. 
•  Vehicular access (ransom strips). 
•  Size of the site. 
•  Topography of the site and its associative limitations. 
 
Physical Risks 
•  Difficulty in identifying site ownership and potential for 
ransom strips. 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Risks 
•  Inappropriate planning gain requirements. 
•  Local resident opposition to development that can 
exceed that on greenfield sites. 
•  Potential local opposition and ‘nimbyism’. 
•  Lack of congruence between development briefs and 
planning permission requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Risks 
•  Disjointed land ownership and multiplicity of tenurial rights and 
its associative site assembly problems. 
•  Reluctance of owners to sell land in general and on terms 
acceptable by purchasers. 
•  Lack of effective institutional framework for remediation 
activities in which all parties have confidence. 
•  No automatic presumption in favour of developing brownfield 
sites. 
•  Unrealistic protection of potential housing sites for future 
employment use. 
•  Outdated development plans, particularly in urban areas. 
•  Delay and inconsistency in planning appeal decisions. 
•  Lack of joined institutional support and integration of objectives 
and activities between and within institutions. 
•  Lack of institutional funding severely contaminated sites. 
•  Lack of insurance for severely contaminated sites. 
•  EU Landfill Directive. 
•  Delays associated with utilities providers. 
•  Lower certainty associated with brownfield sites in terms of 
delivery times and cost requirements.   
Source:  Own Analysis 
 
Having  identified  the  principal  risks  that  exist  in  the  speculative  redevelopment  of 
brownfield land for housebuilding, it is now important to consider the role of perception in 
the tolerability of these risks in any assessment of speculative housebuilders’ response to 
the brownfield development agenda.  This will now be discussed.     
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4.5  The Role of Perception in Risk Tolerability  
Of  course,  any  speculative  development  is  risky  and  therefore  inherently  difficult  to 
consider risk free.  Risk therefore has a normal business role.  This is particularly so with 
speculative  residential  development,  a  process  that  often  involves  large  amounts  of  up 
front  capital,  potential  time  delays  where  planning  permissions  are  required  and  more 
notably,  the  requirement  of  planning  obligations,  which  can  render  a  development 
financially unviable.  Housebuilders’ perception of brownfield risks therefore undoubtedly 
shape their tolerability towards those risks and subsequently their willingness to undertake 
brownfield  development.    As  such,  risk  can  therefore  be  viewed  as  a  constraint or an 
opportunity by housebuilders, depending on their perception of risk tolerability, which is 
influenced by their confidence, willingness and skills.     
 
As the UK speculative housebuilding industry is typically risk averse in its operations and 
business  strategies  (see  Chapter  2),  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  influence  of  ‘risk 
perception’ on the tolerability of brownfield development will be a significant issue to UK 
speculative housebuilders in their decision to build on brownfield sites.  However, with the 
steady increase in the percentage of new homes built on brownfield land since 2000 (see 
Chapter  3),  perhaps  the  consideration  of  what  risk  is  tolerable  to  housebuilders  in 
brownfield  development  has  shifted,  with  the  gap  between  perception  and  reality  in 
brownfield risk gradually decreasing.  This might be due to housebuilders growing their 
brownfield  skills  base  as  they  develop  fresh  competencies  to  deal  with  brownfield 
redevelopment.  However, as Chapter 3 identified, the uptake of hardcore brownfield sites 
remains low, and undoubtedly the perception of risk tolerability is an influence on this.   
 
As such, closing the gap between the perception and reality of risk is one of the most 
important  aspects  for  brownfield  development  success.    Raco  (2006)  suggests  that  the 
problems associated with challenging the negative perceptions of brownfield development 
are as significant as tackling ground related issues, such as contamination.  The author 
mentions that the exaggerated perceptions of the risks of brownfield development have 
actually suited particular interests, such as the property industry, in their calls for higher 
levels  of  state  subsidy  for  development  and  the  relaxation  of  planning  restrictions  on 
development.    Whilst  this  may  be  an  empirical  question  for  investigation  elsewhere,  
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nonetheless  the  impact  of  risk  and  the  perception  and  tolerability  of  risk  will  be  of 
significant research interest in this thesis.    
 
4.6  The Impact of Brownfield Development on the Conventional Business 
Strategies of UK Speculative Housebuilders 
Chapter  2  made  clear  that  the  conventional  business  strategies  of  UK  speculative 
housebuilders have been shaped primarily by the conversion of greenfield land into mass 
standardised estates (Adams and Watkins 2002) and have suited a particularly concentrated 
industry structure (Hooper and Nicol 1999).  Risk, and subsequently risk aversion, has also 
been a significant influential factor in UK speculative housebuilders’ strategic decision 
making (Barker 2003) and the evolution of their business strategies within this greenfield 
development context (refer to Chapter 2).  As such, it is likely that additional risks faced by 
the industry in respect of the policy switch favouring brownfield development will test the 
housebuilding industry’s traditional forms of risk management and abatement.  This will 
now  be  discussed  in  more  detail  in  respect  of  land  acquisition,  planning  permission, 
marketing and product design.       
 
4.6.1  The impact of brownfield development on the importance of land 
Adams and Watkins (2002) and Tiesdell and Adams (2004) have discussed at length the 
potential  impact  of  brownfield  development  on  the  existing  land  strategies  of  UK 
speculative  housebuilders.    Adams  and  Watkins  (2002)  suggest  that  brownfield  land 
purchase presents a challenge to UK speculative housebuilders conventional strategies for 
four reasons: 
 
1.  The very nature of brownfield sites with their history of previous uses often results 
in abnormal site preparation costs, and makes the task of development appraisal an 
even more uncertain exercise than usual. 
2.  Brownfield landowners are unlikely to be as willing as their greenfield counterparts 
to grant options or conditional contracts allowing housebuilders lengthy periods of 
time to bargain with planning authorities.  On brownfield sites then, housebuilders 
may have to be more willing to take the risk of freehold purchase prior to planning 
permission or alternatively be more prepared to work within the adopted planning 
context.  
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3.  If brownfield sites need to be pieced together from a multiplicity of ownerships, the 
acquisition process can be highly protracted. 
4.  For many housebuilders, brownfield land markets remain a relatively unknown area 
in which it will be necessary to build up contacts, networks, and practices before 
large scale entry.   
 
In addition, the traditional strategies of seeking inflationary gains on the value of optioned 
land will also be tested; if brownfield land is less likely to be controlled through options, 
the opportunity  to  accrue profit from short to  medium term inflationary  gains on land 
prices  will  be  limited  in  a  rising  market.    Tiesdell  and  Adams  (2004)  explain  “…the 
process of residential development from land acquisition to sales of completed properties is 
usually a lengthy one that has often coincided with significant periods of house and land 
price inflation.  Thus, cushioned by the increase in the land value, major housebuilders 
have not had to generate gains solely through housing production, and in periods of high 
inflation, have been able to earn a greater proportion of their returns through increases in 
Table 4.5:  The Conventional Approach to Land Supply by UK Speculative           
                    Housebuilders and the Requirements of Brownfield Land 
Conventional 
Competence  
Conventional Skills  Additionally Required Skills 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sourcing land, 
controlling, 
ownership, land 
acquisition  
 
•  Exploiting low land value 
through the use of lengthy 
options to capture 
inflationary land values. 
•  Reliable site preparation 
costs allow certainty in 
development appraisal. 
•  Larger sites allow ease in 
assembling large land 
parcels. 
•  Existing knowledge of the 
market and its contacts 
provides low risk and more 
certainty. 
•  Maintaining a suitable flow 
of both short term and long 
term land. 
•  Dealing with high land value through 
maximising density and using 
efficient layouts. 
•  Integrating abnormal site preparation 
costs into development viability. 
•  Dealing with more expensive land 
preparation costs. 
•  Controlling ownership by other 
means than lengthy options.  
•  Seeking added value in alternative 
ways than from inflationary gains in 
land value.     
•  Dealing with smaller sites and 
protracted land ownership. 
•  Dealing with lack of knowledge in 
brownfield markets and building up 
the necessary contacts and market 
information. 
•  Incorporating brownfield land into 
the flow of suitable sites. 
 
Source:  Own Analysis adapted from Adams (2004)   
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land value than directly through housing production” (p.36).  Thus, due to the uncertain 
nature of brownfield land markets, it “…makes land banking a less attractive strategy (as) 
developers are less likely to benefit from medium-term inflationary increases in land value 
to the same extent as on greenfield land” (ibid.).         
 
As  such,  whilst  the  importance  of  land  in  UK  speculative  housebuilders’  business 
strategies may remain under the brownfield development context, the conventional ways in 
which  housebuilders  will  ensure  this  importance  are  likely  to  be  challenged.    As 
inflationary gains on the value of optioned land will not be suitable under the brownfield 
development  scenario,  controlling  ownership,  dealing  with  expensive  development  and 
abnormal site preparation may also challenge housebuilders’ conventional strategies.     
 
4.6.2  The impact of brownfield development on gaining planning permission        
At the outset, one might assume gaining planning permission on brownfield development 
to be easier than greenfield land because of the importance of brownfield development to 
the  UK  Government’s  housing-led  regeneration  agenda  and  the  obvious  promotion  of 
brownfield reuse in urban and public policy.  However, Adams and Watkins (2002) note 
that housebuilders cannot presume that gaining permission for development on brownfield 
sites will be any easier.  They provide three key reasons: 
 
1.  Local planning authorities often desire to maintain a balance of uses within urban 
areas and can be particularly reluctant to accede to the redevelopment of former 
industrial land for non-employment uses.  
2.  Very  real  concerns  exist  in  urban  communities  that  increased  urban  housing 
development reflects a policy of town cramming rather than town planning.  As a 
result,  housebuilders  can  equally  well  face  opposition  to  their  development 
proposals  from  local  residents  and  communities  on  brownfield  as  on greenfield 
sites.   
3.  Since  the  task  of  fitting  new  development  into  existing  urban  areas  is  more 
challenging  than  building  on  greenfield  land,  housebuilders  may  well  need  to 
develop  fresh  skills  and  approaches  to  convince  planning  authorities  and  local 
communities  that  their  proposed  brownfield  developments,  even  if  welcome  in 
principle, represent a worthwhile contribution to the quality of urban life rather  
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than  a  mere  translation  of  the  greenfield  development  model  to  a  brownfield 
location.    
 
Tiesdell and Adams (2004) also suggest that the planning policy context for brownfield 
development is intrinsically more complex than that of greenfield development, for which 
developers are more used to.  The authors highlight how planning authorities may require 
an element of mixed-use development as a condition of planning consent, thus creating 
additional design challenges.  And, rather than incurring the time and costs of challenging 
planning policy, developers on brownfield sites might need to be more prepared to work 
within  the  grain  of  existing  planning  policy,  thereby  accepting  additional  external 
constraints on their opportunity space.   
 
 
The above table shows how brownfield development will likely challenge the conventional 
ways  in  which  UK  speculative  housebuilders  gain  planning  permission.    Whilst 
housebuilders  have  familiarity  in  the  planning  requirements  of  their  conventional 
developments, it is clear that brownfield development will demand additional skills from 
housebuilders that will test their traditional approach.   
 
Table 4.6: The Conventional Approach to Gaining Planning Permission by  
                 UK Speculative Housebuilders and the Requirements of  
                 Brownfield Land 
Conventional 
Competence 
Conventional Skills  Additionally Required Skills 
 
 
 
Securing 
planning 
permission 
and other 
consents 
•  Utilising standardised layouts 
and products to provide blanket 
building regulations. 
•  Having familiarity of the 
planning requirements of 
conventional developments. 
•  Utilising tried and tested 
methods in promoting land 
through the planning system.  
•  Utilising sophisticated lobbying 
techniques to argue for 
planning consent. 
 
•  Considering a balance of uses in 
development. 
•  Managing the density requirements 
through more intense land use. 
•  Dealing with local opposition from 
adjacent land users. 
•  Convincing local authorities of 
development value. 
•  Arguing for change of use on former 
industrial sites.  
•  Dealing with the additional necessary 
consents of brownfield sites, such as 
access and infrastructure provision. 
 
Source:   Own Analysis Adapted from Adams and Watkins (2002)  
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4.6.3  The impact of brownfield development on marketing strategies 
It is clear that “…quite different approaches and quite different images will be needed for 
brownfield  locations  set  in  the  midst  of  urban  complexity”  (Adams  and  Watkins 
2002:139).  Simply transposing greenfield marketing images onto a brownfield mode will 
not suffice and housebuilders will have to “…realise that entirely new marketing skills and 
concepts…which fully appreciate that the nature of both the clientele and the purchase 
have changed significantly” (ibid). 
 
Tiesdell and Adams (2004) suggest that whilst housebuilders marketing strategies have 
generally evolved and matured to sell greenfield housing, relying on images of car-based, 
family-oriented  housing,  brownfield  development  requires  quite  different  images.  
Brownfield  developments  are  “…set  within  a  different  context  which  is  less  family-
oriented” and therefore “…brownfield housing choices are based more on the freedoms 
and  opportunities  of  particular  lifestyles  choices  than  the  restrictions  of  family 
commitments” (p.42).       
 
Stead (2003) suggests that there is widespread belief that rural areas are better places in 
which to live than towns and cities, and a general perception that rural areas offer more in 
terms of a better environment, lower levels of crime and a greater sense of community.  He 
suggests that a number of obstacles to urban living exist, and highlights how economically, 
developers favour rural locations.  In addition, Stead (2003) also suggests that residential 
parking policy, higher levels of council tax in urban areas and public transport costs may 
also be off putting to potential purchasers of brownfield developments.      
Table 4.7: The Conventional Approach to Marketing by UK Speculative                        
                  Housebuilders and the Requirements of Brownfield Land 
Conventional 
Competence 
Conventional Skills  Additionally Required Skills 
 
 
Creating 
Attractive 
Marketing 
Images  
•  Marketing images and lifestyles 
used.  
•  Images readily connect to the 
suburban family oriented 
lifestyles. 
•  Typical family purchasers. 
 
•  Developing new marketing images 
required for urban lifestyles and city 
centre living.  
•  Need to market smaller dwelling 
sizes that are less suitable for 
families.  
•  Dealing with negative marketing 
aspects of previously used sites. 
 
Source:  Adapted from Adams and Watkins (2002)  
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The above factors are likely to act as constraints on the ability of speculative housebuilders 
to market brownfield sites.  Tiesdell and Adams (2004) therefore suggest that the policy 
switch  favouring  brownfield  development  will  require  housebuilders  to  develop  new 
strategies that are less family oriented.  Table 4.7 provides a synopsis of the issues facing 
speculative housebuilders in marketing under the brownfield development scenario and 
highlights the skills additionally required to account for these issues.   
 
4.6.4  The  impact  of  brownfield  development  on  standard  products  for 
standard locations 
Chapter 2 made clear that product standardisation is an essential feature of UK speculative 
housebuilding.  Whilst the UK housebuilding industry has developed not only its business 
strategies  but  also  its  reputation  around  the  delivery  of  standardised  products  for 
standardised greenfield sites, “…it is clear that brownfield development is more likely to 
require the delivery of individually tailored products for specific locations” (Adams and 
Watkins 2002:144).  Adams and Watkins (2002) suggest that brownfield development will 
challenge housebuilders’ reliance on product standardisation for two key reasons:  
 
1.  Brownfield  sites  are  likely  to  be  more  problematic,  requiring  layouts  that  take 
account  of  particular  site  conditions,  including  ground  conditions  and  existing 
buildings or foundations.   
2.  Successful brownfield development needs to be carefully woven into the existing 
urban fabric and its associated design and infrastructural requirements that go with 
it. 
 
Further, Tiesdell and Adams (2004) suggest that brownfield development presents “…an 
intrinsically different market/development context” (p.36) and as such, will challenge the 
design  context  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders.    Indeed,  because  of  their  inherent 
simplicity,  greenfield  sites  can  be  developed  in  a  formulaic  and  mechanistic  manner, 
producing cost-efficient  layouts and  elementary  formulas can be written for laying out 
housing  developments.    By  contrast,  the  different  constraints  and  opportunities  of 
brownfield  sites  mean  that  standardised  solutions  are  unlikely  to  suffice,  “…which 
compels housebuilders to be more aware of how fundamental design affects end values”  
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(p.36).  Thus, greater attention to design provides a means of overcoming these obstacles 
and achieving a saleable product within budget constraints. 
 
In addition, developers do not simply have to overcome site constraints of brownfield land 
but  must  do  so  in  ways  that  produce  a  saleable  product.    Any  brownfield  housing 
development  usually  needs  to  be  integrated  within  a  more  complex  urban  context, 
accounting for the negative spill over effects.  Thus, in viewing design as a means of 
overcoming  obstacles  and  achieving  a  saleable  product,  “…brownfield  developers  are 
again compelled both to employ skilled designers and to yield opportunity space to them” 
(p.37).   
 
More so, as developers must overcome site constraints and achieve a saleable product, they 
must  do  so  in  a  more  competitive  milieu.    Tiesdell  and  Adams  (2004)  suggest  that 
brownfield  development,  in  contrast  to  greenfield  development,  can  produce  local 
monopolies through strategic land control and usually involves direct competition from 
other developments within the immediate local area.  This competition increases consumer 
sovereignty and reduces both producer sovereignty and the developer’s opportunity space 
to determine the developments design and quality.  In addition, the authors’ suggest that 
brownfield  markets  are  more  likely  to  be  emerging  rather  than  established,  with  less 
accumulated information about consumer preference.  Design on brownfield sites therefore 
“…becomes a deliberate strategy to reduce risk, with developers frequently having to use 
Table 4.8: The Conventional Approach to Product Design by UK  
                   Speculative Housebuilders and the Requirements of Brownfield 
                   Land 
Conventional 
Competence 
Conventional Skills  Additionally Required Skills 
 
 
Product 
Design  
•  Standard products for standard 
locations, achieving blanket 
building regulations.  
•  Standard layouts and 
construction methods. 
•  Certainty in build cost. 
•  Need for tailored and bespoke design 
solutions. 
•  Dealing with uncertain development 
costs. 
•  Adding value directly from the 
product and not land. 
•  Dealing with smaller sites. 
 
Source:  Adapted from Adams and Watkins (2002)  
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design as a means both of improving quality as a competitive strategy and of enabling their 
development to stand out” (p.38).         
 
Tiesdell  and  Adams  (2004)  make  clear  that  the  more  challenging  the  design  task  the 
greater  the  need  to  utilise  design  as  a  means  to  achieve  viable  development  (p.34).  
Therefore, housebuilders need to yield ‘opportunity space’
39 to designers, as investment in 
better  design  is  “…a  development  necessity  rather  than  a  development  choice”  (p.25).  
Tiesdell and Adams (2004) highlight three main external constraints on the developer’s 
opportunity space for brownfield development: 
 
1.  The development site and its local context. 
2.  The market context i.e. the need to create a saleable product and take account of 
investor and user needs. 
3.  The  regulatory  context  i.e.  the  need  for  planning  and  development  consent, 
including the need to comply with development plan policies and any site-specific 
planning guidance.   
 
Tiesdell and Adams (2004) conclude by  arguing that brownfield development contexts 
“…compel developers to invest in design in their business strategies i.e. design must be 
utilized  as  a  means  of  both  overcoming  development  obstacles  and  constraints  and 
achieving the end values necessary to make development viable” (pp.43-44).  The authors 
final word is to suggest that “…if major housebuilders are to operate successfully within 
brownfield  contexts,  they  must  rethink  and  perhaps  adapt  their  established  business 
strategies in ways that yield greater opportunity space for designers” (p.44).   
 
In addition to the comments of Tiesdell and Adams (2004), there are a number of other 
issues  in  respect  of  brownfield  development  that  will  test  speculative  housebuilders’ 
conventional skills for product design.  These are shown in Table 4.8 and highlight the 
uncertain  and  risky  nature  of  product  design  on  brownfield  sites.    The  table  acts  to 
                                                       
 
39 Tiesdell and Adams (2004) define ‘opportunity space’ for design initially by the external constraints (for 
example the site and its context, the planning policy and other regulatory mechanisms, and market conditions 
etc) on the developer and then by the constraints that the developer places on the designer.  The actual 
boundary or ‘frontier’ to the opportunity space is negotiated, fuzzy and ambiguous, as it is on the respective 
negotiating  abilities  of  the  designer  and  the  developer  and  the  dynamics  and  precise  nature  of  their 
relationship (p.32).    
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synopsise  the  key  issues  surrounding  the  challenge  of  brownfield  development  to  the 
conventional design strategies of UK speculative housebuilders.      
 
4.7  Chapter Conclusions  
This chapter has emphasised that the development of brownfield land for housing can be 
complicated by an array of ground related and institutional issues.  These issues can be 
viewed  as  either  constraints  or  opportunities,  depending  on  the  perception  of  risk 
tolerability  by  UK  speculative  housebuilders.    The  chapter  has  discussed  the  most 
prevalent risks associated with the speculative use brownfield land for housing and has 
considered the potential impact of these risks on the conventional business strategies of 
UK speculative housebuilders.  
  
Ultimately,  this  chapter  has  demonstrated  how  brownfield  development  will  likely 
challenge the conventional business strategies of UK speculative housebuilders through 
assessing its impact on the way in which housebuilders establish development feasibility 
and  approach  product  design.    More  importantly,  the  chapter  has  made  clear  that  the 
demands  of  brownfield  development  are  not  currently  matched  by  the  conventional 
organisational processes and cultures of UK speculative housebuilders.           
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO RESEARCH 
 
5.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  outlines  the  conceptual  approach  to  research  that  is  used  to  facilitate  an 
assessment of the impact of the policy switch favouring brownfield development on the 
UK speculative housebuilding industry.  Specifically, the conceptual approach seeks to 
fulfil the aim and objectives of the research, by assessing the institutional capacity of the 
UK speculative housebuilding industry through: 
 
•  An assessment of the internal firm competencies of UK speculative housebuilders 
in response to the policy switch favouring brownfield development. 
•  An assessment of the contributions of the external environment of UK speculative 
housebuilding in response to the policy switch favouring brownfield development.            
 
To illustrate a linkage and interrelationship between the conceptual understandings of the 
external environment of UK speculative housebuilding and the internal firm competencies 
of UK speculative housebuilders and in order to critically assess ‘institutional capacity’, 
the conceptual approach to this research is framed by the Structure of Provision model 
(Ball 1983).         
 
The chapter is structured into three main parts.  The first part of the chapter presents the 
structure  of  provision  model  (Ball  1983,  1999)  and  argues  that  its  use  provides  the 
opportunity to show the interaction and interrelationship between the external environment 
and internal firm competencies of speculative housebuilders in shaping the institutional 
capacity  of  speculative  housebuilders  in  response  to  the  brownfield  development 
requirement.  The second part of this chapter utilises the core competence approach, within 
the field of strategic management, to provide a conceptual understanding of the way in 
which speculative housebuilders develop greenfield land and assess how this might change 
as a result of the policy switch favouring brownfield development.  The third part of the 
chapter uses an institutional approach as a means of enabling a conceptualisation of the 
reaction  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders  to  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield  
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development, through facilitating an understanding the interaction between UK speculative 
housebuilders with the external environment within which they operate.   
 
5.2  The  Structure  of  Provision  Model  in  UK  Speculative  Housebuilding 
Research 
Ball  (1983)  makes  clear  that  housing  provision  does  not  exist  in  a  vacuum.    Indeed, 
‘…broader influences… (and) other social and economic forces…have an effect’ (pg.19).  
This  is  reflected  in  the  institutional  literature,  where  Cars  et  al  (2002)  argue  that  the 
transformation of cities and their governance structures has generated “…not merely new 
relations of economic life and social activity to be accommodated in cities…(but has) also 
changed  expectations  of  the  roles  and  relationships  of  governance  and  the  modes  of 
governance.  It has changed how the formal organisation and procedures of the public 
sector interact with the wider society” (pg.xi).     
 
Against the principles of institutional analysis and institutional capacity
40, it is crucial to 
demonstrate  the  interaction  and  influence  of  the  wider  external  environment  on  UK 
speculative housebuilder behaviour in response to external changes in the public policy 
agenda, specifically the brownfield development requirement.  Ball (1983) conceptualises 
the  impact  of  these  broader  influences  on  housing  provision  through  his  Structure  of 
Provision Model (SOP).  In his later work, Ball uses the model to explore the impact of 
external contexts on UK speculative housing provision; Ball (1999) argues that the external 
market contexts of UK speculative housebuilders influence the way in which housebuilders 
approach innovation in housebuilding products and processes.         
 
In  this  research,  the  SOP  model  is  applied  to  demonstrate  the  interaction between the 
external environment of UK speculative housing provision and speculative housebuilders’ 
internal  strategies  in  shaping  the  ‘institutional  capacity’  of  the  UK  speculative 
housebuilding industry in response to the UK Governments brownfield first policy agenda.  
The application of the SOP model in this research resultantly facilitates an analysis of the 
institutional  capacity  of  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry  in  responding  to 
brownfield policy change.  The SOP model therefore provides a good starting point for 
                                                       
 
40 Which will be explored in more detail later in this Chapter.  
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demonstrating  the  connections  between  the  internal  firm  competencies  of  the  UK 
speculative  housebuilding  industry  and  its  wider  ‘institutional  landscape’  in relation to 
institutional capacity and institutional capacity building.  The following paragraphs explain 
the  SOP  model  and  its  usefulness  in  illustrating  and  demonstrating  the  connections 
between  internal  firm  competencies  and  external  policy  change  specifically  for  this 
research.   
 
Ball  (1998)  considers  the  SOP  model  as  “the  contemporary  network  of  relationships 
associated with the provision of particular types of building at specific points in time.  
These  relationships  are  embodied  within  the  organisations  associated  with that type of 
building provision, and they may take a market or a non-market form” (pg.1513).  The 
SOP model accounts for a wide range of actors who comprise the institutional landscape of 
speculative housebuilding; and, it is specific to its own context, where “the network of 
organisations  and  markets  involved  in  a  particular  form  of  building  provision  is  the 
‘structure of provision of that provision’ and therefore there is consequently ‘no dichotomy 
between agency and structure” (p.1513).              
 
Ball’s (1998) structure  of provision model has  been applied sparingly in the academic 
literature as means of understanding and conceptualising UK speculative housebuilding.  
However, Ball (1998) emphasises the usefulness of his SOP model as a methodological 
tool for application in British property research; he originally developed the structure of 
provision model to facilitate an understanding of the political economy of owner occupied 
housing provision in the UK (Ball 1983), which is shown in Figure 5.1.  This SOP model 
illustrates  ‘…the  series  of  relations  between  social  agents  that  are  familiar  to  almost 
anyone…’  (Ball  1983:18).    Figure  5.1  also  schematically  demonstrates  the  relations 
between speculative housebuilders and these wider ‘social agents’ as they relate to the 
provision of owner occupation housing at that point in time. 
 
Ball  (1998)  makes  clear  that  the  SOP  is  “…a  conceptual  device  for  incorporating 
institutions into analyses of the development process.  It does not constitute a complete 
theory in itself, rather it is a methodological theory – a series of statements about how to 
examine institutions and their roles rather than an explanation in itself” (p.1514).  As such, 
the  SOP  model  is  a  tool  “…whose  theoretical  underpinning  could  come  from  a  wide 
variety  of  theories…within  its  ambit”  (p.1514).    Ball  (1999)  emphasises  that  the  key  
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feature of the SOP model is that it is subject to continual change through a number of 
factors  like  market  pressures,  changes  in  technologies  and  policies,  and  the  strategic 
decisions of organisations.   
 
Figure 5.1:  The Structure of Provision of Owner Occupied Housing Provision, 
1983 
 
Source: Ball (1983:20) 
 
In the context of this research then, the SOP model will be used specifically to illustrate the 
impact  of  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield  development  on  the  structure  of 
speculative housing provision.   
 
Figure 5.2 outlines the current structure of UK speculative housing provision, based on a 
detailed  review  of  the  previous  literature  in  Chapters  1-4,  and  is  in  keeping  with  the 
principles  of  the  model  as  outlined  by  Ball’s  (1983,  1998,  1999)  work.    This  model 
demonstrates  the  interaction  between  the  external  factors  that  currently  affect  the 
speculative provision of new homes in the UK with the internal firm competences of UK 
speculative housebuilders
41.   
 
                                                       
 
41 For more detail on the internal firm competencies, please refer back to Chapters 2 and 4.    
 
 
 
92
Figure 5.2:  The Current Structure of Speculative Housing Provision, UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own Analysis 
 
Figure 5.2 provides a broad contextual understanding of the different external influences 
on the internal firm competencies of speculative housebuilders in the speculative provision 
of new homes in the UK based on a review of the previous literature.  Each box represents 
the  most  important  and  influential  external  factors  that  currently  shape  the  speculative 
provision  of  new  homes  in  the  UK,  which  themselves  are  made  up  of  various  other 
external  contexts.    ‘The  Market’,  for  example,  is  comprised  of  a  number  of  external 
markets to UK speculative housebuilding that affect its provision, such as finance markets, 
investor  markets  and  owner  occupied  markets.    Whilst  these  external  contexts  are  not 
exhaustive  the  model  does  usefully  demonstrate  the  variety  of  external  contexts  that 
currently affect the speculative provision of new homes in the UK.  ‘Public Policy’ for 
example,  accounts  for  policy  framework  within  which  UK  speculative  housebuilders 
operate.  Here, this external context is comprised not only of the planning system and the 
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various  associated  policies  that  constrain  housebuilding,  but  also  lobby  groups  who 
facilitate the delivery of new policy and provide a voice for the housebuilding industry in 
respect  of  the  impact  of  newly  proposed  policies.    Other  external  contexts  outlined in 
Figure 5.2 are construction, development design, the market, land preparation and land 
assembly, and within those core external contexts, other contexts that influence or shape 
the core external contexts are listed.     
 
Because this research concentrates on the impact of the brownfield policy agenda on UK 
speculative  housebuilders,  the  focus  is  on  one  sub-set  of  the  external  market  contexts 
shown in Figure 5.2 in respect of speculative housing provision – Public Policy.  Changes 
in the policy priorities of the UK Government towards the delivery of the majority of new 
homes  on  brownfield  land  will  undoubtedly  shape  the  way  in  which  UK  speculative 
housebuilders deliver the majority of new homes in the UK, particularly as a result of the 
historical dominance of greenfield development to UK speculative housing delivery.  This 
may  in  turn  require  the  emergence  of  a  new  structure  of  provision in  UK speculative 
housebuilding, to which the aim of the research is focused.  Using the SOP model therefore 
presents the opportunity to facilitate an understanding of the impact and effect of changing 
policy priorities on speculative housing provision.      
 
The following two sections outline the two conceptual approaches to this research – the 
core competence approach within the field of strategic management and the institutional 
analysis.    
    
5.3  Assessing Internal Firm Competencies in Speculative Housebuilding 
All  organisations  are  faced  with  the  need  to  make  strategic  decisions
42  in  response  to 
external change and internal firm evolution.  Strategic decision-making is concerned with 
two aspects: 
 
                                                       
 
42 ‘Strategy’ is defined as “…the direction and scope of an organisation over the long-term, which achieves 
advantage for the organisation through its configuration of resources within a changing environment, to meet 
the  needs  of  markets  and  to  fulfil  stakeholder  expectations”  (Johnson  and  Scholes  1997:10).    Strategic 
decision-making  as  an  operational  process  is  therefore  uncertain,  complex  and  speculative,  and  requires 
major organisational change through an integrated approach (Johnson & Scholes 1997:10).      
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•  The  long-term  direction  of  an  organisation  and  the  development  of  competitive 
advantage through conceiving the organisation’s activities and business boundaries, 
and  matching  the  organisation’s  activities  to  the  environment  within  which  it 
operates. 
•  Stretching  an  organisation’s  resources  and  competencies  to  create  new 
opportunities  or  capitalise  on  existing  ones,  through  changing  resources  and 
operational decisions, and affecting or challenging the values and expectations of 
those in power in the organisation.  
(Johnson & Scholes 1997:4-5).    
 
The main elements that make up strategic management are outlined in Figure 5.3.  The 
figure shows that the process of strategic management is comprised of a series of inter-
related and interacting components
43 that cannot necessarily be divorced from one another.  
In respect of its aim and objectives, the focus of this research will centre on strategic 
analysis,  because  the  research  seeks  to  examine  the  delivery  and  implementation  of 
change.    More  so,  strategic  analysis  is  concerned  with  the  processes  by  which 
organisations analyse their own internal characteristics and capabilities, and identify the 
features of the external environment within which they operate (Morden 1999:5).  Strategic 
analysis  therefore  considers  the  external  environment  and  internal  competencies of the 
organisation as a determinant of the strategic capability and purpose of an organisation 
(Johnson  &  Scholes  1997:18).    Strategic  analysis  focuses  on  an  organisation’s  current 
strategy in dealing with external change, the likely ability of delivering the results expected 
and matching the current strategic approach with the required strategic approach that is 
uncovered by the strategic analysis.      
 
 
 
                                                       
 
43 Morden (1999) suggests that the process of strategic management has four components: strategic analysis; 
strategy  formulation and strategic decision  making; strategy choice; and,  strategy  implementation.  This 
process, Morden (1999) suggests, is iterative, where all four components influence each other in a decision 
process that is constantly updated through feedback and learning (p.5).  Johnson and Scholes (1997) on the 
other  hand,  suggest  the  strategic  management  process  has  only  three  main  elements:  strategic  analysis; 
strategic choice; and, strategy implementation.  Mintzberg and Quinn (1991) suggest that a good deal of 
confusion in this field stems from contradictory and ill-defined uses of the term strategy (see Wheelen and 
Hunger 1994; Mintzberg and Quinn 1991; Faulkner 1995, for alternative versions).    
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Figure 5.3: A Summary Model of the Elements of Strategic Management  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Johnson and Scholes (1997:24) 
 
Strategic analysis therefore facilitates an assessment of the current corporate strategies of 
UK speculative housebuilders and the likely impact of external policy change on these, 
such  as  the  policy  switch  towards  brownfield  development.    Recent  research  has 
highlighted the impact of external changes to the regulatory, demographic and economic 
environments  of  speculative  housebuilding  on  the  adaptive  capacity  of  UK speculative 
housebuilders (Adams 2004, Hertin et al 2003, Adams & Watkins 2002).  Currently, the 
housebuilding industry literature demonstrates research interest in the impact of the policy 
switch  favouring  brownfield  development  on  the  structure  and  organisation of the  UK 
speculative housebuilding industry and it is from this interest that this research is derived. 
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5.3.1  Theories of firm strategic analysis and competitive strategy  
Theories  of  strategic  management  have  evolved  and  have  been  shaped  largely  by  the 
behavioural revolution, an important feature of social science research in recent times.  A 
paradigmatic  shift,  from  a  previously  structuralist  focus  of  firm  strategic  analysis  and 
competitive  strategy,  toward  a  more  behaviourist  understanding  of  competition  and 
organisational learning, represents a broader change in the understanding of firm behaviour 
and business strategy and signals the development of a resource-based or knowledge-based 
view of the firm (Dobson et al 2004).  The importance of internal firm characteristics and 
competencies  in  driving  change  is  a  recent  phenomenon  in  the  field  of  strategic 
management,  where  previous  attention  was  paid  to  external  environmental  forces  in 
driving change (Porter 1979).  This shift represents the evolution of strategy as a concept.   
 
Whilst this shift in the logic of competition is “revolutionizing corporate strategy” (Stalk et 
al 1992:62), it is also significantly challenging the traditional orthodoxy held by firms, 
where  the  shaping  force  of  external  environmental  change  has  diminished  as  a  sole 
explanation  for  organisational  change.    The  strategic  management  literature  now 
acknowledges that firm behaviour, managerial ability and organizational learning are at the 
forefront  of  creating  and  sustaining  competitive  advantage,  and  the  development  of 
competence based theories of the firm reflects this interest.   
   
5.3.2  Competence-based theories of the firm   
Although  a  behaviourist  approach  to  firm  strategic  analysis  and  competitive  strategy, 
focusing on collective learning (Prahalad and Hamel 1990), knowledge systems (Leonard-
Barton 1992) and capabilities-based competition (Stalk et al 1992), is the accepted wisdom 
amongst the most recent of strategic management contributions, the articulation of this 
competence-based approach differs.  The most compelling behaviourist understanding of 
firm strategic behaviour is that of Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) and Hamel and Prahalad’s 
(1994) competence-based theory.  The authors suggest that in the face of increasing global 
competition, industry restructuring and the onset of productivity-enhancing technology, the 
critical task now facing firm strategic management is “to create an organisation capable of 
infusing products with irresistible functionality or…creating products that customers need 
but have not yet even imagined” (1990:80).  Accordingly then, the roots of competitive 
advantage “…lie not in the short-run price/performance attributes of current products, but  
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in the more long-run ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the 
core  competencies  that  spawn  unanticipated  products  through  the  consolidation  of 
corporate  wide  technologies  and  production  skills,  allowing  the  quick  adaptation  to 
changing opportunities” (1990:81).   
 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) recognise that the real source of firm advantage is to be found 
in “management’s ability to consolidate corporate-wide technologies and production skills 
into  competencies  that  empower  individual  businesses  to  adapt  quickly  to  changing 
opportunities” (p.81).  This resource-based view of the firm recognises resources in their 
broadest sense to include “assets, processes, attributes, knowledge and information” and, to 
confer  competitive  advantage,  resources  must  be  “rare/scarce,  difficult  or,  better, 
impossible to imitate, non-substitutable and appropriable by the firm” (Barney 1999 cited 
in Dobson et al 2004).   
 
Competencies are generally defined as the ‘the root system’ of the firm.  However, Durand 
(1998) notes how “…vague and fuzzy the concepts of resource and competence used in 
most  of  the  management  literature  remain”  and  further  points  out  “…the  management 
literature  has  not  paid  enough  attention  to  the  issue  of  properly  defining  competence” 
(p.304).  Leonard-Barton (1992) highlights the variety of definitions of the ‘root system’ 
that she herself defines as competence, including distinctive competencies, firm-specific 
competencies, resource deployments and invisible assets.  Leornard-Barton settles on core 
capabilities as her defining term as do Stalk et al (1992), whilst Hamel and Prahalad (1994) 
persist  with  core  competencies  as  their  preferred  term.    Interestingly,  Leonard-Barton 
(1992) suggests that the term is problematically sometimes rendered self-explanatory as a 
result of these loose definitions and as such, contributes to the vague and fuzzy definitions 
apparent.  Much of the more recent literature on strategic management has persisted with 
the phrase core competence (Dobson et al 2004, Hamel et al 1998).   
 
Hamel and Prahalad (1994) define core competence as a bundle of skills and technologies 
that represents the sum of learning across individual skill sets and individual organisation 
units.  And, to be considered a core competence, a skill must meet three tests: 
 
•  Customer Value: skills that enable firms to deliver a fundamental customer benefit.   
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•  Competitor Differentiation: there is a difference between necessary competencies 
and differentiating competencies for participation in a given industry, where the 
competencies  are  considered  ‘core’  if  they  are  competitively  unique  and  not 
ubiquitous.  
•  Extendability: the ability to abstract away from a particular product configuration 
in which the competence is currently embedded, and imagine how the competence 
might be applied in new product arenas. 
 
Core competencies are not immutable; when fundamental technologies change, or if new 
competitors emerge, an organisation becomes vulnerable unless they continually invest in 
learning and understanding their core skills and competencies.  Hamel and Prahalad (1994) 
use the example of outsourcing to illustrate.  Outsourcing can provide a shortcut to a more 
competitive product, but it typically contributes little to people-embodied skills that are 
needed to sustain product leadership (p.84).  Further, core competencies are built through a 
process of continuous improvement and enhancement, so “a company that has failed to 
invest in core competence building will find it very difficult to enter an emerging market, 
unless, of course, it will be content simply to serve as a distributional channel” (p.85).   
 
Agreement  exists  that  the  general  principle  behind  core  competencies  in  the  strategic 
management  literature  is  the  long-run  ability  of  organisations  to  build  the  core 
competencies that spawn unanticipated products through the consolidation of corporate 
wide  technologies  and  production  skills,  allowing  the  quick  adaptation  to  changing 
opportunities (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990:81).  However, the application of this general 
principle  varies  in  the  literature.    Leonard-Barton  (1992)  for  example  explores  the 
interaction of capabilities (she prefers to use this term) with a critical strategic activity: the 
development of new products and processes.  She argues that new product and process 
development  projects  are  obvious  visible  arenas  for  conflict  between  the  need  for 
innovation and retention of important capabilities.  She suggests that managers of such 
projects  “face  a  paradox:  core  capabilities  simultaneously  enhance  and  inhibit 
development” (p.112).     
 
Leonard-Barton (1992) suggests that a core capability is an interrelated, interdependent 
‘knowledge system’ that distinguishes and provides a competitive advantage (p.112).  This  
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knowledge  set  has  four  dimensions,  which  are  shown  in  Figure  5.4.    She  suggests its 
content is embodied in: 
 
•  Employee knowledge and skills.  
•  Technical systems.   
•  Managerial systems, which guide the processes of knowledge creation and control. 
•  Values and norms, which are associated with the various types of embodied and 
embedded knowledge and with the processes of knowledge creation and control 
(p.113).   
 
These  four  dimensions  are  institutionalised  in  that  the  firm’s  core  capabilities  “reflect 
accumulated behaviours and beliefs based on early corporate success” (p.114).   Figure 5.4 
demonstrates how the degree of congruence between the four dimensions of the knowledge 
system could vary between two different hypothetical projects within a firm.  In her study 
of 20 new product and process development projects, Leonard-Barton (1992) suggests that 
the degree of congruence did not necessarily reflect project size or technical or market 
novelty and incongruent projects did not necessarily involve radical innovations, by market 
or technological measures; all projects were aided by managerial systems that created and 
controlled knowledge flows, and by prevalent values and norms.  Essentially, the closer the 
alignment of the project and core knowledge set, the stronger the enabling influence.     
 
However,  Leonard-Barton  (1992)  makes  clear  that  although  core  capabilities  are  of 
strategic  importance  and  provide  a  basis  for  the  firm’s  competitive  capacities  and 
sustainable  advantage,  these  very  same  knowledge  sets  can  become  inappropriate  and 
problematic.  Further, these deeply embedded knowledge sets can actively create problems 
and can affect all projects within an organisation and lead to the development of ‘core 
rigidities’.  Table 5.1 shows both the upside and downside of core capabilities, in terms of 
how  they  enhance  and  inhibit  firm  development.    It  shows  the  four  dimensions  of 
capabilities and highlights both the positive and negative sides of the dynamic interaction 
of the project with these dimensions. 
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Figure 5.4:  Possible alignments of new product and process development  
projects with current core capabilities.  
 
Source:  Leonard-Barton (1992: 115) 
 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) suggested “…core competencies are built through a series of 
continual improvement and enhancement” (p.86) and interpret the negative consequences 
of core competencies as a series of mishaps that corporations stumble across when they 
believe  they  are  building  core  competencies  but  in  fact  are  committing  the  “sin  of 
distortion through the tyranny of the single business unit…concentrating on the battle to 
put competitive products on the shelf today” (p.87).  Prahalad and Hamel (1990) make 
clear that the fragmentation of core competencies becomes inevitable when a diversified 
company’s activities, in particular information systems, patterns of communication, career 
paths, managerial rewards and processes of strategy development, do not transcend single 
business unit lines (p.89).   
 
To  prevent  firms  falling  foul  to  the  fragmentation  of  core  competencies,  Prahalad  and 
Hamel (1990) suggest that a strategic architecture is required to establish objectives for 
competence building.  Defined as “a road map of the future that identifies which core 
competencies to build and their constituent technologies”, the authors suggest that this 
process, by  “providing  an impetus for learning from alliances  and a  focus for internal 
development  efforts”  can  “dramatically  reduce  the  investment  needed  to  secure  future 
market leadership” (p.89).  This architecture provides the logic for product and market  
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diversification, and as such, implies that a successful company whom fully operationalises 
the core competence philosophy will not face ‘core rigidities’.     
 
Table 5.1: The Dynamic Interaction of Project with Capabilities 
THE UP SIDE 
Capabilities Enhance Development 
THE DOWN SIDE 
Core Rigidities Inhibit Development 
 
Skills/Knowledge Dimension 
Excellence in dominance of discipline. 
Pervasive technical literacy. 
 
Technical Systems Dimension 
Embedded knowledge - artefacts left behind 
by talented individuals in a readily 
accessible form. 
 
Managerial Systems Dimension 
Incorporate unusual blends of skills. 
Foster beneficial behaviours. 
Incentive systems. 
Apprenticeship program. 
 
Values Dimension  
Empowerment of project members. 
High status to dominant discipline. 
 
 
Skills/Knowledge Dimension 
Less strength in non-dominant disciplines. 
Specific non-traditional knowledge missing. 
 
Technical Systems Dimension 
Skills and processes captured in software or 
hardware can become easily outdated. 
Technological incompatibility. 
 
Managerial Systems Dimension 
Can grow intractable.  
Negative assessment of importance of task. 
No associated career path in project management.  
New product = new career? 
 
Values Dimension 
Construe empowerment as entitlement. 
Lower status for non dominant disciplines. 
Source: Adapted from Leonard Barton (1992:116-121)  
    
Durand (1998) categorises the work of Leonard-Barton (1992) as the ‘positive/negative 
duality’ of competence.  Thus, competencies “may not only be positive as an asset but also 
negative in the form of a burden” (Leonard-Barton 1992:307).  Durand (1998) suggests 
that when a firm is affected negatively by a capability, “…this should be regarded as an 
incompetence” (p.307).       
 
Despite  the  disagreement  among  the  contributors  to  the  exact  definitions  of  core 
competencies, Dobson et al (2004) suggest that competencies still remain the “future of 
strategy” in their focus on the internal sources of competitiveness in internal capabilities 
(p.117).  Indeed, the advantage of the learning organisation built on core competencies is 
that  “…it  generates  new  knowledge  through  experience,  is  adaptive  at  coping  with 
changing circumstances and generative in creating new solutions and thus combines both 
refinement and renewal capabilities” (pp.177-178).  Further, the learning organisation also  
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enables firms to “…let go of competencies that are no longer relevant and to embrace new 
skills and techniques offering flexibility to its knowledge base” (p.178)
44.     
 
However, Dobson et al (2004) suggest that an organisation that focuses purely on refining 
existing competencies may become “strategically vulnerable” as they become too specific 
to a particular context and if change occurs, an organisation can find it hard to respond 
(p.179).  Dobson et al (2004) acknowledge that over time core competencies can become 
dysfunctional to performance, and the ability for the firm to overcome this is linked to the 
notion  of  absorptive  capacity  –  “the  capacity  of  a  firm  to  absorb  new  knowledge, 
competencies and to develop out of these new routines and actions” (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990 cited in Dobson et al 2004:180).   
 
Durand  (1998)  develops  a  renewed  model  of  competence  by  reviewing  the  classical 
distinctions  and  characterisation  documented  in  the  literature  around  the  various  terms 
associated with the competence-based theory of the firm.  Durand (1998) argues that a 
clear distinction should be made in the understanding of competence between:  
 
•  The tangible assets and resources of the firm; and, 
•  The  intangible  individual  and  organisational  capabilities,  knowledge,  processes, 
routines, identity and culture, which are difficult to buy and imitate.   
 
In reconstructing the definition of core competence, Durand (1998) proposes three generic 
forms of competence:  
 
•  Knowledge corresponds to the “…structured sets of assimilated information which 
make it possible to understand the  world, obviously with partial and somewhat 
contradictory interpretations” (p.318). Knowledge encompasses access to data, and 
the ability to enact them into acceptable information and integrate them into pre-
existing schemes, which obviously evolve along the way. 
•  Know-how refers to the ability to act in a concrete way according to predefined 
objectives  or  processes.    Know-how  does  not  exclude  knowledge  but  does  not 
                                                       
 
44 This feature of the learning organisation is coined ‘dynamic capabilities’ and  was first introduced by 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), cited in Dobson et al (2004).  
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necessitate  a  full  understanding  of  why  skills  and  capabilities,  when  put  to 
operations, actually work.   
•  Attitudes refer to the belief that identity and will (determination) are essential parts 
of the capability of an individual or an organisation to achieve anything.  This is the 
dimension that Durand (1998) suggests has been neglected in competence-based 
theories of the firm which he argues may be due to the traditional lack of interest of 
economists in behavioural and social aspects.  
                    
Recent  commentary  on  core  competencies  have  emphasised  the  understanding  of 
competence not only as a firm-specific attribute but also as an attribute of a network of 
relationships (Dobson et al 2004:180).  Dobson et al (2004) make clear that the notion of 
competence now extends ‘beyond the limits of the firm’ and the authors highlight the need 
to think of competence as a clustering phenomenon in which the firm is only one player 
(p.180).  From this perspective then, perhaps the importance of institutionalism arises as a 
means to explaining more clearly why some firms demonstrate the capacity to adapt to 
external  change  and  others  do  not.    Indeed,  the  studies  done  in  the  field  of  regional 
economic  development,  economic  geography  and  regeneration  in  which  the  clustering 
phenomenon  has  been  explored  and  the  link  between  specific  industries  and  regions 
identified highlights the significance of external environments.     
 
5.4  The Development of Core Competencies for Brownfield Development 
by UK Speculative Housebuilders? 
Utilising  the  core  competence  approach,  this  research  will  outline  the  current  core 
competencies of UK speculative housebuilders, based on a review of the literature and will 
consider  to  what  extent  new  competencies  will  need  to  be  developed  to  successfully 
respond to the policy switch favouring brownfield development.  Chapter 4 outlined the 
conventional core competencies of UK speculative housebuilders, based on a review of the 
literature.    Adams  (2004)  argues  that  because  the  residential  development  process  is 
distinctly  different  at  brownfield  locations  compared  with  that  at  greenfield  locations, 
“…housebuilders will be required to develop new business strategies and specifically to 
invest in the new core competencies needed to exploit emerging market opportunities” 
(p.15).  Specifically, Adams (2004) suggests that developers will need to: 
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•  Deliver valued added directly from housing products rather than rather than rely on 
gaining profits from inflation in land prices. 
•  Develop  greater  skills  in  achieving  integration  with  and  supporting  local 
communities rather than in merely constructing housing estates. 
•  Achieve  much  higher  levels  of  urban  design,  not  simply  to  secure  planning 
approval, but also to resolve potential conflicts with mixed use schemes. 
•  Engage in partnerships with planning authorities.  
 
Speculative  housebuilders  are  therefore  faced  with  the  challenge  of  “…refocusing  or 
rebuilding their core competencies in establishing development feasibility if they are to 
compete  successfully  in  the  emerging  opportunity  arena  of  brownfield  development” 
(Adams 2004:18).   
 
Based on a review of the previous literature on UK speculative housebuilding and theories 
of strategic management, 7 key research questions emerge that seek to assess the extent to 
which the policy switch favouring brownfield development will require housebuilders to 
develop new or  additional core competencies.   The research questions therefore  act to 
operationalise the core competence approach as a means of assessing the impact of public 
policy change on the way in which UK speculative housebuilders deliver new homes.  The 
7 research questions are listed below:     
 
1.  Are  the  core  competencies  that  housebuilders  have  built  their  fortunes  and 
reputations on extendable to the brownfield modus operandi?  
2.  Can housebuilders develop added customer value when developing brownfield sites 
using existing competencies?  
3.  Can  employee  skills  and  knowledge  be  substituted  for  contracted  and  sub-
contracted  expertise?    How  important  are  intangible  links  and  tacit  knowledge 
transfer in the success of this? 
4.  Can housebuilders seek out competitor differentiation in brownfield development?  
5.  Is  continuous  improvement  and  enhancement  of  their  product  a  feature  of 
speculative housebuilding? 
6.  Will the conventional behaviours, norms and values, developed under a greenfield 
modus operandi impede the development of new norms, values  and behaviours 
required for successful brownfield development?    
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7.  To  what  extent  is  the  network  of  external  relationships  likely  to  affect 
housebuilders  in  developing  the  requisite  core  competencies  for  successful 
brownfield development? 
 
These questions will be considered the latter Chapters of this thesis in light of the results of 
the empirical stage of this research.     
 
5.5  Assessing  External  Environmental  Change  in  UK  Speculative 
Housebuilding   
Having discussed the suitability of the core competence approach in analysing the internal 
firm competencies of UK speculative housebuilders, this chapter now turns to a discussion 
on  the  suitability  of  an  institutional  approach  in  assessing  the  impact  of  external 
environmental change on the core competencies of UK speculative housebuilders.  The use 
of an institutional approach is promoted in this research and this position is justified in 
accordance with the aim and objectives of the research in the discussion that follows.  The 
first  section  discusses  brownfield  development  as  a  multi-actor  task  and  suggests  that 
institutional analysis is the most suitable concept for assessing the impact of brownfield 
development on the corporate strategies of UK speculative housebuilders.   
 
5.5.1  Brownfield development as a multi-actor task  
The functional transformation of the traditional industrial structure of urban areas towards 
a service orientation has meant a radical change in urban policy making (Nijkamp et al 
2002).    Nijkamp  et  al  (2002)  make  clear  that  public-private  partnerships  (PPPs)  have 
emerged  as  a  critical  success  factor  in  urban  restructuring,  urban  revitalisation  and 
transformation projects.  Indeed, the use of PPPs means that “…the administrative decision 
on a particular urban development plan is not exclusively a public responsibility, but is 
also a result of private and public negotiation and agreement processes” (p.1866).  The 
transformation  of  cities  and  their  governance  structures  has  therefore  generated “…not 
merely  new  relations  of  economic  life  and  social  activity  to  be  accommodated  in 
cities…(but has) also changed expectations of the roles and relationships of governance 
and the modes of governance.  It has changed how the formal organisation and procedures 
of the public sector interact with the wider society” (Cars et al 2002:xi).  As a result, Guy 
and  Henneberry  (2000)  suggest  that  in  analysing  the  reproduction  of  the  urban  built  
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environment, any analytical approach adopted needs to “…be populated with development 
agencies involved in development events and needs to deal with the relations between 
them” (Healey 1991 cited in Guy and Henneberry 2000:2400).  Accordingly, the authors 
suggest there now exists a wide consensus of support of institutional analysis.  They make 
clear that the changing contexts of development decision-making exemplify the complex 
interrelationships of the social and the economic and provide a basis for justifying the 
development and use of an institutional understanding of urban development processes 
(p.2400).   
 
These emerging new governance arrangements have challenged the traditional role and 
responsibility of the UK speculative housebuilding industry in the delivery of new homes 
and have shifted their role to one that now operates in accordance with a plethora of wider 
urban and social development and regeneration aims.  Indeed, multi-sector partnerships 
have  become  central  tenant  of  urban  regeneration  (Hemphill  2006),  and  the  role  of 
speculative housebuilders in delivering urban regeneration goals has grown in magnitude.  
Essentially, shifts in urban policy have encouraged UK speculative housebuilders towards 
brownfield development as their main source of corporate activity.      
 
And, as housebuilders have faced shifts in the magnitude of the tasks that they undertake, 
in  response  to  these  shifting  governance  arrangements  of  urban  development  and 
regeneration, new forms of governance capacity
45 have emerged that act to both constrain 
and enable housebuilders in their undertaking of brownfield development.  This emerging 
governance capacity is “…embedded in complex local milieux whilst interacting with all 
kinds of external influences.  It is not something which is a fixed asset, but evolves through 
time…(implying)  that  urban  governance  capacity  varies  through  time  and  across 
space…(where)  transformations  in  governance  have  variable  trajectories  and  are  to  an 
extent  continuously  ongoing  projects.    Governance  relations  transform  as  broader 
structuring forces interact with local histories and specifities” (Vigar et al 2000:21).   
 
Therefore,  any  analysis  of the capacity  of UK  housebuilders in response to the public 
policy change needs to be explored from within the context of this new governing capacity 
                                                       
 
45 Vigar et al (2000) define governance capacity as “the capacity of urban policy/governance to make a 
difference in sustaining and transforming the qualities of cities” (p.53).    
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and  therefore  needs  to  account  for  their  embedded  local  milieux  and  their  external 
influences (Vigar et al 2000).       
 
With respect to these changing roles, relationships and modes of governance in the urban 
development  context,  Cars  et  al  (2002)  make  use  of  institutional  analysis  to  assess 
‘institutional  capacity’  through  demonstrating  ‘…the  diversity  of  the  social  relations 
between actors, their networks and the social worlds in which they are embedded, the 
tensions in the ways these social worlds interact, and the complexity of the time-space 
relations which are drawn into these interactions” (p.xii).  Through exploring the relations 
between transformation  processes, institutional capacity and social milieux, the authors 
demonstrate “…the multiple layering in the time and space of urban governance relations 
and the dynamic interactions between local efforts and broader structuring forces” (p.xii).     
 
As such institutional capacity is defined as capacity that ‘…is embedded in the dynamics 
of the wider social context within which action focused at the local level takes place’ (Cars 
et al 2002:4).  Institutional capacity therefore refers to ‘…particular forms of richness that 
enables  individuals  and  groups  to  mobilise  resources  and  perform  meaningful  action’ 
(ibid.).    As  such,  institutional  capacity  is  best  understood  as  ‘…a  complex,  fluid  and 
evolving infrastructure acting at several levels – from the visible level of organisations and 
institutional  power  structures  to  the  deeper  levels  of  ideas,  discourses  and  identities.  
Accumulated  experience  and  history  certainly  count,  but  their  effects  are filtered by  a 
continuous,  open  and  multi-level  interaction  between  established  practices  and 
understandings and emerging ones, with uncertain outcomes’ (Cars et al 2002:62).               
 
Changes in governance capacity have encouraged housebuilders to react and alter their 
traditional and conventional ways of doing things.  Equally, the Government’s capacity to 
deliver urban development and regeneration goals has become increasingly dependent on 
the  capacity  of  the  private  sector
46,  and  in  particular  speculative  housebuilders,  whose 
ability to deliver a product suitable for a brownfield market and location is of absolute 
importance to the success of the Government’s shifting urban policy agenda.     
 
                                                       
 
46 Refer back to Chapter 2 for more detail on this.  
 
 
 
108
It is therefore important that in any analysis of housebuilding capacity, an understanding of 
the wider institutional context within which housebuilders operate is considered in addition 
to what influences their strategic direction and choices.  Indeed, an understanding of the 
importance of partnership has emerged as “…an indispensable element of modern urban 
policy” (Adams and Hastings 2001:1473) as has an understanding of other institutional 
mechanisms.       
 
In response to this new analytical agenda, new conceptual tools for the analysis of these 
changing roles have been required and are emerging.  There is the need for an empirical 
grounding of analysis in the institutional context that influences, and is influenced by, the 
unit of analysis chosen.   
 
The conceptual approach to this research has similar requirements – a chosen approach 
needs  to  be  able  to  identify  the  UK  housebuilding  industry’s  ability  to  deliver 
contemporary urban policy from a framework in which the principal actors decisions are 
embedded and which is sensitive to the institutional changes, in particular policy changes, 
that provide the context for land use decisions.  Adams (2004) argues that the success of 
the UK speculative housebuilding industry in delivering the policy goals of brownfield 
development is influenced by the specific institutional arrangements within which they 
operate.  As such, it is essential to have full regard to the main development constraints and 
opportunities that are relevant to the place specific context which is being investigated, and 
to provide any new institutions with the necessary powers and resources to achieve this.  
There is the need to understand the nature and dynamics of the institutions involved; the 
strategies and interests of the production side in private housing development; the role of 
the state; and, the impact of shifting urban policy on the strategies and corporate operations 
of speculative housebuilders.   
 
Based on the above and the literature review in the first half of this thesis, the analysis of 
the institutional capacity of the UK speculative housebuilding industry in responding to the 
policy switch favouring brownfield development, will consider the following questions:  
 
•  What  locally  specific  institutional  constraints  exist  to  undermine  housebuilders 
capacity for delivery of the urban policy goals?  
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•  How  far  is  the  success  of  the  housebuilding  industry  in  delivering  brownfield 
development influenced by the specific institutional arrangement within which they 
operate?   
 
Any analysis of successful brownfield development by speculative housebuilders therefore 
requires an understanding of the functioning of the institutions involved in the speculative 
development of land for new homes.  This will be achieved by explaining and analysing 
the institutional constraints and causal processes giving rise to brownfield development, 
and  assessing  how  the  complex,  fluid  and  evolving  infrastructure  both  constrains  and 
facilitates the behaviours and attitudes of speculative housebuilders in their response to this 
urban policy shift.   
 
5.5.2  Institutionalism and institutional analysis in social science research  
This  section  argues  that  the  impact  of  shifting  urban  policy  on  the  UK  speculative 
housebuilding industry is best understood by adopting an institutional approach.  Through 
this approach, the impact of the UK Government’s brownfield first agenda on the structure 
and organisation of the UK speculative housebuilding industry can be fully explored and 
the  impact  of  external  environmental  change  on  internal  firm  competencies  be  fully 
understood.    Further,  the  changing  nature  of  state  market  relations  in  the  speculative 
residential  development  can  be  facilitated.    This  thesis  therefore  contributes  to  the 
emerging discussion on how speculative residential development is largely facilitating the 
achievement  of  desired  political  ends  (Adams  et  al  2005)  through  the  utilisation  of 
institutional analysis.     
 
Institutionalism is a widely used theoretical approach that transcends a variety of academic 
disciplines within the social sciences and has seen remarkable growth over the past 20 
years (Marsh and Stoker 2002).  The onset of post modernism in the social sciences in 
recent years has further widened the scope of institutionalism as a theoretical approach 
(Marsh and Stoker 2002).  This ‘behavioural revolution’ has led some commentators to 
claim  that  an  ‘institutional  turn’  has  occurred  (Cumbers  et  al  2003,  Vigar  et  al  2000, 
Martin  1999),  where  the  most  recent  strands  of  ‘institutionalism’,  labelled  as  ‘new 
institutionalism’ focus on networks, relationships, interactions and informal customs and 
conventions (Adams and Watkins 2002, Lowndes 2002, Vigar et al 2000, Van Hees 1997).    
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As institutionalism and the use of institutional analysis transcends many social science 
disciplines, a generic definition of institutionalism is largely absent from the literature and 
definitions  vary  across  the  broad  spectrum  of  institutional  approaches,  themselves 
characterised  by  the  discipline  from  which  they  are  born.    One  of  the  reasons  why  a 
universal  definition  of  institutionalism  remains  elusive  is  because  the  debate  over  its 
ontological and methodological positions has persisted (Oxley 2004, Cumbers et al 2003, 
Ball 1998).  Nonetheless, in a very broad sense, institutionalism is concerned with both the 
structure of organisations and the way in which organisations operate and relate to each 
other (Marsh and Stoker 2002).  Important differences that arise in the varying approaches 
to institutional analysis relate primarily to issues concerning ontology and methodological 
applicability (Cumbers et al 2003, Ball 1998).     
 
In the literature, the theory of institutions and its application in the form of institutional 
analysis is predominately but not exclusively discussed from two key perspectives:  an 
economic perspective, which focuses on the role of the market; and, a policy perspective, 
which focuses on the role of changing public policy and state market relations.  The latter 
is  largely  related  to  the  urban  development  literature,  whilst  the  former  relates  to  the 
economics literature.  In the urban development literature, institutional analysis is readily 
applied as a conceptual approach with which to explore partnership in relation to urban 
regeneration,  emphasising  the  increasing  role  of  the  private  sector  and  development 
agencies’ dependence on the private sector for delivering urban regeneration initiatives and 
policy.  Comparatively, the economics literature focuses on the evolution of the theory of 
institutionalism  and  the  role  of  the  market  in  economic  processes.    In  this  research, 
applying institutional analysis from the policy perspective is more suitable, as the links 
between  the  research  aim  and  objectives  and  the  policy  perspective,  such  as  urban 
regeneration and the role of the private sector in urban development, are more logical.   
 
However, before any application of institutional analysis in this thesis, it is important to 
discuss the evolution of institutionalism as a theoretical concept using both the economics 
and policy perspectives, from which a better understanding of the nature of institutionalism 
as a theoretical concept will be provided.    
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5.5.3  Institutionalism in economics 
Cumbers et al (2003) suggests that, as the term ‘institution’ is used in different ways by 
different writers, it has subsequently led to “…some conceptual slippage and confusion” 
(p.328) as to the concept’s precise definition and generic meaning.  Indeed, some authors 
in their discussion of institutional analysis fail even to provide a definition of the term 
institution, an issue that Hooper (1992) has previously raised.  Martin and Sunley (2001) 
make clear that definitions of institutions differ from one authority to another and “…there 
is generally no agreed theory of institutional formation and evolution” (p.154).  From an 
economic geography perspective, Martin and Sunley (2001) suggest that whilst ideas from 
this  field  are  far  from  easy  to  operationalise  empirically,  “…numerous  economic 
geographers  have  gone  institutional  without  paying  much  heed  to  these  and  related 
difficulties” (p.154).     
 
Whilst there is little agreement in the literature as to what an institution is, many authors 
draw on the work of Walter Hamilton (1932), who defines an institution as “…a way of 
thought or action of some prevalence, which is embedded in the habits of groups or the 
customs of people…institutions fix the confines of and impose structure upon the activities 
of human beings” (Hamilton 1932:84, cited in Adams et al 2005:39).  North (1991) also 
provides  a  well-used  definition  of  institutions,  which  perhaps  reflects  the  more 
contemporary nature of his work in comparison to Hamilton’s.  North (1991) suggests that 
institutions are “…the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interaction.  They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” 
(North 1991, cited in Ball 2006:23).  See also Needham and Louw 2006 and Adams et al 
2005).   
 
North’s (1991) definition provides a more intangible and tacit understanding of what an 
institution  is:  “…tradition,  custom,  culture  and  habit  as  informal  institutional  rules” 
(Lowndes 2001:1959).  Hodgson (1997) also asserts this social aspect of institutions and 
considers  “…the  role  of  both  informal  and  formal  institutions”  (Adams  &  Watkins 
2002:6),  recognising  that  “…individual  habits…when  they  are  shared  and  reinforced 
which a society or group…assume the form of socio-economic institutions…not in the 
narrow  sense  of  formal  organisations,  but  in  the  broad  sense  of  socially  habituated  
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behaviour”  (Hodgson  1997:697,  cited  in  Adams  and  Watkins  2002:6  and  Guy  and 
Henneberry 2000:2414).  Lowndes (2001) makes clear that informal institutions “…may 
provide  the  raw  material  for  the  development  of  formal  institutions  (or  delimit  their 
development)  or  they  may  exist  alongside  formal  rules,  in  concert  or  contradiction” 
(p.1958; see also Lowndes 2002 and Lowndes 1996).      
 
Lowndes  (2001)  highlights  a  distinction  between  organisations  and  institutions.    In 
suggesting that political institutions should not be equated with political organisations, she 
reminds us rather “…they  are sets of rules that guide and  constrain actors’ behaviour.  
Such rules provide information on the likely future behaviour of others and on sanctions 
for non-compliance (p.1958).  Institutions then, “…provide the rules of the game, whilst 
organisations – like individuals – are players within that game” (p.1958).  At the same 
time,  “…organisations  have  their  own  internal  institutional  frameworks  that  shape  the 
behaviour  of  people  within  them.    Institutions  are  sets  of  rules  that  exist  within  and 
between organisations” (ibid) as well as “…under, over and around them” (Fox and Miller 
1995:92, cited in Lowndes 2001).  Khalil (1999) suggests that institutions are ‘…distinct 
from organisations and their goals as much as means differ from ends” because “…while 
means include (besides material and technological resources) institutions, ends define the 
organisation” (p.62)
47.  Thus, the term institution “…basically denotes some of the means 
employed in the pursuit of ends, while the term organisation signifies the agent who makes 
decisions about the end which is worth pursuing” (Khalil 1999:62).              
 
Ball (2006) also makes this distinction between organisations and institutions, suggesting 
that, most commonly in the new institutional economics approach, “…there are rules by 
which actions take place, which may be formal or informal and explicit or implicit in 
nature, and there are organisations and agencies that operate under those rules” (p.23).  
Ball  (2006)  explains  that  the  separation  of  organisations  and  institutions  is  not one of 
equals because “…the form and content of organisation is essentially determined by the 
                                                       
 
47 The author wishes to make clear that “…the identification of institutions with means and organisations 
with ends does not imply any theoretical position.  On the basis of this clarification one can argue that means 
(institutions) are more fundamental for the analysis of human action, or the opposite, the ends (organisations 
and their goals) are the more fundamental.  So, the means-ends distinction is a theory-free way to explain the 
difference between institutions and organisations” (Khalil 1999:62-63).   
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rules” (p.24).  The study of markets and institutions “…thus, becomes an unravelling of the 
riddles of pre-given rules” (ibid.).      
 
So, while organisations are not the same as institutions, ‘…they remain an important focus 
for  (new)  institutional  analysis  –  in  their  roles  as  collective  actors,  subject  to  wider 
institutional constraints and also as arenas within which institutional rules are developed 
and expressed’ (Lowndes 2001:1958).    
 
Ball  (1998)  suggests  that  a  developing  interest  in  institutional  analysis  has  emerged 
because “…economists are somehow getting it wrong”, suggesting that alternative ways 
are needed to  explain “…the mysterious  force  of power that lurks within the property 
world”  (p.1501).    Indeed,  mainstream  economics’  market-orientated  analysis  of 
development  processes  have  in  recent  years  been  both  challenged  and  supplanted  by 
institutional  analysis  (Oxley  2004).    Oxley  (2004)  suggests,  “…the  neo-classical 
domination  of  economics  has  been  challenged  by  economists  who  have  criticised  the 
simple  assumptions  on  which  it  is  founded.    The  reductionist  approach  of  the  neo-
classicists has been set aside by economists who have emphasised the complications of the 
real world” (p.7).      
 
Whilst Oxley (2004) himself suggests that such institutional approaches only provide a 
useful  complement  to,  rather  than  a  substitute  for,  mainstream  economics  (p.16), 
institutional economists emphasise that it is not helpful to study markets and economic 
behaviour in general in terms of equilibrium.  He argues rather that it is more useful to 
study  the  process  of  economic  activity  as  opposed  to  any  theoretical  end-state  i.e. 
equilibrium.  Thus, the institutional focus is on economic change or evolution and the 
focus therefore moves away from rational economic man and the neoclassical account of 
human behaviour.   
 
Institutional approaches to economics argue that individual behaviour is driven by habit 
and  routine,  as  influenced  by  the  institutional  setting  and  individual  inhabits.    Such 
‘values’ influence behaviour in different settings, and vary with culture.  Instead of the 
presumed bedrock of given individuals, there is the idea of “…interactive and partially 
malleable  agents,  mutually  entwined  in  a  web  of  partially  durable  and  self-reinforcing  
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institutions” (Hodgson 1998:175).  Thus, institutionalism is congenitally an evolutionary 
economics (Hodgson 1998).         
 
Colander et al (2004), in their review of American mainstream economics, suggest that 
mainstream  economics  usually  represents  a  broader  and  more  eclectic  approach  to 
economics than is characterised as the recent orthodoxy of the profession (p.490).  The 
authors argue that modern mainstream economics is open to new approaches, as long as 
they are done with a careful understanding of the strengths of the recent orthodox approach 
and with a modelling methodology acceptable to the mainstream (p.492).  The authors 
suggest  that  economics  is  moving  away  from  a  strict  adherence  to  the  holy  trinity  – 
rationality,  selfishness  and  equilibrium  –  to  a  more  eclectic  position  of  purposeful 
behaviour, enlightened self-interest and sustainability.   
 
Much of the most recent research in economics can be found in what Colander et al (2004) 
call the ‘work at the edge of economics – “…the edge is where all the action is in the 
profession” (p.495), and emphasise complexity as a defining factor of the new work at the 
edge of economics (p.496).  They highlight how modelling remains the central core of the 
mainstream approach, but the nature of the models and the assumptions underlying them 
are much more open and transdisciplinary (ibid.).  More specifically, the authors highlight 
inter alia how: 
 
•  Evolutionary  game  theory  is  redefining  how  institutions  are  integrated  into  the 
analysis. 
•  Ecological economics is redefining how nature and the economy are viewed as 
interrelating. 
•  Psychological economics is redefining how rationality is treated. 
•  Econometric work dealing with the limitations of classical statistics is redefining 
how economists think of empirical proof. 
•  Complexity theory is offering a way of redefining how we conceive of general 
equilibrium. 
 
Colander et al (2004) make clear that these developments at the edge of economics have 
led to a broader set of changes in how mainstream economics sees itself.  Importantly, they 
make clear that such changes make it “…far more willing to question economics” special  
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status over the other fields of inquiry and to integrate the methods of other disciplines into 
their economic analysis.  This too finds resonance in the British literature.  Adams, Dunse 
and White (2005) and Adams, Watkins and White (2005) argue that the analysis of state-
market relations in land and property can benefit both from “…permeating mainstream 
economics with greater institutional input and from linking the insights so gained with 
those that can be derived from the political economy of institutionalism” (p.53).  Adams, 
Dunse and White (2005) contend that, since both process and outcome are essential to 
understanding the complexity of state market relations in land and property, “…theoretical 
pluralism should prevail and the explanatory power of mainstream economics should be 
reinforced by an appropriate institutional framework” (ibid.).   
 
This is further resonated in the work of Nelson (2002) who suggests that the boundary 
lines between economics and other social sciences such as sociology and political science 
“…have  grown  into  tough  barriers  over  the  past  half-century  (and)  need  to  become 
traversable again, and economists need to again become general social scientists” (p.112).  
Hodgson (2002) also argue that boundaries between mainstream and heterodox economics 
are far less clear than they were in the past.  Colander et al (2004) suggest “…as the work 
on the edge of economics progresses and accumulates, it shifts the centre of economist’s 
approach and…eventually will create a new orthodoxy centred on a broader complexity 
vision” (p.497).   
 
Hodgson (2002) in response to Nelson and Vromen’s (see Nelson 2002 and Vromen 2002) 
comments  on  his  previous  work  (see  Hodgson  1998)  makes  clear  that  mainstream 
economics  is  preoccupied  with  a  universalistic  attempt  to  erect  general  economic 
principles applicable to all economic systems.  However, Hodgson (2002) argues, “…this 
attempt is largely a failure”, suggesting that part of the reason for this failure “…is that all 
economic history is surveyed through conceptual lenses that have their origin in one type 
of  system  only:  market  society”  (p.126).    Hodgson  further  argues  “Even  when  some 
economists analyse non-market phenomena, such as feudalism, the modern family, or the 
interior  of  important  organisations  such  as  the  firm,  they  see  ‘implicit  contracts’  and 
‘markets’  everywhere.    They  analyse  these  phenomena  with  a  conceptual  toolkit  that 
relates  more  appropriately  to  the  world  of  commodities,  instrumental  rationality,  and 
exchange.  But even in the modern world there is much that does not fit this vision.  And  
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especially  from  a  broad,  historical  view,  much  more  is  ill  suited  for  these  theoretical 
instruments” (p.126).     
 
In this view of the limitations of mainstream economics that he takes, Hodgson (2002) 
highlights  that  such  a  view  was  shared  by  John  Stuart  Mill,  Walter  Bagehot,  Alfred 
Marshall,  Max  Weber,  Werner  Sombart  and  Frank  Knight,  all  of  whom  he  suggested 
“…saw the conceptual tools of mainstream economics as having their place, but this place 
was exclusively the analysis of real markets” (p.126).  However, Hodgson (2002) goes 
further  to  argue  that  the  core  tools  of  mainstream  economics  are  also  limited  in  their 
analysis of real markets, recognising the shortfall in the analysis of property, contracts and 
markets that has to be rectified and suggesting that as it stands, property is treated largely 
as an incentive, neglecting its legal and social-relational aspects (p.26)
48.  
 
Having  given  a  broad  overview  of  the  limitations  of  mainstream  economics  and  the 
subsequent  emergence  of  institutional  economics,  it  is  important  to  make  clear  the 
distinction  between  ‘old’  and  ‘new’  varieties  to  institutional  economics  as  there  are 
important  distinctions  between  the  two  varieties.    Adams  and  Watkins  (2002)  suggest 
broadly  that  old  institutionalism  covers  the  contributions  of  American  and  European 
economists writing in the early twentieth century, which included the works of Commons, 
Mitchell and Veblein (p.6) whilst new institutionalism “…relies on the more mainstream 
assumptions about human agents and explains the existence of political, legal and social 
institutions with reference to the role of individualistic behaviour and its consequences for 
human interactions” (p.7).  Thus, the existence of institutions “…affects the behaviour of 
individual  in  terms  of  the  choices  and  constraints  they  face  but  does  not  mould  the 
preferences of the agents in the way old institutionalists would expect” (ibid.).   
 
                                                       
 
48  Mainstream  economics  adopts  market-oriented  concepts,  but  applies  them  quite  generally,  trying  and 
claiming to be universal but ends up using concepts that have some of the character of a market system 
(Hodgson 2002:127).  At the same time, the analysis of true markets ‘…is doubly devalued, first by the 
inadequacy  of  the  mainstream  concepts  in  dealing  with  property,  contracts  and  markets  themselves  and 
secondly, by the dilution of meaning that occurs when market-oriented concepts and ideas are applied to 
essentially non-market phenomena’ (p.127).  Essentially, Hodgson’s main point of his previous work is that 
markets cannot be judged substantially – either positively or negatively – without specification of the social 
and institutional conditions in which they are embedded (Hodgson 2002:128).  
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Adams  and  Watkins  (2002)  explain  how  the  strand  of  new  institutionalism  has  most 
influenced recent housing and commercial property market analyses
49, and has since the 
1990s, seen urban policy scholars undertake detailed explorations “…of the role of the 
informally constituted and dynamic networks, regimes and governing coalitions that have 
emerged in cities” (p.8).  Davies (2004) suggests new institutionalism invites scholars to 
consider  how  individuals  and  groups  create  strong  ties  enabling  effective  governance 
through partnership; or alternatively why they cannot (p.571).                 
 
Hodgson (1998) suggests that old institutionalism offers a radically different perspective 
on the nature of human agency, based on the concept of habit, where habits and rules are 
seen as necessary for human action.  Old institutionalism’s core ideas therefore concern 
institutions,  habits,  rules  and  their  evolution  (p.168).      However,  unlike  neoclassical 
economics, “who move from a universal theoretical framework concerning rational choice 
and  behaviour  to  theories  of  price,  economic  welfare  and  so  on”  (p.168),  institutional 
economics  “does  not  presume  that  its  habit-based  conception  of  human  agency  itself 
provides  enough  to  move  toward  operational  theory  or  analysis”  (p.169).    The  author 
argues that additional elements are required and in particular, “…an institutionalist would 
stress  the  need  to  show how  specific  groups  of  common  habits  are  embedded in, and 
reinforced,  by  specific  social  institutions.    In  this  manner  then,  instead  of  standard 
theoretical  models  of  given,  rational  individuals,  institutionalism  builds  upon 
psychological, anthropological, sociological and other research into how people behave” 
(p.169).  
 
The thrust of the old institutionalist approach is to see behavioural habit and institutional 
structure as mutually entwined and mutually reinforcing: both aspects are relevant to the 
full picture (Commons 1934, cited in Hodgson 1998:180).  Choosing institutions as units 
of analysis does not necessarily imply that the role of the individual is surrendered to the 
dominance of institutions.  A dual stress on both agency and structure is required, redolent 
of  similar  arguments  in  sociology  and  philosophy,  the  works  of  Giddens  (1984)  for 
example (Hodgson 1998:181).  Both individuals and institutions are mutually constitutive 
of  each  other.    Institutions  mould,  and  are  moulded,  by  human  action  and  are  both 
                                                       
 
49 See Van der Krabben and Lambooy 1993; D’Arcy and Keogh 1998; Keogh and D’Arcy 2000).  
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subjective ideas in the heads of agents and objective structures faced by them (Hodgson 
1998). 
 
Table 5.2: Old Institutionalism: some general remarks by Geoffrey Hodgson 
 
•  There is a degree of emphasis on institutional and cultural factors that is not found in 
mainstream economic theory.  
 
•  The analysis is openly interdisciplinary, in recognising insights from politics, sociology, 
psychology and other sciences. 
 
•  There is no recourse to the model of the rational, utility maximising agent.  In so much as the 
concept of the individual agent is involved, it is one which emphasises both the prevalence of 
habit and the possibility of capricious novelty.   
 
•  Mathematical and statistical techniques are recognised as the servants of, rather than the 
essence of, economic theory. 
 
•  The analysis does not start by building mathematical models: it starts from stylised facts and 
theoretical conjectures concerning causal mechanisms. 
 
•  Extensive use is made of historical and comparative empirical material concerning socio-
economic institutions. 
 
Source: Hodgson (1998:173) 
 
Hodgson  (1998)  argues  that  the  difference  between  old  and  new  varieties  of 
institutionalism  is  made  difficult  because  “…there  is  no  unanimity,  even  among  its 
adherents, in what is precisely to be included in the new variety” (p.175).  Hodgson (1998) 
focuses on the most prominent and influential theoretical core of new institutionalists to 
decipher the  essential differences between the two varieties.  His analysis is shown in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3.    
 
Hodgson (1998) argues that the new institutionalist project to explain the emergence of 
institutions on the basis of given individuals runs into difficulties, particularly with regard 
to the conceptualisation of the initial state from which institutions are supposed to emerge.  
This  involves  an  apparent  infinite  regress  –  what  came  first,  the  chicken  or  the  egg?   
Hodgson  explains  that  this  does  not  mean  that  new  institutionalist  research  is  without 
value, but it indicates that the starting point of explanations cannot be institution-free: the 
main  project  has  to  be  reformulated  as  just  a  part  of  a  wider  theoretical  analysis  of 
institutions.  Such a project would stress the evolution of institutions in part from other  
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institutions  rather  than  from  a  hypothetical  institution-free  state  of  nature.    Crucially, 
Hodgson argues that what is needed is a theory of process, evolution and learning rather 
than a theory that proceeds from an original institution-free state of nature that is both 
artificial and untenable.   
 
Table 5.3: Characteristics of the ‘New’ Institutionalism 
 
•  Attempt to explain the emergence of institutions, such as the firm or the state, by reference to a model 
of rational individual behaviour, tracing out the unintended consequences in terms of human 
interactions. 
 
•  An initial institution-free state of nature is assumed.  The explanatory movement is from individuals to 
institutions, taking individuals as given. 
 
•  Is built upon the antiquated assumptions concerning the human agent, derived from the individualism 
of the Enlightenment – the key idea is the notion that the individual can, and in a sense be, ‘taken for 
granted’. Accordingly, the individual is taken as an elemental building block in economic theory.  
Crucially, the individualistic economist assumes, for the purposes for economic enquiry, that 
individuals and their preference functions should be taken as given. 
 
•  Although by contrast, definitions of an institution in the new institutionalism do not typically include 
the notion of habit, they often share with the older institutionalism a broader, rather than a narrow, 
conception of an institution.  Institutionalists are regarded as general regularities in social behaviour 
(Schotter 1981) or the rules of the game in society or the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction (North 1990). 
 
•  Both new and old institutionalists’ definitions of institutions involve a relatively broad concept.  
Institutions encompass not simply organisations but also integrated and systematic social entities such 
as money, language and law.  The case for such a broad definition of institutions is that all such 
entities involve common characteristics: 
o  All institutions involve the interaction of agents, with crucial information feedback. 
o  All institutions have a number of characteristics and common conceptions and routines. 
o  Institutions sustain and are sustained by, shared conceptions and expectations. 
o  Although they are neither immutable nor immortal, institutions have relatively durable, 
self-reinforcing and persistent qualities. 
o  Institutions incorporate values, and processes of normative evaluation.  In particular, 
institutions reinforce their own moral legitimation; that which endures is often – rightly 
or wrongly – seen as morally just. 
 
•  A key difference between the old and new institutionalists is that in the former, the concept of habit is 
central. For the old institutionalists, habit is regarded as crucial to the formation and sustenance of 
institutions.  Habits form part of our cognitive abilities.  Cognitive frameworks are learned and 
emulated within institutional structures.  The individual relies on the acquisition of such cognitive 
habits, before reason, communication, choice or action are possible.  Learned skills become partially 
embedded in habits, and when habits become a common part of a group or a social culture they grow 
into routines or customs (Commons 1934).  Institutions are formed as durable and integrated 
complexes of customs and routines.  Habits and routines thus preserve knowledge, particularly tacit 
knowledge in relation to skills, and institutions act through time as their transmission belt. 
 
Source: Hodgson (1998:176) 
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Abandoning the attempt to explain all institutions in terms of given individuals does not 
mean the abandonment of theoretical explanation (Hodgson 1998).  Instead, the origins and 
development of organisations and institutions are seen as an evolutionary process.   
 
Having outlined the rise and evolution of institutionalism in economics, the chapter now 
turns to a discussion on the role of institutional analysis from a public policy perspective, 
in particular urban policy and development.   
 
5.5.4  Institutional  analysis  in  urban  policy  development  and  property 
research 
Whilst  urban  policy  development  and  property  research  has  not  been  steeped  in  a 
theoretical history of institutional traditions, a wave of research discussing the applicability 
of institutional analysis to understanding property development, and property development 
processes in particular, has engendered a fresh debate on the contribution of institutional 
thought within the discipline, attempting to persevere with the idea that institutionalism 
works.   
 
From a planning perspective, Vigar et al (2002) explore the ‘institutionalist turn’ in urban 
and  regional  analysis,  drawing  on  the  context  of  the  economic  transformations  being 
witnessed  across  Europe  resulting  “…in  changes  in  production  processes  and  the 
increasing opening of economic activity to global competition” (p.44).  The argument, by 
many analysts, that “…economic activities were embedded in wider social relations, many 
of them strongly tied to locality” (Vigar et al 2002:44) meant that the general social and 
cultural  qualities  of  place  became  of  significant  analytical  interest  and  thus,  the 
development of analysis focusing on local institutional relations and governance capacities 
was steeped in an understanding of institutional economics.  This further influenced the 
development  of  communicative  planning  (see  Healey  1998)  where  work  has  recently 
focused  on  examining  “…how  disparate  actors  in  dispersed  governance  contexts  come 
together to build consensus around difficult local environmental and development issues” 
(Innes 1992, cited in Vigar et al 2002:46). 
 
Adams  and  Watkins  (2002)  adopt  an  institutional  framework  for  their  analysis  of 
greenfields,  brownfields  and  housing  development,  focusing  on  the  institutional  
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dimensions  of  the  greenfield/brownfield  housing  development  debate.    The  authors 
consider the nature and dynamics of the specific institutions involved and their analysis 
encompasses the strategies and interests of the production side in the development process, 
as well as consumer interests and the role of the state.  Essentially, through the use of 
institutional  analysis,  Adams  and  Watkins  (2002)  are  able  to  “…examine  the  ways  in 
which economic and political arguments and social changes impact on the policy arena in 
formal  and  informal  ways”  (p.9).    This  provides  a  framework  within  which  “…the 
principal actors’ decisions are embedded and which is sensitive to the institutional changes 
(and, in particular, policy changes and changes in the economic ad political climate) that 
provide the context for individual land-use decisions” (Adams and Watkins 2002:9).   
 
Table  5.4  provides  a  brief  overview  of  the  focus  of  institutional  analysis  from  the 
perspective of changing urban governance, resulting from new and emerging relations of 
economic life and social activity being accommodated in cities (Cars et al 2002).  From 
their perspective, Cars et al (2002) consider institutional analysis as an analytical approach 
that “…focuses on process dynamics, that is, change in processes, practices and modes of 
governance through time…it needs to consider how values, preferences, interests and ideas 
about place qualities are constituted in these interactions and translated into policy agendas 
around which actors congeal to mobilise as some kind of collective actor”. 
 
Healey  (1991)  in  her  review  of  models  of  the  development  process,  suggests  that  an 
approach needs to be developed that will enable the detail of agency relationships in the 
negotiation  of  development  projects  to  be  captured  while  at  the  same  time,  allowing 
generalizations  about  how  these  relationships  might  vary  under  different  conditions 
(p.237).   
 
In this sense, she suggests that institutional analysis is useful as it uncovers a varied array 
of actors and interests who all play diverse roles in relation to various elements of the 
development process and acknowledges the interrelation of structuring dynamics and the 
active constitution by agents of their interests and strategies.  The focus of her critique of 
the  existing  models  of  development  then  is  the  ontological  claims  that  each  approach 
makes.  Indeed, Healey suggests that none of the models adequately address the way the 
interests and strategies of actors are actively constituted as circumstances change and how 
this relates to broader structural shifts.  Healey conforms to the ontological assumptions of  
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‘structuration’
50, rejecting the domineering structural forces found in ‘structuralism’ and 
the dynamics of agency in more ‘behaviouralist’ traditions in ontology.     
   
Table 5.4: The Focus of Institutional Analysis in Urban Policy Development  
                 And Property Research 
 
•  The dynamic interaction between how particular organisations and actors operate and the 
wider relations of which they are a part. 
 
•  How governance relations are embedded in the social and economic history of particular 
places, and how these in turn contribute to moulding social and economic opportunities.   
 
•  How institutional capacity is embedded in the dynamics of the wider social context within 
which collective action takes place. 
 
•  The qualities of the wider milieux in which government activity is performed and the 
institutional capacity of different places to act to address matters of collective concern.   
 
•  It should be capable of recognising the complex interplay of active agency and broader 
forces, which provide opportunities for, and constrain, what specific governance projects can 
achieve. 
 
•  It requires an awareness of potentially multiple social worlds which shape the ways of 
thinking and ways of acting of those who get involved in governance activity and their 
connection to the social milieux of urban life in particular times and places. 
 
•  It should recognise the diversity of the time-space relations which act as nodal points on 
governance relations. 
 
•  Social actions of any kind need to be understood in the context in which they are embedded. 
 
Source: Cars et al (2002) 
            
In a later paper (Healey 1992), Healey develops this institutional model of the development 
process, the aim of which is to “capture the detail of the social relations of a development 
project,  while  linking  this  to  broader  issues  at  the  macro  economic  and  political 
organisation,  without  overformalising  the  highly  variable  circumstances  of  specific 
projects  and  agencies”  (p.43).    This  ontological  claim  of  ‘structuration’  underpinning 
                                                       
 
50 The theory of structuration, proposed by Giddens (1984) attempts to reconcile theoretical dichotomies of 
agency and structure.  The approach does not focus on the individual actor or societal totality but social 
practices ordered across space and time. Its proponents adopt this balanced position, attempting to treat 
influences of structure and agency equally.  The theory  of structuration argues that all human action is 
performed within the context of a pre-existing social structure, which is governed by a set of norms and/or 
laws that are distinct from those of other social structures. Therefore, all human action is at least partly 
predetermined based on the varying contextual rules under which it occurs.  
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Healey’s approach to her institutional model of the development process (Healey 1992) has 
however come under criticism from succeeding commentary.  Hooper (1992) suggests that 
her  use  of  institutionalism  is  without  adequate  explanation  and  is  problematic  as  it  is 
deployed by Healey as “an instrumental device for relating different levels of analysis, a 
device  which  remains  problematical  in  that  its conceptual  composition  remains largely 
untheorised”  (p.45).    Here,  Hooper  (1992)  emphasises  the  inadequate  development  of 
ontological  approaches  to  the  use  of  institutionalism,  suggesting  that  the  danger  exists 
where “…institutions may be conceived simply as the mediating link between structure 
and agency, requiring theorising only in terms of social relations and then reconnected with 
the material world through a link with production.  Such an approach would lose sight of 
the central idea of the duality of structure offered by contemporary theorists, leading to a 
partial and distorted form of institutional analysis” (pp.47-48).             
 
Gore and Nicholson (1992), in a similar critique of the models of the land development 
process, suggest that the search for a generally applicable model is futile and that energy 
would be more usefully expended in applying the principles of Ball’s (1988) structures of 
provision approach to the full range of land development activity where a specific model 
for each development sector is produced.     
 
In terms of ontological claims of institutionalism in British property research, Adams et al 
(2005) develop a welcome theoretically grounded approach to the use of institutions in 
property research.  The authors utilise their ‘Political Economy of Institutionalism’ (PEI) 
perspective, developed in earlier work (see Adams et al 2003), in order to explore the role 
of public policy in the determination of property values, investment returns and levels of 
development activity in addition to considering the behaviour of and interaction between a 
variety of actors including public agencies, planners, developers, investors and property 
users (Adams et al 2005).  PEI perceives institutions as a social construct and as a result, 
an institution recognises and considers political, legal, social and cultural factors.  On the 
basis of this, PEI seeks to understand context, process and social relations and considers 
any development process as highly social, where the character, personality, interpersonal 
skills and cultural perspectives of the various actors are highly significant.  
   
Thus, in seeking to understand action from a PEI perspective, the analyst must consider 
more than just economic relations in attempting to understanding action.  The analyst must  
 
 
 
124
also consider the variety of local milieux, which are shaped by cultural assumptions about 
appropriate ways of thinking and ways of acting.  Indeed, the PEI recognises and considers 
political, legal, social and cultural facets - the wider ‘institutional landscape’ of specific 
production  processes.    Further,  this  branch  of  (new)  institutionalism  focuses  on  the 
‘…dynamics of social relations and how these get to be patterned in particular ways, rather 
than on organisations understood in terms of their formal structure’ (Adams et al 2005:15).     
 
The political economy of institutionalism emphasises the social construction of economic 
life.    It  takes  a  strongly  disaggregated  view  of  market  structures,  emphasising  the 
distinctive routines, cultures, procedures and institutions evident in each ‘sub market’.  In 
such cases, a single policy response is inappropriate and a more sophisticated and varied 
set of responses is needed that reflect the ‘institutional context’ of each sub market.  The 
political economy of institutionalism identifies three important carriers of institutionalism:  
 
•  actor/network relationships. 
•  formal rules and regulations. 
•  informal customs and conventions.   
 
 
The application of institutionalism in the social sciences is not without controversy (Adams 
and Watkins 2002).  Ball (2006) suggests that the appropriateness of adopting institutional 
analysis depends on the questions being asked.  The significance of institutions, he argues, 
should be treated as a working hypothesis that needs to be subject to scrutiny, suggesting 
that for example on recent international housing market performance, “…easy answers to 
country differences cannot actually be found by reference to institutional variations alone” 
(p.30).     
 
Cumbers  et  al  (2003)  suggest  that  adoption  of  institutionalist  concepts  by  economic 
geographers  has  been  a  partial  and  incomplete  affair,  “…perhaps  reflecting  the  rather 
vague nature of institutionalism, particularly when contrasted with the analytical elegance 
and mathematical tractability of neoclassical economics and the new economic geography 
with their ability to furnish clear predictions and policy advice” (p.2).  The authors make 
clear that such analysis has a tendency to take regions for granted “…as coherent spaces, 
neglecting possible intra-regional divisions and tensions, and the lack of any sustained  
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attempt  to  position  regions  within  broader  processes  of  uneven  development”  (p.9). 
Specifically,  the  authors  note  that  “…institutional  economic  geographers’  failure  to 
consider  the  effects  of  unequal  power  relations  also  leads  them  to  make  implicit 
assumptions about regions as collective entities, devoid of social conflict and contestation.  
This results in the ontologically false treatment of regions as strategic agents with causal 
powers of their own as indicated by the use of terms such as intelligent regions or learning 
regions” (p.11).   
 
Reminding  us  of  the  remit  of  institutionalism,  Hodgson  (1998)  suggests  that  whilst 
institutionalism itself requires much more theoretical and methodological development, it 
does  not  seek  a  general  theory  of  everything.    It  does  however  require  a  coherent 
framework of analysis and a workable methodology (Hodgson 1998:174).  Further the 
author comments that institutionalism does not attempt to build an all-embracing general 
theory.  Instead complex phenomena are approached with a limited number of common 
concepts and specific theoretical tools (Hodgson 1998:168). 
 
5.6  Conclusions and Implications for Research   
The key task in using an institutional approach to this research is to consider to what extent 
institutionalism will add to an understanding of the response by the private sector to public 
policy change.  Specifically, to what extent an institutional approach will facilitate the 
understanding of the institutional capacity of the UK speculative housebuilding industry in 
response to the policy switch favouring brownfield development.   
 
The use of an institutional approach in this research provides an empirical and theoretical 
approach to facilitate the assessment of the research aim and objectives.  Important to any 
assessment of changing state market relations is the recognition of a host of important 
factors influencing the development of brownfield land in UK cities.  Indeed, institutional 
approaches can offer invaluable insights into understanding what sorts of policy reforms or 
assistance may be required to encourage the market to deliver policy goals.  However, it is 
important  to  remember  that  any  reforms  or  changes  to  facilitate  public  policy 
implementation may only work in specific institutional contexts under specific institutional 
arrangements. 
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The use of an institutional approach provides an opportunity to explore how institutional 
presence and interaction may reinforce existing social, economic and political divisions 
(Raco 1998:975).  As Needham and Louw (2006) suggest, the presence of  ‘institutional 
paths’ mean that if housebuilders keep following the same path based on tried and trusted 
strategies and results, an explanation of continuity and no change can be provided (p.81).  
As a result, the need for inter-institutional objectives and a strong institutional presence, 
providing  a  commitment  towards  partnership,  governance  and  a  service  of  common 
enterprise may well “…encourage institutional paths to dissipate and old habits to die” 
(McLeod  1997:302).    As  such,  an  institutional  approach  provides  the  opportunity  to 
demonstrate how the practice of greenfield development has become culturally ingrained 
among housebuilders and other local institutional actors, where habit is reinforced by, and 
in turn reinforces, the ideological predisposition towards greenfield development.  Further, 
the use of institutionalism will facilitate the understanding of social conventions reinforced 
by habits and embedded in specific institutions.  Such conventions are varied and reflect 
the different types of institutional context.     
 
Based  on  the  review  of  the  institutional  literature  above,  the  use  of  an  institutional 
approach presents a number of important implications that will facilitate the understanding 
of the institutional capacity of UK speculative  housebuilders in  response to the policy 
switch  favouring  brownfield  development.    The  following  questions  will  therefore  be 
considered when designing the empirical stage of the research and include: 
 
•  What is the best way to generate capacity and how can organisational integrity be 
created in the delivery of new homes primarily on brownfield sites?  
•  What  institutional  shifts  are  affecting  the  performance  of  UK  speculative 
housebuilders  in  their  response  to  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield 
development?  Housing land supply restrictions impact indirectly on housebuilder 
behaviour responses to land availability and acquisition (Ball 2006:31)   
•  To what extent is brownfield development embedded in the institutional landscape 
and corporate strategies of UK housebuilders? Is there institutional instability and 
is the future of brownfield uncertain?  
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Those  implications  that  are  not  investigated  in  the  research  remain  relevant  to  wider 
debates  surrounding  the  role  of  institutional  analysis  in  British  property  research  and 
include: 
 
•  To what extent is there a spatial variation in the range, density and functions of the 
institutions that underpin brownfield development (Martin 1999:75)? 
•  Is there a willingness for mutual and collective learning amongst UK speculative 
housebuilders? 
•  To what extent is there a strong institutional presence and interactive synergy in 
relation to brownfield development? 
•  What are the dominant patterns of institutional constraint? 
•  Has  the  constant  flow  of  urban  policy  initiatives  favouring  and  promoting 
brownfield development generated strong institutional ties? 
•  Are formal organisations and hierarchies more significant in the development of 
skills  for  the  speculative  redevelopment  of  brownfield  land  for  housing  than 
networks built on strong/weak ties? (Davies 2004:572). 
•  Why have certain forms of institutions and institutional design patterns emerged in 
the first place? (Leibovitz 2003:2637). 
•  What  is  the  best  way  generate  inter-institutional  trust  and  collaboration  and 
inclusion in brownfield development? 
 
In summary, an institutional approach provides the opportunity for this research to identify 
and  explain  the  institutional  constraints  and  causal  processes  giving  rise  to  brownfield 
actor behaviour within a given institutional context.  The premise of this thesis is based 
upon the understanding that an analysis of housebuilders’ response to the policy switch 
favouring brownfield development requires an understanding of the role and functioning of 
the  institutions  involved  within  the  speculative  residential  development  process.  
Consequently,  the  use  of  institutionalism  as  a  theoretical  approach  will  highlight  how 
successful brownfield development will require tailor made urban strategies that involve of 
a  multiplicity  of  stakeholders  with  differing  interests.    From  this,  the  critical  success 
factors of speculative housebuilding under a brownfield modus operandi may involve the 
establishment of public private partnerships and a degree of risk sharing.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO RESEARCH  
 
6.1  Introduction 
The aim of this research is to explore the impact of the policy switch favouring brownfield 
development on the corporate strategies of UK speculative housebuilders and the structure 
and organisation of the  UK speculative housebuilding industry.  The previous Chapter 
demonstrated  how  the  use  of  both  the  core  competence  approach  and  the  institutional 
approach would facilitate the analysis of this.  The first part of the Chapter presents the 
methodological  approach  to  the  research  based  on  the  conceptual  approach.    This  is 
achieved by developing a number of research questions by identifying the key research 
challenges facing this study.  The methodological implications of these research questions 
are highlighted and the most suitable research methods are then identified and justified.   
 
The second part of this Chapter discusses the development of the analytical approach and 
presents  the  new  and  original  ‘typology  of  brownfield  development’,  which  reflects 
speculative housebuilder adaptation to brownfield development based on the results of the 
nationally posted questionnaire in stage 1 of the research.  The ‘typology of brownfield 
development’ represents the differing levels of response by UK speculative housebuilders 
to the brownfield development requirement between the years 2000 to 2005.  It enabled the 
identification of three distinct groups of UK speculative housebuilders: the pioneers, the 
pragmatists and the sceptics. 
 
6.2  The Methodological Implications of the Research  
In  choosing  the  research  methods  it  was  necessary  to  ground  their  choice  in  the  key 
research  challenges  and  questions  that  emerged  in  the  first  half  of  the  thesis.    These 
research challenges and questions related to the broad research themes that emerged out of 
a  review  of  the  literature  in  line  with  the  aim  and  objectives  of  the  research.    These 
research themes included the traditional skills base and structure of the UK speculative 
housebuilding  industry,  the  institutional  environment  within  which  speculative 
housebuilders  operate,  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield  development  and  the 
changing state market relations between the public and private sectors in the delivery of  
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new homes in the UK.  These research themes and the subsequent research challenges they 
present are shown in Table 6.1.     
 
 Table 6.1: Research Themes and their Research Challenges  
Research Theme  Research Challenge 
 
 
 
The Institutional Context of UK 
Speculative Residential Development 
•  Appreciation of the diversity of social relations. 
between actors and their networks within an given 
institutional environment. 
•  Formal rules and regulations as well as informal 
customs and conventions. 
•  Understanding of mutual engagement between 
institutions and individuals.  
•  Structure of Provision – considering both the external 
and internal market influences of speculative housing 
production. 
 
 
The Nature of the UK Speculative 
Housebuilding Industry 
 
 
•  Disaggregating the industry – involve all types and size 
of developers in analysis. 
•  Importance of volume builders in output of homes and 
of regeneration specialists in an urban context. 
•  Regionalisation of speculative housebuilding. 
•  A two tier brownfield land market. 
•  The role of risk in speculative housebuilding. 
 
 
 
 
The Core Competencies of UK 
Speculative Housebuilders 
•  Conventional ‘greenfield’ skills base: land, planning & 
marketing strategies. 
•  Knowledge (data and information). 
•  Firm resources. 
•  Routines, identity, culture and attitudes. 
•  Values and norms. 
•  Competitive advantage and an understanding of 
competition. 
•  Ability to develop and/or acquire requisite skills and 
knowledge. 
 
 
The Challenge of Brownfield 
Development to UK Speculative 
Housebuilders 
 
•  Differing skills set needed. 
•  Differing modus operandi than traditional speculative 
housebuilding. 
•  Risks associated and the perception of tolerability of 
those risks. 
•  New structure of provision? 
 
Source:  Own Analysis 
 
Once the main research themes and challenges were outlined it was possible to develop a 
series of research questions that emerged from these research challenges.  The research 
questions related to the nature of the information that was required to fulfil the aim and  
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objectives of the thesis
51, with respect to the main research themes and challenges.  These 
research questions were: 
 
•  What processes and relationships need to be exposed and understood?   
•  What attitudes and behaviours need to be explained and explored?   
•  What  challenges,  risks  and  constraints  are  faced  and  need  to  be  confronted  by 
speculative housebuilders?   
•  In what ways does the external environment assist or prevent housebuilders from 
managing these risks, constraints and challenges?       
 
Table  6.2  demonstrates  the  linkages  between  the  research  challenge  and  the  research 
questions that arose.  The research questions take account of the varying demands of the 
research challenges, for example the need to explain general attitudes and behaviours of 
speculative  housebuilders  as  well  and  provide  a  detailed  account  of  the processes  and 
relationships that exist between housebuilders and their wider institutional environment.   
 
The development of research questions was useful in identifying the type of information 
that the chosen research methods needed to achieve.  Indeed, the research methods needed 
to adequately explore both the external and internal contexts of a variety of UK speculative 
housebuilders,  from  differing  institutional  (policy)  contexts.    At  the  same  time,  the 
methods also needed to provide the opportunity to account for the broad attitudes and 
behaviours of a large number of speculative housebuilders in order to ensure an adequate 
representation  of  housebuilders’  approach  to  brownfield  development.    The  research 
methods therefore needed to facilitate the collection of both a detailed  knowledge and 
understanding of the corporate strategies of UK housebuilders, and a general overview of 
the industry’s attitudes.  As such, the research questions identified the direction that the 
methodological approach needed to take.    
 
 
 
                                                       
 
51 Refer to the Introduction of this thesis for a review of this.   
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Table 6.2: Research Challenges and Research Questions  
Research Challenge  Research Questions 
The Institutional Context of Speculative 
Residential Development: 
•  Diversity of social relations 
•  Formal rules and regulations 
•  Informal customs and conventions 
•  Mutual engagement 
 
 
•  What processes and relationships need to be 
exposed and understood? 
 
•  What challenges, risks and constraints are faced 
and need to be confronted by speculative 
housebuilders? 
 
•  In what ways does the external environment assist 
or prevent housebuilders from managing these 
risks, constraints and challenges? 
 
The Nature of the UK Speculative 
Housebuilding Industry: 
•  Varying types & sizes of builder 
•  Regionalisation 
•  Role of risk 
•  Dominance of volumes 
•  Regeneration specialists 
 
•  What attitudes and behaviour need to be explained 
and explored? 
 
•  What challenges, risks and constraints are faced 
and need to be confronted by speculative 
housebuilders? 
 
•  What processes and relationships need to be 
exposed and understood? 
The Core Competencies of UK Speculative 
Housebuilders: 
•  Greenfield skills base 
•  Firm resources 
•  Routines, identity, culture 
•  Values, norms & attitudes 
•  Competitive advantage 
 
 
•  What attitudes and behaviour need to be explained 
and explored? 
 
•  What challenges, risks and constraints are faced 
and need to be confronted by speculative 
housebuilders? 
 
•  What processes and relationships need to be 
exposed and understood? 
 
The Challenge of Brownfield Development 
to UK Speculative Housebuilders: 
•  Differing skills set 
•  Different modus operandi 
•  Risk – perception 
 
•  What challenges, risks and constraints are faced 
and need to be confronted by speculative 
housebuilders? 
 
•  What attitudes and behaviour need to be explained 
and explored? 
 
•  What processes and relationships need to be 
exposed and understood? 
 
Source:  Own Analysis 
 
Having identified the research questions that arose from the first half of the thesis, it was 
then possible to identify the methodological implications of those questions, in terms of 
what type of information and/or data was required to fulfil the research aim and objectives.  
The  methodological  implications  of  the  research  are  presented  in  Table  6.3,  which 
demonstrates  that  both  in-depth  and  detailed  knowledge  and  data  and  broader  and 
generalisable  data  were  required  in  order  to  successfully  fulfil  the  research  aim  and 
objectives.    
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Table 6.3: Research Questions and their Methodological Implications 
Research Questions  Methodological Implications 
 
1) What processes and relationships need 
to be exposed and understood?   
 
•  In-depth & detailed knowledge & data 
pertaining to processes & relationships. 
 
2) What attitudes and behaviours need to 
be explained and explored?   
 
•  Broader & generalisable data pertaining to 
attitudes & behaviours. 
 
3) What challenges, risks and constraints 
are faced and need to be confronted by 
speculative housebuilders?   
 
•  In-depth & detailed knowledge & data 
pertaining to perception risk tolerability. 
•  Broader & generalisable data pertaining to 
attitudes & behaviours. 
 
4) In what ways does the external 
environment assist or prevent 
housebuilders from managing these   
risks, constraints and challenges?       
•  In-depth & detailed knowledge & data 
pertaining to key external drivers of change 
and influence. 
•  Broader & generalisable data pertaining to 
attitudes & behaviours of external drivers of 
change & influence.  
Source: Own Analysis 
 
The methodological implications were then used to identify the most suitable methods with 
which  to  conduct  the  research.      This  was  achieved  by  assessing  the  suitability  of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods with respect to the aim and objectives of the 
research through the identification of key research questions.  A discussion on quantitative 
and qualitative research methods now follows after which the chosen methods and then 
presented.   
 
6.3  Quantitative and Qualitative Methodology  
In a broad sense, the quantitative approach to social research emphasises quantification in 
the collection and analysis of data.  Quantitative researchers are largely concerned with 
measurement, causality, generalisation and replication (Bryman 2001).  In contrast, the 
qualitative approach usually emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection 
and analysis of data. 
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Table 6.4 presents a detailed comparison of the competing positions of the quantitative and 
qualitative research strategies, and is a useful overview of the differences of what each 
research strategy aims to achieve.   
 
Table 6.4: The Quantitative and Qualitative Research Strategies Explained 
Quantitative Research Strategy  Qualitative Research Strategy 
 
•  Positivism epistemologically grounds the 
quantitative approach.  Objectivity, 
causality, replicability and generalisation 
are directed by a ridged and often 
sequential research strategy.     
 
•  Society is an external social reality whose 
subjects should and can be studied in much 
the same way as natural science subjects.   
 
•  Hypothesis or theories of action are 
initially formed and then subsequently 
tested.  
 
•  The data produced is considered to be 
‘warranted knowledge’ and is generalisable 
over the range of social actors which were 
studied.     
 
•  The preferred research tool most 
commonly associated with the quantitative 
research strategy is the social survey.  This 
allows a replicable collection of large, 
often numeric data, in an objective manner, 
as distance is maintained between 
researcher and subject.   
 
•  Quantitative researchers are more 
concerned with numbers and frequencies.                 
 
 
•  Epistemologically, the qualitative researcher tends 
to favour a constructionist understanding of what 
is, or should be, regarded as acceptable 
knowledge.  This approach favours taking the 
research subjects perspective as a point of 
departure rather than a hypothesis or a 
theoretically informed hunch.   
 
•  The qualitative approach seeks to understand the 
social world, from the point of view of the subject 
under research.  Meanings and meaning systems - 
comprised of tacit and informal conventions - and 
the interactions, both between and within these 
meaning systems, are at the forefront of interest to 
the qualitative researcher.   
 
•  Researchers seek to contextually frame their 
research to better understand the actions of their 
research subjects within ‘meaning systems’.  The 
qualitative approach emphasises a more fluid, 
dynamic and iterative strategy to research.  
 
•  Methods are employed that enable them to get as 
‘close’ as possible to their research subjects, 
facilitating the ‘inside view’ which they seek. 
Generally, participant observation, the 
establishment of life histories and unstructured 
interviews are among the most common methods 
employed.  These methods produce rich, deep and 
meaningful data, which facilitates the researcher in 
establishing an understanding of social life, rather 
than the mere description of causal relationships.  
Social relationships and patterns of interaction are 
uncovered. 
 
•  Qualitative researchers are more concerned with 
concepts and categories.  
 
Source:  Adapted from Bryman (1984) 
 
As  the  research  questions  and  methodological  implications  identified  in  Table  6.3 
highlighted the need for both generalisable and in-depth knowledge, this research therefore 
used both quantitative and qualitative methods.  This ‘mixed methods’ approach allows the 
opportunity for triangulation of the data.  This is depicted in Figure 6.1.         
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Figure 6.1  Identifying the Most Appropriate Research Methods   
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own Analysis 
6.4  The Case for Mixing Methods 
The  purpose  of  combining  qualitative  and  quantitative  methods  is  usually  for  either 
integrating  data  or  complementing data.    Brannen  (1992)  explains  that  complementing 
means that each approach is used in relation to a different research problem or different 
aspect of the research problem.  In contrast, Brannen (1992) explains that integration is 
referred to as a means to examining the same research problem and hence of enhancing 
claims concerning the validity of the conclusions that could be reached about the data. 
 
Research Themes 
Research Challenges 
Research Questions 
Methodological 
Implications 
Quantitative Methods  Qualitative Methods 
Mixed Methods Approach 
Choice of Methods  
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It is common to find quantitative and qualitative research strategies portrayed in social 
science  research  publications  in  a  dichotomous  fashion.    However,  Bryman  (2005) 
suggests that there need not be a stigma attached to mixing qualitative and quantitative 
methods.  He argues instead that the research technique must fit the problem at hand.   
 
Table 6.5:  Four Ways to Mix Methods in Social Research 
 
Multiple Methods – distinction here is drawn between ‘within methods’ and ‘between method’, 
the former involving the same method being used on different occasions, and the later, using 
different methods in relation to the same object of study/substantive issue
52.  
 
Multiple Investigators – research is carried out by partnerships or teams rather than one 
investigator. 
 
Multiple Data sets – using either different methods to derive different data sets, or, using the 
same method at different times or with different sources. 
 
Multiple Theories – multiple data sets or insights from the research process may lead the 
researcher to employ or generate a number of possible theories.   
 
Source:  Brannen (1992) 
 
Philip (1998) highlights varying advantages of mixing methods, which are summed up as: 
 
•  Minimising the risk of erroneous findings. 
•  Qualitative research may be carried out to establish research questions which will 
subsequently be addressed by quantitative methods  - or the other way round. 
•  Using multiple methods allows a broader range of issues to be addressed in the 
course of the research project. 
 
Philip (1998) makes clear that when using a multiple method approach, ideally one method 
should not be privileged over another and that to gain an understanding of a complex 
world, a variety of methods, in addition to a variety of subject areas, must be addressed’ 
(p.252).   
 
                                                       
 
52  Philip  (1998)  offers  a  competing  explanation  of  the  difference  in  definitions.    According  to  Philip’s 
definition, ‘mixed methods’ refers to Brannen’s ‘between methods’ definition, and ‘multiple methods’ refers 
to Brannen’s ‘within method’ definition.  This differing definition acts to highlight lack of consensus in 
precise definitions of a multiple method approach to social science research.    
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The methods in this research have been chosen for pragmatic reasons that are specific to 
the study and these are briefly outlined below.     
 
6.4.1  The conceptual approach 
Framed by an institutional approach of speculative residential development, this research is 
primarily concerned with social processes rather than quantifiable outcomes.  By focusing 
on the processes that shape the current structure of provision in speculative housebuilding 
and by exploring the reasons why these processes have occurred and continue to occur, the 
subsequent  research  methodology  must  be  equipped  to  identify  and  illuminate  the 
behavioural  patterns,  social  processes  and  forms  of  conflict  that  have  contributed  to 
creating, fortifying and challenging the current structure of provision in UK speculative 
housebuilding.  It is for these reasons that those methods more aligned with the qualitative 
approach will be most suitable for this aspect of the research.   
 
6.4.2  Reifying brownfield 
It is important not to reify brownfield development as a process that is the same in all parts 
of the UK and in all contexts.  An institutional approach supposes that different regions 
will have different types, amounts and levels of brownfield development, availability and 
use.  Housebuilders in towns in the North West for example, where the largest amount of 
brownfield sites (out with London) in the UK are found, will face different and in some 
cases unique challenges in the development of brownfield sites than builders in Oxford, 
Plymouth or Swindon for comparison.  Unique circumstances exist as do generic cases and 
the purpose of this study is not to generalise brownfield development as an outcome, but 
rather  to  uncover  the  processes  through  which  decisions  are  made  and  formed  in  the 
process of brownfield development.   
 
6.4.3  General attitudes and opinions of UK speculative housebuilders  
In  order  that  the  study  provided  a  general  overview  of  the  attitudes,  expectations  and 
behaviours  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders  in  light  of  the  policy  switch  favouring 
brownfield development, there needed to be a quantifiable element to the research.  This 
quantifiable element gave rise to data collection that served to provide a representative 
view of brownfield development by the UK speculative housebuilding industry.   
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6.4.4  Disaggregating the UK speculative housebuilding industry 
Whilst the use of aggregated data pertaining to the general attitudes and behaviours of UK 
speculative housebuilders is useful in providing a context to the research, the demands of 
the research problems required a more detailed and in-depth aspect to the research.  It was 
therefore  important  to  disaggregate  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry  in  its 
approach  to  brownfield  development  so  to  uncover  specific  firm  strategies  and  core 
competencies in brownfield development.  By reducing the level of analysis to that of the 
firm, the development of core competencies, strategic decision-making and the processes 
through  which  decisions  are  made  can  then  were  uncovered  and  explained.    More 
specifically, the research was able to consider firm response to their external environment, 
internal firm evolution, competencies and acquisition agendas and further consider how 
these  processes,  behaviours,  routines  and  actions  related  to  the  approach  taken  to 
brownfield development opportunities.  
 
6.5  The Research Design Process  
The previous sections have outlined and explained the methodological implications of the 
research  with  respect  to  the  aims  and  objectives  of  the  thesis  and  have  identified  the 
quantitative and qualitative research strategies used in social science research.  This section 
combines the outcomes of those previous sections by outlining the research design process 
and presents the most suitable research methods for this research.  Table 6.6 shows the 
methods that are associated with the qualitative and quantitative research strategies.    
 
Because both in-depth, detailed knowledge and broader, generalisable data were deemed 
necessary for the fulfilment of the research aim and objectives, there was a large choice of 
methods  from  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  research  approaches.    However,  these 
methods  needed  to  reflect  the  requirements  of  the  research  challenges  and  subsequent 
research questions (refer back to Figure 6.1).  As a result, and in referring back to Table 
6.3, it was clear that a two-staged approach to data collection was needed - there was a 
methodological  requirement  to  gather  both  general  and  detailed  information  regarding 
speculative housebuilders’ behaviours and attitudes toward brownfield development.   
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Table 6.6:  Methods associated with quantitative and qualitative research  
                 Strategies 
Quantitative  Qualitative 
Sampling 
Structured interviews 
Self-completion questionnaires 
Structured observation 
Content analysis 
Secondary analysis and official statistics 
 
Ethnography 
Participant observation 
Unstructured and semi-structured interviews 
Focus groups 
Discourse and conversation analysis 
Personal documents e.g. diaries, letters & autobiographies 
Source:  Bryman (2004) 
 
The decision was therefore taken to conduct the research in two stages, where the broader 
and more general attitudinal data was collected in Stage 1; this would then influence the 
approach taken in Stage 2 where the more detailed data was collected.  As a result, Stage 1 
was  used  to  gather  broad  information  pertaining  to  the  attitudes  and  behaviours  of  a 
representative sample of UK speculative housebuilders towards the use of brownfield land, 
whilst  Stage  2  was  used  to  gather  more  in-depth  information  pertaining  to  the  use  of 
brownfield land by a small number of select UK speculative housebuilders.  Figure 6.2 
presents  these  in  respect  of  the  methodological  implications  of  the  research  and  the 
methods associated with those.  The research approaches for Stage 1 and Stage 2 will now 
be discussed in more detail.   
 
6.6  The Research Approach for Stage 1 
Stage 1 was designed to survey a wide variety of housebuilders, of differing sizes and 
specialism’s operating all over the UK.  Specifically, the task was to uncover their attitudes 
and behaviours pertaining to the use of brownfield land for housebuilding.  The need to 
collect  quantifiable  and  generalisable  data  pertaining  to  these  general  attitudes  and 
behaviours towards the brownfield policy agenda therefore narrowed down the choice of 
suitable research methods.   
 
6.6.1 Brownfield development database 
Structured interviews and structured observation were not suitable for this research as they 
were too resource intensive, particularly in terms of time.  Content analysis was not suited 
to  the  aim  and  objectives  of  the  research,  as  the  methodological  implications  did  not 
require a detailed analysis of documents published by housebuilders.    
 
 
 
139
Figure 6.2  Linking Methods to the Two-Staged Research Process   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own Analysis 
 
However, some level of background data collection was required in order to provide a 
context to the study and as a result, the suitability of using secondary analysis and official 
statistics was confirmed.  As such, a ‘brownfield development database’ was created using 
documentary data, which was sourced from a wide variety of places, including published 
housebuilding  company  reports,  government  data  on  housebuilding  and  land  use,  the 
Methodological 
Implications 
In-depth & detailed knowledge & 
data pertaining to processes & 
relationships. 
Broader & generalisable data 
pertaining to attitudes & 
behaviours. 
Quantitative Methods  Qualitative Methods 
•  Sampling 
•  Structured interviews 
•  Self-completion 
questionnaires 
•  Structured observation 
•  Content analysis 
•  Secondary analysis and 
official statistics 
•  Ethnography 
•  Participant observation 
•  Unstructured and semi-
structured interviews 
•  Focus groups 
•  Discourse and conversation 
analysis 
•  Personal documents e.g. 
diaries, letters & 
STAGE 1 
 
Collection:  
 
Broad and generalisable data 
pertaining to attitudes & behaviours 
of a large number of speculative 
housebuilders regarding brownfield 
development. 
STAGE 2 
 
Collection: 
 
Detailed and in-depth knowledge 
pertaining to attitudes and 
behaviours of small number of 
speculative housebuilders regarding 
brownfield development within an 
institutional environment.     
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financial press, the internet and the Annual Housebuilding Report series (Wellings 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006).  This data presented information on a wide range of UK housebuilders 
and other stakeholders from the housebuilding and urban development community.  This 
database was used to establish trends, historical and current, in various aspects of the UK 
speculative housing development process such as the stock and flow of brownfield land in 
the UK, housing output levels, percentage of new homes built on brownfield land, and 
annual unit completions.        
 
As these documents are produced independently of this research, the information received 
was  non-reactive,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  subject  to  possible  distortion  due  to  the 
interaction between the researcher and the subject studied (Bryman 2004).  However, one 
disadvantage when dealing with this type of document is that the researcher cannot ask 
further questions but has to be content with the information provided.  Nonetheless, as this 
database informed the creation of the questionnaire and interview guides (see later), there 
was an opportunity to probe further lines of enquiry.   
 
Looking critically at documents, the research process took account of the fact that these 
data  may  have  been  produced  in  order  to  serve  governmental  or  other  organisational 
purposes.    Indeed,  ‘the  concepts,  definitions  and  data-collection  processes  used  in  the 
production of these (data)…are commonly determined by the purpose the (data)…serve 
and the functions of the organisations which are their primary users.   These concepts, 
definitions,  purposes  and  functions  are  part  of  a  world  created  by  the  needs  of  the 
machinery  of  government  and  the  management  of  organizations’  (Thomas  1996:52).  
Further, May (2001) suggests that ‘official statistics do not simply exist independently of 
the actions of those who compile them, they also feed back into everyday practices’ (p.86).  
Indeed, it is important to understand how a document has come into being.  In addition, it 
was important to consider the overt message of these documents, together with any indirect 
information or ‘message’ that the documents may convey.     
 
6.6.2 Brownfield development questionnaire 
However, the use of secondary analysis and official statistics alone did not provide the 
level of detail on housebuilder attitudes and behaviours that were required for the first 
stage  of  the  research,  as  those  methods  would  not  have  given  any  indication  of  
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housebuilder attitudes – the publications simply reported on build activity, turnover, sales 
rates  and  so  on.    Therefore,  the  use  of  a  large-scale  survey  in  the  form  of  a  postal 
questionnaire was deemed as an appropriate additional method in Stage 1.  This provided 
the  opportunity  to  collect  broad,  generalisable  data  pertaining  to  the  attitudes  and 
behaviours  of  a  large  and  representative  sample  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders,  of 
differing  sizes  and  specialisms  operating  all  over  the  UK,  with  regard  to  brownfield 
development.    The  questionnaire  also  allowed  for  the  collection  of  data  from 
housebuilders’ over a large geographical area in a relatively fast timeframe. 
 
Therefore,  the  decision  was  taken  to  use  a  self-administered  ‘closed  question’  postal 
questionnaire,  whereby  respondents  generally  ticked  response  categories.    The 
questionnaire
53 was designed in a way that might have been perceived to be of direct value 
to  the  respondent  in  order  to  increase  the  potential  response  rate.    A  ‘postage  paid’ 
envelope was included in the questionnaire to try and increase the response rate.   
 
As little academic empirical research has been done on the UK speculative housebuilding 
industry in recent times, there was not an extensive body of literature with which to assess 
the suitability of the methodological approach.  Neither was their any academic literature 
that provided an overview of the different types of UK speculative housebuilders or their 
company profiles.  However, the Private Housebuilding Annual (PHA) series (Wellings 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) provides an annual detailed overview of the corporate activity and 
financial analysis of UK speculative housebuilders producing over 100 units per annum.  
The series also covers topics such as reflections on the housing market, the housebuilding 
industry  structure  and  the  stock  market.    The  PHA  series  provides  the  most  detailed 
publicly available information pertaining to UK speculative housebuilder operations on an 
annual basis.   
 
The decision was therefore taken to use the Private Housebuilding Annual (PHA) 2004 
edition (Wellings 2004) as a population frame for the questionnaire because this was the 
only suitable publication available that provided a breakdown of the biggest and most 
active housebuilding companies in the UK.  In each yearly publication, the PHA provides a 
                                                       
 
53 The questionnaire can be seen in Appendix 3.             
 
 
 
142
table of the UK’s biggest speculative housebuilders based on their unit completions and 
uses unit completions as the starting point for comparison of size
54.  In the 2004 edition of 
the  PHA,  a  table  of  104  housebuilders  all  producing  over  100  units  per  annum,  was 
provided.  Although there are over 19,000 housebuilders registered with the NHBC, the 
concentration of the UK speculative housebuilding industry (refer back to Chapters 1,2 and 
3)  means  that  those  housebuilders  producing  over  100  units  per  annum  provide  the 
majority of all new homes built in the UK.  The table of 104 housebuilders provided in the 
PHA  was  therefore  considered  as  representative  as  possible  of  the  UK  speculative 
housebuilding  industry  and  it  was  used  as  a  population  frame  for  the  choice  of 
housebuilders for which to send the questionnaire to.     
 
The use of the PHA provided the opportunity to adequately reflect on the heterogeneous 
nature of UK speculative housebuilding using up to date information, given the lack of 
research on the nature of UK speculative housebuilders in the academic literature.  Further, 
the Top 104 housebuilders are arguably more crucial to the success of the Government’s 
policy switch favouring brownfield development than those smaller housebuilders whose 
market share of housebuilding production is negligible compared to the output of the Top 
104, and even the Top 10 housebuilders (refer to Chapters 1, 2 and 3). 
 
The managing director of each of the 104 housebuilding companies was chosen as the most 
suitable  recipient  of  the  questionnaire  because  they  were  considered  to  have  the  most 
operational  involvement  with  the  day  to  day  running  of  the  company  and  they  were 
therefore  considered  the  most  suitable  representative  of  the  company.    Of  course,  the 
delegation  by  the  managing  director  of  the  questionnaire  completion  to  his  staff  was 
expected from time to time, but this was out of the control of the research.   
       
                                                       
 
54 Wellings (2006) suggests that the choice of unit completions as the starting point for comparison of size is 
by no means as ideal choice – it’s simply just better than the alternative.  He makes clear that the crude 
measure of the number of houses is not perfectly homogenous; not only are they of varying sizes, there can 
also be a significant difference in the selling price according to location.  However in practice, Wellings 
points out, the difference in product mix between companies, particularly the larger ones, is not excessive 
(p.33).  Wellings (2006) further adds that although measuring companies by the number of unit completions 
does not take into account the relative value of the individual product, it has two recognisable advantages: the 
unit numbers tie in with the industry statistics, allowing the calculation of market shares; and changes over 
time are not complicated by selling price inflation.  Nearly all the units drawn by Wellings (2006) in his PHA 
series are drawn from published accounts or are provided for the PHA series by the company (p.33).      
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6.6.3 Piloting the brownfield development questionnaire 
Before  being  dispatched  to  the  104  housebuilders,  the  questionnaire  received  detailed 
comments  by  the  CASE  partner  after  which  it  was  then  piloted.    Originally,  the 
questionnaire  was  to  be  piloted  through  clients  of  the  CASE  partner,  but  due  to  time 
constraints  of  the  CASE  partner,  this  could  not  be  feasibly  achieved.    A housebuilder 
operating in England and Scotland who had links with the University of Glasgow was 
therefore  chosen.    The  decision  was  taken  to  use  only  one  pilot  as  the  potential  for 
housebuilders failing to return the main questionnaire as a result of already having spent 
time completing a piloted issue was considered to be a justifiable reason.  In retrospect, 
this  was  a  justified  decision,  as  the  end  response  rate  was  46%  i.e.  48  of  the  104 
housebuilders.  The pilot housebuilder did however provide some very useful and detailed 
comments on the initial draft. 
  
The pilot stage was successful in that it tested the questionnaire in order to both gauge the 
length of time it took to investigate, and also to determine whether the questions were 
properly understood by the respondent (Wilson 1996).     
 
The results of the questionnaires informed the interview design in Stage 2 of the research 
and therefore demonstrated the complementary nature of questionnaires as research tools.  
The data received in Stage 1 was considered very useful and provided the opportunity to 
inform the design of the second part of this two staged research process.  The way in which 
this was achieved will be discussed in the following section.   
 
6.7 The Research Approach for Stage 2  
Stage 2 provided the opportunity to study, in detail, the strategic decision making of a 
representative selection of speculative housebuilders in differing policy and institutional 
contexts in respect of the impact of the policy switch favouring brownfield development.  
This  stage  focused  on  the  collection  of  qualitative  in-depth  material  pertaining  to  the 
external drivers of change in speculative housebuilding, the perception of risk tolerability, 
and the processes and relationships within the wider institutional context of speculative 
residential  development  that  influenced  the  perception  and  uptake  of  brownfield 
development.  The findings of Stage 1 were used to inform the direction of Stage 2, where  
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the generaliasable data was used to inform the research design of the methods used to 
generate in-depth qualitative data. 
 
6.7.1 Case study approach 
As  the  research  aim  was  to  assess  the  institutional  capacity  of  the  UK  speculative 
housebuilding  industry,  then  providing  a  comparative  assessment  of  the  operations  of 
housebuilders in distinct institutional environments was crucial to the fulfilment of the aim 
and objectives of the study.  The research approach for Stage 2 was therefore designed as 
comparative case study.   
 
Due to time and financial constraints as well as the need to collect in-depth and detailed 
data from a representative sample of UK speculative housebuilders, the decision was taken 
to limit the number of case studies to two.  The case study areas were chosen based on 
local authority jurisdiction.  This was because, whilst being able to keep the local policy 
variable  constant,  the  approach  also  allowed  for  the  dynamics  of  governance  between 
actors in the residential development process at the local level to be explored.   
 
The  case  study  areas  chosen  were  Manchester,  England  and  Glasgow,  Scotland.    The 
choice was based both on pragmatic reasons and the requirements of the research.  Indeed, 
both cities reveal a substantial stock of brownfield land due to the decline of their former 
industrial legacies, textiles and shipbuilding respectively.  The contrast in England and 
Scotland’s Government’s policy approaches to the use of brownfield land for new housing 
(see Chapter 3 for more detail) provided the opportunity for a very interesting cross case 
analysis,  through  a  comparison  of  the  effects  of  differing  national  and  local  policy 
directions on housebuilder behaviour towards brownfield development.  More so, the use 
of two case study areas afforded the opportunity for the research to uncover the differential 
impacts of the different external environments that UK speculative housebuilders operate 
within (refer back to the SOP model in Chapter 5), such as inter alia: housing and land 
markets, land availability, finance markets and skills availability.  The cities of Glasgow 
and Manchester were also where research contacts and personal contacts were based and as 
such, they suited the research for practical reasons.  
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Whilst  the  case  study  areas  chosen  were  reflective  of  the  approaches  of  speculative 
housebuilders operating in two of the four countries that comprise in the UK, there are 
three  clear  reasons  why  the  results  of  the  Stage  2  research  can  be  extrapolated  to  be 
representative of UK speculative housebuilders as a whole.  First, the policy priorities of 
all 4 UK countries are similar in that the reuse of brownfield land for housebuilding is 
promoted in preference to greenfield land.  England is the only country with a specific 
brownfield development target, but the policies of the three other countries similarly do 
require the reuse of brownfield land in preference to greenfield land.  Second, the previous 
Chapters have presented what is known about the speculative housebuilding industry from 
a UK level, in terms of its structure and organisation as well as its core strategic focus and 
modus operandi.  As such, the contextual knowledge for this empirical research is based on 
an  understanding  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders.    It  would  be  wrong  to  present  a 
research project based on only English and Scottish housebuilders when Stage 1 of the 
research  accounted  for  the  attitudes  and  behaviours  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders.  
Finally, the structure and organisation of the UK speculative housebuilding industry  (refer 
to Chapter 1) means that the housebuilders chosen for interview in England and Scotland 
(see below) are some of the biggest housebuilders operating in the UK and who have a 
significant market share in UK speculative housing provision. As such, the views of these 
housebuilders, in addition to the fact that the policy restrictions in place are largely the 
same in all 4 UK countries, mean that the results can fairly and reasonably be extrapolated 
to cover the UK as a whole.       
 
6.7.2 The use of semi-structured interviews 
Due to the nature of the information that was required in Stage 2, the use of methods such 
as  discourse  analysis  and  conversation  analysis,  ethnography,  personal  documents  and 
participant observation were ruled out.  Personal documents are not part of the operation of 
speculative housebuilders and participant observation was not thought possible due to the 
inherent  commercial  sensitivity  of  the  housebuilding  industry
55.    Indeed,  most  land 
departments within housebuilding companies operate behind closed doors and in separate 
                                                       
 
55 This issue will be discussed in more detail later in this Chapter.  
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offices  from  the  rest  of  company,  such  is  the  commercially  sensitive  nature  of  the 
information they deal with on a day to day basis
56.   
 
In addition, focus  groups were not  an option  with specific regard to housebuilders, as 
issues of commercial sensitivity would prevent housebuilders from discussing the nature of 
their  strategic  operations  and  competitive  strategies  with  their  competitors  or  anyone 
outside the company.  Therefore, the most suitable method for information collection in 
Stage 2 was semi-structured interviews.  This allowed the collection of detailed and in-
depth information from speculative housebuilders in line with the aim and objectives of the 
research.  
 
The focus of the housebuilder interviews was to explore: 
 
•  The perceptions and attitudes of housebuilders towards brownfield development 
including current and potential impacts of the policy switch.  
•  The  perception  and  awareness  of  housebuilders’  need  to  adapt  their  current 
‘greenfield’ skills base and business strategies.        
•  The  potential  adaptation  measures  and  strategies  employed  or  likely  to  be 
employed  by  housebuilders  and  the  extent  to  which  these  are  envisaged  or  in 
operation.   
 
Uncovering  housebuilders’  response  to  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield 
development required detailed discussions with housebuilders in respect of: 
 
•  The  three  basic  skills  required  to  establish  development  feasibility  in 
housebuilding,  namely  those  of  controlling  ownership  through  land  acquisition, 
securing  planning  permission  and  other  public  consents,  and  creating  attractive 
marketing (Adams & Watkins 2002).   
•  The design approach to their product and their developments. 
•  The underlying business strategies and sources of competitive advantage. 
 
                                                       
 
56 This is largely anecdotal evidence that was received through a conversation with a housebuilder during the 
formulation of the research strategy.    
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For this research, semi structured interviews offered a flexible, adaptable open-ended and 
discursive  way  of  conducting  the  research,  allowing  insight  into  the  interests  of  the 
interviewee’s point of view into what they consider relevant and important.  Interviews in 
this  research  were  considered  as  conversations  with  a  purpose,  a  way  of  uncovering 
motivations, strategies, meanings and views to gain multi-layered information of a deeper 
and detailed picture. 
 
An interview  guide
57 was used, which the interviewee saw prior to the agreeing to be 
interviewed.  This guide was comprised of a structured list of issues and questions, which 
ensured that questions of fairly specific topics were covered whilst allowing for flexibility 
in  how  the  interviewee  responded.    This  allowed  for  more  dialogue  between  the 
interviewer and interviewee and also allowed for further lines of inquiry to be pursued 
from the responses of the interviewees at the same time as providing the interviewee with 
the opportunity to highlight what was important in explaining and understanding events, 
patterns and forms of behaviour.  The use of an interview guide ensured that the same 
questions with similar wording were asked to all respondents but in a manner that was 
specific to each semi-structured interview.   
 
6.7.3 Critically assessing the information obtained from the interviews 
The  initial  decision  was  taken  to  conduct  4  interviews  with  each  housebuilder.    This 
allowed for the 4 key features of establishing development feasibility in UK speculative 
housebuilding – land, planning, design and marketing (refer to Chapter 2) - to be explored 
in detail with the relevant Director of each of those departments in each housebuilding 
company.    This  would  have  resulted  in  the  need  to  conduct  40  separate  interviews in 
Glasgow and Manchester.       
 
Pilot interviews were conducted with a national housebuilder based in Warrington to assess 
both the usefulness of the interview guide and questions and to practice the process of 
interviewing.  Each of the four interviews took approximately 1 hour and were conducted 
with the Land Director (land), Technical Director (design and technical/ground), Planning 
Manager  (planning)  and  Marketing  Director  (sales  and  marketing).    Arranging  the 
                                                       
 
57 A copy of the interview guide is shown in Appendix 4.  
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interviews  was  a  time  consuming  process,  and  due  to  staff  holiday  and  work  load 
commitments, the 4 interviews were spread over the course of three weeks.  The preference 
was to undertake the interviews in the order that matched the development process, where 
the Land Director was interviewed first, followed by the Technical Director, the Planning 
Manager and finally the Sales and Marketing Director.  This, of course, was more difficult 
than originally anticipated for reasons mentioned above.             
 
Based on the outcomes of these 4 pilot interviews, the decision was taken to just interview 
the Land Director at each housebuilder.  This was for three key reasons.  First, the pilot 
interviews  revealed  that  the  Land  Director  maintained  involvement  through  the  entire 
development process, from the beginning when the land is identified, through the design 
and  planning  process  to  the  sales  and  marketing  process.    The  Land  Director  was 
essentially responsible for the overall management of each piece of land, as it progressed 
through each aspect of the development process.  And, because of this, the Land Director 
had a detailed and relevantly adequate knowledge of all stages of the development process.  
This afforded the opportunity to avoid getting bogged down in the detail of each aspect of 
the development process that the other Departmental Directors did go into whilst the pilot 
interviews were taking place.   
 
Second,  the  Land  Director  managed  the  legal  side  of  the  development  process,  in 
conjunction  with  the  Company’s  legal  team,  so  his  involvement  in  all  aspects  of  the 
development process was crucial.  Third, because this research focused on the general 
approach by housebuilders to the brownfield policy agenda, and not specifically on just 
technical,  planning  or  marketing  solutions  to  increased  brownfield  development,  the 
decision to capture the Land Director’s knowledge of the overall process to avoid getting 
too bogged down in the detail and avoiding gathering resource intensive data to analyse, 
was arguably justified.   
 
From a practical point of view, it was felt that the opportunity to interview just one person 
from  each  housebuilding  company  would  also  increase  the  likelihood of  housebuilders 
agreeing to be interviewed as it would require less time and effort on their part.            
     
There are, of course, other ways in which the research could have been conducted.  The 
number of housebuilders could have been reduced and the corresponding time spent with  
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each of them increased, to provide more detailed and ‘richer’ data set. But, because of the 
heterogeneous  nature  of  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry  and  the  variety  of 
different housebuilders that the results of Stage 1 generated, it was important to ensure that 
Stage 2 was as representative as resource, finance and time constraints allowed.     
 
Similarly, it might have been useful to become involved in one specific brownfield project 
for  each  of  the  housebuilders  chosen  for  interview.    However,  due  to  the  inherit 
commercial  sensitivity  that  was  emphasised  in  the  pilot  interviews  and  the  subsequent 
unwillingness  of  the  pilot  interviewees  to  name  any  specific  developments  they  were 
working on or considering for purchase or acquisition, this was rendered an incredibly 
difficult task to achieve within the constraints of a 3 year research project.        
 
Nonetheless, for the above mentioned reasons and, as land is the lifeblood of housebuilders 
(Barker 2003), the decision to interview just the Land Director was suitably justified.  And, 
the  data  received  was  considered  suitable  for  achieving  the  aim  and  objectives  of  the 
research.   
 
6.7.4  The selection of housebuilders for interview 
The housebuilders chosen for interview were selected using the outcome of the Stage 1 
questionnaire.  However, the final selection process for interview was severely constrained 
by the willingness of the housebuilders to be interviewed, and the final choices were not 
the  originally  preferred  choices.    This  was  largely  due  to  the  timing  of  the  empirical 
research taking place close to and over the Easter and summer holiday periods and the 
preoccupation of housebuilders writing their end of year reports.  It was also, in part, due 
to the inherent commercial sensitivity that exists in speculative housebuilding, which will 
be discussed later on in this section.    
 
Table 6.7 provides a profile of the respondents to the Stage 1 questionnaire based on the 
types  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders  outlined  in  Chapter  1.    The  housebuilders  are 
identified by numbers that were assigned to their questionnaire on response.  Again, due to 
commercial sensitivity, it was felt that the response rate of the questionnaire would be 
better if respondents were afforded the opportunity to remain anonymous and therefore the 
names of the respondents are not published.  Table 6.7 provides clarity in respect of the  
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representative  nature  of  the  Stage  1  respondents  to  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding 
industry as a whole.  It shows that 7 out of the 48 housebuilders who responded to the 
survey operated UK wide.  These same 7 respondents also accounted for 70% of the UK’s 
top ten biggest housebuilders.  Further, 2 out of 3 super builders (refer to Chapter 1) were 
represented in the survey.  This means that those housebuilders who deliver the majority of 
new homes in the UK were well represented in the survey.         
 
The analysis of the responses to the Stage 1 questionnaire, which informed the selection of 
housebuilders for interview in Stage 2, involved the development of a typology that was 
based on a categorisation of the questionnaire responses.  The method used to establish the 
typology categories was based on respondent’s answers to a select number of questions 
from the questionnaire,  which were  chosen based on their suitability for reflecting the 
respondents’  approach  to  brownfield  development,  in  respect  of  the  overall  aim  and 
objectives of the research.  More importantly, the approach also differentiated between:  
 
•  Those housebuilders who have consistently built predominantly on brownfield land 
and who intend to carry on doing so;  
•  Those builders who have not predominately built on brownfield land but intend to 
increase their output in the future; and,  
•  Those housebuilders who have not generally built on brownfield land and do not 
intend to change their approach in the future.           
    
Table 6.7: A Profile of the Questionnaire Respondents, 2006 data 
No  Ownership & Size  Coverage   %Brownfield 
/Greenfield 
Typology 
Category 
 
1  PLC Volume Group  All UK
58  82/12  Pragmatist 
2  PLC Volume Group  All UK   78/22  Pragmatist 
3  Anonymous  All UK  85/15  Pragmatist 
4  Private Volume Group  Scotland & North West 
England 
70/30  Pragmatist 
5  Private, Large  Wales  15/85  Sceptic  
6  PLC, Volume, Group  All UK  89/11  Pragmatist 
                                                       
 
58 Whilst housebuilders have specified that they operate across the UK, this research acknowledges that 
housebuilders may incorrectly state their involvement in all four countries of the UK.  However, the survey 
did provide respondents with the opportunity to individually select each of the four UK countries.        
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7  Private Large   North West England  80/20  Pragmatist 
8  Private Large  North East England  45/55  Sceptic 
9  Private Large  South East England  30/70  Sceptic 
10  Private Large  South East England  70/30  Pragmatist 
11  Private Large  Scotland, Yorkshire, Midlands 
& London 
80/20  Pragmatist 
12  Private Large  North East England  5/95  Sceptic  
13  Private Large  Scotland  36/64  Sceptic 
14  Private Large  England & Wales  70/30  Pragmatist 
15  Private Large  London & South East  100/0  Pioneer 
16  Private Large  Yorkshire  70/30  Pragmatist 
17  Anonymous  London & South East  89/11  Pragmatist 
18  Private Large  Scotland  22/78  Sceptic 
19  Private Large  North West & West Midlands  89/11  Pragmatist 
20  PLC, Group Volume  All UK   84/16  Pragmatist 
21  Private Large  London, South East, South 
West England 
87/13  Pragmatist 
22  Private Large  London & South East England  100/0  Pioneer 
23  Private Large  Scotland  100/0  Pioneer 
24  Private Large  East Midlands & Yorkshire  70/30  Pragmatist 
25  Private Volume Group  London & South East  82/18  Pragmatist 
26  Private Large  North West England & 
Yorkshire 
89/11  Pragmatist 
27  Private, Group Volume  All UK  45/35  Pragmatist 
28  Private Large  Eastern England  70/30  Pragmatist 
29  Private Large  North West England  100/0  Pioneer 
30  Private Large  North West England  76/24  Pragmatist 
31  Anonymous   Mid &South England  38/62  Sceptic 
32  Private Large Group  North West England, Midlands 
& South East 
75/25  Pragmatist 
33  Private Large  Scotland  80/20  Pragmatist 
34  Private Large  North West England  100/0  Pioneer 
35  Private Large  Scotland  15/85  Sceptic 
36  Private Large  London  75/25  Pragmatist 
37  Private Large  Scotland  100/0  Pioneer 
38  Private Large  North West & South West 
England 
70/30  Pragmatist 
39  Private Large  Scotland & London  30/70  Sceptic 
40  Private Large  North West England  100/0  Pioneer 
41  Private Volume  All UK  78/22  Pragmatist 
42  Private Large  North East England & 
Yorkshire 
15/85  Sceptic 
43  Private Large  Scotland  10/90  Sceptic 
44  Private Large  Scotland  25/75  Sceptic  
45  Private Large  Wales & North East England  22/78  Sceptic 
46  PLC Volume Group  All England  93/7  Pragmatist 
47  Private Large  South East England  70/30  Pragmatist 
48  Private Large  North East England  & 
Yorkshire 
40/60  Sceptic  
Source: Own Analysis  
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As such, the questions chosen from the questionnaire were
59: 
 
Question 3:  ‘Please indicate the percentage of housing completions by type of site for 
2005 or the latest financial year, giving your answer to the nearest 5 percent. 
 
Question 4:   Of  those  plots  in  your  company’s  land  bank,  what  percentage  is 
greenfield/brownfield land, giving your answers to the nearest 5 percent? 
 
Question 6:   Has the number of brownfield units completed by your company changed 
over the past 5 years? 
 
Question 8:   Do you think the number of brownfield unit completions by your company 
will change in the next 5 years? 
 
Including Question 3 in the categorisation process provided the opportunity to assess the 
retrospective commitment of housebuilders to brownfield development.  If the respondents 
housing  completions  were  predominantly  brownfield,  this  would  reflect  a  generally 
positive  retrospective  picture  of  their  attitudes  towards  brownfield  development.  
Correspondingly, if their completions were predominantly greenfield, it would suggest a 
lower retrospective commitment to brownfield development.   
 
Question 4 provided the opportunity to account for the respondents’ future commitment to 
brownfield development by assessing the content of their land bank.  Whilst it is obvious 
that  the  land  bank  may  contain  strategic  greenfield  sites  that  have  been  on  the 
housebuilders books for a number of years and may not come to fruition any time soon, it 
does  however  provide  a  good  glimpse  into  the  attitudes  of  housebuilders  towards  the 
suitability of brownfield development.      
 
Question 6 assessed respondents’ retrospective commitment to brownfield land through 
identifying the change in the brownfield units they had completed in the past 5 years.  This 
                                                       
 
59 A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 3.   
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provided a view of developer build activity on brownfield sites over the past 5 years, whilst 
the inclusion of Question 8 assessed the builders intentions towards brownfield land in the 
future  by  asking  respondents’  whether  they  expected  their  brownfield  unit  numbers  to 
increase in the next 5 years.        
 
6.8 The Typology of Brownfield Development  
Three typologies were formed based on the responses to the above 4 questions.  These 
three  typologies  suitably  encapsulated  the  opinions  and  attitudes  of  the  top  104 
housebuilders towards brownfield development, through both their retrospective and future 
commitment to the use of brownfield land for residential development.  The spread of the 
three typologies is shown in Table 6.8. 
 
When placing responses into the three typologies, a categorisation process was followed 
which involved placing respondents into categories based on their answers to the questions 
as discussed above.  The process began with questions 3 and 4, which was fairly simple 
and three core categories emerged which suitably reflected housebuilders’ commitment to 
brownfield development through their build activity and land bank activity.  Specifically, a 
clear cohort emerged who built 100% of new homes on brownfield land and had a land 
bank  comprised  of  100%  brownfield  land.    The  remaining  respondents  were  clearly 
demarcated by their level of brownfield build activity and land bank activity in respect of 
England’s 60% brownfield development target.  As such, the decision was taken to use the 
60% figure to demarcate the remaining respondents
60.  Therefore two more categories were 
formed: those housebuilders who banked and built above 60% brownfield; and, those who 
banked  and  built  less  than  60%  brownfield  land.    The  responses  correlated  for  both 
questions. 
 
                                                       
 
60 As the responses were reflective of attitudes and opinions in the first 5 years of the UK Government’s 
brownfield  development  agenda,  housebuilders  land  bank  and  build  activity  was  therefore  considered  a 
suitable reflection of their attitudes in response to this policy switch.  The 60% figure was adopted from 
England’s brownfield development target, with the acknowledgment that it was not utilised in the Scottish, 
Northern Ireland or Welsh contexts.  However, as brownfield development was promoted in preference to 
greenfield development in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 60% was considered a suitable figure.             
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Table 6.8:  The Spread of Typologies of Brownfield Development 
   
Pioneers 
 
Pragmatists 
 
Sceptics 
 
Total Respondents 
 
 
Number of 
Responses 
 
 
7 
 
27 
 
14 
 
48 
 
% Of total 
 
15% 
 
 
56% 
 
29% 
 
100% 
Source:  Questionnaire Analysis 
 
The three categorise that emerged reflected pioneering, pragmatic and sceptical approaches 
to the use of brownfield development by UK speculative housebuilders.  Those who built 
and banked 100% brownfield land reflected a pioneering approach; those who built and 
banked  over  60%  were  pragmatic  and  those  who  built  and  banked  less  than  60% 
demonstrated a sceptical view of brownfield development.          
 
These three categories then accommodated the responses to questions 6 and 8.  Question 6 
identifies whether housebuilders have always built on brownfield land and if not, how 
much they have increased their output in the past 5 years.  Question 8 identifies whether 
brownfield units will increase over the coming 5 years.  In explaining the three categorise 
in more detail, it will be explained how questions 6 and 8 were included.         
 
6.8.1 The pioneers  
The pioneers are the industry leaders in brownfield development.  This typology is largely 
comprised  housebuilders  whose  strategic  and  competitive  focus  is  primarily  on  the 
redevelopment  of  brownfield  sites,  most  commonly  regeneration  specialists.    The 
responses revealed that these housebuilders deliver 100 % of all new homes on brownfield 
sites and have a land bank comprised of 100% brownfield sites.  Pioneers of brownfield 
development will have built the majority of their units on brownfield sites in the past and 
will most likely build all of their units on brownfield sites in the  future.  Answers to 
following questions that were required to be included in this category were: 
 
Question 3:  100%. 
Question 4:  100%.  
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Question 6:  Stayed the same, increased slightly.   
Question 8:    Stay the same, increase slightly.      
 
6.8.2 The pragmatists  
The  pragmatists  are  those  housebuilders  who  have  demonstrated  an  increased  use  of 
brownfield land for housebuilding in the past 5 years and who intend to continue using 
predominantly brownfield land in the future.  These housebuilders deliver between 60% 
and 89% of units on brownfield land and have a land bank comprised of between 60% and 
89% brownfield sites.  Those who have demonstrated changes in ‘brownfield behaviour’ in 
the  past  5  years  and  who  intend  to  continue  making  changes  in  the  coming  5  years.  
Answers to following questions that were required to be included in this category were: 
 
Question 3:  60% and above. 
Question 4:  60% and above. 
Question 6:  Stayed the same, increased slightly or increased significantly.   
Question 8:  Stay the same, or increase slightly.    
 
6.8.3 The sceptics   
The sceptics are those who have made only limited changes to their already limited use of 
brownfield land for housing in the past 5 years and who are committed to making only 
small and limited changes in their use of brownfield land for housebuilding in the coming 
5 years.   The sceptics deliver less than 60% of all new homes on brownfield sites and have 
a  land  bank  made  up  of  predominantly  greenfield  opportunities.    Essentially,  sceptics 
reflect  those  speculative  housebuilders  who  have  only  made  limited  changes  to  their 
‘brownfield behaviour’ in the past 5 years and who appear committed to making only small 
or limited changes in their use of brownfield land for housebuilding in the coming 5 years.   
Answers to following questions that were required to be included in this category were: 
 
Question 3:  Below 60%.  
Question 4:  Below 60%. 
Question 6:  Increased  slightly,  stayed  the  same,  decreased  slightly  or  decreased 
significantly.   
Question 8:  Stay the same, decrease slightly or decrease significantly.    
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Table 6.8 shows that pioneers made up 15% of the total number of respondents whilst 56% 
were  pragmatists.    Interestingly,  sceptics  comprised  almost  a  third  of  all  respondents.  
Therefore,  whilst  the  majority  of  respondents  demonstrated  a  positive  attitude  towards 
brownfield development, in the way of pragmatists and pioneers, approximately a third of 
respondents demonstrated only a limited and sceptical commitment to the use brownfield 
land for speculative residential development.        
 
6.9 Interviewee Selection  
Three steps were involved in choosing the housebuilders to be interviewed.  The selection 
of housebuilders for interview needed to: 
 
•  Ensure they were representative of the heterogeneous nature of the housebuilding 
industry. 
•  Ensure they operated within the two case study areas.     
•  Ensure they were representative of the questionnaire results.     
  
Because  of  the  practical  constraints  of  time  and  money  involved  in  interviewing 
housebuilders in England and Scotland, such as travel distances, the decision was taken to 
undertake detailed interviews with ten housebuilders, five in each case study area.  The 
composition of those ten housebuilders needed to reflect the heterogeneous nature of the 
UK speculative housebuilding industry but also have consideration to the concentration of 
the industry and the dominance of volume and super builders.   
 
Additionally, because of the nationally operative functions of volume and super builders 
and  the  significance  of  the  wider  institutional  environment  of  UK  speculative 
housebuilding  (see  Chapter  5),  the  decision  was  taken  to  interview  the  Glasgow  and 
Manchester franchises of three nationally operative housebuilders.  These three nationally 
operative housebuilders were chosen because they were respondents of the questionnaire 
and  were  of  different  sizes,  representing  the  largest  and  the  smallest  of  the  nationally 
operative builders.  The decision to interview different franchises of the same housebuilder 
in Glasgow and Manchester was taken for two key reasons: 
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•  To compare and contrast the impacts of differential brownfield policy contexts on 
head office corporate strategies in two differing and distinct areas.  
•  To  explore  the  differential  impacts  of  varying  institutional  landscapes  on  the 
housebuilders behaviour and attitudes towards brownfield development. 
 
The two other housebuilders chosen for interview in each region were specialist and niche 
housebuilders  who  had  responded  to  the  questionnaire  and  who  were  operating  in  the 
Glasgow and Manchester regions.  Because of the limited response of specialist and niche 
housebuilders in the questionnaire, the decision was taken to interview one regeneration 
specialist and one other niche housebuilder.  The housebuilders chosen to interview are 
shown in Tables 6.9 and 6.10
61.   
 
6.9.1 Interviewee Confidentiality  
The table shows that the names of the housebuilders have been disguised.  The decision to 
afford the interviewees a full level of confidentiality, which removed both the name of the 
housebuilding company and the name of the interviewee, was taken for three key reasons.  
First,  the  commercial  sensitivity  prevalent  in  speculative  housebuilding  makes 
housebuilders very private enterprises that are constantly concerned about the leakage of 
commercially sensitive information, such as profit margins and potential land acquisitions.  
Secondly, at the time the interviews were being arranged, all but one of the housebuilders 
requested confidentiality, both of the housebuilding company’s name as well as the Land 
Directors  name.    Third,  it  was  considered  that  the  opportunity  for  the  respondents  to 
remain confidential would encourage them to divulge more information than they have 
may have done if they were ‘on record’ in the interview process; and, this appeared to 
work well in the pilot interviews.        
 
Because the firm’s identities remained confidential, any direct reference to their current 
developments  or  their  marketing  brochures  to  illustrate  and  provide  examples  of  their 
                                                       
 
61 Table 6.10 shows that Edzell West Scotland was unable to be interviewed due to a last minute cancellation.  
The table also shows that a sixth housebuilder was interviewed in Scotland, who was interviewed in addition 
to the chosen five because of his keen interest in the research topic and his willingness to be involved in the 
research.   
  
 
 
 
158
points was not allowed.  Therefore, the decision was taken to include a limited amount of 
secondary data into the results section of this research in order to suitably illustrate the 
findings from the interviews with ‘real life’ examples.  This provided the opportunity for 
the  reader  to  see  the  application  of  the  strategies  and  approaches  taken  to  brownfield 
development  that  were  discussed  in  the  interviews,  for  example  the  use  of  computer 
generated images in marketing literature.    
 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show the housebuilders have been identified using made up names.  
These  names  were  chosen  randomly  and  cross-checks  were  made  to ensure that  those 
names were not the names of real housebuilding companies.  The names chosen were also 
typical Scottish or English names to aid the distinction between the two countries.   
 
6.9.2 The interviewees 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show some basic data and descriptions of the English and Scottish 
housebuilders chosen, going as far as confidentially allows.   
 
Table 6.9: The English Housebuilders Interviewed in Stage 2, 2006 data 
Name  Type and Ownership  Coverage  BF/GF 
Units 
Arden North West  Pragmatic, Volume, PLC  All UK  78/22 
Bridgemere North West  Pragmatic, Volume, PLC  All UK ex. Ireland  78/22 
Edzell North West  Sceptical Volume, PLC  All UK  90/10 
Vision Construction  Pioneer, Private, Large  North West 
England 
100/0 
Unicorn Construction   Pioneer, Private Large  North West 
England 
100/0 
Source: Own Analysis 
 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show that the housebuilders interviewed in England and Scotland were 
representative  of  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry,  where  super  and  volume 
housebuilders  were  interviewed  as  well  as  privately  owned  and  publicly  limited 
companies.  The tables also show that all the typology categories were represented in both 
Scotland and England. 
  
 
 
 
159
Table 6.10: The Scottish Housebuilders Interviewed in Stage 2, 2006 data 
Name  
 
Type and Ownership 
 
Coverage 
 
BF/GF 
Units 
 
Arden West Scotland  Pragmatic, Volume, 
PLC 
All UK  78/22 
Bridgemere West Scotland  Pragmatic, Volume, 
PLC 
All UK ex. Ireland  78/22 
Edzell West Scotland unable to 
be interviewed and was replaced 
by: 
Caledonian Homes 
Sceptical, Large, Private  Scotland  36/64 
Campbell Construction  Pioneer, Large, Private  Scotland  100/0 
Lothian Homes  Pragmatic Volume, 
Private 
Scotland & North 
West England 
70/30 
Lomand Developments  Pioneer, Large, Private    100/0 
Source: Own Analysis 
 
6.10  Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has shown how the methodological approach taken to the research has been 
designed taking account of the practical and pragmatic issues in the research.  This study 
utilises a mixed methods approach to social science research, which provided the ability to 
triangulate  the  data  and  provide  a  more  comprehensive  explanation  of  the institutional 
capacity of the UK speculative housebuilding industry in responding to the policy switch 
favouring brownfield development.  This was achieved by conducting the research in two 
stages, which provided the opportunity for stage one to influence stage two of the research.   
 
The chapter made clear that questionnaires, secondary data sources and semi-structured 
interviews were the most suitable research methods for this study.  In assessing the impact 
of  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield  development  on  the  UK  speculative 
housebuilding  industry,  this  research  compares  the  responses  of  UK  speculative 
housebuilders from two distinct policy areas, in order to emphasise the impact of the wider 
institutional environment in UK speculative housebuilders adaptation to policy change.   
 
The establishment of the ‘Typology of Brownfield Development’ facilitates the critical 
analysis  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders  response  to  the  brownfield  development 
requirement  through  highlighting  the  differing  approaches  and  attitudes  at the  industry  
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level of housebuilders to the use of brownfield land in the delivery of the majority of new 
homes.  Whilst the use of typologies in social science research is important in facilitating 
the  explanation  of  research  findings,  through  providing  the  opportunity  to  make  some 
generalisable  outcomes,  it  is  important  to  make  clear  that  the  boundaries  between  the 
typologies are not impermeable.  Indeed, as housebuilders evolve in their experiences of 
the speculative development of brownfield land for housing, through building upon their 
core competencies, they may well make the transition from pragmatists to pioneers, or 
from sceptics to pragmatists in the future.      
 
The use of a questionnaire provided a generalisable picture of the opinions and attitudes of 
UK  speculative  housebuilders  to  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield  development.  
However, to explore in more detail the extent to which UK speculative housebuilders have 
replaced their traditional skills based with novel approaches better suited to brownfield 
development,  in  depth  semi  structured  interviews  were  conducted  with  a  number  of 
housebuilders in each typology category.  Housebuilders were also chosen who operated in 
England and Scotland.  Based on using this approach, three clear groupings were formed.  
These three categories well reflected UK speculative housebuilders degree of involvement 
in and attitudes towards brownfield development.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
LAND SUPPLY 
 
7.1  Introduction  
Land supply in UK speculative housebuilding has rested primarily on the experiences of 
utilising greenfield land, both in respect of its acquisition and achieving planning consent.  
Chapter  2  highlighted  the  conventional  core  competencies  and  skills  used  by  UK 
speculative housebuilders in acquiring land and gaining planning permission and made 
clear that these skills and competencies were honed and sharpened primarily through the 
greenfield experience (Adams and Watkins 2002).  Chapter 4 highlighted the challenges 
that the primary use of brownfield land might present to this existing skills base.  Sourcing 
land and controlling the ownership of land prior to its full acquisition has conventionally 
been an important core competence in UK speculative housebuilding.  The skills of using 
lengthy options and the preference for large greenfield sites whilst providing reliable site 
preparation costs, in addition to using their existing knowledge of contacts and the market, 
has facilitated housebuilders in historically managing land supply successfully.  As such, 
brownfield development presents a number of challenges to this existing competence and 
skills set because brownfield land will normally: 
 
•  Be of comparatively high land value. 
•  Have abnormal site preparation costs due to it previous use. 
•  Be smaller in size and may have protracted ownership issues. 
•  Be in new market areas. 
 
In addition to land acquisition, securing planning permission and other public consents as 
part of land supply has also been shaped primarily under the greenfield experience.  The 
use  of  standardised  products  and  layouts  facilitates  housebuilders  in  achieving  blanket 
building  regulation  approval  and  provides  them  with  a  crucial  familiarity  in  the 
requirements  of  the  planning  process.    Brownfield  development  presents  a  number  of 
challenges  to  this  existing  competence  and  skills  set  of  securing  planning  permission.  
Brownfield land may normally: 
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•  Require a balance of uses in addition to residential. 
•  Require higher densities through efficient plotting, the result of higher land values. 
•  Garner local opposition from adjacent land users. 
•  Need an argument for change of use from employment to residential. 
•  Require housebuilders to deal with other necessary consents such as infrastructure 
provision.     
             
7.2  The Results – Quantitative Data 
The  quantitative  data  provides  a  general  insight  into  the  role  of  land  supply  in  UK 
speculative housebuilding under the brownfield modus operandi.  Whilst not specifically 
identifying the development of core competencies or the establishment of new skills, the 
quantitative  data  does  provide  a  general  view  of  the  ways  in  which  UK  speculative 
housebuilders consider land supply in respect of land availability, planning skills and the 
impact  of  planning  policy  on  their  business  activities.    As  such,  it  supplements  the 
succeeding  qualitative  data,  as  is  the  case  with  a  multiple methods  approach  in  social 
science research.   
 
7.2.1  Land availability 
Land availability remains a crucial issue under the brownfield mode of operation. In the 
questionnaire,  when  housebuilders  were  asked  whether  brownfield  completions  had 
changed over the past 5 years because of land availability, Figure 7.1 shows that 79% of 
respondents suggested they had.        
 
Undoubtedly, a severe limit of this question is its inability to consider whether the lack of 
greenfield land has meant that builders are just building more new homes on brownfield 
land or whether the increased availability of brownfield land has meant that builders are 
actively choosing to build more new homes on brownfield land.  However, Stage 2 of the 
research involving the qualitative research methods overcame this limitation by providing 
the opportunity to discuss the issue in more detail.            
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Figure 7.1:  Have  brownfield  development  completions  changed  over  the 
past 5 years because of land availability?   
79%
13%
8%
Yes
No 
Not Applicable
 
When  housebuilders  were  asked  the  same  question  in  respect  of  planning  policy, 
interestingly, 53% of respondents felt that brownfield completions had changed in the past 
5 years because of changes in planning policy.  However, Figure 7.2 also shows that 38% 
of respondents did not list planning policy as an influence in the change in brownfield 
completions.  Still, the quantitative data makes clear that Government planning policy is a 
primary influence in driving the increase in brownfield completions by house builders, in 
addition to issues of land availability.   
 
Figure 7.2:  Have  brownfield  development  completions  changed  over  the 
past 5 years because of government policy?   
 
53% 38%
9%
Yes
No
Not Applicable
 
When housebuilders were asked whether brownfield completions will change over the next 
5 years because of Government policy, the results very much mirrored the above question.  
The exception was however the number of respondents who felt that land availability was 
not applicable to brownfield completions changing in the future.      
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Figure 7.3:  Will brownfield development completions change over the next 
5 years because of land availability?     
 
79%
8%
13%
Yes
No
Not Applicable
 
Figure 7.3 shows 79% of respondents suggested land availability would be an influence on 
the change in their brownfield unit completions in the coming 5 years.  This is likely to be 
reflective  of  the  wider  attitude  towards  the  increasingly  stringent  position  the  UK 
Government  is  taking  in  restricting  greenfield  development  and  the  more  general 
tightening of the regulatory environment of UK speculative housebuilding.       
 
Figure 7.4:  Will brownfield development completions change over the next 
5 years because of government policy? 
47%
40%
13%
Yes
No
Not Applicable
 
 
The impact of Government policy on changing unit completions on brownfield land in the 
next 5 years was less pronounced.  Figure 7.4 shows only 47% of respondents stated that 
brownfield unit completions would change over the next 5 years because of Government  
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policy, compared with 53% who felt it had affected brownfield completions over the past 5 
years.    
 
In respect of the planning  element to land supply, the quantitative data suggested that 
under the brownfield modus operandi, interestingly, the majority of housebuilders do not 
outsource the planning skills required for brownfield development.  Figure 7.5 shows that 
only  29%  of  respondents  outsourced  planning  skills  for  brownfield  development, 
indicating that this skill has not been significantly affected by the increase in brownfield 
development rates by housebuilders.       
 
Figure 7.5:  Does your company outsource planning skills?     
29%
71% Yes
No
The quantitative data above demonstrates that both planning policy and land availability 
have affected brownfield unit completions by UK speculative housebuilders since 1999.  
Housebuilders also showed that land availability issues would further affect brownfield 
unit completions over the next five years (from 2004 to 2009).  In respect of planning 
skills, housebuilders do not generally outsource the planning skills required for brownfield 
development. 
 
7.3  The Results - Qualitative Data 
In  response  to  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield  development,  UK  speculative 
housebuilders have developed new skills that permit their conventional core competencies 
of land supply to be applicable under the brownfield mode of production.  The following 
section outlines how housebuilders have achieved this and is organised into 5 parts.  The 
first  part  discusses  the  continued  critical  importance  of  land  to  housebuilders,  part  2 
explains the land search strategies of housebuilders, part 3 focuses on land discernment  
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whilst part 4 discusses land acquisition.  Part 5 explains housebuilders’ approach to gaining 
planning  permission.    The  5  parts  together  demonstrate  that  the  conventional  core 
competencies and skills utilised by UK speculative housebuilders in respect of land supply 
have been successfully transposed onto the brownfield modus operandi.   
 
7.3.1  The continuing critical importance of land  
The  research  confirms  that  UK  speculative  housebuilders  continue  to  seek  out  a 
competitive edge and maintain profitability through the readily available supply of suitable 
development sites (Ball 1983, Barlow and King 1992, Bramley et al 1995, Adams and 
Watkins 2002, Adams 2004), despite the policy switch favouring brownfield development.  
Edzell  North  West,  a  sceptical  volume  PLC,  emphasise  land  as  their  most  important 
strategic asset:  
 
‘Land is our life blood, it’s our raw ingredient…it’s at the centre of 
everything we do, both in terms of our ability to grow the business, 
to deliver to the City, but also to generate profit; it’s the core of 
everything we do and its our single biggest investment’. 
 
For the sceptics and pragmatists equally, land acquisition remains the most crucial core 
competence  to  their  overall  business  functions  and  successes.    This  is  the  same  for 
housebuilders in both England and Scotland.  When asked to identify the main source of 
competitive advantage to the company, all of the housebuilders interviewed identified land 
and its acquisition as their most significant source of competitive advantage.  Bridgemere 
North West, a pragmatic volume PLC, made clear that they are a ‘big hungry animal that 
needs feeding’, whilst Arden West Scotland, another pragmatic volume PLC, suggested ‘its 
obvious, without eggs, you can’t make omelettes’.  Providing a comparison to their English 
counterparts, Bridgemere West Scotland highlight the critical importance of land to their 
company’s corporate success:   
 
‘Land  is  our  raw  material,  it’s  a  big  big  driver…its  key  to  the 
whole thing’.   
 
And, Lothian Homes, a pragmatic Scottish based privately owned volume producer, make 
the point even clearer:   
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‘Without land, you can’t build any houses, it’s as fundamental as 
that…without land, we are nothing’.    
 
Whilst both the pragmatists and sceptics continue to see land as critical to their business 
success, there is additionally no distinction between those Scottish and English builders.  
Indeed, for both Scottish and English speculative housebuilders, the continued importance 
of  land  in  establishing  development  feasibility  remains  significant  in  their  strategic 
successes.     
 
For the pragmatists and the sceptics, sourcing and controlling land therefore remains a 
critical strategic activity despite the policy switch favouring brownfield development.  This 
research therefore adds weight to recent research findings that have suggested there to be a 
sustained ‘land focus’ in the UK speculative housebuilding industry (Barker 2003, 2004; 
Callcutt 2007).   
 
For the pioneers, whose business operations have clearly flourished in response to the 
policy switch favouring brownfield development, it is difficult to establish the extent to 
which their processes of land supply have been affected because no previous literature 
exists to provide a benchmark.  Indeed, the growth of regeneration specialists and their 
business functions is a relatively new topic of research in the literature with only a handful 
tackling the issue (Katrimindou 2005, Dixon 2006).  However, whilst it is clear that land is 
important to the success of a pioneer, this research will show that there are other aspects to 
their business functions that are equally crucial to their success; these will be explored in 
more detail in the forthcoming Chapters.            
 
7.3.2  Land search strategies  
How housebuilders seek out development opportunities remains one of their most crucial 
business strategies.  Previous research has not fully detailed the land search strategies of 
UK  speculative  housebuilders  and  therefore,  no  marker  exists  in  judging  how  the 
brownfield development requirement has affected this crucial business function.  However, 
through discussions with the interviewees, it is clear that land search strategies generally 
do  not  differ  for  brownfield  and  greenfield  sites  and  therefore  no  new  skills  or 
competencies have been developed.  Rather, this research confirms previous research on 
the subject that highlights the inherent competitiveness in speculative housebuilding of  
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finding the right site in the best location that has always pervaded land search techniques 
for UK speculative housebuilders (Adams and Watkins 2002, Bramley et al 1995, Ball 
1983).  However, this research specifically uncovers how this inherent competitiveness is 
particularly  acute  when  considering  the  short-term  land  function  that  brownfield  sites 
provide to UK speculative housebuilders.         
     
Generally,  UK  speculative  housebuilders  have  well-developed  and  comprehensive  land 
search  strategies  which  have  been  successfully  transposed  onto  the  brownfield 
development contexts.   In effect, no new ‘brownfield’ strategies have been developed, 
which  subsequently  demonstrates  the  malleability  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders’ 
conventional strategies to changing policy agendas.  The land search strategies will now be 
discussed in more detail.  
 
For  speculative  housebuilders,  all  land  opportunities  arise  in  the  form  of  ‘market 
opportunities’ and ‘off market opportunities’.   Market opportunities refer to those sites 
that are advertised in the national and local press and therefore attract  a high level of 
interest from a number of housebuilders.  Off market opportunities reflect housebuilders’ 
ability to seek out sites that have not yet gone to the open market and are therefore less 
competitive.  Off market opportunities involve housebuilders approaching the owners of 
sites in which they have identified a development interest and enquiring whether they have 
considered disposing of their site.  Off market opportunities therefore afford housebuilders 
the opportunity to purchase a site in a non-competitive situation and allow housebuilders 
the potential to make lower value offers.  The research indicates that both market and off 
market  opportunities  were  equally  prevalent  in  the  Scottish  and  English  context.  
Additionally, this approach was relevant to both pragmatic and sceptical builders.       
 
For illustration, Caledonian Homes, a sceptical Scottish private volume builder, suggest the 
benefits of buying land ‘off market’ rather than in a competitive market situation accrue 
because: 
 
 ‘…normally you can drive your margins forward and make a big 
impact over your competitors. In a non-competitive situation, you 
don’t have to offer a higher price to secure the site because the 
land owner won’t have as many offers on the table and you won’t 
have to inflate an offer to beat off the competitors’.    
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Importantly, Caledonian Homes suggest that seeking out off market opportunities is as 
relevant for brownfield sites as it is for greenfield sites, and no difference in their approach 
exists.  In a brownfield context, Caledonian Homes make clear that the strategy involves: 
 
 ‘…knocking on owners doors and asking them if they are willing 
to dispose of the site’.         
 
Whilst  the  distinction  between  ‘market’  and  ‘off  market’  land  search  strategies  is  an 
important one to make, the research indicates there to be three distinct approaches taken by 
UK speculative housebuilders when searching for suitable development sites within which 
market and off market opportunities sit.  These are detailed in Table 7.1 and again are 
relevant in both the English and Scottish contexts.   
 
Table 7.1: UK Speculative Housebuilders Land Search Functions 
Reactive  Proactive  Strategic 
‘On market’ offers 
Property consultants  & 
other contacts 
Press and advertisements 
External skills 
‘Off market’ offers 
One-on-one  
Change of use 
opportunities 
Land agents and other 
contacts (finders fee) 
External and in-house 
skills 
 
‘Off market’ offers 
Local Plan led land identification 
Options 
‘Forward land’ 
In-house skills 
 
Source:  Own Analysis 
 
Reactive land search functions represent opportunities that are on the open market and 
advertised  through  a  selling  agent  or  by  the  landowner  himself,  to  which  speculative 
housebuilders react.  Property consultants such as King Sturge, Savills, GVA Grimley and 
DTZ provide an important function in introducing land to developers.  The local press and 
local  advertisements  are  also  an  important  source  of  information  and land  is  regularly 
advertised in the Estates Gazette and other property magazines and publications, as well as 
at residential and commercial property auctions.  Whilst reactive land search techniques 
can provide lucrative opportunities, housebuilders are in direct competition with each other 
to secure the site and therefore, this approach may be more expensive and ultimately may 
produce a lower profit margin.    
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Proactive land search techniques depend on the skills and techniques of the individual 
housebuilders in their methods of land identification.  Under this approach, housebuilders 
seek out opportunities that are not on the open market and that provide the opportunity for 
housebuilders to negotiate a deal on a one-on-one basis with the landowner.  Depending on 
their land search techniques, housebuilders may or may not be in competition with other 
housebuilders.  Proactive land opportunities arise through either the introduction of a site 
by a land agent or through the housebuilders’ land teams searching for sites by driving 
around,  knocking  on  doors,  monitoring  planning  applications  and  generally  being 
proactive.    The  preference  for  speculative  housebuilders  is  to  proactively  seek  land 
opportunities using the latter technique.  This is because whilst land agents do offer good 
opportunities and sometimes on a one-to-one basis, housebuilders are generally charged a 
‘finder’s fee’ in the region of 1.5% to 3% of the completion purchase price on completion 
of the acquisition.  The finder’s fee does vary and is dependent on the size of the site and 
its location, market and planning potential.  Of all the housebuilders interviewed, the most 
common finders fee was between 2 and 2.5%.   
 
For example, where a housebuilder buys a site for £10.5 million that was introduced by a 
land agent and a finders fee of 2% was agreed, the housebuilder would pay the land agent a 
£210,000 fee.  This cost would be integrated into the land appraisal process and would be 
deducted from the overall land value.  So, in the same instance where the site was not 
introduced by a land agent, the housebuilder could either increase his profit margin and 
maintain the land value at £10.5 million, or provide the landowner with an increased price 
of £10.71 million whilst maintaining his profit margin.        
 
Most  of  the  housebuilders  made  clear  that  a  finders  fee  of  3%  was  considered  an 
unacceptable cost and they would try and negotiate this down should a land agent request 
one.  However, where it secured an excellent development opportunity or very lucrative 
investment, most of the housebuilders would seek to obtain main board approval from head 
office to allow that cost to be spent.     
 
Proactive land search strategies therefore provide housebuilders with the opportunity to 
make  a  better  return  on  capital  than  reactive  land  search  strategies.    Lomand 
Developments, a pioneering Scottish private niche builder, make clear that for them:  
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 ‘It’s all about contacts and knowing the agents – we go off market 
as  a  rule…We  maintain  a  profile  with  significant  contacts  and 
maintain a profile that people will want to come and talk to us’.      
 
Strategic land search techniques are largely planning driven and relate to the identification 
of land that may come forward for development in the next round of development plans or 
might be suitable for development based on a thorough analysis of the local and national 
planning  policy  and  guidance.    Strategic  land  search  techniques  usually  involve 
housebuilders  identifying  potential  development  opportunities  using  the  local  plan  or 
ordnance survey or web based maps, and controlling these sites under long-term options.  
This long option period allows housebuilders to promote the site through the planning 
system to ensure that if not allocated in the next round of plans, it stands a good chance of 
gaining planning permission.  These strategic land search techniques were conventionally 
used to identify and secure greenfield land and have been well discussed in the previous 
literature (Ball 2006, Adams and Watkins 2002, Bramley et al 1995).  As the next section 
will discuss, long term options are not typically utilised on brownfield sites and therefore 
currently, brownfield sites generally tend not to be uncovered using strategic land search 
techniques by builders in both Scotland and England.           
 
The identification of sites through the study of local plans provides housebuilders with the 
opportunity to secure sites for development in the medium to long term, therefore taking 
them off the open market and securing a more competitive deal.  Edzell North West, a 
sceptical volume PLC, made clear that this strategy - the potential of ‘forward land’ - was 
very beneficial to the company’s development: 
 
‘Forward land is basically pre-empting the planning process and 
as the planning process has to make future provision for homes, we 
look at acquiring options on land and basically promoting them 
through the planning process’.  This method allows Edzell North 
West to ‘…identify which areas are likely to have the greatest need 
and most likely to bring sites forward’.      
 
Interestingly, Edzell North West do demonstrate that their ‘forward land’ approach has 
also been successful in seeking out brownfield opportunities: 
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‘Land  is  land,  whether  its  brown  or  green…so  the  strategic 
approach  of  identifying  suitable  sites  which  will  maybe  come 
forward in 2,3,4 years time can equally be applied to brownfield 
land…Brownfield land is not off our sights in terms of the strategic 
route’.      
 
Having  established  how  UK  speculative  housebuilders  approach  the  identification  of 
suitable  development  sites,  using  either  reactive,  proactive  or  strategic  land  search 
functions,  it  is  important  to  discuss  the  skills  that  are  involved  in  carrying  out  those 
functions.  The reactive land search functions as expected require the least demanding 
skills from housebuilders and simply involve their land team being on all the press and 
advertisers mailing lists.  Also important is for the builder to be well connected with all the 
various property consultants and land agents to ensure they are told about opportunities as 
soon  as  they  come  to  market.    All  the  housebuilders  interviewed  reactively  sought 
development opportunities this way.      
 
Seeking out sites under the proactive and strategic land search strategies require a more 
resourceful and demanding approach from the housebuilders.  All of the housebuilders 
interviewed  who  sought  out  development  opportunities  in  a  proactive  and/or  strategic 
manner conducted ‘saturation surveys’.  This tool has been used for a number of years by 
UK speculative housebuilders but hardly documented at all in the literature.   
 
The saturation survey is essentially a survey of all available and potential development 
sites within target market areas where housebuilders seek to operate.  It thus becomes a 
library of all possible development land.  These market areas are typically related to local 
planning authority boundaries, but can be organised around towns, settlements or housing 
market areas.  Bridgemere North West, a pragmatic volume builder provides an overview 
of the saturation survey:  
 
‘In  a  saturation  survey,  we  identify  an  area  that  we  want  to 
concentrate  building  in,  and  we  identify  what’s  currently  there, 
from every land use point of view …to build up a picture of what’s 
around there and then you then start knocking on peoples doors 
saying ‘have you considered disposing of this?’  
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Arden  West  Scotland,  a  pragmatic  volume  PLC,  highlight  how  the  saturation  survey 
provides  housebuilders  with  the  opportunity  to  potentially  identify  sites  that  other 
housebuilders have yet to come across: 
 
‘The saturation survey is a good way to try and identify sites that 
aren’t currently on the market or are unknown to other people’.   
 
As most housebuilders conduct saturation surveys, the competitive nature of this survey 
method means that housebuilders tend to pin down two or three regions at a time and 
concentrate on identifying all potential development opportunities within that area before 
moving onto the next area.  Arden North West provide an interesting comparison to their 
Scottish counterpart, emphasising that: 
 
‘…all builders do them, so what we do is focus on certain areas, 
markets where we want to be now and in the future and we literally 
saturate it, we make sure we’ve looked at every opportunity so that 
we get there first and tie up the site, either option it or whatever, 
and that makes sure that the other vultures can’t get in there.   Now 
that takes time, which is why there is still land out there – most 
builders’ patches are huge…’  
 
Whilst  this  section  has  made  clear  that  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield 
development has not affected how housebuilders seek out land, the research does however 
indicate that housebuilders generally seek out brownfield opportunities using the ‘reactive’ 
and ‘proactive’ land search functions.  Greenfield opportunities tend to remain the preserve 
of  the  ‘strategic’  element  of  speculative  housebuilders’  land  search  functions.    It  is 
therefore  logical  to  assume  that  not  all  housebuilders  conduct  reactive,  proactive  and 
strategic land search functions.  Regeneration specialists for example, would generally not 
be interested in seeking out greenfield sites using strategic land search techniques.       
 
Ultimately,  whilst  greenfield  land  is  conducive  to  long  term  strategic  options,  as 
housebuilders seek planning permission or lobby for the inclusion of their site in the next 
round  of  development  plans  under  the  option  period  (Adams  and  Watkins  2002), 
brownfield land acquisition typically necessitates an immediate or short term deal.  This is 
because  brownfield  landowners  are  not  likely  to  grant  lengthy  options  for  derelict  or 
disused brownfield sites that might have an alternative commercial value, or where the 
landowner  requires a quick  sale.    These  findings  support  Adams  and  Watkins’ (2002)  
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position.  Any land search and acquisition strategy for brownfield sites therefore generally 
require housebuilders to be certain of the development success of a potential brownfield 
site at the outset.  
 
This  part  has  demonstrated  how  UK  speculative  housebuilders  have  maintained  their 
traditional strategies of land search and acquisition despite the policy switch favouring 
brownfield development.  Because the previous literature has not detailed in any great 
length the land search techniques of UK speculative housebuilders, there is no academic 
benchmark  with  which  to  judge  the  findings  of  this  research  against.    However,  the 
interviewees  made  clear  that  land  search  techniques  had  not  changed  specially  for 
brownfield sites.  Housebuilders, like they always have done, still get in cars and drive 
around looking for land.    
 
7.3.3  Discernment in land choice 
In  response  to  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield  development,  UK  speculative 
housebuilders have developed new skills that permit their conventional core competencies 
of land supply to be applicable under the brownfield mode of production.  As such UK 
speculative  housebuilders’  conventional  short  and  medium-term  and  strategic  land 
functions (Ball 1983, Adams and Watkins 2002) remain unaffected by the policy switch 
favouring brownfield development, but they have developed greater discernment in site 
selection, to ensure that their chosen sites fit suitably within these land supply functions.   
 
Both English and Scottish based pragmatic and sceptical speculative housebuilders still 
seek  to  fulfil  short  and  medium-term  and  strategic  land  interests  under  the brownfield 
modus operandi by using both brownfield and greenfield land to maintain a constant flow 
of ready sites for development.  This is particularly evident for those pragmatic speculative 
housebuilders, who view brownfield land pragmatically and seek to gain an advantage 
from  using  brownfield  land  in  their  existing  land  procurement  functions.    However, 
significant discernment is taken when choosing to pursue a brownfield site, particularly so 
for the sceptics.  For example, Arden North West, a pragmatic volume PLC, indicated that 
because builders need to have a continuous flow of land in order to keep production from 
grinding to a halt, they will buy: 
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 ‘any land that we can get our hand on…so if that means we buy 
brownfield land, we buy brownfield land, it’s a simple as that’.   
 
For the pragmatists then, brownfield sites are viewed therefore in much the same way as 
greenfield  sites,  in  terms  of  their  function  in  the  overall  land  supply  and procurement 
strategies of UK speculative housebuilders, but with greater discernment.  For the pioneers 
of brownfield development, previously used land is the natural choice for all types of land 
acquisition and the level of discernment is less stringent and prescribed.          
 
Greater discernment in site selection has allowed brownfield land to be accommodated and 
assimilated within the conventional short and medium-term and strategic land functions of 
UK speculative housebuilders, rather than brownfield land initiating change to them.  This 
is important to note, as previous research had suggested greenfield land was the preferred 
land type choice by UK speculative housebuilders (see Adams and Watkins 2002).  UK 
speculative housebuilders have therefore moulded their land procurement strategies around 
the  changing  policy  preference  favouring  brownfield  sites  rather  than  changing  their 
strategies to suit the policy switch.  This again demonstrates the malleability and flexibility 
of housebuilders corporate strategies to external policy change.                      
 
More  specifically,  the  way  in  which  UK  speculative  housebuilders  have  been  able  to 
transpose their conventional competencies in land supply onto the brownfield mode of 
operation is through their altered assessment procedures for brownfield land suitability, in 
respect of its viability for development.  Where historically housebuilders had an innate 
preference  for  greenfield  land  (Adams  and  Watkins  2002),  their  choice  of  which 
brownfield sites to pursue for acquisition was determined by a small number of important 
factors,  which  acted  to  ensure  a  high  level  of  discernment  in  site  selection.    This  is 
particularly  true  of  pragmatic  and  sceptical  housebuilders.    These  important  factors 
include: 
 
•  The location of the site and its related potential for sales. 
•  A high chance of gaining planning permission. 
•  Financial reasons including profit generation. 
•  Ensuring a steady ‘flow’ of suitable development land. 
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The  most  important  factor  from  the  above  list  was  variable  across  the  sceptical  and 
pragmatic housebuilders interviewed, and most identified at least two when discussing 
their approach to site discernment.  Therefore, no ranking of the above factors in order of 
importance is provided.  There were no significant differences  either in respect of the 
approaches taken by English and Scottish builders.      
 
For the pioneers however, there is of course an innate desire to acquire brownfield land so 
the level of discernment was not really evident save for the profit margins that needed to be 
achieved from the development.  The below discussion provides evidence to support the 
above findings.         
 
Arden North West, a pragmatic volume PLC, suggests that the most important features of 
any site that they seek to acquire for residential development are its security in gaining 
planning permission and the robustness of the market for the product it intends to build on 
the site.  The builder confirms this to be the result of the policy focus in the North West on 
regeneration, itself a result of the national 60% brownfield target in England: 
   
‘What makes us choose sites…whether it’ll get planning permission 
and is in areas where we can sell the houses…because nowadays, 
especially  in  the  North  West,  the  emphasis  is  so  much  on 
regeneration  and  building  on  recycled  sites,  that  it’s  really  a 
matter of if it’s got planning permission we want to buy it’.   
 
Expanding on the importance of market certainty in the saleability of its product on a 
potential development site being considered for acquisition, Arden North West emphasise 
that the market needs to be one of the ‘first things’ that is looked at when deciding on a site 
acquisition potential ‘… because everything else follows from that’.  Giving an example, 
the builder makes clear that in locations where markets are buoyant, the reclamation value 
of a brownfield site is less of an issue than in low demand areas and therefore, the market 
can determine the viability of brownfield sites, thus affecting land type preference: 
 
‘If  it  costs  you  £250,000  per  acre  to  reclaim  a  site  and  you’re 
working in a poor market area, you’ve immediately got a problem, 
but that same £250,000 wouldn’t be an issue in a very high priced 
area. So, you’ve got to look at the market first, it always depends 
on what houses are going for how much, that’s the very first thing’.     
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Edzell  North  West,  a  sceptical  volume  PLC,  suggest  that  the  impact  of  public  policy 
restricting land supply in the North West has also affected their land type preference by 
guiding them to seek out potential land acquisitions to where they are confident that they 
can secure planning permission.  That means that in the short term, Edzell North West are: 
 
‘…working with those policies and that in itself is filtering out a 
number of locations we can’t build in… it doesn’t mean we’d build 
anywhere, you’ve got to be able to sell the houses’.   
 
Thus, although the planning system acts as a constraint on the development of land for 
housing, whether it is greenfield or brownfield (Bramley et al 1995), the planning system 
also provides direction to housebuilders in terms of what sites are suitable for residential 
development.  Historically, housebuilders had used the planning system to assist them in 
their site identification  strategies, particularly for strategic  greenfield sites (Adams and 
Watkins 2002).  This research indicates that whilst housebuilders do not use the planning 
system to identify specific brownfield sites, they do take guidance from the planners in 
identifying where housing will most likely be accepted in principle, largely in the form of 
change of use opportunities from employment to residential.  This issue is relevant in both 
the English and Scottish context.                
  
Edzell North West discuss how they include the changing nature of the planning policies at 
the local level in their shrewd choice of suitable development land.  The builder makes 
clear that they have ‘learned to work with the planning policies’ that control the selection 
of housing land in their given target markets, in shrewdly identifying brownfield sites that 
will have a high potential of achieving planning permission: 
 
‘If  we’ve  got  a  short  term  need,  we’ll  say  right,  here’s  the 
restrictive housing policies, so what we are doing is working with 
those  policies  and  that  in  itself  is  filtering  out  a  number  of 
locations we can’t build in.  So, we’re looking at sites that are in 
the pathfinder areas, or on the edge of pathfinders, where you sort 
of say ok, we can make a case for it and working with authorities’.   
 
However, Edzell North West make clear that, whilst their cautious and calculated approach 
to land acquisition is crucial in ensuring the success of their brownfield developments, they 
are not going to build in areas just because planning policy is directing them there: 
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‘… you’ve got to be able to sell the houses, and if you go back to 
some of the renewal areas you might say well I’ve got a site of two 
acres, two acres on its own might not make a difference to that 
area’.   
 
Arden North West, pragmatic volume PLC, also demonstrate that they have adapted to the 
changing policy context and have focused their site identification strategies on land that 
will get planning permission because it means that more certainty will arise:  
 
‘We just have the land we can get that’ll get planning permission in 
areas where we can sell.  Its one of life’s essentials, that’s what it 
is.  You can say we’d like the best locations in the North West, but 
were not going to get permission for them, so it’s as simple as that, 
you might as well be realistic and move onto the areas where we 
can get planning permission’.   
 
In discussing their future land search strategies, Edzell North West make clear that they 
will continue to be led by the likelihood of getting planning permission:   
 
‘At the moment we are very much planning led and I think that’s 
going  to  continue  certainly  for  the  foreseeable 
future…Alternatively  we’ve  looked  at  some  new  market  areas 
where there are no planning restrictions’.   
 
The  restrictive  land  supply  issues  that  English  based  speculative  housebuilders  are 
currently experiencing (see Barker 2003, 2004 and latterly Callcutt 2007) are considered 
by the majority of housebuilders interviewed in this research as a bigger constraint than the 
UK  Government’s  brownfield  first  agenda.    It  has  resulted  in  housebuilders no longer 
competing against each other for prime greenfield sites or even the cleanest brownfield 
sites, but rather, for any land within their target market areas where planning permission 
has a good chance of coming through.  Bridgemere North West, a pragmatic volume PLC, 
makes clear that: 
 
‘…whilst  we  might  have  a  perfectly  good  brownfield  site  in  the 
right area which we could reclaim efficiently, if the LA said you 
can’t have anymore planning permissions because we’ve used up 
our  numbers,  your  wasting  your  time.    So,  that  is  a  far  bigger 
constraint that the 60% rule’.       
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Interestingly, despite the policy switch favouring brownfield development, housebuilders 
have continued to use the local development plans to identify and control likely future 
housing sites, largely greenfield in nature, and actively promote them through the planning 
system.  This ensures that their sites will be allocated in the next round of development 
plans, as they had historically done (Adams and Watkins 2002).  Greenfield land therefore 
still has a role to play in speculative residential development.     
 
Whilst planning significantly influences the choice of suitable development sites by UK 
speculative housebuilders, the research indicates that location and target markets are also 
significant  influences  the  shrewd  choice  of  development  site.    Caledonian  Homes  for 
example, a sceptical Scottish private volume builder, suggest that whilst they would not be 
developing brownfield sites if they did not have to, their choice of site selection is down to 
it being in the best location within their target market area: 
 
‘If we want to be in a particular area and there is a restriction on 
greenfield land supply, then the only way to get in there is with 
brownfield – its matching availability to where we want to be’. 
 
Lothian  Homes,  a  pragmatic  Scottish  private  volume  producer,  concur  with  the  site 
selection choices of Caledonian Homes, making clear that their approach is largely down 
to the location of the site.  Additionally however, Lothian Homes suggest that issues of 
marketing and contamination of brownfield sites also affect the saleability of their product 
and therefore does affect their choice of site: 
 
…and  probably  things  that  would  affect  the  marketing  of  it, 
particularly if you had a certain well known contaminant’.     
 
From  a  market  point  of  view,  Vision  Construction,  a  pioneering  North  West  based 
regeneration specialist, suggests that the sites that they are most interested in acquiring are 
large sites, away from other housebuilders:   
 
‘… what we look for is a big site, stand alone without a lot of 
competitors,  those  are  key  things,  in  an  area  where  there’s  a 
demand.    And,  that  might  not  necessarily  be  the  highest  priced 
area, it’s where there might be a lot of people who are looking to 
improve  their  lot  and  buy  a  new  house  and  move  onwards  and 
upwards’.    
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Lothian Homes, a pragmatic Scottish private volume producer, suggests that whilst the 
issue of planning permission and marketability does undoubtedly influence what land they 
choose to acquire, they also buy for financial reasons, which are dictated to them by their 
Board of Directors.  Lothian Homes make clear that‘…its very difficult to control your 
contracted sites so to generate £100 million each year or a slight increase in that’ so they 
often seek out development opportunities that facilitates them in the generation of £100 
million each year: 
 
 ‘…depending on where we are at certain months and where we 
need to be by year end’.   
 
As most housebuilders have yearly build and profit targets to achieve, the choice of which 
sites to pursue at any given scenario is determined by their need to achieve their build or 
profit targets.  This is a particularly acute issue for publicly quoted housebuilders, whose 
balance  sheets  and  unit  outputs  can  affect  the  share  value  and  overall  value  of  the 
company.  Bridgemere West Scotland, a pragmatic volume PLC, indicates that business 
parameters imposed upon them by their Group Board of Directors significantly affects 
their brownfield site selection processes:    
 
‘All  land  opportunities  have  to  meet  the  business 
parameters…we’ve got to keep the performance indicators that we 
strive  to  get  as  a  Group…as  long  as  it  fits  all  those  business 
parameters, then we’ll have it if we can get it’.   
 
The business parameters described above generally refer to Group and Company specific 
targets for business growth and expansion.  Whilst these are specific for each Company or 
Division  within  a  Group,  typically,  they  will  include  financial  targets  such  as  unit 
completion  targets,  the  continued  achievement  of  a  profit  margin,  and  rate  on  capital 
employed (ROCE).  Indeed, Arden West Scotland, a pragmatic volume PLC, additionally 
make clear that the performance indicators from Head Office can determine where they 
seek out land opportunities: 
 
‘…if we’ve got money left in our land budget and we need to spend 
it by year end to ensure that we get more money next year to buy 
land with, then we’ll buy what we can get our hands on.  We need 
to make sure that we achieve all our targets and if we need to make  
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50 units by year end, then we’ll buy an oven ready site to fulfil 
those targets’.  
 
Bridgemere  West  Scotland  confirm  in  the  Scottish  context,  the  financial  issues  raised 
above are equally as important.  The builder’s performance indicators that they strive to 
achieve mean that they look to acquire sites that provide them with market coverage in 
both their target areas and areas that they are currently active in.  The builder makes clear 
that they look to acquire sites that: 
 
 ‘…fit our target market as a client base – the first time buyers, that 
middle market price structure’.      
 
In a similar vein, Arden North West, a pragmatic volume PLC, also make clear that their 
preferred  choice  of  site  relates  to  its  potential  contribution  to  the  overall  flow  of 
development sites over a 3-5 year period:  
 
‘…we’ve got to have enough land to fulfil those budgets over a 
three year period or a similar time to that.  So if that means we buy 
brownfield land, we buy brownfield land, it’s as simple as that’.   
 
Overall, this section demonstrates how housebuilders have become increasingly shrewd in 
their choice of suitable brownfield development sites.  Whilst this approach is reflective 
partly of the policy switch favouring brownfield development, the lack of housing land 
supply coming through the planning system (Barker 2003; 2004) has also undoubtedly 
affected the site discernment strategies of UK speculative housebuilders.  As such it will be 
discussed further in Chapter 11.  Further, as past research has not explicitly uncovered how 
housebuilders  make  choices  when  it  comes  to  land  acquisition  and  brownfield  land 
acquisition in particular, this research therefore presents a new and original perspective on 
this aspect of development feasibility.     
 
7.3.4  Land acquisition  
The use of options as a mechanism for the control of medium-term and strategic land prior 
to its full acquisition has conventionally provided housebuilders with the opportunity to 
benefit from any inflationary gains in the value of these optioned sites over the course of 
the  option  period  (Ball  1983,  Bramley  et  al  1995).    Under  the  brownfield  mode  of  
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production however, the use of options for all types of builder and in both the Scottish and 
English context, is not suitable because brownfield sites are generally short term in their 
nature.     
 
Arden West Scotland, a pragmatic volume PLC, confirm that as options are more suitable 
for long-term prospects, brownfield sites: 
 
 ‘…are short term prospects and are therefore not suitable to the 
use options on those sites’.   
 
Providing an  English comparison, Arden North  West make clear that options are only 
really useful for greenfield sites: 
 
 ‘…that don’t have planning permission and to which there isn’t 
another use’.   
 
Thus, Arden North West emphasise that because of the short-term nature of brownfield 
sites: 
 ‘…if your landowner wants to make up his mind fairly quickly, a 
longer-term option is really just not the way to go.  He wants to 
know, if I close my factory, are you going to buy it immediately, in 
other words can I relocate my business?’          
   
Because brownfield sites generally do not need to be optioned in order to secure planning 
permission in the same way that greenfield sites typically do (Adams and Watkins 2002, 
Bramley et al 1995), the conventional skills involved in optioning sites preceding its full 
acquisition  in  order  to  secure  planning  permission  are  not  required  in  the  brownfield 
context.  As Caledonian Homes, a sceptical Scottish privately owned builder make clear: 
 
 ‘…you’ve got a better chance of getting planning on brownfields 
because policy is driving us there – you’ve just got to make sure 
that  all  the  boxes  are  ticked  and  the  various  hoops  have  been 
jumped through in terms of design and access statements etc’.   
 
The existing market value of a brownfield site may also prevent the use of options because 
brownfield sites are inherently difficult to establish a market value for, as the development 
cost is not certain owing to the sites previous use and its potential for ground issues and 
contamination.              
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Brownfield  opportunities  can  arise  as  windfall  opportunities,  the  result  of  either 
unexpected or planned closure of the sites existing function.  The use of an option in this 
context is generally not suitable because it would inhibit the immediate acquisition of sites 
that may be in competitive market locales or suitable for immediate development.  For 
example,  Caledonian  Homes  suggest  that  options  are  less  useful  on  brownfield  sites 
because they generally provide a: 
 
 ‘…short term windfall land function in terms of their immediate 
availability’.   
 
In effect, if housebuilders can build and sell houses on any site to the requirements of the 
Board agreed profit margin, they will do, because it does not benefit them not to.   
 
Whilst  options  are  not  suitable  for  brownfield  sites,  Bridgemere  West  Scotland,  a 
pragmatic volume PLC, proves an exception to the rest of the evidence.  The housebuilder 
indicated that they were looking at the possibility of transposing the use of options onto the 
brownfield scenario.  Under this strategy, Bridgemere West Scotland would seek to buy 
brownfield sites as ongoing concerns, such as factories or workshops, and rent them back 
to the landowner.  During this rental time, they would seek to gain planning permission.  
Bridgemere West Scotland make clear that this strategy: 
 
‘…is pushing on options really, rather the buying a farmers’ field 
and trying to work through the planning process; we say why don’t 
we  move  that  onto  brownfield  sites…it’s  the  same  strategy,  just 
evolved onto brownfield’.       
 
Bridgemere West Scotland demonstrate the potential for housebuilders to adapt one of 
their conventional land strategies to a brownfield modus operandi.  In the future, the use of 
options on brownfield land might become more important where housebuilders may seek 
to use options to control brownfield land prior to its acquisition, using the option period to 
gain planning consent in much the same way as they would on a non-consented greenfield 
site.  This would be suitable for use on brownfield sites that are currently in use but might 
be available for development in next few years, as listed in England for example on the 
National Land Use Database of Previously Developed Land.  This strategy would provide 
housebuilders with the opportunity to consider brownfield sites as strategic opportunities in  
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the same way that greenfield sites have historically been (see Ball 1983, Bramley et al 
1995), an issue to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.             
 
However,  this  research  does  confirm  that  UK  speculative  housebuilders’  conventional 
strategy of optioning sites to control ownership prior to full acquisition is not as relevant to 
the brownfield scenario in both the Scottish and English contexts as to greenfield land.  
The way in which UK speculative housebuilders have replaced the conventional option 
function in respect of land acquisition under the brownfield mode of production will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, where ground issues are discussed.       
 
7.4  Gaining planning permission  
The  strategies  used  by  speculative  housebuilders  in  seeking  planning  permission  on 
brownfield  sites  do  not  significantly  differ  to  the  ways  in  which  housebuilders  have 
conventionally approached the planning permission process.  As such, the conventional 
competencies are also applicable under the brownfield mode of operation.  Interestingly, 
this is relevant in both the Scottish and English scenarios and for pragmatists, sceptics and 
pioneers.     
 
Differences have emerged, however, in the length of time that it takes to achieve planning 
permission on brownfield sites and it is those reasons behind the lengthy process that this 
section  focuses  on.    This  research  therefore  confirms  Adams  and  Watkins’  (2002) 
comments on the nature of brownfield development resulting in a more protracted process 
requiring  housebuilders  to  gain  more  consents  than  historically  (Adams  and  Watkins 
2002).    This  research  therefore  indicates  that  the  way  in  which  housebuilders  achieve 
planning  permission  on  brownfield  sites  is  largely  a  continuation  of  the  greenfield 
strategies.            
 
For example, Arden North West, a pragmatic volume PLC highlight a number of issues 
making the process of achieving planning permission more protracted, including design 
and  big  open  space  requirements  and  affordable  housing  requirements.    With  specific 
regard  to  the  design  issues  of  new  houses  on  brownfield  sites,  Arden  North  West 
emphasise that: 
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‘if you talking about building standard house types, that’s a red 
rag to a bull to any planner – it takes time to convince the planners 
of your scheme’.       
 
In comparison, Bridgemere West Scotland, a pragmatic volume PLC, make clear that it is 
the lack of experience  of the councillors, which acts as a hindrance to gaining all the 
additional consents that a brownfield development requires: 
 
‘Getting the approvals has been the biggest constraint.  There is no 
priority in councils to approve brownfield before greenfield – you 
need to tick more boxes to get consent on brownfield – it takes time 
and some processes are complex and the officials in the council are 
not necessarily experienced enough to deal with it and are looking 
for someone else to take that risk away.  It’s  hard to get those 
boxes ticked by the council even though we feel we are justifying it.  
It’s ok having policies but you’re still dealing with individuals in 
the council’.   
 
Moving on from this, Arden North West suggest that ultimately, it is the political nature of 
planning that can be a real problem for developing brownfield sites in England and, in 
particular, the nature of public consultation:   
 
‘…I’m absolutely amazed some times you know that, and we do 
public  consultations,  we  have  separate  meetings  with  the  locals 
where we sit down with them, we talk through our proposals, and 
we give them loads of opportunities to contribute, and we’ll change 
the  mix,  and  you  still  get  people  who  are  objecting  to  new 
developments.  I just can’t believe it.  And the politicians listen to 
that.. So it’s a political thing that’s very difficult as far as we’re 
concerned’.  
 
Although the political nature of residential development is not new, the way in which it 
affects  and  lengthens  the  residential  development  process  is  distinct  with  brownfield 
development.  Arden North West suggest that the issue of change of use from employment 
to residential and the perception of job losses can lead to protest and objections that might 
not affect a greenfield development:   
 
‘There are employment issues perhaps on operating facilities and 
we need to prove that that is no longer needed or is appropriate.  
That usually takes a year to do  – we need to prove that there isn’t 
a commercial demand for the site, so the policies say right, you  
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advertise it on the open market for a year and give us proof that 
there is no demand!’    
 
In support of the above, Edzell North West, a sceptical volume PLC, also make clear that 
in the North West, achieving a change of use from employment to housing on brownfield 
sites can be a real problem because councils tend to resist employment loss because it 
looks bad politically.    
 
Vision Construction, a privately owned North West based pioneering urban regeneration 
specialist,  identify  the  increasing  demands  of  consultation  as  delaying  the  planning 
permission  process  on  brownfield  sites,  as  they  typically  have  numerous  constraints 
attached to them that need to be ticked off:  
 
‘Trying to get planning on a difficult site which has all sorts of 
constraints, whether it be ecology and contamination and transport 
in  an  area,  then  in  some  ways  getting  to  the  point  where  the 
planning  officer  is  going  to  pull  the  report  together  ready  for 
committee is the very end, but its all the work that has to take place 
to get to that point, which is quite a lot of consultation that goes on 
with all the various bodies to make sure that the scheme you are 
putting  in  ticks  all  the  boxes  really.    Some  of  those  boxes  are 
mutually  exclusive  and  you  have  got  to  somehow  find  a 
compromise that both parties are happy with and that can take a 
lot of time’.   
 
From  a  Scottish  context,  Campbell  Construction,  another  pioneering  privately  owned 
provider, also considers consultation in brownfield development a ‘bugbear’, particularly 
when redeveloping sites in existing middle class areas: 
 
‘…Nimbysim in East Dumbartonshire is a problem – there is a lot 
of  resentment  of  people  not  wanting  social  rented  housing  in 
Milngavie and Bearsden’.  
 
As a regeneration specialist and a pioneer with experience in dealing with some of the 
most difficult brownfield sites in the North West, Vision Construction further discuss the 
increasingly  over  complicated  and  bureaucratic  system  in  making  the  development  of 
complicated brownfield sites even more complicated:       
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‘I  think  nationally,  there  is  a  general  wish  that  the  planning 
process  could  become  more  streamlined,  but  that’s  trying  to 
happen at a time when the development process is getting much 
more  complicated  because  we  are  trying  to  take  on  much  more 
complicated sites. And so, although that’s a wish, it’s very difficult 
to see how it could be done quite honest and certainly quickly’.   
 
From a Scottish context, Caledonian Homes, a private volume builder, discussed at length 
the problems of the Scottish planning system in acting as a barrier to delivering new homes 
on brownfield sites.  Specifically, Caledonian Homes highlighted the lack of resources in 
Scottish planning, the culture of the planning system and the issue of planning gain as 
barriers to the delivery of new homes on brownfield land in Scotland: 
 
‘Resources, culture and planning gain are the three main barriers 
to gaining planning permission in Scotland.  Resources: there are 
far  too  few  planners  in  local  government,  far  too  few  planning 
courses,  not  a  lot  of  experienced  people.    Culture:  it’s  anti-
housebuilding,  we  get  very  little  out  of  the  system,  there’s  the 
perception  that  housing  is  dirty  and  taking  up  someone’s  view.  
Planning  gain:    the  amount  of  time  you  spend  on  negotiating 
planning gain is just remarkable, particularly affordable housing.  
It means that the planning process is becoming incredibly slow, 
allied  to  the  amount  of  information  that  is  required  and  the 
consultation required’.    
  
Whilst  this  research  was  being  conducted,  the  majority  of  councils  in  North  West  of 
England had a moratorium in place that placed a limit on all new planning applications for 
residential development.  This was, of course, a significant topic of conversation for the 
housebuilders  during  the  interview  and  clearly  came  across  as  a  planning  issue  that 
prevented  the  delivery  of  new  homes  on  brownfield  land.    Whilst  the  effects  of  the 
moratoria are not directly linked to the impact of the policy switch favouring brownfield 
development on housebuilders strategies towards achieving planning, it is worth a small 
discussion.       
 
For example, Edzell North West, a sceptical volume PLC, highlighted that the planning 
moratorium as the main barrier in gaining planning permission on brownfield sites, and 
hinted at its political nature in being an obstacle:   
 
‘The main barrier on brownfields, well on any site, is the   
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planning moratorium.  It’s a real frustration – sites with common 
sense  that  should  be  developed  aren’t.    The  classic  is  non-
conforming uses.  Some ludicrous situations are created that are 
often  politically  motivated.    Beyond  that,  it  depends  on  the 
brownfield land definition – i.e. you knock down 4 detached and 
put up 64 flats, local residents object and the politicians refuse the 
planning  permission,  but  it  accorded  to  government  guidelines.  
There  is  a  restraint  on  land  supply  and  that  is  leading  to  the 
intensification  of  densities  in  existing  residential  areas.    It’s 
supported by PPS3 but politically it doesn’t go down very well.  So, 
the political angle is an obstacle’.   
 
This section has outlined how the strategies for gaining planning permission on brownfield 
land have not significantly changed under the brownfield mode of production.  Rather, the 
process  remains  the  same  and  housebuilders  simply  have  to  assign  more  time  to  the 
process  than  they  had  done  previously,  in  order  to  gain  all  the  additional  consents 
associated with the development of brownfield land for housing.  In effect, UK speculative 
housebuilders  have  transposed  their  conventional  skills  onto  a  brownfield  mode  of 
production and this has been successful to date.   
 
The  qualitative  data  indicates  that  the  pragmatists  and  sceptics  have  successfully 
transposed  their  existing  land  supply  skills  set  and  competencies  onto  the  brownfield 
modus operandi.  As such, the pragmatists and the sceptics are able to successfully seek 
out  brownfield  land  opportunities  using  these  same  conventional  core  competencies.  
Additionally, new skills have been developed by  the pragmatists and sceptics, both in 
response to and to account for, the risks and uncertainties that speculative brownfield land 
supply and acquisition presents.   
 
For the pioneers, it is difficult to compare their existing attitudes, behaviours and corporate 
strategies with their speculative activity in the past, as no previous research has covered the 
role of regeneration specialists in speculative residential development in any depth.  As 
such,  what  is  presented  here  will  confirm  the  approach  taken  by  the  pioneers  in  UK 
speculative housebuilding activity.   
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7.5  Chapter Conclusions  
The research presents a new commentary on the decision-making factors surrounding UK 
speculative housebuilders’ choice of suitable development sites under the brownfield mode 
of operation.   
 
UK speculative housebuilders have positioned brownfield land supply neatly within their 
conventional  business  strategies  of  land  supply,  which  maintains  a  suitable  flow  of 
development  sites.    As  such,  the  conventional  core  competencies  of  UK  speculative 
housebuilders  in  respect  of  land  supply  are  applicable  under  the  brownfield  mode  of 
operation through the development of new skills.     
 
Indeed, if a brownfield site is in a good marketable location and has a significant chance of 
gaining planning consent, pragmatic housebuilders will choose to procure the brownfield 
site with much the same logical as they would conventionally have used to procure a 
greenfield site.  For those sceptics, the level of certainty in achieving planning permission 
and anticipated sales values and rates needs to  be higher still.  For the pioneers, who 
present an innate preference for brownfield land, matters pertaining to profit achievement 
appear to be the only determining factors in site selection and discernment.        
 
However, whilst this is the case, it would be foolish to assume that the innate preference 
for ‘easy and simple’ greenfield sites is no longer.  Pragmatic and sceptical housebuilders 
in particular in both the English and Scottish contexts, still pursue greenfield opportunities.  
Therefore, the temporary nature of the above findings, in response to the policy switch 
favouring brownfield development, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
GROUND PROBLEMS 
 
8.1  Introduction  
The way in which UK speculative housebuilders manage and negate the risks of the ground 
problems that are common on brownfield sites is a crucial part of their business operations.  
Indeed, the speculative purchase of land that might be contaminated or present serious 
ground conditions owing to its previous use, is inherently risky and requires a level of risk 
management (see Adams and Watkins 2002, Adams 2004, Barker 2003, 2004).     
 
Whilst  the  emergence  of  new  skills  such  as  greater  discernment  in  site  selection  (see 
Chapter 7) can in some ways filter out some sites that have obvious ground problems, 
unless the full scale removal of all the ground on a site for detailed investigation is carried 
out, then there is no way of knowing precisely what risks are in the ground.  In any event, 
the removal of all the ground on a site to investigate such is simply not possible for UK 
speculative  housebuilders,  where  the  time  and  financial  expense  involved  in  doing  so 
would most likely render the development opportunity unviable before its commencement.       
 
The ways in which UK speculative housebuilders have conventionally managed the risks 
associated with ground problems pertaining to speculative residential development have 
not been well documented in the literature.  However, as UK speculative housebuilders 
have  conventionally  focused  their  development  activity  primarily  on  greenfield  land 
(Adams and Watkins 2002), it is clear that housebuilders, aside from the pioneers, will not 
have had much experience in dealing with the ground problems specific to brownfield 
land.  Therefore, the policy switch favouring brownfield development has presented UK 
speculative  housebuilders  with  challenges  pertaining  to  a  site’s  previous  use  and  its 
resultant ground problems.  Indeed, the hazards of a derelict site - the result of a past 
human  interference  with  the  land  -  impose  constraints  on  the  freedom  of  action  of 
speculative housebuilders.     
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8.2  The Results – Qualitative Data 
UK  speculative  housebuilders  have  developed  ways  to  manage  and  negate  the  risks 
associated with ground problems that arise when speculatively redeveloping brownfield 
land  for  housing.    This  has  been  achieved  through  the  development  of  a  new  core 
competence and the transposition of existing competencies and associated skills onto the 
brownfield  mode  of  operation.    UK  speculative  housebuilders  have  therefore  further 
adapted their existing business functions and core competencies to suit the demands of the 
policy change.  Together, this adapted approach acts to negate the ground risks associated 
with the speculative acquisition of brownfield land for UK speculative housebuilders.     
 
The new core competence that housebuilders have developed in response to the policy 
switch favouring brownfield development is the use of intrusive site investigations.  The 
existing competencies that housebuilders have successfully transposed onto the brownfield 
mode of operation are the use of conditional contracts and the use of desktop research.  
The application of these competencies to the brownfield development scenario will now be 
discussed in more detail.  The use of desktop surveys will be discussed first, as they are the 
beginning of the process of establishing the extent of ground problems.  From there, the 
new  competence  of  intrusive  site  investigations  will  be  discussed,  as  desktop  research 
informs this process.  Finally, the use of conditional contracts will be discussed, as this is 
the final stage of securing a site taking account of all the potential ground problems that 
relate to the site.   
 
8.2.1  Desktop research      
Desktop research plays an important role in establishing a sites’ previous use but more 
importantly,  providing  an  initial  overview  of  the  potential  risks  associated  with  the 
speculative acquisition and development of a brownfield site.  Conducted in the form of a 
survey, the desktop research provides housebuilders with a detailed historical account of a 
brownfield site’s previous use.  The information gained from this survey is used to uncover 
the exact nature of its previous use and to deduce the potential and likely status of the 
ground.  The use of desktop research as part of establishing development feasibility on 
brownfield  land  was  undertaken  by  all  speculative  housebuilders  interviewed,  in  both 
Scotland and England 
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Desktop research is conducted in-house and is within the remit of the land and technical 
departments of most speculative housebuilders.  It involves  gathering data on the sites’ 
historical use, comprised of historical records, data and maps.  The servicing history of the 
site is also researched.  The desktop research specifies the past uses of the site, using 
secondary sources and official documents such as coal reports, service and utilities reports 
and  flood  risk  reports,  to  establish  any  issues  that  may  have  cause  for  developmental 
concern.  The key issues that housebuilders are looking out for are generally the existence 
of mining work, the presence of cavities in the ground and the presence of contamination, 
all the result of many historical and industrial uses.         
 
Whilst exact levels of contamination or other abnormal issues cannot be deduced from 
desktop research alone, this facility provides housebuilders with a contextual fact file with 
which to base their subsequent ground related decisions on.         
 
8.2.2  Intrusive site investigations  
In  order  to  determine,  with  reasonable  clarity,  the  nature  of  ground  problems  on  a 
brownfield site with acquisition potential, UK speculative housebuilders have developed 
new skills in intrusive site investigations.  The use of intrusive site investigations further 
acts to demonstrate how UK speculative housebuilders have learned to manage the risks 
involved in brownfield land acquisition.  The use of intrusive site investigations as part of 
establishing development feasibility on brownfield land was undertaken by all speculative 
housebuilders interviewed, in both Scotland and England.             
 
Intrusive site investigations are undertaken before UK speculative housebuilders commute 
their final land offer for a brownfield site, and therefore before a legal commitment to 
purchase and full-scale acquisition.  The investigation is commissioned on the basis of 
information  received  from  conducting  desktop  research  into  a  sites’  previous  history.  
Therefore,  before  housebuilders  commit  to  the  cost  of  taking  out  an  intrusive  site 
investigation, they  will have some knowledge on the likely presence of all ‘abnormal’ 
hazards and risks on the site and within the ground, thereby reducing unexpected and/or 
speculative upfront financial outlays prior to site control or acquisition.       
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The development of this new competence for brownfield development therefore affords 
housebuilders  the  opportunity  to  establish  certainty  and  minimise  risk  in  the  land 
acquisition  process.    It  also  provides  housebuilders  with  a  mechanism  to  establish  the 
costing of full-scale remediation to the legal standards required on a site.            
 
The crucial function of commissioning an intrusive site investigation is imperative for UK 
speculative housebuilders in the redevelopment of brownfield sites for housing because 
most of the risks, and therefore costs, with a brownfield site are in the ground.  As Edzell 
North West, a sceptical volume PLC, highlight: 
 
‘The bulk of risk with any brownfield site is in the ground. What we 
build above it we’re in full control of.  We know what it costs; we 
know  how  long  it  takes  to  build.    Anything  in  ground  for  a 
brownfield site, you don’t know’. 
 
Concurrently,  Bridgemere  North  West,  a  pragmatic  volume  PLC,  suggest  that  below 
ground is where housebuilders should have problems with brownfield development: 
 
‘Where  you’re  going  to  lose  money,  or  where  you  should  lose 
money, is below ground.  You should know all your build costs of 
your  houses,  you  can  easily  identify  your  externals  and 
landscaping and things like that; it’s below ground where you’re 
going to have your problem’.   
     
In  terms  of  their  methodology,  intrusive  site  investigations  commonly  take  the  form 
digging up small ‘boreholes’, also known as window samples, on the site.  These window 
samples are placed at intervals suitable to the sites’ topography, existing layout and with 
reference to the results of the desktop research.  The location of these ‘window samples’ 
are chosen with respect to the likelihood of discovering a contaminant or ground issue, of 
which the information is based on desktop research and using coal reports, historical use 
surveys  and  utilities  maps.    The  samples  from  these  boreholes  are  used  to  assess  the 
chemical status of the ground and to determine the types of materials buried in the ground 
at that particular location.       
 
These  intrusive  site  investigations  are,  of  course,  only  as  good  as  the  boreholes  dug.  
Indeed, as Edzell North West highlight: 
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 ‘…you do all your site investigations, you do all your ecological 
searches, you do all your desk top studies to identify what’s likely 
to  be  there,  and  then  you  do  your  ground  investigations  to 
determine what the ground’s like.  But unless you do bore holes 
every  couple  of  inches,  you  can’t  guarantee,  there’s  no 
guarantee…’  
 
However, as long housebuilders have done their research and are aware of the potential 
ground problems that they may find on site, then they have done all they can do, save 
digging up the entire site at extortionate cost.   From a Scottish perspective, Campbell 
Construction, a pioneering private niche provider, makes clear: 
 
 ‘…if you researched the site enough then you’re reducing the risks 
– as long we have good information and consultants to eliminate 
the risk, then that’s fine’.  
  
The function that intrusive site investigations provide in the wider land acquisition agenda 
is crucial in facilitating the establishment of what ‘abnormals’ are contained within the site.  
Indeed, once the intrusive site investigation has been completed, the housebuilder will have 
a list of all the known hazards that are on the  site.  As Bridgemere West Scotland, a 
pragmatic volume PLC, makes clear, the process of establishing what ‘abnormals’ are in 
the ground is about: 
 
 ‘…getting all those ducks in a row and just knocking them down 
one at a time.  We see what we are getting ourselves into before we 
actually acquire the site’.         
  
More  importantly,  the  intrusive  site  investigations  facilitate  the  assignment  of  costs  to 
those abnormals.  All of the housebuilders interviewed practiced the same process in using 
the information received from the intrusive site investigations to arrive at a residual land 
value  with  which  to  offer  the  landowner.    This  process  firstly  involves  housebuilders 
establishing a ‘greenfield’ offer for the site i.e. the value of the site as if it were ‘clean’, 
accounting for the most important marketable aspects of the site and sales values in the 
proximate area.  From this, the status of the ground is established through the use of the 
information received from the site investigation, and the associated costs of both finding 
and removing the ‘abnormals’ are commuted.  These costs are then deducted (along with 
any other issues that relate to the site in question) from the ‘greenfield’ value and a net 
land  value  is  achieved.    This  is  then  offered  to  the  landowner  (‘subject  to  ground  
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remediation’ which will be discussed in more detail in the next section).  Edzell North 
West, a sceptical volume PLC, explains this process: 
 
‘So,  we’ll  pay  you  £2  million  for  ‘clean’  land  i.e.  no  abnormal 
costs.    From  that,  take  off  costs  of  demolition,  remediation, 
resulting ground conditions for piling, surfacing issues, planning 
requirements etc, to arrive at a net payable land price – we have to 
arrive at these before we enter into a contract’.   
 
The effect is that the landowner pays for the contaminated nature of their site.  The cost is 
not paid for by the housebuilder, rather it is built into the existing residual land valuation 
process.  This means that UK speculative housebuilders have successfully transposed their 
existing skills in residual land valuation onto the brownfield mode of operation in order to 
account for a site’s previous use and potential ground problems.     
 
In terms of strategic advantage then, the ability to cap the costs required in the remediation 
of a site would provide housebuilders with competitive advantage over their peers.  And, 
the interviews made clear that this is already becoming a common request by landowners.  
One way in which housebuilders themselves have sought competitive advantage over their 
peers  in  respect  of  this  inherent  competitiveness  in  establishing  the  exact  value  of  a 
brownfield site is to make use of an ‘abnormals cap’.  The cap reflects the absolute limit of 
the  expected  costs  of  abnormal  remediation  and  preparing  the  ground  for  the 
commencement of construction.  This is worked into the residual land valuation of the site 
and  therefore  a  capped  land  value  is  established.    This  value  will  be  reflected  in  the 
conditional contract, which will be signed between the housebuilder and landowner as a 
commitment  to  proceed  with  purchase
62.    Should  an  abnormals  cap  not  be  used,  the 
housebuilder’s land value offer is provisional and is dependent on receipt of a satisfactory 
site  investigation  and  a  satisfactory  structural  survey.    Should  the  housebuilder  find 
extensive contamination that they feel is not suitably rectifiable, they then have the ability 
to withdraw their offer.        
 
Most of the housebuilders interviewed did not make routine use of the ‘abnormals cap’ 
because  they  felt  they  needed  to  develop  a  greater  understanding  of  brownfield 
                                                       
 
62 Conditional contracts will be discussed in more detail in the next section.     
 
 
 
196
development before they could manage such risk.  However, Caledonian Homes, a Scottish 
based sceptical private volume producer, suggested that the use of an abnormals cap was 
beneficial as it can provide the landowner with some level of certainty over the value of 
their site:   
‘We get an understanding of what the abnormals are likely to be 
based on desktop research, so at least we can tell them that the 
land won’t go below a certain price i.e. there is an ‘abnormals 
cap’.  More and more landowners are looking for an abnormals 
cap, and that requires us to be a bit more efficient, more clued and 
begin to buy-in some of that advice, from engineers, surveyors etc’.     
 
Whilst abnormals caps are good to a point, Bridgemere West Scotland, a pragmatic volume 
PLC, also suggest that it can obviously bear more risk, particularly if the brownfield site 
has a history of contamination: 
 
 ‘…as the market becomes extremely competitive and more so every 
day, the vendor will say well lets cap those abnormal costs and you 
give me a guaranteed price for the land, and your risk starts to 
accrue then – risks start to come up and up and start to meet that 
guaranteed price, then the risks come in’.   
 
And, it is because of this inherently competitive nature of speculative housebuilding that 
Bridgemere West Scotland suggests that there is always another company who will: 
 
 ‘…step in and say I’ll take it for a lower margin.  You’re always in 
that competitive market’ 
 
Therefore, having access to knowledgeable specialists who are able to establish the exact 
level of contamination and assign an accurate cost to it is an important strategic element 
for speculative housebuilders in the development of brownfield land.  This issue will be 
returned to in Chapter 11, where institutional capacity will be discussed.      
 
Caledonian Homes make clear that their approach in dealing with the presence and costing 
of  abnormals  has  evolved  to  become  more  transparent  as  they  have  built  up  more 
knowledge and experience.  Whilst they do not routinely offer an ‘abnormals cap’, their 
standard  land  offer  now  has  twelve  potential  deductions  for  abnormals and they  often 
present landowners with a ‘menu of abnormals’ with sums against each one.  However,  
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whilst this is beneficial in terms of being transparent with the landowner about the status 
his land: 
 
‘the problem comes when you’re arriving at the true line value, 
taking  into  account  particularly  abnormal  site  development 
costs…that’s where the difficulty arises because most landowners 
won’t  just  accept  an  open  ended  approach  to  the  deduction  of 
abnormals.    They  want  to  know  with  some  certainty  what  the 
problems are with the site’ 
 
In  effect,  Caledonian  Homes  highlight  the  inherent  risks  associated  with  brownfield 
development.  Whilst the development of additional skills such as greater discernment in 
site  selection  and  utilising  intrusive  site  investigations  negate  and  manage  the risks of 
brownfield  development,  speculative  residential  development  on  brownfield  land  will 
always require housebuilders to mediate and manage risk. To illustrate further, Caledonian 
Homes emphasise the inherent risks with brownfield valuation: 
 
‘…when you enter the bid, you’re in a catch 22 because you can’t 
begin  to  quantify  those  abnormals  until  you  have  done  some 
investigations,  the  investigations  cost  money,  you  don’t  want  to 
expend  that  money  until  you  are  under  contract,  they  won’t  go 
under  contract  until  you’ve  given  them  an  idea  of  what  the 
abnormals will be and you end up in a bit of a cycle and not really 
going anywhere’.      
 
As such, risk transference has emerged as an important aspect of speculative residential 
development under the brownfield mode of operation.  Because housebuilders establish the 
level of abnormals within a potential development site prior to full acquisition, and deduct 
the cost of these from the ‘greenfield’ land value of the site, a process of risk transference 
has emerged.  Risk can be transferred in two ways under brownfield development: firstly, 
the cost of abnormals can be passed on to the landowner through the deduction of the costs 
of ridding the site of the abnormals from the ‘greenfield’ land value.  Secondly, the risks of 
conducting  site  investigations,  commissioning  remediation  and  then  finding  more 
contamination  when  construction  commences  is  negated  through  getting  a  remediation 
contractor to take the risk.  Edzell North West, a sceptical volume PLC, illustrate this:  
 
‘…there is a risk in starting on site and finding something you’re 
not  expecting.    A  way  around  that  is  to  get  a  remediation 
contractor to take the risk - they give us a price for remediating  
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that site, in accordance with all legislation, and delivering it to us 
with  all  the  warranties,  so  when  we  go  on,  there  will  be  no 
problems.  They charge you a slightly higher price, because they’re 
taking the risk, every ten jobs they might get one wrong, but overall 
they’ll be up.  From our perspective, we’re passing the risk on.  But 
the downside is that because it’s a higher cost, the landowner is 
going to have to swallow that cost’.   
 
Whilst  intrusive  site  investigations  act  to  reduce  the  risks  involved  in  redeveloping 
brownfield sites for housing, conducting them can indeed be a risk in itself, as there is a 
cost attached to the investigations and there is always the potential to lose the site to a 
competitor.  From a Scottish perspective, Arden West Scotland, a pragmatic volume PLC, 
for example, make clear that intrusive site investigations: 
 
 ‘…are  a  risk  in  themselves,  as  there  is  always  the  potential  of 
losing the site to a competitor or even for the landowner to walk 
away from the deal after the investigation has been done’.   
 
Additionally, whilst intrusive site investigations act to manage and mediate risk in the 
speculative development of brownfield land for housing, there are instances where they 
have failed to fully identify contamination.  Most of the housebuilders interviewed could 
refer to at least one occasion where they had discovered unforeseen contamination on a 
brownfield site, after the site investigation was complete.  Lothian Homes, a Scottish based 
pragmatic private volume produce, provide an example of such an instance: 
 
‘We got caught – knocking down swimming pool – we accepted  
the asbestos report – the roof above the pool had asbestos in it and 
the main power supply had asbestos lined cables (the survey didn’t 
include  these  because  they  couldn’t  get  near  them)  -  it  cost  us 
£140,000.  There’s nothing you can do about it –you just have to 
take it on chin and hope for an increase in sales cost to cover it’.  
 
The  builder  also  makes  clear  that  brownfield  remediation  is  an  evolving  process  and 
experience of new problems and contaminants mean that in some cases, builders have to 
learn from the mistakes they make: 
 
‘We had a former hospital site that used x-ray and back in the old 
days, they used lead based paint in an x-ray room and with that 
you will seal the x-ray into the room, so when you come back 20-30 
years later and crack the wall open, all the radiation comes out.   
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Luckily we were fine, but it’s that level of risk we are working with.  
As you get more experience, you know what to look for and the 
right questions to ask’.   
   
In such instances where unforeseen ground problems do arise, most housebuilders, like 
Lothian Homes, explain that they prefer to stick with the site rather than walk away from a 
deal ‘…because it’s too awful’.  Lothian Homes explain how they attempt to renegotiate 
with the landowner:  
 
‘…it’s not in our interest to walk away if the story is too bad – the 
landowner will just go to somebody else.  That is why you must 
have the ability to make deductions’.     
 
Interestingly some of the housebuilders interviewed suggest that landowners conducting 
their own site investigations would be a useful way of risk management and mediation in 
brownfield development.  Campbell Construction for example, a pioneering Scottish based 
private niche provider, make clear that in their past experience: 
 
 ‘…the council (as the vendor) has produced a site investigation; 
and it certainly reduces the risk; you can take a view right away on 
the site’.   
 
In a situation where councils, as the landowner, do not provide site investigations and 
where the developers have to commission a site investigation before they submit a bid for 
council owned sites, Campbell Construction emphasise that this: 
 
 ‘…adds on time to the whole development process; the risks could 
be minimised if the landowner makes that information available.  If 
we bid for a site with unknowns, then that is where the risks can 
come  from.    In  a  lot  of  cases,  if  the  landowner  had  made  that 
information available to interested parties, then they would take 
out the risk, but it’s unlikely to happen if it isn’t a council’.   
 
The above section has demonstrated how housebuilders have developed skills to assist 
them in the brownfield land acquisition process, through both conducting rigorous site 
investigations  and  establishing  an  abnormals  identification  system.    This  provides 
housebuilders with the opportunity to establish the level of remediation required prior to 
submitting a land offer and subsequently speculatively acquiring a brownfield site.  This  
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competence  therefore  acts  to  manage  and  negate  the  ground  risks  associated  with  the 
speculative development of brownfield land for housing.   
 
Once  conducted,  the  intrusive  site  investigation  is  then  used  by  UK  speculative 
housebuilders to make an informed decision when selecting the remediation specialists.  
This  is  because  remediation  specialists  tend  to  specialise  in  one  general  aspect  of 
remediation.  For example, there are those who focus primarily on the removal of asbestos, 
whilst others focus on the removal of Japanese knotweed or petrochemicals or ash.  This 
means  that  speculative  housebuilders  might  commission  a  number  of  remediation 
specialists to remediate a site where a number of different ‘abnormals’ are present.         
 
Whilst housebuilders have developed new skills in dealing with ground problems relating 
to brownfield sites, ultimately, UK speculative housebuilders have accommodated ground 
problems  within  their  conventional  land  feasibility  and  appraisal  system,  rather  than 
establishing an entirely different system of land appraisal specifically for brownfield sites.    
 
The  next  section  discusses  the  way  in  which  UK  speculative  housebuilders  control 
potential development sites prior to full acquisition, in light of the results of the intrusive 
site investigations they conduct.  It will be demonstrated that this skill further manages the 
risks associated with the speculative development of brownfield land for housing.   
 
8.2.3  Conditional contracts  
Having  taken  a  discerning  approach  to  identifying  potential  brownfield  sites  and  then 
establishing the nature of the abnormals likely to be present in the ground, UK speculative 
housebuilders continue to negate the risks associated with contamination on brownfield 
sites through the use of conditional contracts.    
 
Unlike greenfield sites, options are not used by housebuilders to secure their commitment 
to the speculative purchase of a brownfield site.  Rather, because of the inherently risky 
and  unforeseen  nature  of  a  brownfield  site,  UK  speculative  housebuilders  make  their 
commitment  to  a  speculative  development  opportunity  conditional  upon  a  number  of 
issues,  which  are  legally  outlined  in  a  contract.    Conditional  contracts  are  a  legal 
commitment by both the vendor and the housebuilder to exchange ownership of the site,  
 
 
 
201
and they contain a number of conditions that must be satisfactorily achieved before the 
exchange can be legally completed.   
 
The  two  most  common  conditions  used  by  speculative  housebuilders  in  conditional 
contracts relate to the two core risks of the speculative redevelopment of brownfield land 
for housing: 
 
•  ‘Subject  to  Planning’:  The  satisfactory  achievement  of  a  fully  implementable 
planning permission.  
•  ‘Subject  to  Ground’:  The  satisfactory  achievement  of  full  remediation  and  full 
removal of contaminated material.   
 
The  ‘subject  to  planning’  condition  affords  the  developer  certainty  in  being  able  to 
discharge all the conditions typically attached to a planning permission, often including a 
Section  106/75  agreement,  common  on  all  brownfield  developments.    The  ‘subject  to 
ground’ condition essentially provides the housebuilder with a ‘get out clause’ should they 
discover unforeseen issues that renders the development opportunity financially unviable.  
As was previously suggested, this was typically not favoured by housebuilders, but having 
the facility in place should it need to be enacted provides housebuilders with a level of 
comfort and means of negating and managing risk.  
 
Conditional  contracts  therefore  provide  speculative  housebuilders  with  certainty  and 
guarantee when purchasing a brownfield site, that the ground and planning issues will be 
resolved  before  they  complete  their  purchase  of  the  site,  thereby  managing  risk.  
Caledonian  Homes,  a  sceptical  Scottish  based  private  volume  producer,  explains  the 
content of a typical conditional contract and makes clear that because of the conditional 
contract, they are able to view contamination and other ground problems as simply just 
another cost:   
 
‘…we make an offer subject to firstly a number of conditions and 
secondly, to the deduction of various costs, one of those might be 
contamination. Contamination is just another cost to us.  Ideally 
you  conclude  a  missive  and  then  you  have  a  period  of  time  to 
undertake the site investigation’.    
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Bridgemere  West  Scotland,  a  pragmatic  volume  PLC,  also  suggests  that  conditional 
contracts act as a means of managing the risk of contaminated brownfield sites, as they 
allow housebuilders to assess the nature of the land and the problems that will arise before 
they commit to purchase: 
 
‘We  see  what  we  are  getting  ourselves  into  before  we  actually 
acquire the site.  We make a condition to the vendor that we deduct 
from  the  land  value  the  costs  of  these  abnormals.    Because  all 
developers will suffer the same costs, we can therefore say your 
land value is subject to these deductible costs’.  
 
The utilisation of a conditional contract therefore acts to supplement the other risk negation 
skills that UK speculative housebuilders have developed in response to the shifting policy 
emphasis  favouring  brownfield  development.    Indeed,  as  the  shrewd  site  selection 
processes and the use of intrusive site investigations act to negate the risks associated with 
brownfield development, the use of a conditional contract complements and strengthens 
this approach.  By ensuring a ‘get out clause’, if contamination cannot be remediated to the 
levels reasonably required, speculative housebuilders can therefore secure a development 
site without having a legal requirement to purchase the site if remediation or planning 
permission is not satisfactorily completed and achieved.         
 
For those developers who do not purchase land outright, the risk management strategy of 
conditional contracts are generally not suitable.  However, the research indicates that those 
developers do indeed utilise risk management strategies.  Indeed, the issues of risk from 
contamination  and  the  refusal  of  planning  permission,  together  with  assigning  the 
responsibility  of  cost,  still  provide  uncertainty  and  therefore  risk  to  speculative 
housebuilders.  Thus, where a developer builds out a site that the landowner has retained 
ownership of, a joint venture  agreement is established and both the developer and the 
landowner enter into a ‘licence agreement’.  In much the same way as the conditional 
contract, the housebuilder and the landowner establish a ‘development agreement’, which 
establishes the terms of the deal and provides clarity in the responsibility of both parties.   
 
Regeneration  specialists  are  more  likely  to  develop  under  licence  using  development 
agreements than purchase the site under conditional contract because: 
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 ‘…quite often the public sector own the land so what happens in 
major areas in decline is that quite often, the public sector starts to 
gather the land together into a sort of land bank that it can then go 
out to the market to say that we’ve assembled this land and we 
know  that  its  got  some  issues  but  it  has  some  sort  of  certainty 
because we’ve managed to ring fence it and you know, we’ll make 
it into a regeneration area’ (Vision Construction).      
 
Development agreements therefore act to provide a risk management mechanism to those 
speculative housebuilders who do not purchase the land outright on which they build.     
 
8.3  Chapter Conclusions  
The above section has shown how UK speculative housebuilders seek to maintain a level 
of risk management and risk mediation through the use of desktop research, intrusive site 
investigations,  conditional  contracts  and  development  agreements  in  controlling 
brownfield land prior to full acquisition.  The skills complement the other skills outlined in 
Chapter  7.    Indeed,  whilst  greater  discernment  in  site  selection  seeks  to  negate  and 
minimise risk in the initial stages of land search, the use of site investigation techniques 
and conditional contracts maintain that level of risk management by securing control of a 
site subject to alleviating the risks of brownfield development.     
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CHAPTER 9 
 
MARKETING 
 
9.1  Introduction 
Chapter 4 explained that ‘…quite different approaches and quite different images will be 
needed  for  brownfield  locations  set  in  the  midst  of  urban  complexity’  (Adams  and 
Watlkins  2002:139).    For  UK  speculative  housebuilders,  simply  transposing  their 
greenfield marketing images onto a brownfield mode will not suffice and housebuilders 
will most likely need to ‘…realise that entirely new marketing skills and concepts will be 
required, which fully appreciate that the nature of both the clientele and the purchaser have 
changed significantly’ (ibid). 
 
Figures 9.1 and 9.2:  Britannia Mills, Manchester before redevelopment.   
Developer: Urban Splash   
     
Secondary Data Source: Urban Splash www.urbansplash.co.uk  
 
For regeneration specialists, however, the task may be more demanding.  They are more 
likely to need to convince potential purchasers that a brownfield site is a good place to live 
in order to get advance orders for their product.  This is because the sites that regeneration 
specialists  generally  redevelop  are  ‘hardcore’  in  comparison  to  the  sites  that  other 
housebuilders such as the volume and super builders approach.  The brownfield sites that 
regeneration specialists focus on redeveloping generally require extensive ground works to 
remove  contamination  and  other  side  effects  of  historical  use  and  have  often  sat  in  a 
redundant state for a long time.  As a result, local people and potential purchasers have  
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generally built up a picture of the site as redundant, derelict or industrial and the challenge 
arises in getting them to view the site as a desirable place to live is perhaps the trickiest 
aspect to brownfield development for regeneration specialists.   
 
Figures  9.1  to  9.4  are  secondary  data  sources.    They  illustrate  the  issues  involved  in 
changing  people’s  perceptions  of  brownfield  sites  from  ‘dirty  industrial  places’  into 
desirable  places  to  live.    Figures  9.1  and  9.2  show  Britannia  Mills  before  it  was 
redeveloped  and  Figures  9.3  and  9.4  show  the  results  of  extensive  remediation  and 
redevelopment and presents a new image of a clean, fresh and desirable place to live.   
 
Figures 9.3 & 9.4  Britannia Mills, Manchester, after Redevelopment 
Developer: Urban Splash 
     
Secondary Data Source: Urban Splash www.urbansplash.co.uk  
 
9.2  The Results - Quantitative Data   
In respect of marketing in the questionnaire, housebuilders were asked what they perceived 
to be the most important marketable features of a brownfield development.  They were 
asked to rank the following in order of importance: product design and its unique features; 
location; local amenities; proximity to workplace; being in an urban environment; and, 
transport links.  This question was designed to uncover what housebuilders perceived to be 
the most important marketable features of a brownfield site.  This further facilitated the  
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correlation  between  housebuilders’  perception  of  brownfield  marketing  and  what  the 
previous literature had suggested.       
 
In  terms  of  location,  the  results  were  obvious.    Overall,  it  was  the  most  important 
marketable feature of brownfield development, with 63% of respondents ranking it in first 
place.  Only 5% ranked location as the least important marketable feature of brownfield 
development, and is shown in Figure 9.5.      
 
Figure 9.5:  The Importance of Location in the Marketability of Brownfield 
Developments by UK Speculative Housebuilders 
 
63% 11%
5%
5%
11%
5%
Rank 1 (Most important)
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Rank 5
Rank 6 (Least important)
 
In  the  case  of  local  amenities  as  an  important  marketable  feature  of  brownfield 
developments, Figure 9.6 shows the majority of respondents ranked it in either 2
nd or 3
rd 
most  important.    This  is  perhaps  not  a  surprising  result;  the  proximate  amenities  and 
services are an important selling point of brownfield developments and of attracting people 
back into the cities.   
  
 
 
 
207
Figure 9.6:  The  Importance  of  Local  Amenities  in  the  Marketability  of 
Brownfield Developments by UK Speculative Housebuilders 
5%
29%
32%
18%
11%
5%
Rank 1 (Most important)
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Rank 5
Rank 6 (Least important)
 
The  importance  of  ‘product  design  and  its  unique  features’  to  the  marketability  of 
brownfield development was reflective of an industry that does not consider design as a 
key  parameter  for  success.    Figure  9.7  shows  that  whilst  only  6%  ranked  it  the  most 
important aspect of the marketability of brownfield development, 26% ranked it as least 
important and a further 13% placed it 5
th.   
 
Figure 9.7:  The Importance of Product Design and its Unique Features in the 
Marketability of Brownfield Developments by UK Speculative Housebuilders 
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21%
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Rank 6 (Least important)
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In respect of proximity to the work place as an important marketable feature of brownfield 
development, Figure 9.8 shows that 26% of respondents ranked it as least important and 
only 8% placed this feature first.  This is interesting as it implies that proximity to the work 
place is not a defining feature of a brownfield market, yet is part of the drive to create 
sustainable communities and is, in effect, one of the purposes of brownfield development – 
to get people back into the cities and close to their place of work in order to reduce travel.         
 
Figure 9.8:  The Importance of Proximity to Work Place in the Marketability 
of Brownfield Developments by UK Speculative Housebuilders 
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13%
13%
19%
21%
26%
Rank 1 (Most important)
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Rank 5
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Being in an urban environment as the most marketable feature of brownfield development 
was an interesting result.  Figure 9.9 shows that 18% of respondents placed it first, yet 29% 
placed it last.  Although being in urban environment is seen as important in marketing 
terms  for  some  housebuilders,  it  appears  that  the  exact  location  within  that  urban 
environment is the most important feature.     
 
With  regard  to  the  importance  of  transport  links  to  the  marketability  of  brownfield 
development,  Figure  9.10  shows  whilst  no  respondents  placed  it  first,  the  majority  of 
respondents  ranked  it  either  5
th  or  6
th.    The  results  of  this  question  perhaps  reflects 
housebuilders  assumptions  that  urban  areas  are  better  integrated  when  compared  to 
suburban areas, and as such is less likely to significantly affect marketable features and 
sales demand. 
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Figure 9.9:  The  Importance  of  Being  in  an  Urban  Environment  in  the 
Marketability of Brownfield Developments by UK Speculative Housebuilders 
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Figure  9.10:  The  Importance  of  Transport  Links  in  the  Marketability  of 
Brownfield Developments by UK Speculative Housebuilders      
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The above quantitative data has shown that although being in urban environment is seen as 
important to the marketability of brownfield developments by housebuilders, it appears 
that  the  location  within  the  urban  environment  is  the  most  important  feature.   This  is 
perhaps  not  surprising  as  housebuilders’  conventional  approach  to  housebuilding  was 
largely based on location and not on other features such as design or local amenities.  This  
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has  some  interesting  consequences  for  the  longevity  of  the  brownfield  development 
requirement:  will  housebuilders  seek  to  secure  brownfield  sites  in  the  best  market 
locations?  Will housebuilders continue to rely on their behavioural tendencies to focus on 
land acquisition rather than on the betterment of design? 
 
In addition to location, local amenities were also considered to be important marketable 
features of brownfield developments by UK speculative housebuilders. This is perhaps 
unsurprising, as the proximate amenities and services are an important selling point of 
brownfield developments and of attracting people back into the cities.        
 
Interestingly, product design was not considered to be important, which is surprising given 
the policy importance placed on good design in contemporary housebuilding.  It is also 
surprising considering that some of the most innovative housebuilding companies drive 
their  success  on  a  path  of  bespoke  and  innovative  design.    Then  again,  the  historical 
reliance by housebuilders on tried and tested methods perhaps explains this
63.          
 
9.3  The Results – Qualitative Data 
With  the  exception  of  the  pioneers  of  brownfield  development,  the  qualitative  data 
indicates  that  UK  housebuilders’  conventional  competencies  pertaining  to  marketing 
strategies  do  not  differ  significantly  from  the  way  in  which  they  have  conventionally 
marketed  their  developments.    The  most  significant  reason  why  UK  speculative 
housebuilders  have  not  needed  to  alter  their  conventional  strategies  of  marketing  in 
response to the brownfield development agenda is because the perceptions of a previously 
used brownfield site have not been detrimental to its marketing and sales success.  This is 
an important finding, as it was this very issue that the previous literature on the subject 
considered  to  be  the  most  detrimental  to  the  success  of  brownfield  marketing (Adams 
2004, Adams and Watkins 2002).  The impact of the brownfield development requirement 
is therefore at its least notable in this aspect of establishing development feasibility for UK 
speculative housebuilders.  Before discussing this further, attention will first focus on the 
pioneers.            
 
                                                       
 
63 The impact of brownfield development on product design will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.    
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Figure 9.11 and 9.12:  Albert Mills, Manchester. Developer: Urban Splash 
 
    
  Secondary Data Source: Urban Splash www.urbansplash.co.uk  
 
For the pioneers of brownfield development, people’s perceptions of a brownfield site as it 
currently is rather than its potential for becoming a residential area, has required them to 
develop skills to change these perceptions, both of the site and the area.  These skills 
involve housebuilders encouraging their potential purchasers to visualise a redundant mill 
or a derelict factory as a place to live, rather than ‘…a dirty redundant glowing in the dark 
health hazard’ (Vision Construction).  Figures 9.11 and 9.12, which are secondary data 
sources, provide an illustration of this issue.  To overcome this perception issue, Vision 
Construction, a pioneering North West based regeneration specialist, build a show house 
and  provide  a  ‘street  scene’
64  at  the  beginning  of  construction  on  their  brownfield 
developments, which allows speculative purchasers to envisage how their potential new 
home will look, rather than them just seeing redundant buildings or derelict wasteland:   
 
‘People want to see what they can get, so you’ve got to get a show 
house and you’ve got to get a street scene.  If we are going to get 
advance orders, we’ve got to convince people what it’s going to 
look  like  at  the  end  of  the  day.      You  need  to  change  people’s 
perceptions of what that site was’.     
 
                                                       
 
64 A street scene is a marketing term that refers to the view on a development site that provides potential 
purchasers with an image that will likely reflect the finished development.  A small street scene is usually 
built on site at the commencement of construction and commonly includes a show house with a driveway 
leading up to it.   A more detailed street scene is commonly provided in the marketing literature and is a 
computer generated image of an average day on the new development, showing a number of homes, cars 
parked in drive ways and people walking up and down tree lined streets.        
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For Vision Construction, successful marketing involves convincing potential purchasers to 
buy a plot on a site whilst it resembles a redundant mill, wasteland or a crane yard, with the 
use  of  this  street  scene.    However,  despite  the  development  of  this  skill,  Vision 
Construction do suggest most of their potential purchasers of urban brownfield units have 
actually already made their minds up about wanting to live in an urban environment.  To 
make use of this decision and to further negate against the negative perceptions that their 
potential  purchasers  might  have  of  the  site,  the  builder  identifies  the  specific  positive 
features that a brownfield site presents and builds them into their marketing literature: 
 
‘What we try to show is that this particular development is near to 
something  or  it’s  got  certain  things  within  it  which  make  it  an 
attractive place to live and that sort of thing…that its going to be 
an exciting place to live over the next ten years because its going to 
generate all this new stuff’.   
 
Essentially,  the  pioneers  make  clear  that  whilst  ‘urban  lifestyles’  are  an  important 
marketing  aspect  to  saleability  of  any  brownfield  development,  the  positioning  and 
function of the forthcoming development within the existing urban fabric is equally as 
important, particularly in large regeneration initiatives where a change in perception may 
be required.                           
 
For those pragmatic and sceptical housebuilders in both Scotland and England, whilst it is 
true that the same strategies have been utilised in marketing brownfield sites, different 
marketing images have been developed to account of the sites previous use and unique 
urban placement.  Nonetheless, the conventional competence and skills of marketing in UK 
speculative  housing  development,  as  part  of  establishing  development  feasibility,  have 
successfully  been  transposed  onto  a  brownfield  development  context  with  minimal 
conflict.        
   
Indeed, the reasons why the sceptics and pragmatists in Scotland and England did not find 
the  previous  use  of  a  site  and  the  perceptions  of  such,  detrimental  to  its  successful 
marketing  was  because  they  were  able  to  provide  legal  guarantees  of  remediation.  
Housebuilders felt that because they could legally guarantee remediation had taken place,  
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through their solicitors on exchange of contract, then it should not be an issue that deters 
purchasers.  In effect, they could ‘convince’ potential purchasers that all would be alright.   
 
However, it is perhaps useful to remember in any assessment of the marketing strategies of 
UK  speculative  housebuilders  that  different  types  of  brownfield  sites  will undoubtedly 
require different levels of marketing.  Indeed, for pioneers who specialise in delivering 
new homes on hardcore urban brownfield sites that have historically been, and are often 
situated within and between, industrial places, it is more of a challenge to change people’s 
perceptions than for a site that was a former primary school or nursing home.   
 
For example, Figures 9.13 and 9.14, which are secondary data sources, show images of a 
‘hardcore’ brownfield site in Salford: the former Cadishead Chemical works.  The site is a 
16 acre former oil storage depot with high levels of oil-based product contained within the 
soils and ground water, the visual effects of which are shown in Figure 9.14.  The site was 
acquired  unconditionally  by  Harrow  Estates  in  2006  and  recently  obtained  planning 
consent for 350 residential units.  The site is still undergoing extensive remedaition and in 
2008 will be put on the open market for sale to residential developers.   
 
Figure 9.13:Cadishead Chemical Works, Salford, prior to remediation   
    Developer/Remediation: Harrow Estates. 
 
Secondary Data Source: Harrow Estates, www.harrowestates.co.uk  
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Figure 9.14: The Visual Effects of Contamination, Cadishead, Salford.   
    Developer/Remediator: Harrow Estates 
 
Secondary Data Source: Harrow Estates, www.harrowestates.co.uk  
 
The way in which pioneers therefore overcome the negative images that the sites they 
approach typically present, is to develop computer generated images (CGI’s) of how the 
development  is  likely  to  look  when  completed.    These  images  are  then  presented  to 
potential purchasers in well-designed marketing literature.  The secondary data sources 
shown below provide a few examples of these.    
 
Figure 9.15: CGI of the Lakeshore Development in Bristol, Urban Splash    
 
Secondary Data Source: Urban Splash, www.urbansplash.co.uk 
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Developers often insert people, foliage and activity into these pictures to put across an 
image of community, success, functionality and attractiveness in order to lure in potential 
purchasers.  In effect, this is the exact same skill that UK speculative housebuilders have 
used  conventionally  when  creating  images  of  suburban  family  life.    The  distinction 
between the brownfield and greenfield scenario is the lifestyle that is promoted, with the 
brownfield sites typically promoting an urban ‘yuppie’ or ‘dinky’ lifestyle vis-à-vis the 
suburban family centred lifestyle for greenfield sites.       
 
Figure 9.16: CGI of ‘The Waterside at Royal Worcester’, Berkeley Homes  
 
Secondary Data Source: Berkeley Homes, www.berkeleyhomes.co.uk 
 
Of course, the use of CGI technology is inherent amongst all housebuilders and is not 
specific for ‘hardcore’ brownfield sites.  But, the benefits that accrue from developing 
images  for  a  brownfield  site  that  at  the  time  resembles  a  former  industrial  site  or  a 
chemical plant, are significant for regeneration specialists.  Figure 9.17 shows a CGI of the 
‘The Light Buildings’ in Preston, a brownfield development by the volume housebuilder 
Gladedale.      
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Figure 9.17: CGI of ‘The Light Buildings’, Preston.  Gladedale (Manchester)  
 
Secondary Data Source: The Gladedale Group, www.gladedale.com  
 
For the sceptics and pragmatists who do not tackle ‘hardcore’ brownfield sites, such as 
former chemical works, the use of CGI technology is not essential but rather an added 
extra.  Also, the marketing literature used by sceptics  and pragmatists need not be as 
persuasive in convincing potential purchasers to view a site as a place to live.  Indeed, the 
redevelopment of ‘easier’ brownfield sites such as former schools or hospitals demands 
less persuasive marketing images than the former chemical plant shown in Figures 9.13 
and 9.14.   
 
Figure 9.18 presents an image of a former school that was marketed between May and July 
2008.  The site is a brownfield site situated in the greenbelt and suitable for residential 
development on the existing building footprint only.  The image shows a desirable site 
where  you  can  image  that  people  would  aspire  to  live.    Indeed,  although  partially  a 
brownfield site, the image of the site readily still connects with the British psyche of the 
suburban dream (Adams and Watkins 2002).          
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Figure 9.18: The Former Massey Hall School, Thelwell, Warrington. 
 
Source: DTZ Residential, www.dtzresidential.co.uk  
 
Whilst Figure 9.18 is not typical of a brownfield site, it does provide a stark contrast to 
former chemical plants or redundant cotton mills.  As such, it therefore seems logical that 
those conventional marketing strategies that UK speculative housebuilders have utilised 
are appropriate for some brownfield sites, such as the Former Massey Hall School above.  
The  use  of  tried  and  tested  marketing  methods  provides  housebuilders  with a  level of 
certainty,  as  they  utilise  skills  that  they  know  have  been  successful  in  the  past.    For 
example, Lothian Homes, a pragmatic Scottish private volume producer, make clear that 
their approach to marketing brownfield developments is very traditional and is based on 
what  they  have  done  conventionally  because  this  tried  and  tested  approach  provides 
certainty for them.  Indeed, the use of adverts in papers of forthcoming developments and 
the use of mailing lists, email, and phone databases allows Lothian Homes to inform their 
potential purchasers at key stages in the marketing process, in such the same way that they 
had conventionally done.  Lothian Homes also made clear that, as done traditionally:  
 
‘…the show house is also used to pick up purchasers, it’s all pretty 
traditional really’.   
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Arden North West, a pragmatic volume PLC, suggest that transparency and clarity with 
regard to a brownfield site’s former use is an important aspect of making these tried and 
tested methods successful under the brownfield modus operandi:    
 
‘With brownfield sites, you sometimes need to hit head on with the 
fact that the site has been previously developed and used and that 
we’ve taken engineers advice to make it safe.   Sometimes you have 
to do that upfront, but not very often but occasionally...The main 
marketing  tools  are  a  show  house,  and  the  brochures  are  site 
specific  for  each  development,  not  a  huge  amount  of  television 
advertising, quite a lot of press advertising’.   
 
The above has shown that the use of ‘lifestyles’ as a marketing concept in the brownfield 
context remains.  As suggested in previous research (see Adams and Watkins 2002, Adams 
2004), these ‘brownfield lifestyles’ are in fact targeted more to the young professional 
crowd and rely largely on images of bars, coffee shops and access to city centre amenities 
such as shops,  clubs, and fashionable eateries  as the marketable driving  force.   Arden 
North West emphasise this lifestyle difference: 
 
‘All  the  city  centre  flats  are  advertised  with  cups  of  coffee  and 
pictures of shops- you don’t see pictures of the flats so much, it’s 
always  the  lifestyle  pictures.    You’ve  got  to  be  very  targeted  if 
that’s what you’re trying to sell’.  
 
Interestingly, the marketing images used by housebuilders on brownfield sites also show 
more internal images of the developments than the traditional external marketing images of 
blue skies, children playing in the streets and big double garages, which are clearly more 
relevant to the greenfield scenario.  The use of internal images supplement the computer 
generated  images  that  most  housebuilders  utilise.    The  secondary  data  sources  shown 
overleaf provide one example of this use of internal images for marketing and advertising 
brownfield sites.      
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Figures 9.19, 9.20 & 9.21: ‘Waterside Park’, West Drayton, Developer: Taylor 
Wimpey  
           
Secondary Data Source: George Wimpey, www.georgewimpey.co.uk  
 
Having discussed the images that UK speculative housebuilders utilise in their approach to 
the marketing of brownfield sites, it is important to comment on the differences between 
the approaches taken by smaller developers and those nationally operative volume and 
super builders. 
    
9.4  Differentiating Approaches to Marketing through Builder Size 
Aside from the differences taken to marketing by speculative housebuilders by typology, 
the  research  indicates  that  there  is  also  a  distinct  difference  between  the  marketing 
approaches taken by volume and super builders and their smaller, niche and specialist 
counterparts.  Whilst volume builders use generic branding and procedures, the smaller and 
more specialist builders approach the marketing of brownfield developments in a more 
bespoke and unique fashion.   
 
9.4.1 Generic marketing and the medium, volume and super builders 
Volume housebuilders use generic marketing strategies for two reasons.  First, although the 
corporate structure of these housebuilders means that they are regionally franchised and 
locally  operative,  corporate  branding  and  group  marketing  procedures  mean  that  any 
marketing literature used is based on templates already approved by the Group’s Board of 
Directors.    Second,  generic  marketing  allows  continuity  for  nationally  operative 
housebuilders across their various regional boundaries and allows Head Office to maintain 
a  level  of  corporate  consistency  and  to  promote  an  image  of  the  branded  product.  
Bridgemere West Scotland, a pragmatic volume PLC, illustrate this:  
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‘Generally, the Group like consistency – we’re a large company 
and it benefits us as an organisation, it’s better than a local builder 
who doesn’t have that gravitas behind them.  Consistency in brand 
is good for company image’.   
     
However,  the  research  indicates  there  are  times  when  generic  branding  and  marketing 
literature  needs  to  be  supplemented  with  site  specific  information  relating  to  each 
brownfield  site  they  market.    Bridgemere  West  Scotland  further  suggest  that  although 
company branding is important in respect of group procedure and consistency, there are 
times when unique brownfield sites provide an opportunity to use site-specific information 
to complement the generic approach:    
 
‘…specific sites sometimes need something a bit different – perhaps 
ambitious to make it stand out – but you have to ask to step out of 
line’.   
 
Caledonian Homes, a sceptical Scottish based private volume producer, also highlight a 
level  of  consistency  in  marketing  brownfield  developments  and  describe  how  they 
positively incorporate the brownfield status of the site into the existing marketing process.  
From  an  English  comparison,  Edzell  North  West,  a  sceptical  volume  PLC,  similarly 
discuss the role of a generic template for their marketing, whether it’s a brownfield or 
greenfield site:  
 
‘In  our  strategy  for  marketing  throughout  the  UK,  we  have  the 
same  underlying  principles,  generic  templates.    Then  we  tailor 
them to the site – we pick on unique pointers for the site.  We don’t 
differentiate for brownfield or greenfield, its about the site, what's 
it been what it’s got to offer.  Essentially, we look at a site on its 
merits and try to develop a strategy from there.’  
 
9.4.2  Bespoke marketing and the smaller and specialist builders 
Where  volume  and  super  builders  rely  on  conventional,  tried  and  tested  methods  in 
marketing  brownfield  sites,  with  input  from  a  site’s  history  to  complement  these 
conventional  and  generic  strategies,  smaller  and  more  specialist  housebuilders  utilise 
bespoke marketing strategies and do not follow any formulaic process.   For example, 
Campbell Construction, a pioneering Scottish based private niche producer, make clear  
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that the marketing of brownfield sites needs to be site-specific and they make the important 
distinction in the different types of brownfield sites when discussing this: 
 
‘Tarring every site with the same brush is dangerous.  You need to 
identify the merits of each site and develop a marketing strategy 
around that’.   
 
Lomand  Developments,  a  pioneering  Scottish  private  niche  producer,  outsource  their 
marketing skills to external specialist companies: 
 
‘Marketing is bespoke, so we don’t take a formulaic approach to 
marketing  either.    We  have  a  number  of  marketing  and  PR 
company contacts that we employ.  We constantly rotate them – it’s 
horses  for  courses.    We  assess  each  site  on  its  own  merits  in 
relation to the location, the strength of market, the level of renewal 
activity, is the site a unique jewel in a crown?’  
 
From  an  English  perspective,  Vision  Construction,  a  pioneering  private  regeneration 
specialist make clear that their approach: 
 
 ‘…really depends on what we are building, what an area is like 
and what an area’s strengths are really.  And sometimes, who the 
architect  is  and  what  sort  of  flavour  they  bring  to  the 
development…and schemes may need to be marketed in a slightly 
different way.’ 
 
9.5  Chapter Conclusions  
This chapter has demonstrated that the effect of the policy switch favouring brownfield 
development on the marketing approaches taken by UK housebuilders has been limited.  
However, the important distinction was raised between the generic marketing approaches 
taken by volume housebuilders and the more bespoke approaches taken by the smaller and 
more specialist housebuilders.  Specifically, the chapter has shown how the majority of UK 
speculative housebuilders have simply transposed their conventional core competencies for 
marketing onto the brownfield modus operandi rather than developing entirely new ones.  
Housebuilders have developed new marketing images to suit the demands of brownfield 
sites,  and  these  are  supplemented  by  the  use  of  CGI  technology  to  create  images  for 
developments  that  have  yet  to  be  built.    Ultimately,  this  research  indicates  that  the 
marketing strategies of UK speculative housebuilders are continually evolving to suit the  
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changing demands of both the potential purchasers and housing development in general, 
rather  than  featuring  significant  step  changes  in  immediate  response  to  external policy 
change.        
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CHAPTER 10 
 
DESIGN AND PROCUREMENT  
 
10.1  Introduction 
Chapter  2  emphasised  that  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  features  of  speculative 
housebuilding that elucidates the way in which housebuilders approach the speculative 
residential  development  process  is  the  standardisation  of  production.    This  business 
strategy and the associated core competencies of using standardised building materials and 
tried and tested methods to generate a number of standard house types has shaped the way 
housebuilders operate and compete.  Further, it has instilled construction efficiency as a 
means of profit maximisation in speculative housebuilding over time, primarily through the 
greenfield experience (Tiesdell and Adams 2004, Adams and Watkins 2002).  
 
As the UK speculative housebuilding industry has developed both its business strategies 
and its reputation around the delivery of standardised products for standardised greenfield 
sites,  Adams  and  Watkins  (2002:133)  suggest  that  ‘…it  is  clear  that  brownfield 
development is more likely to require the delivery of individually tailored products for 
specific locations’ for two key reasons: 
 
1.  Brownfield  sites  are  likely  to  be  more  problematic,  requiring  layouts  that  take 
account  of  particular  site  conditions,  including  ground  conditions  and  existing 
buildings or foundations. 
2.  Successful brownfield development needs to be carefully woven into the existing 
urban fabric and its associated design and infrastructural requirements that go with 
it. 
 
Because product standardisation has been the preserve of UK speculative housebuilders in 
their  conventional  approaches  to  the  design  of  residential  developments,  brownfield 
development will therefore present a severe test to those tried and tested methods (Adams 
and Watkins 2002, Adams 2004, Adams and Tiesdell 2004).   
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10.2     The Results – Quantitative Data 
In respect of skills access and procurement, the quantitative data suggests that the use of 
externally sourced skills by UK speculative housebuilders has increased since the inception 
of  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield  development.    When  asked  to  specify  what 
methods  they  had  relied  upon  for  acquiring  the  necessary  skills  and  expertise  for 
brownfield development over the past 5 years, the majority of housebuilders stated that 
outsourcing had been the most significant method.   
 
Figure 10.1  Has  your  company  use  outsourcing  as  a  means  of  accessing 
expertise and skills for brownfield development over the past 5 years? 
55%
4%
41%
Yes
No
Not Applicable
 
 
Only 4% of respondents stated that outsourcing had not be used to access the skills and 
expertise necessary for brownfield development.  When asked the same question for the 
coming 5  years, 59% of respondents suggested that they would rely on outsourcing in 
accessing the necessary skills and expertise for brownfield development.  
 
Figure 10.2  Will  your  company  use  outsourcing  as  a  means  of  accessing 
expertise and skills for brownfield development over the next 5 years? 
59%
2%
39%
Yes
No
Not Applicable
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The quantitative research therefore indicates the significance of external and outsourced 
resources  in  providing  UK  speculative  housebuilders  with  the  necessary  skills  and 
expertise required for successful brownfield development.   
 
In respect of design, the questionnaire asked housebuilders if brownfield development had 
affected  their  use  of  consultants  for  design,  with  a  view  to  uncovering  whether 
housebuilders  were  using  external  expertise  for  the  design  of  their  brownfield 
developments.  Figure 10.3 shows that 28% of respondents stated that there had been no 
change  in  the  use  of  consultants  for  design,  which  perhaps  reflects  the  retention  of 
standardisation in brownfield development.  Of those who did state an increase usage of 
consultants for design, 51% stated that they had experienced only a slight or moderate 
increase, whilst only 15% experienced a significant increase.      
 
The  results  of  this  question  also  act  to  reinforce  the  position  that  UK  speculative 
housebuilders have continued to use product standardisation under the brownfield modus 
operandi, through the limited use of external consultants for design.     
 
Figure 10.3  Has  brownfield  development  affected  your  company’s  use  of 
consultants for design? 
15%
34%
17%
28%
6%
Significant Increase
Moderate Increase
Slight Increase
No Change
Consultants Not Used for
Design
 
Also  interesting  was  the  results  of  the  question  that  asked  respondents  what  the  most 
important marketable feature of a brownfield site was.  Figure 10.4 shows that only 5% of 
respondents placed product design as the most important.  The majority of respondents 
actually placed it as the least important marketable feature of brownfield development.   
 
 
 
226
The other options were location, local amenities, proximity to work place, being in an 
urban environment and transport links (see Chapter 9 for more detail on this question).     
 
Figure 10.4: Product  Design  as  the  most  important  marketable  feature  of 
brownfield development 
5%
21%
21%
13%
13%
27%
Rank 1 (Most important)
Rank 2
Rank 3
Rank 4
Rank 5
Rank 6 (Least important)
 
 
The quantitative data has emphasised the sustained importance of product standardisation 
under the brownfield modus operandi in two key ways.  First, by suggesting that product 
design is not important to the success of marketing brownfield developments.  Second, by 
highlighting  that  housebuilders  have  not  significantly  increased  their  use  of  external 
consultants  for  design  as  a  result  of  increased  brownfield  development  rates.    The 
qualitative  data,  presented  below,  will  outline  in  more  detail  how  UK  speculative 
housebuilders approach product design on brownfield land through the sustained use of 
product standardisation and construction efficiency as means of competitive advantage.     
 
10.3  The Results – Qualitative Data 
It is important to emphasise that land remains the lifeblood of housebuilders and seeking 
out potential development sites therefore remains their most important strategic activity 
under the brownfield modus operandi.  However, once land acquisition has taken place, 
speculative  housebuilders,  with  the  exception  of  the  pioneers,  seek  to  maintain  their 
competitive edge through construction efficiency.  This is achieved through the use of 
standard  house  types  under  the  brownfield  modus  operandi  and  as  such,  this  research  
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confirms that the conventional core competencies of UK speculative housebuilders have 
again been transposed onto brownfield development.        
 
10.3.1  Construction efficiency as competitive advantage 
Whilst the UK speculative housebuilding industry still maintains its land focus and seeks 
out competitive advantage through effective land search techniques (see Chapter 7), this 
research  indicates  that  UK  speculative  housebuilders  also  seek  further  competitive 
advantage under the brownfield scenario through construction efficiency.   
 
UK speculative housebuilders focus their profit generation functions under the brownfield 
modus operandi on the efficiency of the construction process for two reasons: 
 
•  Housebuilders cannot compete on unit sales cost because the existing housing stock 
and the market set them.   
•  Housebuilders  also  cannot  compete  on  the  cost  of  the  land,  as  the  value  they 
generate is a residual value having deducted the costs of ‘abnormals’.  
 
The result is that housebuilders have been able to successfully transpose their conventional 
competencies of product standardisation onto the brownfield modus operandi to ensure 
construction efficiency.  Further, fresh skills have been developed by housebuilders for 
controlling  the  costs  of  the  construction  process  on  brownfield  land  through  both  the 
efficient plotting of their product and the efficient use of materials.  By increasing plots per 
acre, housebuilders are able to increase their revenues and generate a better land value.   
 
Bridgemere  West  Scotland,  a  pragmatic  volume  PLC,  explains  that  their  design  of 
developments on brownfield sites reflects their conventional priorities of needing to use 
land efficiently and maximising the potential of the site in financial terms, as well as taking 
account of the site’s planning requirements.  For the builder then, design is therefore not a 
competitive issue on brownfield sites, as their main concern in design remains providing 
the landowner with a competitive offer through maximising the development potential of 
the site.   
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Plot  efficiency  and  construction  efficiency  mean  that  UK  speculative  housebuilders 
generally deliver high-density brownfield developments, comprised of either standardised 
flats and/or standardised townhouses.  And, because brownfield sites are often smaller, 
more  expensive  to  purchase,  present  complex  ground  issues  and  sit  within  an existing 
urban fabric with its own existing design (Adams 2004), the use of high-density schemes 
also overcome other issues that brownfield land may present.     
 
Standardised  flats  and  standardised  townhouses  provide  the  housebuilder  with  the 
opportunity to have high density developments and have a higher unit to acre ratio, making 
smaller brownfield sites more financially viable and being able to provide landowners with 
a competitive land offer.  Flats and townhouses also provide a higher square footage to 
acre ratio, which additionally makes the development more financially viable.     
 
Additionally, flatted developments and townhouses also remove the need for housebuilders 
to provide gardens, which can be an issue for contaminated sites.  Generally, whilst flats 
have no private open space, townhouses do, and this is provided in the form of decking 
rather than grass.  Indeed, the research made clear that if housebuilders are redeveloping a 
heavily contaminated site, providing private grassed gardens is generally resisted because 
they want to prevent the use of vegetable patches and other digging activity.  Bridgemere 
West Scotland express this issue:  
   
‘…  if  contamination  levels  are  such  that  housing  is  no  longer 
appropriate because we can’t deliver private gardens because of 
the long term risk that contamination might present itself again, 
then  we  would  deliver  flats,  or  this  hybrid  of  townhouses  with 
decking’.  
 
The use of product standardisation is crucial to construction efficiency, as costs can be 
both  established  before  commencement  of  construction  and  controlled  throughout  the 
construction process.  The research shows that product standardisation therefore facilitates 
competitive advantage through construction efficiency on brownfield land.  Caledonian 
Homes, a sceptical Scottish based private volume producer, illustrate this: 
 
‘…we’ve  made  our  houses  efficient  i.e.  you  get  a  lot  of  square 
footage on quite a small footprint and that allows you to get more 
sales revenue out of the site and allows you to bid for a greater  
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price  on  the  land.–  so,  in  order  to  get  that  land,  we  use 
construction  efficiency  to  make  us  finish  number  1  rather  than 
number 2’.             
 
10.3.2  The continuing importance of product standardisation 
Because  of  the  importance  of  construction  efficiency  under  the  brownfield  modus 
operandi,  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield  development  has  not  significantly 
affected housebuilders’ conventional strategies of standardisation in product design.  The 
exception to this is of course the pioneers, whose use of ‘one off’ bespoke design solutions 
is  the  only  design  approach  they  will  consider  on  their  developments.    This  will  be 
discussed in more detail in a succeeding section.     
 
The research therefore indicates that UK speculative housebuilders, with the exception of 
pioneers,  still  rely  on  tried  and  tested  conventional  methods  associated  with  standard 
product design in the configuration of their developments where they can.  The research 
also  demonstrates  the  malleability  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders  conventional 
approaches to product design in a brownfield scenario.  This approach is relative for both 
the English and Scottish contexts.     
 
Whilst  UK  speculative  housebuilders  have  made  limited  attempts  to  alter  their 
conventional  design  strategies  under  the  brownfield  scenario,  they  have  managed  to 
integrate standardised unit types into the existing urban fabric on the brownfield site they 
build.    The  result  is  that  standardised  design  solutions  have  been  transposed  onto  the 
brownfield modus operandi.   
 
UK speculative housebuilders maintain a standardised approach to design solutions for 
brownfield sites by using of standard structural footprints.  As such, any difference to the 
design of developments therefore comes by way of altering the façade of the structure.  
This  skill  allows  housebuilders  both  to  ‘alter’  their  standard  product  in  respect  of  the 
differing  urban  environment  but  also  ensures  housebuilders’  ability  to  draw  on  the 
conventional benefits that product standardisation affords, such as controlling construction 
costs, materials procurement and providing the level of construction certainty necessary to 
negate the risks of speculative residential development.   
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Therefore,  the  use  standardised  design  solutions  on  brownfield  sites  provides 
housebuilders with a level of certainty in the costs associated with construction ‘above 
ground’.    Whilst  UK  speculative  housebuilders  have  developed  fresh  skills  in  site 
selection, site investigation and conditional acquisition (see Chapters 7 and 8), the innate 
risks involved in developing brownfield sites mean that housebuilders will seek to control 
and  manage  risk  through  the  development  process.    Therefore,  controlling  costs  by 
utilising standardised product designs means that housebuilders can manage risk ‘above 
ground’ whilst concentrating their efforts ‘below ground’.   
 
For example, Edzell North West, a sceptical volume PLC, make clear that: 
 
‘With standard house types, which we’ve used a lot in the past, you 
know what it costs to come out of the ground, it’s what is in the 
ground that’s really the issue on brownfields’.     
 
The way in which housebuilders utilise standardised designs on brownfield land is to use a 
‘…standard pattern book of floor space’ (Edzell North West).  This standard pattern book 
of floor space refers to the structural footprint of the standard unit types, which is it’s 
defining feature (Nicol and Hooper 1999).   
 
Figures 10.5 and 10.6 are secondary data sources and show the footprint of a standard 
house type and a standard apartment block by Manor Kingdom, a Scottish based privately 
owned niche producer.  Whilst the footprints of both unit types are standard, the materials 
used on the external part of the units can be altered to suit the demands of each context in 
which the units are built.  For example, the façade of the units could be finished with full 
render, half render half brick, full brick, stone, sandstone or any other type of material.  
Indeed, planning permissions do attach conditions that relate to the external dressing of a 
development.  For example, Bridgemere North West, a pragmatic volume PLC, make clear 
that the planning permission for a site they were developing in Calderdale required them to 
utilise local materials in the development: 
 
‘….we had to use the local stone and put slate roofs on all the 
units.    But  that’s  fine  and  we  can  do  that  with  our  standard 
footprints – we’ve done it before so we know the cost and where to 
get the materials from, it’s not an issue for us. Our houses can be  
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what you want them to be but we still have that certainty from the 
standard footprint, we can still control those build costs…’    
 
 Figure 10.5 ‘The Sovereign’ House Type by Manor Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
Secondary Data Source: The Manor Kingdom Group, www.manorkingdom.com 
 
Therefore, whilst the external façade of an apartment block or a standard house type can be 
altered to suit each local context within which it is being built, the standardised nature of 
the unit type is retained through its footprint.  This means that the construction costs of 
each standard unit type are known and controlled before development has begun and the 
risks involved in development are therefore managed.       
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The use of standard structural footprints under the brownfield modus operandi therefore 
enables housebuilders to continue to bolt on different external facades on to the standard 
structural  design  on  a  brownfield  site,  as  Nicol  and  Hooper  (1997)  had  previously 
suggested.        
 
Figure 10.6  The Bankhouse Apartments by Manor Kingdom    
 
 
Secondary Data Source: The Manor Kingdom Group, www.manorkingdom.com  
 
The research therefore demonstrates that the inherent flexibility afforded by the use of 
standard footprints provides speculative housebuilders with the ability to respond to the 
changing policy agenda favouring brownfield development, whilst also providing them  
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with the ability to maintain their conventional competence of standardisation under the 
brownfield  scenario.    The  focus  of  design  for  UK  speculative  housebuilders,  with  the 
exception of regeneration specialist, therefore remains: 
 
 ‘...on external design, the quality of external finish and external 
environment in which the house sits’ (Edzell North West).   
 
When asked to discuss how they approach design on brownfield sites, Bridgemere West 
Scotland, a pragmatic Scottish based volume PLC, make clear that design is about the 
external finish of a standard unit: 
 
‘On brownfields we can change the façade of  a standard house 
type and have a similar footprint; we can use different standard 
bricks, use different external designs, put pitched roofs on it, make 
it fit something different, which suits the demands of brownfields’.   
 
In  addition  to  the  ability  to  control  construction  costs,  sceptical  and  pragmatic 
housebuilders continue to use standardised unit types on brownfield land because on the 
inherent competition to produce the most competitive land offer and win sites.  This is 
linked to construction efficiency as a means of competitive advantage.  Caledonian Homes, 
a sceptical Scottish based private volume producer, make clear that their approach to using 
standardised design solutions on brownfield sites is down to the pressure from landowners 
to receive the maximum value for their sites:   
 
‘All the landowner is interested in is maximising their land value; 
the way to do that is to make houses as efficient as possible and to 
get  as  many  houses  on  the  site  as  you  can  and  make  the  non 
developable areas as small as possible.  You cram as many on to 
win the site, and that’s the only way of winning it’.   
 
The utilisation of standardised unit types under the brownfield development scenario also 
affords UK speculative housebuilders the ability to readily adapt their standard unit types 
to  the  inherent  variation  that  brownfield  sites  produce,  whilst  being  able  to  provide  a 
competitive  land  bid  and  manage  the  risks  associated  with  brownfield  sites  through 
controlling construction costs.        
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10.3.3  The use of bespoke design solutions on brownfield sites 
The  use  of  bespoke  design  solutions  is  a  non-conventional  way  for  UK  speculative 
housebuilders to develop land for residential development, as it deviates from the use of 
standardised techniques conventionally used.  However, the results of the research indicate 
that UK speculative housebuilders in both Scotland and England have utilised bespoke 
design solutions on brownfield land.  Nonetheless, the use of bespoke design is far from 
common  and  the  decision  to  utilise  this  design  approach  in  place  of  a  standardised 
approach is informed by a number of site-specific issues and whether the housebuilder is a 
pioneer, a pragmatist or a sceptic.  The site-specific issues are:  
 
•  The location of the site.  
•  The size of the site. 
•  The target market.  
•  The demands of the vendor/landowner. 
 
For example, Bridgemere West Scotland, a pragmatic volume PLC, suggest the decision to 
choose a bespoke approach depends on the often unique factors that each site presents: 
 
 ‘…we want them to fit in well with their environment, look good 
with the local community and improve the whole area’.   
 
For  regeneration  specialists  however,  bespoke  design  solutions  are  their  core  business 
strategy.    Vision  Construction,  a  North  West  based  pioneering  regeneration  specialist, 
make clear that because they are ‘…quite tuned into design’, they realise the value of good 
design  and  therefore  ‘…it’s  quite  a  strong  part  of  the  delivery  of  our  developments’.   
Vision Construction therefore approach each brownfield development in a unique fashion 
and develop a bespoke design solution around the demands of the site, which include inter 
alia: topography, existing urban fabric, existing on-site structures, ground issues such as 
contamination and existing foundations, market demands and expectations, and the local 
authorities’ wider regeneration initiatives.  This means that they;  
 
‘…can  recognise  an  opportunity  without  having  to  think  about 
what  design  might  go  on  there  and  quite  often  we  are  quite 
committed to an opportunity before we go out to a competition to 
select an architect and that’s really when a design starts.  So we  
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are  quite  often  committed  to  an  opportunity  with  no  real 
preconceptions of what’s going to go on there’.   
 
Vision Construction thus utilise their in-house skills to conceptualise their aspirations for a 
development opportunity and then externally source the expertise required to make that 
conception a reality, through the use of architects.          
 
Interestingly, the research identified that it was not just the pioneers who considered the 
use of bespoke design solutions a benefit to the success of a brownfield development.  A 
small number of the volume builders were beginning to recognise the potential of bespoke 
design  to  the  success  of  brownfield  development.    Lothian  Homes  for  example,  a 
pragmatic Scottish based private volume builder, make clear that: 
 
 ‘…in some ways, the good thing about a major regeneration area 
is you’re often less constrained by surrounding buildings, because 
there often aren’t any.  So if you are building a new development 
right in the middle of the city centre, whatever you design there 
would have to fit in with all the surrounding buildings around it 
and that quite often kind of half designs it for you, in terms of its 
height,  its  materials,  its  colour,  its  access,  everything  else.  
Whereas  if  you  are  doing  something  major  in  a  big  area  then 
there’s a bit more flexibility for setting a new sort of design criteria 
for that area’.   
 
Making their point clearer on the design agenda of the company, Lothian Homes highlight:  
 
‘We as a company are very against pastiche developments – it’s 
not our thing at all really…so, as far as the design goes, we just 
aim for using quality architecture consultants to produce quality 
design and kind of bring out an area’.       
 
For those pragmatists who do utilise bespoke design solutions, they tend to reserve them 
for brownfield sites in prime and prominent locations, typically in the city centre or close 
to prominent existing structures.   
 
Arden West Scotland, a pragmatic volume PLC, who has had experience in delivering 
bespoke design, confirms this:  
 
‘…we tend to use bespoke only on “prime” city centre sites. It’s 
dictated by the site really’.    
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Further, the builder makes clear that it is the location of the site that is key to the decision 
behind using a bespoke approach to development design: 
 
‘The choice of using bespoke is not a result of the land, it’s more 
the location of the site.  Brownfield sites tend to be urban areas’.   
 
The  way  in  which  UK  speculative  housebuilders  approach  the  bespoke  design  of 
developments is to utilise externally based skills.  These typically include architects, who 
design the development and construction companies, who build the development.  Edzell 
North  West,  a  sceptical  volume  PLC,  make  clear  that  the  distinction  between 
standardisation and bespoke design is one of internal and external skills: 
 
‘With  bespoke,  everything  is  externally  designed.    There  is  no 
direct  involvement  –  it’s  a  contractual  relationship  between  the 
architect and sub contractor’.   
 
Arden North West, a pragmatic volume PLC, suggests that when they do choose to use 
bespoke design solutions, they appoint a locally active external architects, who they know: 
 
 ‘…will know the locality better or have some creative ideas that 
would suit the site better’. 
 
Whilst UK speculative housebuilders have utilised bespoke design solutions on brownfield 
land, the research uncovered a number of constraints that have significantly influenced this 
approach.  For example, Edzell North West suggest that from their experience, the most 
significant constraints on the design of a brownfield development are density, story height, 
and requirements for open space. Whilst open space provision is driven by number of bed 
spaces or homes, it means that higher density developments require a higher open space 
requirement  and  therefore  Edzell  North  West  consider  it  ‘…not  good  land  use’.  
Caledonian  Homes,  a  sceptical  Scottish  based  private  volume  builder,  highlight  these 
challenges: 
 ‘…gave  us  build  problems  in  coordinating  design  and 
construction.    It  needs  fairly  close  project  management  skills to 
make  sure  that  everything  is  coordinated  whereas  with  our 
standard house types, we know we can deliver them in X number of 
weeks.  Bespoke are a lot longer and more complicated – we don’t 
know if we will be doing any more of them’.  
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The processes involved  in the use of bespoke design solutions on brownfield sites are 
therefore challenging to UK speculative housebuilders.  Edzell North West, a sceptical 
volume PLC, suggests that this is because everything about bespoke design is different in 
relation to their conventional standardised approaches.  The builder makes clear that, as a 
volume producer, they have had difficulty in getting the use of bespoke developments right 
first time, ‘…in terms of its financial efficiency and viability’.        
 
Edzell North West, a sceptical volume PLC, make clear that because they are a volume 
producer and bespoke design solutions are completely different to their conventional ways 
of designing developments, they struggle to maintain the efficiencies that a standardised 
approach provides: 
    
‘Bespoke developments are challenging, as everything is different.  
We’re a volume producer and we’ve had the difficulty of getting it 
right first time and being as efficient’.    
 
The research also indicates that the encouragement of bespoke design on council owned 
land by local authorities has been limited.  For example, Caledonian Homes, a sceptical 
Scottish based private volume builder, argue that generally, local authorities are actually 
positive to the use of standard house types because they can give them a guaranteed cost of 
the design and build package:  
‘…we  can  cut  costs  in  the  whole  design  package  and  that  is 
attractive package in city councils and HA’s and LA’s’.     
 
However, from a differing perspective, Lothian Homes, a pragmatic Scottish based private 
volume  producer,  suggest  that  council-led  regeneration  schemes  can  actually  motivate 
housebuilders to exceed their current design standards because: 
 
 ‘…when a standard is set, all they are going to do is raise it the 
next time so you are as well designing it as best as you could with a 
view to how much it is going to cost us.  Usually about 10% above 
where we need to be unless there is a technical reason where the 
technology isn’t there to allow you to be able to do what is being 
asked’. 
 
This section has shown how UK speculative housebuilders have successfully transposed 
their  conventional  competencies  of  product  standardisation  onto  the  brownfield  modus  
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operandi.  The section has demonstrated how housebuilders have been able to alter their 
standard  designs  around  the  unique  demands  of  brownfield  sites  through  changing  the 
façade  of  the  unit  rather  than  developing  a  bespoke  unit.    With  the  exception  of 
regeneration  specialists,  where  bespoke  design  solutions  are  used,  they  have  proven 
complicated and tricky to an industry better placed to deliver standardised solutions.   
 
The section has also highlighted that the reasons why UK speculative housebuilders do not 
utilise bespoke design solutions on brownfield sites, in the same manner as standardised 
approaches, are mainly down to the complications that bespoke design presents to their 
conventional design skills.  The failure of UK speculative housebuilders to fully embrace 
bespoke design solutions on brownfield land is therefore reflective of an industry reliant on 
tried  and  tested  methods  of  residential  design  and  extending  and  transposing  their 
traditional competencies onto the brownfield scenario.    
 
10.4  Skills Access and Procurement in Brownfield Development 
The  research  indicates  that  speculative  housebuilders  in  both  the  English  and  Scottish 
contexts have developed a detailed external contacts base with which to use in developing 
brownfield land for new homes.  The research uncovered the most common skills that were 
externally  outsourced  by  the  majority  of  housebuilders  in  assisting  them  in  the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites were: 
 
•  Site investigations. 
•  Remediation of all forms of contamination. 
•  Bespoke layout design and development design. 
•  Planning consultants. 
•  Bespoke build functions. 
 
The use of external specialists affords UK speculative housebuilders with the opportunity 
to be flexible in their approach to brownfield development in that they can draw on a wide 
and varied skills base that they can select based on the unique demands of a brownfield 
site.  Brownfield sites themselves present unique challenges and require tailored solutions.  
For  example,  a  site  suffering  from  acute  asbestos  would  likely  be  remediated  by  an  
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asbestos specialist, whilst petrochemical contamination would likely  require a different 
remediation specialist.     
 
In  addition to the use of externally sourced specialists, the research indicated that UK 
speculative housebuilders employed specialists whose function it was to ‘manage’ these 
externally sourced specialists.  This function afforded housebuilders a level of control and 
involvement in the specialists’ activities and the knowledge to know what was expected 
from a brownfield development and more importantly, why.     
 
Bridgemere  North  West  for  example,  a  pragmatic  volume  PLC,  employ  an  in-house 
planning manager in every regional division, whose sole responsibility is to coordinate and 
brief  the  planning  consultants,  rather  than  create  and  submit  the  planning  applications 
themselves.  These ‘managers’ essentially function to oversee and manage those external 
consultants  rather  than  to  enact  those  skills  themselves.    Bridgemere  West  Scotland 
provides  a  Scottish  comparison  and  highlights  the  collaborative  nature  that  the  use  of 
specialists for brownfield development entails as well as the relationships that are formed 
over time through redevelopment.  The builder also mentions the positive attitude that 
these externally sourced specialists provide to housebuilders, in instilling confidence that 
the job can and will be done: 
 
‘These companies are happy to come in with us at the start and  
develop strategies for sites, even before we really get down to a lot 
of the details…a lot of these guys because they’ve worked with us 
in the past, are happy to come in and talk to us about what the best 
way is for all of us.  So, if you get the right people feeding into the 
process,  it  helps  the  process  and  the  job  and  you  get  a  better 
development really’.    
 
Vision Construction, a pioneering North West based regeneration specialist, makes clear 
that their use of external specialists acts to ensure that the pace of change in brownfield 
development is reflected in their skills set.  The builder highlights that it is hard for them to 
find good staff because; 
 
 ‘…brownfield development is quite a complicated fast changing 
subject’.   
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In further discussion, Vision Construction make clear that the use of external consultants 
means  that  they  can  also  keep  up  will  all  the  changing  legislation  relating  to  the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites for housing: 
 
‘…remediation is a subject that is forever changing and forever 
becoming better understood and better regulated and you really 
need a specialist to keep on top of it all’. 
 
Edzell North West, a sceptical volume PLC, who describe themselves as ‘…a team of 
managers’,  only  actually  directly  employ  a  site  manager  and  engineers  during  the 
construction process on a brownfield site.  The builder makes clear that if they have not got 
the skills that they require to approach brownfield development, they will ‘ bring them in’: 
 
‘ For example, we had radioactive tiles once, and we had never 
come across them before, so we went to a specialist contractor – it 
wasn’t a problem. The same with asbestos – they can cause big 
problems, but you bring in a specialist’. Evaluate, remove, dispose.  
So you just outsource that expertise’.  
 
The  use  of  external  consults  therefore  affords  UK  speculative  housebuilders  with  the 
opportunity to access specialists and provides an opportunity to learn and become more 
knowledgeable in the specifics of brownfield redevelopment.   
 
From a slightly different perspective, Lothian Homes, a pragmatic Scottish based private 
volume producer, discusses the issue of skills access as it relates to the use of external 
planning expertise.  The builder reflects on the changing nature of local government, the 
ways in which the private sector are brought in to do the planners jobs, and how this assists 
them with landowner negotiations:  
 
‘Local  Government  is  changing;  it’s  run  like  a  business.    The 
private sector is brought in to do it – the view I take is if you’re 
dealing with the planners, then you do the job for them – it’s your 
site’.   
 
Vision Construction, a pioneering North West based regeneration specialist, highlight the 
importance of experienced staff in facilitating the successful management of the external 
consultants and specialists:  
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‘Everyone  in  our  development  team  has  some  experience  in 
different parts of the construction industry before they come to us.  
So we have an inbuilt knowledge and skill within ourselves’.   
 
Although the above discussion has demonstrated the way in which external skills access 
facilitates the redevelopment of brownfield land for housing, the use of third parties can 
cause  difficulties,  as  is  the  nature  of  construction  and  build  management.    Vision 
Construction for example suggest that there may actually be more risk in the employment 
of specialists to deliver refurbishment schemes:  
 
‘…you  always  run  the  risk  of  a  refurb  project  that  gets  to  the 
contractor and something happens that’s unforeseen – they put a 
spade in the ground and then you find all sorts of buried oil tanks 
or you take a wall down and you find a whole lot of dry rot that 
hadn’t been accounted for.  Now when you’re using a third party 
contractor, that’s when the problems start really because they’ve 
given you a fixed price to build something out to your drawings in 
a fixed time and if something comes up which completely throws 
the whole process out, where do they go?  They’ve got to make 
their money, they’ve got to carry on and if they having to stop work 
for whatever reason or they’re having to take on extra work, then it 
brings very substantial claims for the client.  If we could build it 
ourselves, then that gives us a much better chance of managing 
that sort of thing in-house…A new build is much easier because 
you know more or less exactly what you going to have to build and 
what you going come across, so long as we’re happy they’re going 
to produce the sorts of quality that we want the development to be, 
then,  we’re  happy  to  go  out  to  third  party  contractors.  
Refurbishments we’re a bit more, well we need to think a bit more 
about which way we are going to go’.  
 
The above quote demonstrates the acute need for UK speculative housebuilders to ensure 
that  the  previous  development  stages  in  the  use  of  brownfield  land  for  residential 
development provide complete certainty and negate risk as much as possible in order to 
ensure that the use of external specialists does not provide further and unwanted risk.   
 
10.5  Chapter Conclusions 
The policy switch favouring brownfield development in England and  Scotland has not 
significantly caused a step change in the way UK housebuilders approach the design of 
speculative residential developments.  Rather, design, in a similar vein to marketing, is 
evolving and being continually motivated by a number of policy, market and financial  
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impacts.  Pragmatic and sceptical housebuilders are using the same design strategies that 
they  have  conventionally  built  their  fortunes  and  reputations  on  (Adams  and  Watkins 
2002).  This has been made possible because UK speculative housebuilders have been able 
to  adapt  and  transpose  their  conventional  competencies  onto  the  brownfield  modus 
operandi, whilst coping with the design demands of complex brownfield sites by utilising 
bespoke design solutions where they deem it appropriate.  This means that whilst UK 
speculative  housebuilders  have  proved  to  be  malleable  to  the  design  demands  of 
brownfield sites, standardised design solutions do remain the preserve of housebuilders’ 
approach to product and development design.          
   
The research therefore indicates that the UK speculative housebuilding industry, with the 
exception of the pioneers, has transposed its conventional design competencies of product 
standardisation  onto  the  brownfield  mode  of  production,  rather  than  changing  its 
conventional  design  competencies  to  suit  the  demands  of  brownfield  land.    For  those 
pioneers of brownfield development, their prime strategic function is to redevelop derelict 
or vacant land within the urban area using bespoke design solutions.   
 
As such, UK speculative housebuilders, with the exception of regeneration specialists, still 
rely on tried and tested conventional methods associated with standard product design in 
the configuration of their developments where they can.   
 
In addition to design, the use of external consultants affords UK speculative housebuilders 
with  the  opportunity  to  access  specialists  and  to  transfer  the  risk  of  redeveloping 
brownfield sites to these specialists for a guaranteed price.  The use of external specialists 
also provides housebuilders with the ability to learn and become more knowledgeable in 
the specifics of brownfield redevelopment.   
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CHAPTER 11 
 
THE  INSTITUTIONAL  CAPACITY  OF  THE  UK  SPECULATIVE  HOUSEBUILDING 
INDUSTRY 
 
11.1  Introduction 
Using the results of the research presented in Chapters 7 to 10, this Chapter assesses the 
institutional capacity of the UK speculative housebuilding industry in the delivery of the 
UK  Government’s  brownfield  development  agenda.    After  a  review  of  the  aim  and 
objectives  of  this  research,  the  first  part  of  the  Chapter  emphasises  that  the  current 
institutional  capacity  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders  in  respect  of  brownfield 
development  is  not  necessarily  institutionally  embedded,  but  rather  established  in  the 
internal core competencies of housebuilders.  As such, the second part of this Chapter 
confirms  that  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry  has  developed  the  necessary 
capacity  to  deliver  brownfield  development,  but  has  not  significantly  replaced  its 
traditional emphasis on greenfield land dealings, planning battles, marketing strategies and 
product  design  with  novel  approaches  better  placed  for  successful  brownfield 
development.  However, whilst housebuilders have generally responded positively to the 
brownfield  policy  agenda,  the  research  emphasises  that  a  variation  in  housebuilder 
adaptation is evident.    
 
The third part of the Chapter confirms that the leading established housebuilders in UK 
speculative housebuilding have not fallen victim to takeover by an emerging generation of 
more  innovative  housebuilding  companies.    This  is  reflected  in  an  emerging  market 
segmentation of brownfield development, where regeneration specialists have been able to 
co-exist with the leading established housebuilders under the brownfield modus operandi.             
As  a  result,  the  fourth  part  of  this  Chapter  confirms  that  the  present  policy  emphasis 
favouring  brownfield  development  has  not  placed  innovation  amongst  the  currently 
dominant  producers  as  a  necessary  means  of  corporate  survival  under  the  brownfield 
policy  context.    Rather,  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry  has  proved  to  be 
malleable  to  changes  in  public  policy  and  as  such,  has  successfully  transposed  its 
conventional  greenfield-based  business  strategies  onto  the  brownfield  modus  operandi.  
This has been facilitated by the development of fresh skills for brownfield development.   
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As such, the current structure of speculative housing provision has therefore shown to be 
applicable to the brownfield scenario.   
 
However, this research argues that the extent to which the current structure of speculative 
housing  provision  can  secure  a  long-term  commitment  to  brownfield  development  is 
limited.  It is likely that the recent policy drive to secure an increase in new housebuilding 
numbers (DCLG 2008, Callcutt 2007, Barker 2004), which has developed over the course 
of this research period, may severely test housebuilders’ capacity to maintain current levels 
of  brownfield  development  under  the  current  structure  of  speculative  housebuilding 
provision.      
 
The  Chapter  concludes  by  emphasising  that,  in  spite  of  the  positive  response  by  UK 
speculative  housebuilders  to  the  UK  Government’s  policy  switch  favouring brownfield 
development,  very  real  concerns  remain  over  whether  the  housebuilding  industry  has 
developed the institutional capacity necessary to ensure the long-term success of the policy 
emphasis  favouring  brownfield  development  under  the  current  structure  of  speculative 
housing provision.  As such, the final part of this Chapter critically assesses the match 
between public policy aspirations and private sector deliverability as a crucial issue for 
institutional capacity building and suggests that additional forms of institutional capacity 
may  therefore  be  necessary  to  secure  a  long-term  commitment  to  the  brownfield 
development agenda.                           
 
11.2  A Review of the Research Aim and Objectives. 
The main aim of the research was ‘to determine whether and how far the long-term success 
of the present policy emphasis on brownfield development will require the emergence of a 
new structure of provision in speculative housebuilding rather than a reliance merely on 
stimulating innovation among currently-dominant producers’.  This aim was supplemented 
by three research questions, which emerged from a detailed review of the literature: 
 
1.  How far does the UK speculative housebuilding industry have the ‘institutional 
capacity’ to replace its traditional emphasis on greenfield land dealings, planning 
battles,  marketing  strategies  and  product  design  with  novel  approaches  better 
placed for successful brownfield development?  
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2.  To what extent will the leading established housebuilders be able to survive and 
adapt to the new policy agenda, or will they, with some notable exceptions, fall 
victim  to  takeover  by  an  emerging  generation  of  more  innovative  companies 
capable of doing so? 
 
3.  To what extent will brownfield development emerge as a new form of strategic 
competitive advantage amongst currently dominant housebuilders? 
 
To fulfil the aim and research questions, three objectives were utilised in the research, and 
these are detailed below: 
 
1.  Outline the current structure and organisation of UK speculative housebuilding and 
consider the extent to which the policy switch favouring brownfield development 
will challenge the currently dominant producers. 
 
2.  Outline the conventional business strategies of UK speculative housebuilders and 
critically  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield 
development will require the development of new core competencies.  
  
3.  Outline the external institutional and internal firm barriers to successful brownfield 
development and consider the extent to which these can be overcome under the 
current structure of provision of UK speculative housebuilding.     
 
The remaining sections of this chapter will evaluate the aim and objectives of this research 
in  relation  to  the  empirical  findings  and  will  consider  the  extent  to  which  the  UK 
speculative housebuilding industry has developed the institutional capacity to deliver the 
success of the present policy emphasis favouring brownfield development.     
 
11.3  Embedded Institutional Capacity for Brownfield Development?  
This research has shown that the UK speculative housebuilding industry has developed 
sufficient capacity to deliver the majority of new homes on brownfield sites, through the 
adaptation of its existing core competencies and the development of fresh skills.  However,  
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because housebuilders have developed this capacity largely through a reassessment of their 
internal  firm  competencies  which  has  subsequently  reinforced  the  current  structure  of 
speculative housebuilding provision, their capacity is arguably not ‘…embedded in the 
dynamics of the wider social context within which action focused at the local level takes 
place’ (Cars et al 2002:4).  As such, the extent to which this research can confirm that the 
success of the housebuilding industry in delivering brownfield development to-date has 
been influenced by the specific institutional arrangements within which they operate, is 
limited.  This is illustrated by the limited distinction between housebuilders’ brownfield 
behaviours  in  the  differing  institutional  environments  of  Manchester,  England  and 
Glasgow, Scotland.  Indeed, the purpose of a comparative case study as a methodological 
approach was to facilitate the identification of locally specific institutional constraints that 
undermine housebuilders capacity for the delivery of brownfield policy goals.   
 
As such, if housebuilders’ capacity for delivering the majority of new homes in the UK is 
not ‘…embedded in the dynamics of the wider social context’ (Cars et al 2002:4), then this 
raises  very  real  concerns  over  the  long-term  success  of  the  present  policy  emphasis 
favouring  brownfield  development  under  the  current  structure  of  speculative  housing 
provision.  Needham and Louw (2006) suggest that the presence of ‘institutional paths’ 
may  explain  why  housebuilders  continue  to  follow  the  same  path,  based  on  tried  and 
trusted  strategies  and  results.    This  research  shows  how  the  conventional  practice  of 
greenfield  development  and  its  associated  skills  base  has  become  culturally  ingrained 
among housebuilders (Guy and Henneberry 2000).  These habits have subsequently been 
reinforced by housebuilders’ abilities to transpose their conventional approaches on the 
brownfield modus operandi, which has been facilitated through the development of fresh 
skills, as identified in Chapters 7 to 10.  As such, this research suggests that the extent to 
which housebuilder capacity for brownfield development is embedded in the institutional 
landscape is limited.   
 
Therefore,  a  limit  to  this  research  is  the  lack  of  discussion  over  the  nature  of  path 
dependency  in  UK  speculative  housebuilding  and  its  link  with  institutional  analysis.  
Further  research  assessing  the  institutional  capacity  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders 
should acknowledge the notion of path dependency more explicitly (see North 1991 for 
further detail on path dependency in institutional economics).  Nonetheless, this research 
confirms that inter-institutional objectives and a strong institutional presence providing a  
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commitment towards partnership, governance and a service of common enterprise, will be 
required to “…encourage institutional paths to dissipate and old habits to die” (McLeod 
1997:302).   
 
11.4  A New Structure of Provision in UK Speculative Housebuilding? 
Chapter  5  presented  the  current  structure  of  speculative  housing  provision,  which  was 
based on a detailed review of the literature and using Ball’s (1983, 1998, 1999) structure of 
provision  model.    A  recap  of  the  current  structure  of  speculative  housing  provision is 
detailed below.  
 
Figure 11.1: The Current Structure of Speculative Housing Provision, UK 
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The results of this research indicate that the changes which have occurred in the structure 
of  speculative  housing  provision  as  a  result  of  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield 
development,  have  largely  been  confined  to  the  internal  firm  competencies  of  UK 
speculative housebuilders rather than the external institutional context within which their 
competencies are embedded.  This is because housebuilders have proved to be malleable to 
changing  public  policy  and  have  generally  been  able  to  transpose  their  existing  core 
competencies  and  business  strategies  onto  the  brownfield  mode  of  production.    This 
transposition has been facilitated by the development of fresh skills suitable for brownfield 
development.     
 
Clearly, the extent to which individual housebuilders have adapted to the policy switch 
varies, as is the subject of further discussion below.  However, generally, housebuilders 
have been able to continue to deliver the majority of new homes in the UK speculatively 
and within the existing structure of provision and through their conventional ways and 
means and with adequate capacity from their wider institutional environment.  As such, it 
is  very  much  business  as  usual  for  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry.    This 
research therefore highlights the inherent flexibility in both the corporate strategies and 
structure and organisation of the UK speculative housebuilding in responding to external 
policy change.               
 
However, it is important to acknowledge the impact that significant shifts in other external 
contexts may have on the current structure of speculative housing provision.  These may in 
turn  necessitate  change  in  housebuilders  current  approach  to  housing  provision  on 
brownfield land.  At the time of writing, the ‘credit crunch’ has significantly influenced 
housing completions in the first half of 2008 and this volatility in the financial markets is 
likely to have an impact on the way in which housebuilders deliver brownfield land in the 
future.    This  emphasises  the  inherent  fragility  of  the  existing  structure  of  speculative 
housebuilding provision in its external market contexts.  Indeed, whilst the policy switch 
favouring brownfield development has not caused significant movement in the existing 
structure of speculative housing provision, public policy is but one aspect of the external 
environment in which UK speculative housebuilders operate.   
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11.4.1 A critical assessment of the SOP model in UK housebuilding research. 
The SOP model used in this research provided the opportunity to demonstrate the broader 
context  of  UK  speculative  housing  provision  and  facilitated  an  understanding  of  the 
different  external  influences  on  the  internal  firm  competencies  of  housebuilders  in  the 
speculative provision of new homes in the UK.   
 
Because this research concentrated on the impact of the brownfield policy agenda on UK 
speculative housebuilders, its focus in respect of the SOP model was on one sub-set of the 
external contexts in respect of speculative housing provision - public policy - as shown in 
Figure 11.1.  The use of the SOP model in this research therefore presented the opportunity 
to facilitate an understanding of the impact and effect of changing policy priorities on 
speculative housing provision and the aim of this research was to assess whether the policy 
switch favouring brownfield development would require the emergence of a new structure 
of provision in UK speculative housebuilding.        
 
However, the results of the research have confirmed that the changes which have occurred 
in the structure of speculative housing provision, as a result of the policy switch favouring 
brownfield development, have largely been confined to the internal firm competencies of 
UK speculative housebuilders and not to the external institutional context within which 
their competencies are embedded.  As such, the use of the SOP in this research has been 
limited and a new structure of speculative housing provision has not emerged.  However, 
this is not necessarily surprising, for two main reasons.   
 
First, one of the core limitations of using the SOP model in assessing the structure of 
speculative  housing  provision  is  its  broad  focus  on  all  aspects  of  speculative  housing 
provision and the underlying premise that all external contexts influence the internal firm 
competencies  of  housebuilders  which  themselves  in  turn  influence  all  the  external 
contexts.    What  emerges  then  is  an  assumption  that  the  use  of  the  SOP  as  part  of  a 
methodological or conceptual approach in any research must require the researcher to look 
at  each  and  every  one  of  these  external  contexts  to  assess  housebuilder  response.  
Therefore, any research project that focuses on only one of the external contexts in Ball’s 
(1983, 1998, 1999) SOP model is likely to run into difficulties and will not yield the results 
that are necessary to assess whether a change in the SOP has occurred.    
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Second, if the premise of the model is to account for all external contexts, then research 
which just assesses the interaction between one particular external context and the core 
competencies of housebuilders could be argued to be insufficient in that the model has not 
been applied properly in the empirical stages.  Therefore, a new SOP will not emerge.  
However,  from  a  practical  point  of  view,  this  endeavour  is  likely  to be  very  resource 
intensive and perhaps an unachievable task.  Indeed, this research has assessed in detail the 
interaction between changes in public policy and the competencies of housebuilders - one 
aspect of the SOP model - and it has taken 3 years to do so. 
.    
The  application  of  Ball’s  (1983,  1998,  1999)  structure  of  provision  model  in  British 
property  research  has  been  limited  since  its  first  publication  and  this  research perhaps 
presents valid  reasons  why.  The results of this research therefore perhaps present the 
opportunity to move away from the use of Ball’s (1983, 1998, 1999) SOP model as a 
means of conceptualising and for modelling the provision of new homes in the UK and to 
encourage the development of a new model for assessing the impact of external change on 
UK speculative housing provision.  Those interested in such an endeavour may find the 
emerging state market relations literature of interest.       
 
The  next  section  discusses  how  the  policy  switch  restricting  the  balance  of residential 
development primarily to brownfield sites has not resulted in the emergence of innovative 
companies challenging the currently dominant producers.    
 
11.5  Brownfield  Development  -  a  challenge  to  the  currently  dominant 
producers? 
This research has shown that the leading established housebuilders have maintained their 
dominance in UK speculative housebuilding since the inception of the UK Government’s 
brownfield  agenda.    More  so,  the  emergence  of  super  builders  in  UK  speculative 
housebuilding since the onset of the policy switch favouring brownfield development (see 
Chapter 1) further confirms this dominance.  As such, the concentration of UK speculative 
housebuilding has persisted since the policy switch favouring brownfield development and 
despite the restrictions placed on greenfield development for new housing.  Indeed, the  
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onset of the brownfield development agenda predates the most recent spate of merger and 
acquisition activity in UK speculative housebuilding by six years (refer to Chapter 1).   
 
The  research  suggests  that  the  reasons  why  volume  producers  and  latterly  the  super 
builders, have been able to maintain their dominance in the UK speculative housebuilding 
industry  in  spite  of  the  present  policy  emphasis  favouring  brownfield  development,  is 
because of the acute variation in housebuilder response to the brownfield policy agenda.  
This has subsequently resulted in an emerging market segmentation of brownfield land. 
These  two  key  features  of  UK  speculative  housebuilding  under  the  brownfield  modus 
operandi will now be discussed in more detail.  
 
11.5.1 The variation of housebuilder response to the brownfield agenda 
The extent to which the UK speculative housebuilding industry has responded to the UK 
Government’s brownfield development agenda has been markedly variable.  Importantly 
though, this variance is not reflective of the differing institutional contexts within which 
housebuilders operate, but rather reflects the strategic business functions and competitive 
priorities of UK speculative housebuilders.  Specifically, there is a distinction between 
those housebuilders who seek competitive advantage exclusively from the redevelopment 
of  brownfield  land,  and  those  housebuilders  who  approach  brownfield  development 
opportunities in much the same way as any other land development opportunity.     
 
For the latter, the decision to participate in brownfield development is based not on the site 
being  brownfield  per  se,  but  rather  on  the  opportunities  that  a  particular  site  presents 
within the context of the wider business operations of the company at given time.  This 
business approach to brownfield development is typical of the pragmatic housebuilders, 
who have developed fresh skills to facilitate the transposition of their existing business 
strategies  on  to  the  brownfield  modus  operandi,  rather  than  development  entirely  new 
competencies.    This  strategy  is  also  a  feature  of  the  sceptical  housebuilders,  but  the 
sceptics will generally avoid developing brownfield sites unless the site presents a lucrative 
investment  where  risk  can  be  suitably  managed.    This  variation  in  response  supports 
Karadimitriou’s (2005) anecdotal evidence, suggesting ‘…some traditional housebuilders 
have remained awestruck and fatalistic while some others treat the new requirements as an  
 
 
 
252
opportunity  to  do  business  in  a  new  market  without  substantially  reconfiguring  their 
business model’ (p.283).      
 
It also supports Shephard and Dixon’s (2004) suggestions that a significant proportion of 
developers view brownfield development as ‘…an opportunity for profitable development 
in what has been a relatively buoyant property market’ (p.3).  Shephard and Dixon (2004) 
consider there to be at present a clear intention amongst developers to continue to increase 
the amount of brownfield development they are undertaking.  This was supported by the 
composition of their land banks ‘…in which brownfield accounted for, on average, 70% of 
total plots’ (p.3).          
 
For the pioneers, such as Urban Splash and The Berkeley Group, the way in which they 
actively  compete  with  their  peers  is  exclusively  through  the  redevelopment  and 
regeneration of brownfield land.  Whilst they also have profits and targets to meet like their 
peers, their main business operations centre on delivering bespoke, innovative and cutting-
edge products typically in non-traditional residential locations.  However, it is interesting 
to  make  clear  that  both  Urban  Splash  and  The  Berkeley  Group  are  privately  owned 
companies, so they do not have the pressures of the stock market upon them in the same 
way that their volume PLC peers do.  Again, this raises interesting implications for the 
structure  of  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry  and  the  way  in  which  it  is 
organised.  Indeed, the fragility of the PLC’s in respect of their vulnerability to external 
market change and in particular, access to finance, may well threaten the achievement of 
brownfield development targets in the future. 
 
Although  the  research  has  shown  that  the  majority  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders 
demonstrate a positive attitude towards brownfield development, on further reflection, the 
extent  of  this  positive  commitment  is  perhaps  tenuous  in  its  nature.    Indeed,  the 
commitment  to  brownfield  development  by  those  builders  other  than  the  pioneers  is 
dependent on the way in which brownfield land suits their business functions and fits in 
with their strategic priorities at the time, rather than on a general willingness to develop 
brownfield land per se.  Whilst the majority of housebuilders have proven malleable to 
changing public policy, they have not actively sought to change their business strategies to 
suit  the  demands  of  the  policy  switch.    The  research  therefore  indicates  that  there  is 
something ingrained in the cultures of housebuilders in their perceptions and evaluations of  
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urban and regional risk (Guy and Henneberry 2000) that is encouraging them to maintain 
their conventional business strategies under the brownfield modus operandi, rather than 
developing entirely new forms of behaviour in response to policy shifts.  This results in 
brownfield development not being a strategic priority for the majority of UK speculative 
housebuilders  in  the  sense  that  the  core  competence  literature  suggests,  but  rather  an 
additional  form  of  business  activity.    Again,  this  confirms  Karadimitriou’s  (2005) 
comments on speculative housebuilders viewing new requirements ‘…as an opportunity to 
do  business  in  a  new  market  without  substantially  reconfiguring  their  business model’ 
(p.283).  As such, and in reference to the third research question of this thesis (see pg. 
263), this research confirms that the currently dominant producers have not necessarily 
placed brownfield development per se as a new form of strategic competitive advantage in 
UK speculative housebuilding.               
 
11.5.2 Market segmentation in brownfield land 
Because  UK  speculative  housebuilders’  approach  brownfield  development  is  based  on 
differing motives that are influenced by their pioneering, pragmatic or sceptical ways, the 
brownfield land opportunities that housebuilders’ chase are resultantly different in nature.  
The research indicates that those housebuilders who approach brownfield development in a 
sceptical or pragmatic way tend to seek out ‘easy’ brownfield sites, whilst the trickier and 
hardcore brownfield sites are usually only tackled by the pioneers.  Additionally, it is not 
common  to  find  pioneers  encroaching  onto  the  patches  of  pragmatists  and  sceptics.  
Indeed,  most  regeneration  specialists,  owing  to  their  smaller  size  and  comparatively 
limited funding stream, are simply not able to compete with their volume counterparts 
financially.   
 
This  has  resulted  in  the  emergence  of  a  two-tier  brownfield  land  market.    Tier  1  is 
characterised by brownfield land commonly pursued by pragmatists and to some extent the 
sceptics.  The focus of these builders is on the acquisition of sites in prime residential 
market locations, which are not complicated and are simply an act of redevelopment.  Tier 
2 is characterised by brownfield land commonly pursued by the pioneers, whose focus is 
on  the  acquisition  of  brownfield  sites  in  non-existing  residential  market  locations  and 
which often have a pressing need for wider regeneration.  The distinction between the two 
tiers  of  brownfield  land  markets  is  therefore  a  distinction  between  redevelopment  and  
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regeneration  as  a  core  business  strategy.    The  two  tiers  of  brownfield  land  markets 
therefore act to further distinguish between the commercially attractive sites and those sites 
that are marginally viable or non-viable
65.        
 
11.6  Innovation as a Requirement of Brownfield Development Success? 
The first half of this thesis identified the important role that innovation might play in the 
successful redevelopment of brownfield land for housing.  It provided an overview of the 
challenges  that  better  design  and  innovative  production  processes  presented  to  the 
conventional business strategies of UK speculative housebuilders.  Whilst some authors 
had  suggested  that  innovation  would  be  an  important  feature  of  the  successful 
redevelopment  of  brownfield  land  for  housing  (See  Adams  2004;  Tiesdell  and  Adams 
2004;  Adams  and  Watkins  2002),  this  research  makes  clear  that  innovation  is  not  a 
prerequisite for brownfield development success.   
 
A key question in this research was to examine to what extent the currently dominant 
producers would fall victim to take over by an emerging generation of more innovative 
companies better placed to deliver new homes primarily on brownfield land.  Whilst the 
previous section has shown that the leading established housebuilders have maintained 
their  dominance  in  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding,  this  section  emphasises  that 
innovation has not been a requirement for successful brownfield development.  As such, 
this explains why an emerging generation of regeneration specialists have not challenged 
the currently dominant producers.       
 
The  main  body  of  this  research  demonstrated  how  the  pioneers  successfully  utilise 
innovative design and construction techniques in a brownfield scenario, illustrating that 
innovation does facilitate the redevelopment of brownfield land for housing.  However, 
standardised solutions do suffice on brownfield sites and the majority of UK speculative 
housebuilders  have  not  utilised  design  as  a  means  of  overcoming  the  obstacles  of 
brownfield  sites,  as  Tiesdell  and  Adams  (2004)  had  suggested.    This  is  because  UK 
speculative  housebuilders  have  developed  fresh  skills  to  enable  their  conventional 
competencies to be transposed onto the brownfield mode of production.                       
                                                       
 
65 English Partnerships ‘Towards a National Brownfield Strategy’ (2003:12).   
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Importantly,  the  research  also  confirms  that  the  concurrent  public  policy  initiatives 
encouraging better design, sustainable building techniques and promoting modern methods 
of  construction  (see  Tiesdell  and  Adams  2004,  Adams  2004)  have  not  resulted  in 
innovative approaches being used on brownfield sites.  Tiesdell and Adams (2004) suggest 
that  brownfield  developments  represented  a  more  challenging  design  task  and  as  such 
require a greater need to utilise design as a means to achieve viable development.  The 
authors  argue  that  housebuilders  need  to  yield  opportunity  space  to  designers,  as 
investment  in  better  design  is  “…a  development  necessity  rather  than  a  development 
choice”  (p.25).    This  research  has  shown  that  housebuilders  have  been  able to deliver 
design  solutions  on  brownfield  sites  without  investing  in  better  design  through  the 
sustained utilisation of standard unit types.  However, the extent to which housebuilders’ 
design solutions on brownfield sites match the policy goals of new urbanism (Ellis 2002) is 
questionable.    Indeed,  the  sustained  use  of  standard  unit  types  by  UK  speculative 
housebuilders on brownfield land means that in most cases, developments look like they 
have been, for want of a better phase ‘beamed down’ from outer space, rather than being 
suitably integrated into the existing urban fabric, such is the aim of CABEs design agenda.                  
 
As such very real concern remains in respect of the impact of a tightening design agenda 
(Adams  2004)  and  the  onset  of  the  zero  carbon  homes  requirement  by  2015
66  on  the 
currently achieved rates of brownfield development.  As UK speculative housebuilders 
have shown that they can deliver new homes on brownfield land using their conventional 
design  techniques  of  standardisation,  the  impact  of  a  more  demanding  design  agenda 
requiring  more  innovative  measures  will  significantly  affect  existing  build  rates  on 
brownfield land because it fundamentally challenges construction efficiency as a means of 
competitive advantage.          
 
Because  brownfield  development  does  not  require  nor  demand  innovative  design  as  a 
development solution, encouraging housebuilders to deliver non-standardised products on 
brownfield sites does therefore remain a policy challenge.  Of course, there are examples 
of where housebuilders have utilised modern methods of construction and bespoke design 
                                                       
 
66 See ‘Building a Greener Future: policy statement’.  
www.communities.gov.uk/publications/planningandbuilding/building-a-greener.      
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solutions on brownfield sites, but this research emphasises that these approaches are not 
significant  sources  of  competitive  advantage  for  the  majority  of  UK  speculative 
housebuilders under the current structure of provision.   
 
This research has demonstrated that, for the majority of housebuilders, novel approaches 
sit  alongside  conventional  skills  in  brownfield  development  in  UK  speculative 
housebuilding.  Therefore the dynamic between existing and new core competencies in 
respect  of  bespoke  and  standard  build  techniques  demonstrates  the  flexibility  of 
housebuilders’  corporate  strategies.    As  such,  the  flexibility  of  UK  speculative 
housebuilders corporate strategies is an interesting area of further research.   
 
11.7  The  Narrowing  Gap  between  Perception  and  Reality  of  Risk  in 
Brownfield Development 
Until  fairly  recently,  brownfield  development  was  viewed  as  a  risky  business  for 
speculative housebuilders, the perception of which was based upon misguided opinions 
and attitudes towards the risks involved, itself a symptom of a lack of knowledge and 
skills.   
 
However, this research confirms that the gap between the perception and reality of risks 
associated with brownfield development has narrowed.  Brownfield land is now commonly 
viewed as an ‘opportunity with rectifiable constraints’ by the pragmatists and the pioneers, 
rather than simply a constraint per se.  This is because housebuilders have been able to 
transpose their conventional core competencies onto the brownfield mode of production 
through the development of fresh skills.  This has enabled UK speculative housebuilders to 
negate the majority of the risks of brownfield development through readily identifying 
them and put in place measures to manage their impacts, the use of conditional contracts 
and intrusive site investigations being examples (see Chapters 8 and 9).      
  
Adams  and  Watkins  (2002)  had  previously  suggested  that  the  task  of  development 
appraisal was uncertain.  Significantly, this research indicates the contrary, emphasising 
that it is now more certain, as housebuilders have learned to assign costs to each abnormal 
and work that cost into the land appraisal system to establish a land value (see Chapters 8 
and 9).  Further, it is clear from the research that certainty is a crucial and inevitable aspect  
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of a robust and accurate appraisal of a potential brownfield site.  Because housebuilders 
have developed skills in placing a cost next to each abnormal issue, through the access of 
knowledge from skilled external experts, risk is mitigated and reduced and to an extent, 
certainty is improved in the brownfield scenario (See Chapter 9).   
 
For  UK  speculative  housebuilders,  brownfield  development  is  a  task  in  discovering, 
assigning and managing the costs of converting risks into workable solutions.  Therefore, 
understanding  the  speculative  development  of  brownfield  land  for  housing  is  about 
understanding how housebuilders manage risk.     
 
11.8  Policy  Aspirations  vs.  Deliverability  –  institutional  requirements  for 
long-term brownfield development success 
This  research  has  shown  that  housebuilders  are  demonstrating  a  current  willingness to 
deliver  the  majority  of  new  homes  on  brownfield  sites  and  there  is  evidence  of  an 
accumulation of skills and experience for doing so.  However, as the research has shown, 
this  willingness  is  largely  based  on  UK  speculative  housebuilders  transposing  their 
conventional  business  strategies  onto  the  brownfield  modus  operandi,  rather  than 
developing entirely new competencies for brownfield development (refer to Chapter 4).  
This has been facilitated by the development of fresh skills for brownfield development, 
which  ensures  the  effective  transposition  of  conventional  competencies  onto  the 
brownfield scenario.  As such, this raises three crucial issue that require further policy and 
research attention: 
 
1.  To  what  extent  is  the  existing  structure  of  UK  speculative  housing  provision 
inherently  fragile  under  the  brownfield  mode  of  operation,  as  a  result  of  UK 
speculative  housebuilders  retaining  their  conventional  business  strategies  and 
competencies and in anticipation of other changes in the external environment? 
2.  To  what  extent  will  increased  housing  numbers  place  a  strain  upon  the current 
structure of UK speculative housing provision as a result of this fragility? 
3.  To  what  extent  will  increasing  levels  of  brownfield  development  require  the 
emergence of a new structure of provision in UK speculative housebuilding where 
brownfield specific competencies (see Chapter 4) are developed and new business 
strategies formed?    
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In  light  of  these  concerns,  very  real  challenges  therefore  remain  for  UK  speculative 
housebuilders in both maintaining their current brownfield output and increasing their rates 
of new housebuilding to those favoured by the Government (DCLG 2008).  The capacity 
of the UK speculative housebuilding to concurrently step up housing production whilst 
maintaining and the current levels of output to the required policy levels in the UK remains 
a crucial research and policy issue.     
 
Indeed,  as  Dobson  et  al  (2004)  make  clear,  organisation  that  focus  purely  on refining 
existing competencies may become “strategically vulnerable” as they become too specific 
to a particular context and if change occurs, an organisation can find it hard to respond 
(p.179).    Whilst  this  research  has  shown  that  the  policy  switch  favouring  brownfield 
development  has  not  meant  that  housebuilders  have  become  strategically  vulnerable, 
Dobson  et  al  (2004)  emphasise  that  over  time,  core  competencies  can  become 
dysfunctional  to  performance.    This  means  that  whilst  housebuilders  are  currently 
demonstrating  a  positive  response  to  the  UK  Government’s  brownfield  development 
agenda, the retention of conventional competencies may well challenge this.       
 
As such, to ensure the required rates of brownfield development in new housing provision, 
a key test remains for public policy.  As the increase in the speculative provision of new 
homes on brownfield development that has occurred since 2000 has largely been policy 
driven, and because this research has shown that the majority of housebuilders approach 
brownfield development in a pragmatic or sceptical way, the driving force of public policy 
in ensuring this level of success in brownfield development in the future is absolutely 
critical.   
 
In addition, there are a number of institutional issues that UK speculative housebuilders 
will face in delivering the UK Government’s brownfield policy aspirations in the long-
term, which will require further consideration by the UK Government:    
 
•  Land  availability:  ensuring  an  adequate  flow  of  suitable  development  sites, 
particularly brownfield sites.   
•  Planning  issues:  delays  or  refusals  can  affect  obtaining  commercially  viable 
planning permissions on optioned or contracted land and restrict housing delivery.    
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•  Matching the price and volume of sales: ensuring the correct supply to demand in 
terms  of  product,  location  and  price,  remains  a  key  success  factor  in  UK 
speculative housebuilding under the brownfield scenario.  Incorrect assessments in 
market value or demand can result in missed sales targets and/or inefficient levels 
of completed stock. 
•  Construction: build costs are affected by the availability of skilled labour and the 
price and availability of materials.  
•  People: the ability to attract and retain highly skilled people and key management 
personnel is crucial to the strategic success of UK speculative housebuilders.      
•  Government  policy:  changes  to  government  policy  on  housing  and  wider urban 
issues at both national and local level. 
•  The macro economic climate: Interest rates, employment levels, the housing market 
and the stock market.   
 
Ultimately, because brownfield development is reflective of a policy push rather than the 
strategic choices of housebuilders, it is vital that a transparent policy dialogue between the 
Government  and  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry  is  established  and  fully 
supported if brownfield development is to be an achievable public policy goal in the long-
term.  It is at this interface where the long-term success of residential development on 
brownfield sites will be realised.  Further, the implementation of action at the local level is 
key to the long-term success of brownfield development.  Throughout this research, the 
differing spatial configuration of brownfield development has been emphasised and the 
differential spread of brownfield land requires a bottom up approach.   
 
The chronic and fundamental battle between the vision of public policy and the demands of 
the market will shape the approach taken by housebuilders towards brownfield land.  As 
such, an institutional understanding of this issues surrounding brownfield development for 
new housing is critical in assessing the long-term success of the policy switch favouring 
brownfield  development.    The  successful  and  sustained  achievement  of  building  the 
majority of new homes on brownfield land lies at the interface between market choice, 
public policy and the strategic choices of housebuilders.  Institutional capacity therefore 
remains crucial to the future success of the brownfield policy agenda.   
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11.9 Limitations of the research 
Perhaps one of the main limitations of this research has been the issue of commercial 
sensitivity  in  speculative  housebuilding,  which  has  prevented  the  disclosure  of  builder 
specific information that may have otherwise been useful, such as examples of current 
build projects or upcoming build projects.  This issue is reflected in the limited amount of 
empirical research on UK speculative housebuilding that predated this research.  Indeed, 
there are only a handful of empirical research  projects that make reference to detailed 
interviews with housebuilders.  This commercial sensitivity is largely explained by the 
intense and inherent competition that takes place within speculative housebuilding that has 
seen the emergence of  super builders and volume builders hoping to capture a greater 
market share.  
 
Some  may  argue  that  these  prevailing  issues  of  commercial  sensitivity  prevent  the 
researcher  from  being  able  to  penetrate  the  housebuilder  in  a  way  that  yields  useful, 
detailed  and  robust  data.    However,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  these  issues  of 
commercial sensitivity that have been faced in this research do exist and will remain and 
whilst there are no immediate solutions to this issue, it is necessary to work around them in 
a way that still yields useful research in the time constraints presented by the research 
project.  Otherwise, research into housebuilding runs the risk of becoming an increasingly 
rare endeavour, as it has previously been, at a time when public policy and urban policy in 
particular is very much focused on increasing the rates of new housebuilding.            
 
11.10 Further areas of research  
In  light  of  the  varying  response  of  UK  speculative  housebuilders  to  the  policy switch 
favouring  brownfield  development,  a  number  of  important  research  questions  remain, 
which themselves have policy implications.  These research questions reflect issues that 
this research has identified to be unresolved and requiring further policy and academic 
attention.  These research questions are:      
 
1.  Is there a willingness from the pragmatists to increase their occasional business 
interest in brownfield development over the long term, in order to maintain the  
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momentum of the public policy switch favouring brownfield development in light 
of the need for new homes?
67   
2.  How  can  the  pragmatists  and  the  sceptics  in  particular,  be  encouraged  into  a 
predominantly  brownfield  modus  operandi  particularly  if  their  brownfield 
momentum is largely policy-led? 
3.  To what extent should all housebuilders be engaging positively with the policy 
switch favouring brownfield development?    
4.  How can brownfield build rates be sustained with the use of innovative design 
techniques that also match consumer demand and market values?      
 
Whilst  the  previous  section  has  confirmed  the  limited  impact  of  the  emergence  of 
regeneration  specialists  on  the  currently  dominant  producers,  it  will  be  interesting  to 
monitor the effect of the brownfield development agenda on the structure and organisation 
of  the  UK  speculative  industry,  particularly  its  sustained  and  fervent  concentration  in 
concurrence with the continuing policy preference for brownfield development.  Two key 
questions emerge when one considers this: 
 
1.  What  are  the  key  motivations  for  sustained  concentration  in  UK  speculative 
housebuilding in respect to the recent spate of mergers and acquisitions between 
top 10 housebuilders? 
2.  What  role  has  increasing  restrictions  on  greenfield  land  availability  played  on 
merger and acquisition activity in UK speculative housebuilding? 
 
The  link  between  brownfield  policy  and  housebuilder  merger  and  acquisition  activity 
remains an area of interest.  Indeed, because this research has shown that seeking out and 
acquiring land is still the main core competence and source of competitive advantage in 
UK speculative housebuilding, the issue is perhaps increasingly pertinent. 
 
                                                       
 
67 It is important to note that the boundaries between the typologies of brownfield development are not 
impermeable;  in  the  future,  as  housebuilders  evolve  in  their  experiences  of  the  speculative  residential 
development process on brownfield land, and subsequently build upon their core competencies, they may 
well make the transition from pragmatists to pioneers, or from sceptics to pragmatists.        
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11.11 Thesis Conclusions 
It  was  Ball  (1999)  who  originally  suggested  that  developers  had  a  positive attitude to 
brownfield land reuse when conditions allow, suggesting that they were open to influence 
on questions of good practice and sustainability.  He further suggested that public policy 
designed  to  turn  the  development  industry  towards  brownfield  opportunities  and  the 
sustainable  reuse  of  existing  infrastructure  is  likely  to  induce  a  favourable  response.  
Whilst  this  research  has  uncovered  that  UK  speculative  housebuilders  have  indeed 
demonstrated the positive response to the brownfield development agenda predicted by 
Ball (1999) this response is likely to be increasingly challenged, under the current structure 
of provision, as the Government seeks to step up the pace of new housing delivery with 
speculative  housebuilders  at  the  driving  seat  (DCLG  2008).    As  such,  the  positive 
responses of UK speculative housebuilders to the brownfield policy agenda that have been 
documented  in  the  literature  to-date  (Ball  1999,  Dixon  2006)  should  be  treated  with 
caution.      
 
Ultimately, this research has demonstrated that the extent to which the UK speculative 
housebuilding  industry  has  adapted  to  the  UK  Governments  brownfield  development 
agenda has been variable.  Whilst the pioneers command an enthusiasm for brownfield 
development and regeneration, the pragmatists and sceptics take a more reserved attitude, 
approaching brownfield opportunities with caution and greater discernment.  Rather, the 
variation  in  response  reflects  the  strategic  business  functions  and  priorities  of  UK 
speculative housebuilders.  Specifically, there is a distinction between those housebuilders 
who  seek  their  primary  form  of  competitive  advantage  specifically  through  the 
redevelopment of brownfield land, and those who approach a brownfield opportunity in 
much the same way as any other land development opportunity                
 
As a result of this varying level of adaptation, this research argues that there is an emerging 
segmentation  in  the  brownfield  land  market.    For  those  housebuilders  who  approach 
brownfield development in a sceptical or pragmatic way, there is a preference to seek out 
less complex and less risky sites.  The trickier brownfield sites tend to be the preserve of 
the pioneers, whose core competencies and business strategies are more aligned to the 
requirements of these demanding sites.  
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Whilst this research has uncovered a variation in UK speculative housebuilders’ approach 
to brownfield development, there has concurrently emerged a narrowing gap between the 
perception and reality of risk in brownfield development since the inception of the UK 
Government’s  brownfield  agenda,  which  is  positive  to  note.    Whilst  historically, 
brownfield  land  was  perceived  as  ‘difficult’  and  approached  with  caution,  it  is  now 
commonly viewed as an opportunity with rectifiable constraints to the majority of UK 
speculative housebuilders, rather than constraint per se.  This is because housebuilders 
have  learned  to  manage  and  mediate  against  the  risks  involved  in  the  speculative 
development of brownfield land, by developing a deeper understanding of the nature of 
those  risks  through  experience,  learning  and  building  up  relationships  with  brownfield 
specialists.  For  those  sceptics  however,  brownfield  development  still  remains  the  least 
preferred option, and the gap between perception and reality of risk has changed little.        
 
Additionally, the research makes clear that innovation is not a requirement for brownfield 
development.  As such, the emergence of regeneration specialists and ‘innovative’ players 
in UK speculative housebuilding has not significantly altered the structure and organisation 
of  the  industry,  through  challenging  the  currently  dominant  producers.    Indeed,  the 
emerging market segmentation in brownfield land reflects the way in which the pioneers, 
pragmatists and sceptics have managed to seek out their own business niches and as such, 
the more innovative companies have not challenged the currently dominant producers.  As 
such, the suitability of standard house types in the brownfield modus operandi has meant 
that for the majority of UK speculative housebuilders, it is business as usual.  And, market 
segmentation  has  meant  that  the  UK  speculative  housebuilding  industry  is  in  effect 
reinforcing this.  However, very real concerns remain over the delivery of public policy 
initiative  designed  to  deliver  ‘new  urbanism’  in  a  way  that  is  more  reflective  of  the 
attitudes and corporate strategies of the pioneers.           
 
This research therefore argues that UK speculative housebuilders have emerged under the 
brownfield modus operandi with an acute need for institutional support in the long-term 
delivery of new homes on brownfield land.  Indeed, the UK Government has an important 
role to play in ensuring an adequate stock and flow of brownfield land is achieved to 
facilitate the delivery of new housebuilding on brownfield sites (see Chapter 3).      
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Adams and Watkins (2002) suggest that brownfield development is policy-led rather than 
market-led, and the results of this research confirms this.  Therefore, the longevity of UK 
speculative housebuilders’ commitment to the brownfield development policy agenda, with 
respect to the extent of their adaptation to it, is a crucial area requiring further research and 
policy attention.  Indeed, as Chapter 3 emphasised, if there were to be a gradual release of 
greenfield sites to combat problems of affordability, this will likely undermine the policy 
drive towards focusing new housebuilding on brownfield sites, because UK speculative 
housebuilders have retained their conventional greenfield based strategies.      
 
The research also acts to emphasise that the relationship between public policy and the 
private housebuilding sector remains an important arena for sustained research and debate 
in both academic and policy circles.  Indeed, if both brownfield development rates and the 
UK Government’s housebuilding programme are going to be achievable in the long-term 
and not just the political short term, then a better understanding of the relationship between 
public  policy  change  and  private  sector  behaviour  is  crucial.    This  research  therefore 
embodies a case study in state-market relations.       
 
As such, the institutional capacity of the UK speculative housebuilding industry, although 
well explored in this thesis, remains a crucial academic and public policy issue.      
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 Appendix 1: UK Housing Completions by Tenure, 1946-2007  
 
 Year    
   Private 
Enterprise 
Registered Social 
Landlords 
Local Authorities  All Dwellings 
1946    
                    28,760                         100                    20,400                     49,250  
1947    
                    38,630                         860                    81,370                   120,860  
1948    
                    30,370                      1,820                  161,400                   193,590  
1949    
                    23,800                      1,330                  136,980                   162,110  
1950    
                    25,310                      1,500                  136,530                   163,340  
1951    
                    20,170                      1,610                  140,510                   162,290  
1952    
                    30,500                      1,800                  164,620                   196,930  
1953    
                    58,270                      7,200                  198,210                   263,680  
1954    
                    85,380                    14,020                  193,710                   293,110  
1955    
                  106,800                      4,350                  158,860                   270,010  
1956    
                  115,940                      2,400                  137,750                   256,100  
1957    
                  118,820                      1,880                  135,660                   256,360  
1958    
                  119,910                      1,120                  110,120                   231,150  
1959    
                  141,510                      1,100                    95,990                   238,600  
     
             
1960    
                  156,020                      1,650                    99,950                   257,620  
1961    
                  163,350                      1,560                    91,250                   256,160  
1962    
                  159,520                      1,550                  102,490                   263,560  
1963    
                  160,630                      1,930                    94,020                   256,580  
1964    
                  200,670                      2,850                  114,020                   317,540  
1965    
                  196,750                      3,620                  127,290                   327,660  
1966    
                  187,890                      4,100                  138,140                   330,120  
1967    
                  183,720                      4,520                  154,500                   342,740  
1968    
                  203,320                      5,540                  143,680                   352,540  
1969    
                  164,070                      7,100                  135,700                   306,860  
     
              
1970    
                  153,440                      8,180                  130,180                   291,790  
1971    
                  170,820                    10,170                  113,680                   294,680  
1972    
                  173,990                      6,900                    91,630                   272,520  
1973    
                  163,460                      8,340                    77,920                   249,710  
1974    
                  121,490                      9,260                    98,610                   229,360  
1975    
                  131,480                    13,650                  116,330                   261,460  
1976    
                  130,900                    14,440                  118,090                   263,430  
1977    
                  121,570                    24,190                  115,840                   261,600  
1978    
                  127,490                    20,570                    93,300                   241,360  
1979    
                  118,390                    16,280                    74,790                   209,460  
     
              
1980    
                  110,230                    19,300                    74,840                   204,370  
1981    
                    98,900                    16,820                    54,880                   170,600  
1982    
                  108,790                    11,180                    31,660                   151,630  
1983    
                  129,490                    14,340                    29,900                   173,720  
1984    
                  138,970                    13,920                    29,190                   182,080  
1985    
                  135,460                    11,300                    23,280                   170,040  
1986    
                  148,890                    10,620                    19,630                   179,140  
1987    
                  161,740                    10,940                    16,620                   189,300  
1988    
                  176,020                    10,780                    16,130                   202,930  
1989    
                  154,000                    10,650                    14,700                   179,360  
     
             
1990    
                  136,060                    13,820                    14,020                   163,900   
 
 
 
1991    
                  131,170                    15,300                      8,130                   154,600  
1992    
                  119,530                    20,790                      3,510                   143,830  
1993    
                  116,630                    29,780                      1,420                   147,840  
1994    
                  122,700                    30,850                      1,090                   154,640  
1995    
                  125,470                    30,890                         790                   157,140  
1996    
                  121,550                    27,030                         510                   149,090  
1997    
                  128,240                    20,970                         290                   149,490  
1998    
                  122,510                    19,900                         240                   142,650  
1999    
                  123,180                    17,780                          50                   141,010  
     
             
2000    
                  118,330                    16,680                          90                   135,100  
2001    
                  114,850                    14,500                         160                   129,510  
2002    
                  123,320                    13,310                         180                   136,800  
2003    
                  131,060                    12,820                         180                   144,060  
2004    
                  137,330                    16,600                         130                   154,070  
2005    
                  141,740                    17,540                         180                   159,450  
2006                      139,910                    20,660                         280                   160,850  
2007                      152,090                    22,090                         340                   174,530  
Source: DCLG 2008 
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APPENDIX 3 
     Brownfield Development Questionnaire 
 
Sarah Payne (Department of Urban Studies, 
University of Glasgow) is conducting doctoral 
research into the UK private housebuilding 
industry’s response to the 60% brownfield 
development requirement, focusing specifically 
upon the impacts of increased brownfield 
development on the corporate strategies of house 
builders.     
 
This questionnaire survey comprises a number of 
questions that are arranged into four sections.  It 
should take no longer than 15 minutes to 
complete.           
 
All the information that you provide will be treated 
in a strictly confidential manner.  All the 
information received will be aggregated and no 
comments made will be attributed to a particular 
company.      
This research is primarily funded by the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC).  The results 
of this research will be disseminated to key 
players in the house building industry and the 
wider academic research community.   
 
If you would like any further information please 
contact Sarah Payne 
(s.payne.1@research.gla.ac.uk) on 0161 928 
0074 at Department of Urban Studies, University 
of Glasgow, 25-29 Bute Gardens, Glasgow G12 
8RS.   
 
I would be grateful if you would return this 
questionnaire in the pre-paid envelope by 
February 20
th 2006 at the latest.        
 
The term brownfield for the purposes of this research is defined as ‘“formally previously developed land that 
is unused or may be available for development”.  It includes both vacant and derelict land and land currently 
in use with known potential for redevelopment.  It excludes land that was previously developed where the 
remains have blended into the landscape over time’ (ODPM 2005 Sustainable Communities: Homes for All 
HMSO London, pg 77) 
 
SECTION 1: RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
1. In which of the following UK regions does your company operate? (Please tick all that apply) 
              All UK Regions    North West     Northern Ireland   
South East     Wales   
East Midlands     South West        
Eastern                                West Midlands        
London                               Yorkshire and the Humber       
North East    Scotland       
 
2. Please indicate your company’s annual unit completions for 2005 or your latest financial year: 
Private housing units   
   
Social housing units   
   
Total housing units   
 
3. Please indicate the percentage of housing completions by type of site for 2005 or the latest financial year, 
giving your answer to the nearest 5 percent: 
% Greenfield   
% Brownfield   
 
4. Of those plots in your company’s land bank, what percentage is greenfield/brownfield land, giving your 
answers to the nearest 5 percent?    
% Greenfield   
% Brownfield   
 
5. Of those plots in your company’s land bank that are brownfield, what percentage is contaminated land 
requiring remediation, giving your answer to the nearest 5 percent?  
% Brownfield land bank contaminated   
 
SECTION 2: APPROACHES TO BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT 
 
6. Has the number of brownfield units completed by your company changed over the past 5 years?  (Please 
indicate by ticking the appropriate box)  
Increased significantly   
Increased slightly   
Stayed the same   
Decreased slightly   
Decreased significantly   
 
7. For what reasons have brownfield unit completions by your company changed over the past 5 years? 
(Please tick all that apply) 
 Government Planning Policy   
Land Availability   
Company Policy   
Market/Consumer Demand   
Site Specific Risks   
Other (please specify)   
 
 
 
8. Do you think the number of brownfield unit completions by your company will change in the next 5 years?  
(Please indicate by ticking the appropriate box)  
Increase significantly   
Increase slightly   
Stay the same   
Decrease slightly   
Decrease significantly   
 
9. For what reasons will brownfield unit completions by your company change over the next 5 years? (Please 
tick all that apply) 
Government Planning Policy   
Land Availability   
Company Policy   
Market/Consumer Demand   
Site Specific Risks      
Other (please specify)   
 
 
 
10. Has you company been involved in any consortium or partnership developments on brownfield land with 
other house builders or public sector organisations?  (Please indicate by ticking the appropriate box) 
Yes, with other private house builders only   
Yes, with public sector organisations (including RSL’s) only   
Yes, with both public sector organisations and housebuilders   
No   
Other (please explain)   
 
 
 
SECTION 3: SKILLS AND RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
11. Please specify which methods your company has relied upon for acquiring the necessary expertise for 
brownfield development in the past 5 years (Please tick all that apply).   
Recruitment   
Staff Training   
Outsourcing   
Already have all the necessary expertise   
Other (please explain)   
 
 
 
12. Please specify which methods your company intends to rely upon for acquiring the necessary expertise for 
brownfield development in the next 5 years (Please tick all that apply).  
Recruitment   
Staff Training   
Outsourcing   
Already have all the necessary expertise   
Other (please explain)   
 
 
 
13. Which of the following 4 skills for brownfield development does your company currently outsource? (Please 
tick all that apply) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Design/Architectural   
Remediation   
Building/construction   
Planning       
14. Does your company currently have active training policies for brownfield development? (Please indicate by 
ticking the appropriate box) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15. Does your company intend to develop training policies for brownfield development in the next 5 years? 
(Please indicate by ticking the appropriate box) 
Yes   
No   
Other (please explain)   
 
 
 
16. How has brownfield development affected the way that your company uses consultants for design? (Please 
indicate by ticking the appropriate box) 
Significant increase in the use of design consultants   
Moderate increase in the use of design consultants   
Slight increase in the use of design consultants   
No change   
Consultants not used for design   
Other (please state below)   
 
 
 
17.  What  do  you  perceive  to  be  the  most  important  marketable  features  of  a  brownfield/greenfield 
development?    (In  the  boxes  below,  please  rank  the  following  features  in  order  of  importance  using  numbers  1-6,   
1=Most Important    6=Least Important) 
 
Brownfield Development  Greenfield Development 
Product Design and its unique features    Product Design and its unique features   
Location    Location   
Local amenities (inc. schools, shops etc)    Local amenities (inc. schools, shops etc)   
Proximity to work place    Proximity to work place   
Being in an urban environment    Being in an suburban environment   
Transport links    Transport links   
 
 18. In your company, is brownfield development the responsibility of a specialist subsidiary or subsidiaries? 
(Please indicate by ticking the appropriate box) 
Yes (please go to Q 19)   
Yes (please go to Q 16)   
No (please go to Q 15)   
Already have adequately trained staff (please go 
to Q 16) 
 
 Other (please explain)      
No (please go to Q 20)    
Other (please explain)   
 
 
 
19. Please indicate the number of active subsidiaries your company currently has for specifically brownfield 
development? 
Number of brownfield subsidiaries   
 
SECTION 4: COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
20. To what extent has brownfield land development been a source of competitive advantage to your company 
over the past 5 years? (Using the table to the right, please tick the appropriate box)   
1    2    3    4    5   
  
  
 
 
 
21. To what extent will brownfield land development be a source of competitive advantage to your company 
over the next 5 years? (Using the table to the right, please tick the appropriate box)   
1    2    3    4    5   
  
  
 
 
 
SECTION 5: YOUR DETAILS 
 
Please fill in the following details (or attach a business card) 
 
Name:  (For contact purposes only) 
Position:  (For contact purposes only) 
Company:  (For contact purposes only) 
 
 
Thank you for your assistance in this research 
A summary of the research findings will be sent to you on completion of the 
research 
    
1  =  Not a source 
2  =  Minor source 
3  =  Moderate source 
4  =  Significant source 
5  =  Very significant source 
1  =  Not a source 
2  =  Minor source 
3  =  Moderate source 
4  =  Significant source 
5  =  Very significant source Appendix 4 
 
 
 
Interview Topic Guide 
The following information provides you with the general topics/issues that will come up in the 
interviews.  Whilst the exact questions are not given, this topic guide will provide you with the key 
issues  that  this  research  is  investigating.    Also  discussed  are  the  issues  of  confidentiality  and 
anonymity and the use of examples.       
 
1.  LAND  SEARCH  AND  ACQUISITION  INCLUDING  SITE  APPRAISAL  AND 
INVESTIGATIONS  
This interview seeks to uncover the principle methods of land procurement taken by your company 
with regard to residential land development.  It seeks to illuminate the decision-making process in 
land acquisition  and  highlight  any  constraints  or  incentives  in this  process.   The  focus  of  the 
questions will be on: 
•  Main processes in the search for land/land strategy 
•  Land as a form of competitive advantage  
•  The use of options/conditional contracts 
•  Contaminated land 
•  Principle deterrents to land acquisition 
•  Land bank 
 
2.  DEVELOPMENT DESIGN AND PLANNING PERMISSION INCLUDING PLANNING 
GAIN, PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND OTHER NEGOTIATIONS 
This  interview  focuses  on  questions  relating  to  the  design  of  developments,  the  use  of 
subcontracted expertise and the process of acquiring planning permission & negotiating planning 
gain requirements.  The focus of these questions will be on: 
•  Main barriers to gaining planning permission – any examples? 
•  Planning gain on brownfield sites 
•  The  planning  permission  process  and  brownfield  development  (including  public 
consultation) 
•  Design skills, staff training, strategic hiring and subcontracting 
•  Changes to the style and mix of house types – product and process innovations 
 
3.  CONSTRUCTION  AND  OTHER  TECHNICAL  MATTERS  RELATING  TO  THE 
PRODUCT & LAND INCLUDING ABATEMENT AND REMEDIATION MEASURES.    
 
 
The focus of this interview will be not on the detailed technical matters of construction but rather 
on the processes of construction and any constraints related to the product and the land including 
remediation and abatement measures.  Specifically, the interview will focus on: 
•  Managerial approach to construction 
•  Skills for construction – training programmes, outsourcing, strategic hiring 
•  Availability of materials and other constraints 
 
4.  SALES  AND  MARKETING  STRATEGIES  AND  LAND  &  CUSTOMER 
AFTERCARE 
This  interview  seeks  to  discuss  the  approach  to  the  marketing  and  sales  of  brownfield 
developments by your company and also, to the land and customer aftercare of these developments, 
highlighting any constraints, barriers or incentives experienced by your company.  Specifically, the 
interview will focus on: 
•  Sales and marketing strategies of redeveloped sites, including market research 
•  Uniqueness of brownfield marketing strategies 
•  Marketing tools 
•  Issues facing the sale of redeveloped sites 
 
5.  THE  USE  OF  EXAMPLES  OR  REFERENCES  TO  RECENT  RESIDENTIAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
The use of, and reference to, examples of recent developments that your company has currently 
completed or that are currently underway, in any of the interviews is very much welcomed.      
 
6.  ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY   
As a participant in this research, you will have the opportunity to request complete anonymity (i.e. 
the  company’s  name  and  your  title  will  removed  from  the  final  research  output)  or  partial 
anonymity (i.e. only the company’s name will be revealed in the final research output) in this 
research.  This will be agreed between the researcher and yourself before the commencement of the 
research.   
 
With regard to data anonymity, there will be a two-step process.  First, you will be sent a summary 
of the interview transcript prior to the use of any information resulting from that interview, along 
with a confidentially agreement, to confirm your approach to confidentiality.  After this, you will 
be sent a copy of the relevant section of the thesis (likely at this stage to be a 6/7 page case study of 
the company) prior to submission of the thesis for further approval; here you will be given the 
opportunity to respond if the do not want specific information included in the PhD thesis, the 
ESRC archive or the University of Glasgow’s archive.  If you request information to be destroyed,  
 
 
this will be done in a confidential way.  If you request the information to remain confidential, this 
will be done in a safe and secure way.    
 
Sarah Payne 
July 2006  
 